We shall approach the
discussion of modes of intentionality by first concentrating on
the psychic, that is, conative, appetitive or feeling aspect of
consciousness. This is readily recognisable in the gospel. By
conative we mean those forms of consciousness, or modes of
intentionality, which in either case, perceptual or conceptual,
result in 'satisfaction'. The word 'intentionality' here simply
points to 'aboutness', the way in which each state of
consciousness is focused so as to include consideration of, and
interest in certain things, and exclude those of others. We
could use the metaphor of foreground and background, or describe
such intentionality in terms of our interest in certain things
at the expense of others. But the more appropriately
philosophical definition of the same will concern the discussion
of subject and object, one which we shall leave to a later
stage.
'Satisfaction' must suggest the role of desire, as this appears
in each of the four feeding events in the messianic series. That
is part of the meaning of the word here, but this term must also
depict the same process within conceptual consciousness. We need
to attend to the texts to appreciate the real similarity between
the two affective (conative) modes of intentionality. For this
too is the realisation of the meaning behind their formal
correspondence, the fact that the story of creation and the
story of salvation are homologous or isomorphic. The difference
between 'satisfaction' as it applies to the perceptual (the
gospel), and as it applies to the conceptual (Genesis), has to
do with temporal perspectives. One form of satisfaction is
inextricably tied to the vector present-future, the other with
that of present-past. These variant perspectives which
nevertheless are commonly grounded in present immediacy,
recapitulate the categoreal paradigm, transcendence : immanence,
and must be regarded as highly contrastive.
It is easy enough to see the latter. The three feeding miracles
and the Eucharist together, begin the portrait of that aspect of
human consciousness to which the terms appetition-satisfaction
refer in the first instance: desire.
This is nowhere more clearly stated than it is in Luke's account
of the Eucharist:
And when the hour came, he
sat at table, and the apostles with him. And he said to them,
"I have earnestly desired to eat this passover with you before
I suffer; for I tell you I shall not eat it until it is
fulfilled in the kingdom of God." And he took a cup ... (Luke
22.14-16)
The Greek text redoubles the word here translated 'desire': e)piqumi/a? e)pequ/mhsa
('earnestly desired'). So clearly this notion is of consequence
to this evangelist. Moreover, the fact that Luke refers to two
cups, a fact which has occasioned much consternation and
misunderstanding, sits with his emphasis upon the psychology of
desire. We noted that the first of the messianic miracles, The
Transformation Of Water Into Wine, uses imagery of wine
to configure the phenomenon of sexual desire, the milieu of the
incarnation of the word, the medium by which the logos becomes flesh. But
even though this is the only account of that miracle story we
have, John is not alone in his presentation of the psychology of
desire, and it is possible that Luke's apparent doubling of the
'cup' connects with the tradition of that miracle story. The pericope in Luke
immediately prior to his record of the institution of the Lord's
Supper, The Preparation Of The Passover, mentions
'a man carrying a jar of water' (Luke 22.10, c.f. Mark 14.13).
This same metaphor, that of water as logos spermatikos for the masculine as opposed
to wine-'blood' for the feminine, John later redeploys in Jesus
and the Woman At The Well, just as he does in the
narrative of The Passion (John 19.34).
The peculiarly Lukan inflection of this occasion will be
relevant to another fact concerning his gospel: the apparent
absence of a doctrine of atonement. The death of Jesus on
the cross, to which this event, the institution of the supper is
directly linked, is other for Luke than it is for Mark. The
theology of the cross in Luke will have to reckon with a
thoroughgoing tendency which can be understood in relation to
tendencies comparable in the other gospels, including John.
These are what we are in the process of sketching, here, for
now, in only the barest outline. Thus we will contend that the
gospels are uniformly organized as a syntax which, in their
several intentional orientations of both kinds, cognitive and
conative, further Christological doctrine.
There is only one other Eucharistic episode in Luke's gospel, The
Feeding Of The Five Thousand (Luke 9.10b-17):
And all ate and were
satisfied. ( e)xorta/sqhsan
v 17).
Mark (6.42, 8.8) and Matthew (14.20, 15.37) both use the same
expression in each of their accounts of the two miracles of
loaves and fish. The Johannine parallel reads:
And when they had eaten their
fill ... (w(v de\
e)neplh/sqhsan ... John 6.12).
He uses the same verb 'satisfy' in the same form in 6.26, in the
discourse on Jesus The Bread Of Life, immediately
following The Walking On The Water. Luke 15.16 combines
both key verbs 'to desire' and 'to satisfy' ('to be
satisfied') in the parable of The Lost Son:
kai/ e)pequ/mei xortasqh~nai e)k tw~n
kerati/wn w(~n h)~sqion oi(/ xoi~roi, kai ou)deiv e)di/dou au)tw~?:
And he would gladly have fed on (varr. filled his belly
with/satisfied himself with (gemisai thn koilian au)tou)),
the pods that the swine ate; and no one gave him anything.
(Luke 15.16)
Another noteworthy combination of the same words occurs in the
parable of The Rich Man And Lazarus, a name which
signals the possibility of another point of contact with the
gospel of John, and of whom Luke says:
kai\ e)piqumw~n xortasqh~nai a)po\ tw^n
pipto/ntwn a)po\ th~v trape/zhv to plousi/ou -
who desired to be fed with what fell from the rich man's table
... (Luke 16.21)
Yet another verse in Luke calling to mind a Johannine pericope,
that of The Calling Of Nathanael (John 1.45-51), whom we
see John links with the miracle at Cana, the archetypal story of
desire, is the following:
And he said to the disciples,
"The days are coming when you will desire ( e)piqumh/sete) to see (
i)dei~n) one of the
days of the Son of man, and you will not see (w!yesqe) it ... " (Luke
17.22).
We shall return to the themes of vision and desire, in a moment.
The expression rendered 'hungry' - nh/steiv - in the Markan and Matthean
accounts of The Feeding Of The Four Thousand does
not occur in any version of The Feeding Of The Five Thousand,
but it is a common enough term in religious discourse, referring
in the first instance to 'fasting'. It thus has a long and
complex list of associations in all four gospels.
Hunger-appeasement/appetition-satisfaction, this is time and
again the fundamental way in which the gospels describe the
prevalence and function of desire in human consciousness. Much
of this, as in the canonical expression of desire, to wit sexual
desire, should be viewed in association with the second creation
story. The myth of the disobedience of the first human
couple in the garden of Eden is evoked by John in the narrative
of the exchange between Nathanael and Jesus immediately prior to
the first feeding miracle at Cana:
Nathanael said to him, "How
do you know me?" Jesus answered him, "Before Philip called
you, when you were under the fig tree, I saw you." (John 1.48)
(The depiction of a particular disciple linked with a particular
messianic miracle, is not peculiar to John. Matthew similarly
connects Peter with The Walking On The Sea.) What is
remarkable about the Johannine pericope is that like the
prologue, it adopts creation theology, only this time, that of
the second such narrative in Genesis. The commonplace
interpretation of Jesus' cryptic remark envisages Nathanael as
the exemplary pious Israelite. But it is too much at variance
with the context and tenor of the gospel at this point. Notice
for example that it leaves completely out of the picture the
role of vision. Vision is a key element to this story. The verb
'to see' occurs four times, John using both terms we have just
noted above in Luke (17.22). Jesus claims to have seen Nathanael
under the fig tree; he then repeats this claim in response to
the disciple's belief, and adds:
Jesus answered him, "Because
I said to you, I saw (ei)do/n)
you under the fig tree, do you believe? You shall see (w!yh?) greater things
than these." And he said to him, "Truly, truly, I say to you,
you will see (w!yesqe)
heaven opened and the angels of God ascending and descending
upon the Son of man." (1.50-51)
The contrast between seeing and believing here is fully drawn.
However the role of vision in relation to the sexual innocence
or 'guilelessness' (v 47) of a probably young or even adolescent
disciple and in relation to the disciples generally, for in
verse 51 both the pronoun 'you' and the verb are in the plural
form (u(mi~n o!yesqe),
can hardly be missed. In the story of the first human couple the
same function is attributed to vision, its power to compel the
recognition of beauty. That power constitutes the motive for
disobedience of the woman and the man, and the concept of beauty
of course sits perfectly with the role given by the author(s) to
the woman in particular, a fact which seems to have escaped our
notice, probably because we continue to read the narrative with
an emphasis on the expression 'good and evil' at the expense of
the expression 'good to eat'. Add to this the dialogue between
the serpent and the woman which mentions vision also, and a
clearer case for the link between vision, beauty and desire
could hardly be made:
And the serpent said to the
woman: You will certainly not die! God knows well, that as
soon as you eat of it, your eyes will be opened, and you will
be like God, knowing what is good and evil.
Then the woman saw that it
would be good to eat from the tree, that it was pleasant to
look at, and that the tree was desirable so as to become
clever. So she took some of its fruit and ate, and she gave it
to her husband with her, and he ate.
Then the eyes of both of them were opened, and they
realised that they were naked, and they sewed fig-leaves
together and made themselves aprons. (Genesis 3.4-7)
The tree in this narrative of course reminds us, as in the Day 3
rubric, of the person of the Holy Spirit, whom we have
consistently linked with this particular form of sentience -
vision, and whom we will link just as consistently also with
this specific form of value - beauty. Note that here we are
drawing a connection between this identity, the Holy Spirit and
both a particular form of sentience - vision - and the
particular form of value which the same best exemplifies -
beauty. That is to say, we are not in any way attributing the
intentional mode to the same identity. As for the connection
between the intentional mode, here that of desire, and any
identity, we note that all three messianic feeding miracles
formulate this mode of consciousness. That is, the miracle at
Cana which is linked to the Son, The Feeding Of The Five
Thousand, which is linked to Transcendence, and The
Feeding Of The Four Thousand, which is linked to the Holy
Spirit. All three episodes, and their corresponding forms of
sentience, inextricably function in terms of desire. That is to
say, there is not one and only manifestation or expression of
the one intentional mode, here desire. If desire functions as an
intrinsic part of the epistemology/psychology of the feeding
miracles, and by extension to their logical complements, the
three transcendent miracles, equally so, since all denote at the
radical level forms of sentience, modes of sense-percipience,
then all six such sentient modes must act as occasions for the
same mode of intentionality - desire. At a later stage we will
postulate the connection between this and other modes of
intentionality (consciousness), and a specific identity in God.
For John at least, the 'incarnate word' here signifies physical,
that is, sexual, love. How then can we miss this simple fact,
the instinctual force of desire? The exchange between Jesus and
the 'sixth' disciple, stands as a literary foil to the
later exchange between Jesus and Samaritan Woman At
The Well (John 4.1-42), who is notably described as not
being an Israelite. The numerical symbolism alone legitimates
such a relationship: six disciples at the wedding, including
Mary the mother of Jesus; six days leading up to the wedding;
six stone jars at the wedding feast; sixth hour, and a woman who
has had six husbands. The numerical symbolism could scarcely be
more precisely or emphatically articulated.
Our previous survey of the immanent messianic miracles stressed
the concept of determinism, the notion that in each of the three
episodes, and so presumably also in the Eucharist itself, Jesus
is forced to act. This is a major criterion, which like that of
temporal perspectivity, serves to distinguish not only the
immanent miracles from the 'transcendent' miracles. We are
qualifying the latter term 'transcendent' here since they are
all immanent at the broadest or most rudimentary level, that is,
they are finally all subsumed under the banner of immanence when
we look at the broader picture which connects 'beginning' with
'end', Genesis with the gospel. The same criterion adverts us to
the broader and more definite distinction between conceptual
consciousness and perceptual consciousness. The affective mode
we will determine as operative in the former, the conceptual
forms, will not like actual desire, possess this same quality,
compulsion, necessity, obedience to a driving force, an
'instinct'. Even so, we can speak of it in terms of outcomes,
fulfillment, 'satisfaction', achievement and so on.
Another secondary criterion, which holds good for both Genesis
and Gospel, is the differentiation between masculine and
feminine typology. All the nurturing miracles recapitulate the
typological characteristics of the feminine as opposed to the
masculine. In this connection, we can note the reiteration of
the type of the Jesus-Nathanael dialogue in John's later
version of The Feeding Of The Five Thousand,
with the difference that in the latter case John has Jesus
himself quite literally 'test' ('tempt') Philip. This is yet
another remarkable ironic allusion to the second creation story,
whereby John virtually aligns the role of Jesus with that of the
serpent:
Lifting up his eyes, then,
and seeing that a multitude was coming to him, Jesus said to
Philip, "How are we to buy bread, so that these people may
eat?" This he said to test (peira/zwn) him, for he himself knew what he
would do. (John 6.5-6)
A comprehensive listing of those pericopae which combine the
sense of sight and the experience of desire would take us far
afield; the following three examples will suffice:
"You have heard that it was
said, 'You shall not commit adultery.' But I say to you that
every one who looks at a woman lustfully (pro\v to\ e)piqumh~sai)
has already committed adultery with her in his heart ...
(Matthew 5.27-28)
But blessed are your eyes, for they see, and your ears, for
they hear. Truly, I say to you, many prophets and righteous
men longed (e)pequ/mhsan)
to see what you see, and did not see it, and to hear what you
hear, and did not hear it. (Matthew 13.16-17)
Nor are such ideas confined to the gospels:
For all that is in the world,
the lust ( e)pqumi/a)
of the flesh, and the lust ( e)pqumi/a) of the eyes and the pride of
life, is not of the Father but is of the world. And the world
passes away, and the lust (e)pqumi/a)
of it; but he who does the will (qe/lhma) of God abides for ever. (1 John
2.16-17)
The last two passages bring us to that conative mode of
intentionality which is proper to the conceptual polarity - will
- qe/lhma. John
links this with the Father and 'God' - that is, with
Transcendence. Matthew does likewise through his references to
the Decalogue.
If we search for this precise expression in the creation
narratives, we do not find it, although we did find the concept
of desire, the conative form of consciousness proper to
immanence and fully articulated in the messianic series, and we
will also surely meet the (perceptual) cognitive form of
consciousness, already given in the above citation: 'the tree
was desirable so as to become clever', and in the references to
'knowledge of good and evil' of the tree itself. In the second
creation narrative, which akin to the second half of the first
creation story presages the feeding miracles and the Eucharist,
desire played a seminal role in the depiction of specifically
human consciousness. Given the immanentist persuasion of that,
the J creation narrative, clearly visible in the role it
concedes to appetition, which becomes the defining
metaphor for desire, that is no surprise. That narrative linked
the concept of desire not only to the formulation of the
value/disvalue 'good and evil', but also to the formulation of
the value beauty. This axiological and specifically human
consciousness, is part and parcel of our own sense of mortality,
a topic due for further consideration. If then in the last
quote from 1 John we chanced upon that conative mode of
intentionality, will, which is the 'antithesis' of desire, and
which plays a significant role in the Johannine gospel, such a
link again confirms the relation of the two cycles, creation and
salvation. But we must now examine the first creation story for
evidence of the kind of thing we are describing; a state of
consciousness which promotes an outcome or 'satisfaction' so to
speak, and yet which stems not from the perceptual but from the
conceptual polarity of mind, that specific state of
consciousness or mode of intentionality we are referring to as
will.
We need not pursue in any more detail just here, the preciser
features of what we are defining as desire. Our purpose is
initially to sketch in its broadest outlines only, the overall
pattern which arises from the previous determination that the
series of creation events and the series of messianic events
portray the anatomy of mind as constituted by two isomorphic
sets of entities. These twelve various conceptual and
perceptual components, which are interrelated in the closest
possible way, in their turn act as the basis for further
processes both conscious and other than conscious, and of which
we are about to see, four in particular, integrate the four
gospels themselves. These processes we refer to as modes of
intentionality, or forms of intentionality. We shall use common
language expressions for each of them, all of which occur within
the texts. The first of the four we have now briefly argued is
desire. It is presented readily and without any apparent
obfuscation in each of the three Eucharistic miracles, as well
as in the Eucharist itself, subsequently to the second creation
narrative. That story will be examined at a later point, just as
we shall consider in further detail the specific bearing that
each of these four elemental forms of intentionality has on
the particular theological and soteriological perspectives
of each of the four gospels.
We have begun with the most obvious first step, that of the
feeding miracles in the gospels, and with the conative form of
intentionality of the perceptual polarity. There is of course
another side to this. It is the cognitive. That is to say, that
perceptual mind is not merely desiderative. The perceptual
polarity of mind expounded in the messianic series, the
soteriological series, rather than in the creation series, is
responsible also for another intentional mode, which is
recognisable as cognitive, intellective, epistemic. We shall
come to this later. It will be best to continue in the same
vein, and to examine the creation series, that of the conceptual
polarity of mind, for the countervailing conative form of
intentionality. That is, we need now to look to the Days series
for a corresponding conative form of intentionality.
Conative
Intentionality: Genesis 1.1-2.4a
We have urged repeatedly that the primary, denotative subject of
this text is the inception of the spatial manifold. Only this
will account for what are the most conspicuous logical features
of the story: its repeated threefold form; and the most
conspicuous referential features: the expressions denoting space
itself: myima#$,ha
and (ayqirf. The
first term ("heavens") occurs in verses 1, 8, 9, 14, 15,
17, 26, 28 and 30. The second ("firmament" etc.)
occurs in verses 6, 7 (three times), 8, 14, and15. The compound
("firmament of heaven" etc.) occurs in verses 14, 15, 17, and
20. Such a tally constitutes a substantial total. The
significance of the terms rests on the concept of space, the
single entity to which these terms refer. What is the connection
between space, the primary instantiation of 'beginning', and will? To replace the
latter by its common synonym, free
will is to begin to answer that question. Space is the
primary entity which signifies our freedom, because it is the
medium of our ability to move, and the theme of movement
envisages this repeatedly in the second half of the story. For
everything there moves, or appears to move, beginning with the
planets, which are made during Day 4.
And God made the two great
lights: the greater light to rule over the day, and the lesser
light to rule over the night, and the stars too. (Genesis
1.16)
And God said: Let the waters teem with living beings, and
let birds fly above the earth across the vault of the heavens.
(v 20)
And God created the sea monsters and every living being
that moves with which the waters teem, each of its kind, and
every winged bird, each of its kind. And God saw how good it
was. (v 21)
And God made the wild animals, each of its kind, and the
cattle, each of its kind, and all animals that creep on the
ground, each of its kind. And God saw how good it was. (v 25)
And God created humanity according to his image, according
to the image of God he created it, male and female he created
them. (v 27)
And god blessed them (saying): Be fruitful and increase and
fill the earth and make it subject to you! Rule over the fish
in the sea and the birds in the heavens and over every living
being that moves on the earth! (v 28)
The idea of movement, that the created living entities, and the
planets, change their place, their 'space', can never be merely
adventitious to the text, nor according to it, to being itself.
As for the first, movement will become one of the dominant
criteria determining the Levitical codes as they pertain to
food, and food becomes the subject of the next verses in the
story:
And God said: And so I hand
over to you every seed-bearing plant over the whole face of
the earth and every tree, with fruit-bearing seed in its
fruit; they are to serve you for food. (v 29)
While to every animal on earth and every bird in the
heavens and to every animal that creeps on the earth, (to
everything) that has the breath of life in it, (I give) every
sort of grass and plant for food. (v 30)
And God saw everything that he had made, and how good it
was. And it was evening and it was morning a sixth day. (v 31)
Even here, in the first creation narrative with its emphatic
awareness of transcendence, we find a link between seeing and
valuing; that is, we find the motif which will become so
important in the second narrative, and which will be finally and
fully explicated only in the messianic series. For not only does
God create humanity 'according to his image, according to the
image of God', but God sees and evaluates the creation, as was
already the case twice during Day 3 (vv 10, 12). The P story,
Genesis 1.1-2.4a, therefore accepts the implications of
immanence. For the same reason, the role of desire is implicit
in this second half - the "earth" section - of the story. The
injunctions at the close of Day 5 (v 22), and Day 6 (v 28) to
'be fruitful and increase', no less than the theme of eating,
comply with the psychological portrait of desire in the second
creation narrative, both narratives functioning precursively its
final exposition in the stories of the feeding miracles and the
Eucharist.
But the real difference between the theology of transcendence as
this dominates the first half of the creation narrative, and the
theology of immanence such as we have definitively in the
gospels, concerns the real difference between the conceptual and
perceptual - and one of the means by which we discriminate them
must defer to the difference between will and desire
respectively, which are the conscious conative (psychic)
intentional modes bound to them.
Just now we mentioned that the concept of space is foundational
to the holiness code as this concerns the consumption of living
things. (That code of course departs from the presentation of
the idea of eating in the second half of the P narrative, in
narratological time at least, for there, foodstuffs do not
include living things. In the post diluvian world however, they
do.) Day 5 as the rubric of space-time answers to Day 2 in
accordance with the pattern of the relation of the form of unity
to the conceptual form, space-time to space in itself. To the
same end, both the creatures of Day 5 and those of Day 6 are all
depicted in terms of movement. As noted, the sun moon and stars
submit to the same notion - motion. Movement is a recurrent
marker of the second half of the story. Thus the patterns of the
movement of living things become instrumental in determining
whether or not they are permitted as food in the Levitical
purity codes.
But in a still more fundamental sense, space as emblematic of
freedom and of what we may call (free) will, is inseparable from
what is effectively the defining moment for Judaism - Torah. For
this means finally, the observance of 'the Law'. I cannot live
after the decrees of the Torah, I will be unable so to conduct
myself, so to perform the business of living in its entirety,
unless I am free to do thus. That is, I cannot live in
accordance with God's will, unless I am free, just as I am free
to move. Just so, will underpins 'beginning' and is itself a
foundational psychological premise of Judaism in general to a
degree that is as absolute as that of the role of desire in
'end' - that is to say, in salvation.
In the gospels also of course we do meet the ascription to God -
there, particularly to "the Father" (the Transcendent) - of a
force called will. One of the petitions of the prayer taught by
Jesus to his disciples puts it thus:
"Thy kingdom come, thy will
be done, on earth as it is in heaven." - e)lqe/tw h) basilei/a sou
genhqh/tw to\ qe/lhma/ sou - (Matthew 6.10)
In John, there is an extended discourse which uses the term
frequently. This gospel and Matthew's gospel have certain
characteristics in common a propos of the doctrine of mind which
we are expounding here, as we shall see. Even prior to its
concentration in the discourse in John, where it is indissolubly
linked with the identity of "the Father", it appears, within the
context of the story of The Feeding Of The Five Thousand.
The two messianic miracles which centre the chiasmos, the latter
and its complement, The Walking On The Sea, are
specifically proper to this identity, the Transcendent:
Jesus then took the loaves, and when he had
given thanks, he distributed them to those who were seated; so
also the fish, as much as they wanted (h!qelon). (John 6.11)
The discourse which follows, Jesus The Bread Of Life,
is replete of references both implicit and explicit, to will:
Then they said to him, what
must we do, to be doing the works of God?" Jesus answered
them, "This is the work of God, that you believe in him whom
he has sent." (John 6.28, 29)
"For I have come down from heaven, not to do my own will (qe/lhma), but the will
of him (qe/lhma)
who sent me; and this is the will (qe/lhma) of
him who sent me, that I should lose nothing of all that he has
given me, but raise it up at the last day. For this is the
will (qe/lhma)
of my Father, that everyone who sees the Son and believes in
him should have eternal life; and I will raise him up at the
last day." (6.38-40)
There is a profound difference drawn by the evangelist just
here, between the conative mode proper to the feeding miracle,
namely desire, and the kind of psychological (conative) mode
proper to the transcendent episode. We are attributing the polar
antithesis of desire, that is will, to the conceptual forms, in
the first instance, and not of course to the transcendent events
of the messianic miracles. Even so, The Walking On The Sea
which ushers in not only the discourse, but the entire second
half of the gospel of John in which we find the three miracles
of the transcendent kind, reverts to the normative event, the
Day 2 rubric. Ostensibly the miracle narrative borrows the
iconography of the separation of 'waters above' from 'waters
below', just as Jesus himself is envisioned in the miracle,
between the sea and "the heavens".
Mark uses the expression we have noted, in his own account of
The Walking On The Sea:
And about the fourth watch of
the night, he came to them, walking on the sea. He meant (h!qelen) to pass by
them. (Mark 6.48b)
This term is missing from the Matthean account, and of course
Luke omits the miracle narrative altogether. John includes the
expression, and it resonates somewhat differently as is given by
the translation here:
Then they were glad (h!qelon) to take him in
the boat. (John 6.21)
This juncture in the gospel of John is recapitulated in the
synoptic gospels, for they too take into account the full
significance of the crossing 'to the other side'. But the
synoptics have several such crossings. In Mark they
systematically determine for us the subdivided species of
messianic miracles, 'transcendent' or immanent, and the pattern
is one of consistent oscillation. In John however, there is only
one such crossing. Clearly his tradition up to the final chapter
does not know of a second miracle at sea, nor of The
Transfiguration Of Jesus. The distinction is therefore all
the more salient, and clearly put as such by the evangelist.
Thus, at the close of chapter 6, and following the dispute among
the Jews over Jesus' claims of his relationship to "the Father",
we find:
Many of his disciples, when
they heard it, said, "This is a hard saying; who can listen to
it?" But Jesus, knowing in himself that his disciples murmured
at it, said to them, "Do not take offense at this. Then what
if you were to see the Son of man ascending to where he was
before? It is the spirit that gives life, the flesh is of no
avail; the words that I have spoken to you are spirit and
life. But there are some of you that do not believe."
(6.60-64a)
After this, many of his
disciples drew back and no longer went about with him. Jesus
said to the twelve, "Do you also wish (qe/lete) to go away?"
(6.66-67)
There is a certain connection here between will and belief, and
this latter is one very notable mode of intentionality which
must concern us, and one which is of particular concern to John.
We shall come to that in a moment.
What should be said of Matthew's version however, regards the
portrait we have of a particular disciple, Simon Peter, who more
than any other figure is the manifest expression of this very
psychological reality. Where John in his introduction to the
first messianic miracle linked Nathanael to the reality of
(physical) desire, Matthew appears to forge a similar tie
between Peter and the driving energy of will. These are then not
abstract metaphysical principles, but actual entities which
profoundly shape human existence. We can even see in the power
of the storm the extrapolation of the same: 'The sea rose ... '
(John 6.18); par.: 'And he saw that they were making headway
painfully, for the wind was against them. ' (Mark 6.48a); par.:
'... but the boat by this time was many furlongs distant from
the land, beaten by the waves; for the wind was against them.'
(Matthew 14.24)
We know very little concerning Nathanael, his name does not
appear in the synoptic disciple lists, and apart from the
calling narrative, there is only one other reference in the
gospel of John itself, that in the last resurrection appearance
story, where he is listed with six other figures, of whom four,
namely Simon Peter, Thomas, and James and John the sons of
Zebedee, are known to the synoptists (John 21.2), the other two
disciples being unnamed. With Peter however, the situation is
reversed. He dominates the synoptic portraits of the followers
of Jesus, and is a similarly prominent figure in the gospel of
John. There of course, he is set as in the epilogue (chapter 21)
against 'the disciple whom Jesus loved'. We will consider in a
moment the image John presents there of Peter.
Matthew's recension of The Walking On The Sea shows
Peter in a characteristic light - one which reveals him linked
to the very psychological mode we are describing, that is will:
And Peter answered him,
"Lord, if it is you, bid me come to you on the water." He
said, "Come." So Peter got out of the boat and walked on the
water and came to Jesus; but when he saw the wind, he was
afraid, and beginning to sink he cried out, "Lord, save me."
Jesus immediately reached out his hand and caught him, saying
to him, "O man of little faith (o)ligo/piste), why did you doubt?" (Matthew
14.28-31)
Here again, it is not merely a question of will, but of another
state of consciousness, or mode of intentionality - faith.
Matthew's image of Peter in this the second miracle at sea,
squares perfectly with the image of Peter in the Johannine
epilogue. The setting in both is the same, the Sea of Tiberias.
After the three injunctions to feed his sheep, Jesus says to
Peter:
"... Truly, truly, I say to
you, when you were young, you girded yourself and walked where
you would ( h@qelev);
but when you are old, you will stretch out your hands, and
another will gird you and carry you where you do not wish (qe/leiv) to go." (This
he said to show by what death he was to glorify God.) And
after this he said to him, "Follow me." (John 21.18-19)
In the very same pericope, this time in connection with the
disciple whom Jesus loved, we find:
Peter turned and saw
following them, the disciple whom Jesus loved, who had lain
close to his breast at the supper and had said, "Lord, who is
it that is going to betray you?" When Peter saw him, he said
to Jesus, "Lord, what about this man?" Jesus said to him, "If
it is my will that he remain (qe/lw me/nein) until I come, what is that
to you? Follow me!" (John 21.20-22)
We could multiply occasions during which Peter is closely linked
to that particular form of intentionality which we are
depicting, for the lasting impression we gain of him from all
four gospels, is of a man dominated by his own impulsiveness,
his own willfulness. We shall refine the association of the will
to the transcendent miracles directly, such as Matthew has
inferred, for these defer to the normative conceptual forms
first outlined in the Genesis story, and the centre of
consciousness accounted for in this particular miracle story -
acoustic imagination - and certainly all three forms of
imagination, are somewhat equivocal in their nature as
transcendent. They are the three conceptual forms which are
unambiguously transcendent - mind, space and the symbolic
masculine, as disclosed in the story of the first three Days of
creation. Of these, it is the second, space, which is owing to
the Transcendent ("the Father") specifically. Just so, in
Peter's declaration about Jesus (Matthew 16.13-20, par. Mark
8.27-30, par. Luke 9.18-21), correlations between Peter and "the
Father" and "heaven" are noticeable:
And Jesus answered him,
"Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jona! For flesh and blood has not
revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven. And I
tell you, you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my
church, and the powers of death shall not prevail against it.
I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and
whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and
whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven."
(Matthew 16.17-19)
There is here no mention of 'faith' as such. Moreover, no sooner
has the avowal been made, than the characteristic willfulness of
Peter returns. For Jesus next foretells his death and
resurrection:
And Peter took him, and began
to rebuke him saying, "God forbid, Lord! This shall never
happen to you." But he turned and said to Peter, "Get behind
me, Satan! You are a hindrance to me; for you are not on the
side of God, but of men." (Matthew 16.22-23)
In the following passage concerning the cost of discipleship,
the theme of will is explicitly articulated:
Then Jesus told his
disciples, "If any man would come (qe/lei o)pi/sw) after me, let him deny
himself and take up his cross and follow me. For whoever would
save (qe/lh? ... sw~sai)
his life will lose it, and whoever loses his life for my sake
will find it." (Matthew 16.24-25)
These episodes, The Walking On The Sea, Peter's
Declaration About Jesus, and Jesus' Rebuke Of Peter
are central to Matthew's portrait of the disciple, and assist us
in reckoning the particularity of the evangelist's viewpoint.
The second episode follows fairly directly his recension of The
Walking On The Sea, and is something of an apologia for
the disciple, in the same way that John envisions Peter's
rehabilitation in the last chapter of his gospel. But both
pericopae in Matthew, The Walking On The Sea, and Peter's
Declaration About Jesus, expand the role of Peter in a
manner peculiar to Matthew. They are representative of the
distinctiveness of this gospel. Thus in the latter we find the
following pattern restated: Transcendence ("the Father")-space
('heaven'-will-Peter.
We have not strayed from our task, whose conclusion will
comprise understanding the distinctiveness of each gospel from a
psychological standpoint. If there is a strong connection
between Luke and the psychology of desire, one which cuts to the
core of his soteriology, then this is not an isolated case.
Taking the messianic series at face value, and as the complement
of the creation series, it must be seen that the significance it
attributes to appetition-satisfaction acts as a sort of equal
and opposite reaction to the psychological reality behind the
'beginning'. This of course is only half the picture; will as
native to the conceptual polarity of consciousness and
adumbrated in the Genesis narrative, and desire as given in the
gospels, the property of perceptual mind, taken together account
for only the conative, and only the conscious conative at that.
Mind is not mere feeling, mere conation, the
satisfaction/achievement of desire/will alone. That is to say,
in both cases, conceptual and perceptual, an epistemological
(thinking) mode is operative in tandem with the psychological
(feeling). Resuming the light metaphor so basic to Christology,
Christian epistemology-psychology, we can say that heat which
generally accompanies light rather than light, itself
metaphorically connotes the conative forms of intentionality.
This is as good a metaphor for the affective nature of
consciousness as any.
The gospel in its fourfold entirety will submit to this
differentiation of these various modes. Moreover, this is the
only way in which we can reasonably account for its variety, its
plurality. So then, the picture which is emerging of Matthew, is
that in adopting as a recurrent if not the prevailing leitmotif
the concept of Torah, it allies itself with a transcendental
perspective. Its presentation of Peter, the apostle to the
Hebrews par excellence, which we have in part examined,
certainly follows suit. For there also, we discover that Matthew
accords with the conative mode of the 'beginning'. That is, his
gospel appears to be typologically grounded in the intentional
mode will. It establishes what is peculiar to his
soteriology. This same Christological and psychological mode,
the will, formed the backdrop of the creation. Will as the
conceptual polarity of consciousness in its conative or
affective constitution is thus emerging as a dominant factor in
the specificity of the gospel of Matthew, just as its
antithetical intentional mode, desire, appears to be
establishing the psychological underpinning of the gospel of
Luke, and so too his specifically soteriological perspective.
But these matters must be discussed in much greater detail,
since we have for now the much wider task of discerning the full
gamut of the doctrine of intentionality.
THE CONATIVE - NORMATIVE WILL AND
NORMATIVE DESIRE
Both will and desire are given to fulfillment. As divergent
as they are on account of the disparity between the conceptual
and the perceptual, they are both conative. Both are affective
or emotive as motivating forces in human consciousness. Both
seek outcomes; both require that we discharge certain duties
and/or inclinations, obligations, functions, both engage us in
the quest or striving for particular ends. On this count then,
they are what we have called conative. In the same regard will
and desire can be categorised together and distinguished from
the cognitive or epistemic modes. On at least two occasions, we
can see the same term used for both:
And a leper came to him
beseeching him, and kneeling said to him, "If you will (qe/lh?v), you can make
me clean." Moved with pity, he stretched out his hand and
touched him, and said to him, "I will (qe/lw); be clean."
(Mark 40-41)
The twelve or so healing miracle stories in Mark replicate the
entire corpus of radicals of consciousness depicted in Genesis
and the gospels. There are six events of the conceptual type,
and six of the perceptual type. The story of The Leper
belongs to the latter group. But even though it is classifiable
as a miracle of the transcendent subspecies within the immanent
(perceptual) group, its subject is perceptual imagination, in
this case haptic imagination. Like the messianic miracle focused
on the same, The Transfiguration, haptic imagination is
radically other than haptic memory. Their alterity is usually
configured as the difference between erotic desire and the
desire to be clean. Both miracle stories which address haptic
imagination, that of The Leper, and the story of The
Transfiguration, refer to Moses. Both focus on purity,
ritual purity, of a kind which Mark sets beside the story of The
Woman With The Haemorrhage. Thus The Leper
represents one of the six events which expound perceptual
consciousness, and not conceptual consciousness. As such, the
conative mode proper to it is desire, not will in sensu strictu. But we
cannot lose sight of the fact that The Transfiguration
and The Leper are theologically of a piece They denote
transcendence within the first order taxonomy of the immanent.
We can therefore say of them that they are 'transcendent' or
virtually transcendent. This is transcendence of the second
order. It therefore remains a non-normative radical of mind.
Haptic imagination as presented in both miracle stories is
relative to the normative conceptual form mind, its taxonomic
equivalent or analogue in the conceptual realm. Thus mind is
normative for consciousness, especially in respect of the value
it imparts to the same. But haptic imagination is something of a
copy of the same entity, even though it is at heart, that is to
say, classifiably or taxonomically, perceptual and not
conceptual.
The purpose behind the use of the first order distinction which
speaks of normativity and non-normativity is the business of the
doctrine of the conscious and aconscious respectively
Hence it belongs to the aconscious. The ambivalent taxonomic
status of this particular healing event therefore sits perfectly
with its conation depicted as will. In coming later to the
exposition of the intentional modes proper to the aconscious we
shall explain this in more detail. But we may say here that what
is at stake is temporal perspectivity which acts as the
differential between conscious (normative) will and conscious
(normative) desire. For the will is aligned with the future, and
desire with the past, as is of course delivered in the doctrine
of perceptual memory. But the aconscious, redolent as it must be
of paradox, ambivalence, ambiguity and the rest, subverts these
logical distinctions. The conative intentional mode proper to
haptic imagination functions in tandem not with the past, but
rather with the future. In this very respect it is similar to
will, for it is essentially 'imaginal'. In this respect it
appropriates what is normatively the property of will, it
functions in a virtually transcendent manner.
The use in this Markan narrative of the term 'will' to cover a
process which is, properly speaking, about desire, for it is
about sense-percipience rather than ideation, is understandable
given the proximity of the two modes. It is their common
capacity to coerce human behaviour towards some sort of effect
or conclusion which allows for such latitude in the use of the
term 'will'. An example which follows suit, and similarly blurs
the distinction between perceptual and conceptual polarities of
mind, again in the interests of making clear the conative
capacity of both, and the presence of the aconscious, occurs
early in the prologue of John, where it adds to the impetus
towards the first miracle story:
But to all who received him,
who believed in his name, he gave power to become children of
God; who were born, not of blood nor of the will (qelh/matov) of the
flesh, nor of the will (qelh/matov)
of man, but of God. (John 1.12-13)
In the first instance - 'will of the flesh' - it is
abundantly clear that what is involved is desire; in the second,
the same conative entity is referred to, this time as the
conceptual form. In other words, what John alludes to here are
the two radicals of consciousness haptic memory (erotic desire)
and that specific form of will based not on sense percipience,
but on the conceptual form, the body, to which we have not yet
given a name. Both radicals of consciousness, haptic memory and
the conceptual form of unity, the body, are in the last analysis
proper to the identity of the immanent Son: both are
Christological (psychological) entities. The difference is that
of the conscious perceptual form from the aconscious conceptual
form: that of the haptic memory from the body qua idea;
or as we may say, actual immanence from virtual immanence. Both
are pertinent here as concerning the Johannine doctrine of the
logos become flesh. But once again, there is a substantive
difference between conscious haptic memory - the 'will' of the
flesh - and the aconscious radical, soma, (mind : body) -
the 'will' of man. These nuanced tenets of the metapsychology
underpinning the narratives and finally the orientations of the
gospels themselves, will occupy us later. But even though we
must not suppose there is a lasting and insuperable difference
between the two basic conscious conative forces, will and
desire, the primordial fact of their spatiotemporal
vectors serves logically to specify their real and final
variation from one another.
So we can clearly discern a fundamental difference between will
and desire, and we can do so without entering the time-worn
discussion about free-will versus determinism. It is the latter
of course which qualifies what we mean by desire, and this
feature is clearly announced in each of the feeding miracle
stories just as it is in the accounts of the Eucharist. In
effect, we have already achieved the logical distinction between
both modes, for one is derived from conceptual consciousness
whereas the other stems from the perceptual polarity of the
same. But that facet to this very bipolarity itself which
formally guarantees the distinction the two modes, will and
desire, is the first order difference of the relation of their
radically disposed vectors present-to-future and
present-to-past.
That difference is encapsulated so nicely for us by the optic
semeia. The optic semeia are not mere cosmetic adjuncts to
theology. If we accept what is perhaps more generally
acknowledged in Eastern religious traditions which utilise yantra
and mandala, namely that it is possible to some extent,
to see reality, to envisage it, and finally even to represent it
visibly, then the use of these semeia for such purposes, viz.
metaphysical propositions, will occasion no consternation. Even
barring recourse to those traditions, or circumscribing them, we
can recur to scientific disciplines such as astrophysics. These
teach us that the light which reaches our eyes from distant
sources may be of two basic kinds. It may come from either end
of the spectrum, the red or the blue. The light in the first
case, is said to be moving away from us, and in the second case,
to be coming towards us. There is a fundamental difference here
of the kind that conforms to the very polarisation of the semeia
in their business of representing the two conscious conative
modes.
For the radical and real differentiation of these two modes, in
addition to that of polarisation of consciousness into its
division conceptual : perceptual, corroborates the binary
temporal perspectives we notice in the narratives. The Lukan
(22.14-23) and Pauline (1Corinthians 11.23-25) versions of the
institution of The Eucharist, both use the word
'remembrance'/'memory': a0na/mnhsin
(Luke 22.19, 1 Corinthians 11.24, 25). In the recensions of Mark
(14.22-25) and Matthew (26.26-29), this word does not occur.
Even so, if we accept as a cultic precedent to whatever degree,
the Passover, it is implied. If we take rather the view adopted
here, which is theological rather than performative, and agree
to see the precedent in the creation narratives, the result is
the same. For there, in the case of the P narrative, we are
confronted with the plethora of living beings and the planets,
the subjects of the second half of the story, the four Days
which answer to the four Eucharistic events. These things are
our past, and humanity is the last of them which is made. That
the P narrative not only tacitly supports an evolutionary
theoretic understanding of our own connectedness, continuity,
unity, with sub-human life-forms, but is the best of any
testimony for an evolutionary perspective that we come across in
the first part of the canon, I have argued elsewhere as tacit,
and a fait accompli. That what follows from this is an
evolutionary psychology is equally well assured.
The second section of the P narrative diverges from the three
Days which together comprise the theology of transcendence
unequivocally: Days 1, 2, and 3, which formulate the basis
for the second creation narrative. This means that the usual
point of view adopted when reading the creation stories, namely
that these events have already taken place, is legitimate for
the second half of the P narrative. But this is not so for the
theology of transcendence proper, Days 1, 2, and 3, and these
formulate the centre of P's concerns. The second creation story,
like the second half of the P story, adopts this very
perspective: the events it recounts are considered as having
transpired. Its aetiological cast, its purpose to comprehend the
intrusion into the created order of suffering, toil and death,
renders any alternative perspective impossible. After the stance
of immanence, and proper to it, the notion of causality is
tantamount to the notion of that which is past, or before
another thing in time. In its simplest manifestation, this is
what a cause means; some prior event or events. For the same
reason, the second creation narrative is also a second order
creation story; as is the second half of the P narrative. But of
the first half, in which we find the pure transcendent forms,
the opposite is true. Hence will is logically and
criteriologically postulated there as consisting essentially in
league with the advent of a future. For creation proper remains
the business of the future, in other words, the business of
will, as opposed to desire. We should not forget this when
coming to those astounding first verses of the P narrative. They
do not take us back; they draw us forward to a future as yet
unknown. Here they mark the foundation of the transcendent
messianic events, events which propose imagination, which also
is nothing if not grafted to the 'not yet'. Thus the three
transcendent messianic miracles at once echo both the
resurrection, and the creation. Creation or true beginning
purports final or teleological causality. Creation or
'beginning' in this its primary sense therefore, can never be
past: it belongs to the future in all its manifestations -
promise, hope, and also dread and fear.
It should be clear now, that a Christian epistemology-psychology
of the radical difference between will and desire reverts to the
bipolarity of time. In the first place will and desire are
logically distinguishable as concerning precisely the two
temporal perspectives which recapitulate the categoreal
paradigm; those of the present-future and the present-past,
transcendence and immanence, will and desire, respectively. At
least this is so for the conscious mind, wherein these processes
are normative. There is an aconscious form of will, and an
aconscious form of desire. These controvert the normative and
standard order. They reconfigure what we understand as the fixed
and accepted natures of these same intentional modes. This too
might be expected due to the presentation of the categories
responsible for them. These are the aconscious categories,
depicted in the texts in terms of ambivalence, and again in the
temporal cycle by the two quarters of the year which contain
both the autumn equinox and winter solstice. Thus that half of
the annual cycle in which the diurnal duration, (day)light is
always diminishing, represents these as well as the remaining
two aconscious modes of intentionality. Just one way in which
the conscious as norm is reconfigured in the aconscious concerns
the rudimentary logical rationale for the difference between
will and desire; the difference between future and past
respectively. We shall find in the case of the aconscious, that
desire and not will is aligned with the vector present
-to-future, just as we shall see that the normative association
occurring between the past-to-present and desire is completely
modified, so that will now becomes aligned with the immanent
vector, past-to-present. Here however, we need first to observe
the conscious and normative expressions of these two fundamental
conative modes of intentionality.
Consequently an irrefragable break between will and
desire obtains: for the first is free, possible, non-actualised,
self-determining and 'ideal' or conceptual, whereas the latter
is actualised, determined and perceptual in nature. This
fundamental rupture between will and desire, one which recurs to
the primordial category space : time, for it devolves upon the
differentiation of the two temporal perspectives, helps
explicate the normativity of the forms outlined above. It can be
further expounded according to the contents of the theology of
immanence, in which persons play such an important part. Here
there are varying portraits of being as autonomous, social,
dyadically corporate as in the case of desire, and so on. These
will also elaborate the discussion of the modes of
intentionality. But their fuller exposition can wait.
Extrapolating reciprocally between the creation series and the
messianic series together as their isomorphism requires, at
first glance it appears we have two subsets of things which are
superfluous to need. For on the one hand, the transcendent
messianic miracles look like mere pale imitations of the first
three Days, and on the other, the last four Days seem, in the
light of the four Eucharistic events, equally redundant. These
two sets of entities, the forms of imagination and the forms of
unity, moreover confront us with their ambivalence where the
categoreal paradigm is concerned, because the forms of
imagination as perceptual in kind, yet manifest some of the
characteristics of immanence; while the forms of unity look all
too similar to the forms of memory, in spite of their taxonomic
denomination as transcendent.
This same ambivalence vis-à-vis the paradigm transcendence :
immanence, will be of enormous avail, and these six entities are
by no means otiose. They are vital to a comprehensive doctrine
of mind. But the fact that the purely transcendent entities -
mind, space and the symbolic masculine - are normative for
transcendence, and that correspondingly, the forms of memory -
haptic, acoustic and optic - likewise function in the realm of
immanence, can now be further understood. For what we mean in
the first instance by the word 'desire', will always possess the
temporal orientation of which both sets of texts speak; our own
animal past, and the 'Eucharistic' events. That is, the
perceptual mind as this is allied with the vector present-past.
Imagination must take its cue from memory, and here the doctrine
of immanence which posits that there is no memory in itself,
that is, no memory without imagination, is self explicative.
That there is an imagination without memory must follow from the
doctrine of transcendence; imagination has this paradoxical
quality of being at once conjunct with memory in so far as
memory itself is concerned, but existing in itself and for
itself, that is, disjunctively of the very same, memory. In
other words, memory is internally related to imagination,
whereas imagination itself is externally related to memory. For
this reason, perceptual imagination is firstly immanent in its
kind - sense-percipient - even so, it demonstrates the
characteristics of transcendence. Likewise, those centres of
consciousness to which the forms of unity give rise must be
categoreally explained in terms of transcendence, in spite of
which, their full definition will entail the theology of
immanence.
Hence desire is necessarily grafted to past occasions; it is
inseparable from anamnesis, or memory. It is always the recovery
of something already experienced, albeit in a form which is not
perfectly or not immediately recognisable. Here then, it is the
pattern of salvation, of redemption. It is the fact of regaining
what was lost; recovering, retrieving, reliving. That is because
desire as unequivocal desire, what we mean by the word in its
normal every day sense, is always beholden to memory, rather
than to imagination. There are forms of desire whose
spatiotemporal orientation is that of present-future. These are
those sorts of desire which are predicated of the modes of
perceptual imagination.
Although imagination is like memory in so far as it is part of
the sentient or sense-percipient heart of mind, it presents us
with certain features of transcendence. In other words, it is
similar to the conceptual polarity of mind, similar but
certainly not the same.
We have stressed at every opportunity that the forms of
imagination are ambiguous, equivocal, and paradoxical. This
means that they cannot, as the forms of memory can, be
considered as representative of 'desire'. The exemplary forms of
desire, are those which are formulated after the essentially
sense-percipient modes of memory; the haptc, the optic and the
acoustic.
So too with the forms of unity. For these must be categorised
under the rubric 'conceptual' in first order terms. That is,
they are of a piece with the conceptual forms proper - mind,
space and the symbolic masculine. Yet they manifest certain
characteristics proper to immanence, and function similarly to
the functioning of memory. They can act as the premise for
particular species of will. Thus mind : body, space : time and
male : female give rise to voluntaristic mental processes which
are of a kind with those processes logically classifiable as
will. Nevertheless, these same forms of unity are not as the
pure conceptual forms are, constituted according to the vector
present-future. This creates the fundamental or exemplary
disposition of what we call will. It is criteriologically
oriented towards the satisfaction of a future goal. It always
entails novelty, 'beginning' or creation. Whatever else is true
of the forms of unity as they establish certain species of will,
they do not accord completely with this pattern. Their
particular spatiotemporal bias is that of present-past, and in
this they seemingly function as does memory. These types of will
then, subversive of true will, are neither normative nor
exemplary, nor representative of what we mean by the term 'will'
in its primary sense. The forms of unity are equivocal,
ambiguous, and paradoxical, as are the forms of imagination.
Thus the varieties of will to which they give rise, cannot be
deemed fully typical of this mode of intentionality.
The normative occasions of desire are those three centers of
consciousness which arise from sense-percipient memory - haptic
memory, acoustic memory, and optic memory. These are the
definitive forms of perceptual consciousness. The normative
occasions of will are those three centres of consciousness
determined by (pure) conceptual forms - mind, space, and the
symbolic masculine. These are the definitive forms of conceptual
consciousness. In the same way the exemplary and normative
varieties of desire, are those which are the products of the
former; and the exemplary and normative varieties of will are
the products of the latter. In each of these two classes, that
of the perceptual memory, and that of the pure conceptual forms,
one of the three occasions or roots for the expression of desire
and will, is normative to a maximum degree, or as we shall say
canonical, and sovereign. More shall be said on this topic, and
we shall in due course, also say more concerning the equivocal
status of the forms of imagination and forms of unity, in
the discussion of the aconscious.
THE PERCEPTUAL COGNITIVE
We have introduced the concept of intentionality as this
concerns appetition-satisfaction or fulfillment, which is so
clearly a fundamental part of the meaning of the Eucharistic
('feeding') miracles and the Eucharist itself. This is
intentionality of the psychic, feeling, or conative kind.
According to the metaphor of heat-light, it answers to the
former. It is a truism that it is much easier for
feeling to influence thinking, than for thinking to influence
feeling. Thus feeling, which in Christian
philosophical psychology means firstly will and desire, thought
of as the aspect 'heat' in this metaphor, enjoys a kind of
status which is denied to thinking, since it is in the
understanding of very many philosophers, the basis of
experience: Hume, Spinoza, Whitehead, and Sartre are among such.
This may or not be consonant with biblical metaphysics, the
question remains open for now. Indeed the epistemic processes,
which we may envision in terms of the metaphor light, these do
indeed have their day. In now turning to the cognitive modes of
intentionality we shall call upon experience itself. For already
we see in the terms we have just employed - 'desire' and 'will'
- how absolutely familiar are the things we are describing. We
are not then searching for anything which we do not already
understand as essential to our lived experience. The existential
reality of each of the four elemental modes of intentionality is
total. They are the common coin of our own epistemic and psychic
lives, and so we must use common language as well as common
sense, to describe them.
Here, the order of dealing with the two modes may seem odd in
view of the fact that we shall find Genesis a better source for
the cognitive mode proper to the gospel (immanence), and the
gospel also a better source for the cognitive mode native to
Genesis (transcendence). The J story of creation focuses on
desire and knowing both, and even the P story implicitly refers
to the former of these in its second half. We find repeatedly in
the gospel of John, references to will. The sources, that is the
texts, are so systematically related that this is no real
wonder. Again and again we shall observe just how closely
related they both are; as if we could not intelligibly read one
without the other. In any case, we have already practised this
method; for we have already observed the prominence of the theme
of desire clearly announced in the second creation story, and
the description of will clearly presented in both gospels,
Matthew and John. The discussion of the cognitive form of
intentionality proper to the conceptual polarity of mind will in
fact have to take into consideration The Letter To The Hebrews,
in which we find it very clearly depicted and with particular
emphasis on the creation.
Genesis 2.4b-34
If we can use the creation narratives as a source for what is
the finally and definitively presented by the gospel, namely a
form of intentionality grafted to perceptual consciousness, then
it is more than likely that it will come from those sections of
the text which correlated most closely with the latter. These
are of course the second half of the P narrative, and the second
creation narrative. It is the latter which best serves us. Since
there is a wealth of information for us to consider, we shall
deal with it according to the order of its appearance.
And Yahweh God planted a
garden in Eden, and put the man that he had formed in it.
(Genesis 3.8)
And Yahweh God made all kinds of trees grow out of the
ground, pleasant to look at, and good to eat, and the tree of
life in the middle of the garden, and the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil. (v 9)
The J (for Yahweh) narrative, adopts the close association
between the rubrics of Day 3 and Day 6. We reasoned in the first
essay of The Markan Mandala
that the first of these signifies the masculine in its
transcendent status, as paradoxical as this is. It is
paradoxical because the form of unity male : female is weighted
in virtue of immanence. Thus it is set at odds from the entity
space, the thing which most unequivocally instantiates
transcendence. This means that space is by nature disjunct with
what is otherwise its compound form, space : time. Space exists
in the first place, in itself and for itself. This transcendent
space is equivalent to the expression 'heaven' or 'heavens', the
latter being emphatic of the tri-dimensional manifold nature
of transcendent space, which, being the space of the
future, is void of passage, and is portrayed in terms of the
seal of its provenance in a transcendent God who is also
threefold.
Mind too can and does exist in itself and for itself, without
its complement, soma
or body, where body is always the form of unity mind : body,
just as time, is always the form of unity space : time. Such
mind is what the fourth gospel understand as the logos. The latter, time and
body always comprise the transcendent, the other, in their
composition, and to a certain extent, they compromise it. But
they do not and cannot obtain in themselves and for themselves.
Body however, is not weighted either according to transcendence,
as is space, or to immanence, as is male : female. Or if it is
so accentuated, it is accentuated equally, now according to
transcendence ('heavens') and now according to immanence
('earth'). Thus it stands literally in the middle between the
two terminal categories, space and male : female as exemplifying
both polarities.
Now the meaning of the accentuation of the male : female
category according to the principle of immanence is clearly
envisaged in the J narrative. This narrative selects this the
least developed of the categories in P for the reason of its
complexity. Thus P first presents the symbolic masculine under
the guise of two sets of terms, those of Day 3. Firstly there
are the earth and sea, then there are the two types of plants.
These of course are the products of the earth, clearly the
typological equivalent of the feminine. (We can extrapolate from
this relation to that of the 'earth-animals' and humans of Day
6; so that the Day 3 pattern of this relation, suggests the
latter are the product of the former.) In other words, P like J
appears to be saying that there can hardly be a male without a
female; yet there must be according to his logic, for all the
things subsumed in this narrative conform to the categoreal
paradigm - transcendence : immanence - and this will necessarily
attribute some sort of transcendent status to the masculine. We
have referred therefore to this, as 'symbolic masculine'. Thus
we saw that the two types of plants appear as some sort of
reference, however veiled, to the distinctive patterns of the
organs of generation in both animals and humans: external in the
case of the male, internal in the case of the female, just as
the same are to be linked with not only the continuity of life
itself, but with the supply of foodstuffs, a recurrent theme of
the second section of the story. Thus too this part of the
triad, Day3-Day 6 theologically identifies the life-giving
Spirit, the Holy Spirit.
All of the above complexities, the P text must deal with in
fairly summary fashion if the clear propositional outlines of
the story are to maintain their meanings. And they do. The J
text does not start anew, but ramifies what is already implicit
in the first narrative; in doing so, it elaborates in particular
the close metaphorical association between plants as some sort
of prototypical pattern for animals and humans both, and
furthermore the nexus between the propagation of species and
food and death. For fruit-bearing trees, humans and animals are
locked together, and interrelated in the unfolding drama.
And Yahweh God commanded the
man: Of all the trees of the garden you may eat; (2.16)
but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you may
not eat; because on the day that you eat of it you must die.
(v 17)
Here again we notice the epistemic, the cognitive, that is a
consciousness as manifest in a form of thinking about something,
and the same consciousness which is peculiarly sentient;
consciousness which derives not from the conceptual, but from
the perceptual. Thus the trees are not only 'pleasant to look
at' but also 'good to eat'. This consciousness is of the
thinking type, not the feeling type. We have considered the
affective mode of sentient consciousness, it too is clearly
articulated in the story: desire. This feeling type of
consciousness is somehow related to its thinking mode; there is
no mere feeling by itself, but feeling and thinking. The J
narrative therefore connects the conative and cognitive forms of
intentionality, but not without clearly articulating the latter:
'knowing'.
And Yahweh God reflected: It
is not good that the man be alone; I will make a helper for
him that is fit for him. (v 18)
And Yahweh God formed out of
earth every kind of animal of the field and every kind of bird
of the heavens, and he brought them to the man, to see how he
would name them; and just as the man would name the living
beings so was that to be their name. (v 19)
This element in the story too, in however modest a degree,
reinforces the theme. It was used in the first section of the P
narrative; there God named the light 'day', and the darkness
'night' (Day 1); the vault 'heaven' (Day 2); the dry land
'earth' and the water 'sea' (Day 3). In both cycles the result
reinforces the conceptual link between humanity - and solely
humanity - and deity. So that if for P, humanity alone is made
'according to the image of God' (Genesis 1.26-27), for J this
similitude of humanity to God will be achieved in its
determination to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil. Where for P that God creates and names the creation is
iconic of deity, for J man recreates and names his companions
and in knowing good and evil becomes iconic of deity.
What is missing from the J story is any sense of the real
independence of the masculine from its complement. It is there
initially as a suppressed premise, in just the same way that
light-darkness and hence day-night functions in the P story. For
just as the P text leaps ahead of itself in positing its
categories, as it must do, the most significant of which are the
primordial space of space : time and mind ofmind : body, so too
the J text acknowledges some sort of priority (transcendence)
due to the 'symbolic masculine', but in a very understated
manner. The ceremonial naming his companions as the due of the
man, extends to his companion:
And Yahweh God built the rib,
which he had taken from the man, into a woman, and he brought
her to the man. (v 22)
Then the man said: This at last bone of my bone and flesh
of my flesh! This one shall be called woman, because she is
taken from man! (v 23) ...
The naming in this case though it may be linked to the same
action of God in the prior narrative, is also part of the
presentation of the event of knowing. The naming emphasises the
close connectedness of male and female, the circle is closed,
and the suppressed premise is confined to virtual oblivion.
Where naming was the right if not the privilege of the man, only
because the woman has not been formed from his own rib, the
woman will be instrumental in the act that conduces to knowing.
This typology fits the same pattern that we encounter in the
gospels. If we acknowledge a propos of desire, the conative
mode, that the feeding miracles like the creation stories,
replicate the feminine polarity in a manner that even
subordinates the role of the masculine, then we must acknowledge
also the same in relation to the cognitive (thinking) mode.
There is no dodging the fact that the texts pronounce this form
of intentionality - knowing - as the province of the feminine,
equally to the link between desire and the symbolic feminine.
This has never been fairly recognised, and an emphasis has been
accorded the affective mode - desire - at the expense of the
thinking mode - knowing. Such an emphasis the texts will not
support. Where both the masculine and the feminine are
concerned, the story is a two edged sword. This idea, that of
the link between feminine and masculine typologies and certain
intentional modes, we shall return to later. It calls for some
refinement, and when we listed the secondary criteria which
distinguish the two subsets of messianic miracles,
nocturnal/diurnal, free will/ determinism, and so on, we did not
include it for this reason. These two principles themselves,
masculine and feminine, are among the six conceptual radicals.
That they are simultaneously engaged in Mark's very clear and
logical account of perceptual consciousness is true enough, but
the other criteria were sufficient to the task of separating
those messianic miracles which depict perceptual memory from
those which depict perceptual imagination. Clearly for J then,
it is now the woman and the serpent who are responsible for the
final outcome, for the intentional process in this case -
knowing - belongs to the perceptual polarity of mind, and in
some way, this is profoundly linked with the symbolic feminine
rather than the masculine. So the woman and the serpent appear
as the harbingers of knowing as well as desire, although that is
already there (Genesis 3.6):
And the serpent was more
astute than all the animals of the field which Yahweh God had
made. And it said to the woman: Has God really said: You may
not eat of any of the trees of the garden? (Genesis 3.1)
The woman answered the serpent: Of the fruit of the trees
of the garden we may eat; (v 2)
but of the fruit of the tree in the middle of the garden
God said: you shall not eat of it, you shall not even touch
it, otherwise you shall die. (v 3)
And the serpent said to the woman: You will certainly not
die! (v 4)
God knows well, that as soon as you eat of it, your eyes
will be opened, and you will be like God knowing what is good
and evil. (v 5)
Behind any aetiological rationale for suffering, toil and
ultimately death in this account, lies the simple fact that
everything we consume, with the exceptions of water, milk and
honey, is or was at one time a living entity. Rather than escape
from this ineluctable reality, it is duly acknowledged, whence
it is intimately implicated in the realms of desire and knowing.
For its author(s) then, knowing is no different from desire.
When therefore the man names his wife 'Hawwah (Eve) because she
became the mother of all living' (2.23, 3.20), it is with a view
to the ties to which we are drawing attention: the feminine -
the past - knowing - desire and of course the life and death
struggle which is our common inherited existence. The verb
'know' - t(d, - is
referred to three times in this the second creation narrative:
3.5, 7, 22. Thereafter, in 4.1-26 it will be used in the context
of 'carnal knowledge' both of the man 'knowing' his wife Eve
(4.1, 25), and likewise of Cain (4.17). The story of Cain
murdering his brother Abel (Genesis 4.1-16) introduces the
archetypal masculine form of evil, namely destructiveness which
runs counter to the creation itself. In it we hear the
expression 'sin' for the first time. It stands as a foil against
what is ostensibly the feminine form of evil, namely greed,
delineated in the first part of the story of the disobedience of
the human couple in the garden. These narratives thus concern
the sexual psychology of evil as finally countermanding the
likeness of God in male and female humans (5.1-2). The
wickedness of humankind is multiplied with the burgeoning human
population (Genesis 6.6s), thus the narratives cede to the
justification of God's decision to destroy the human race and to
the story of The Flood.
But our concern is with the J creation story, and to add to it,
whether there is one tree in the garden, or two compounds the
complexities mentioned above. The 'tree of life' is mentioned
only in the introduction and at the conclusion (Genesis 2.9,
3.22-24). The ambiguity is purposive just as is the ambiguity of
the copula in the expression 'good and evil'. Both knowing and
desiring are connected in this myth to two forms of value, good
and evil, and beauty and its corresponding disvalue. We must
bear in mind this related axiological value/disvalue,
beauty/ugliness, because the function of seeing in the story is
so pronounced, just as it was in connection with the 'fig tree'
in the introduction to the first messianic miracle, the
classical New Testament theology of desire; and as we observed,
the theme of shame (Genesis 2.25, 3.7, 10, 11, 21), is
inseparable from this phenomenal mode of sentience. One aspect
of the subtextual import of the J narrative clearly has to do
not just with the experience of shame, but with the complex
axiological awareness that arises from seeing the naked human
form. This is a mythological aetiology as much about clothing as
it is about consciousness, the likeness and unlikeness of
humankind to God, and the other factors already mentioned,
although most hermeneutical efforts seem to concentrate on the
association the narrative draws between sexual experience and
sin, or regard its primary purpose as accounting for the
incursion of death into the world. The link, however tenuous,
between its two axiological strands, good/evil and
beauty/ugliness, is seamlessly woven into the text, and is
central to its psychological thrust.
The Gospel
It is not long before we encounter the idea of knowing in the
gospel, it confronts us in the first miracle story:
and he cried out, "What have
you to do with us, Jesus of Nazareth? Have you come to destroy
us? I know (oi)da/)
who you are, the Holy One of God." (Mark 1.24)
The subsequent amazement at the 'new teaching' (didaxh\) of Jesus and his
commanding the unclean spirits 'with authority' (e)cousi/an, v 27) lend
weight to the idea. 'Teaching' and its cognates - 'teacher', 'to
teach' and so on - will feature prominently in this gospel, as
of course in others. The Paralytic similarly portrays
the power and authority of Jesus:
"... But that you may know (
e)idh~te) that the
Son of man has authority on earth to forgive sins" (2.10)
The parable of The Seeds begins with an expression
characteristic of Mark: 'Again he began to teach ... '
(4.1). In it we find the process of knowing twice indicated:
"To you has been given the
secret of the kingdom of God, but for those outside everything
is in parables; so that they may indeed see but not perceive,
and may indeed hear but not understand (i!dwsin); lest they
should turn again, and be forgiven." (4.10-12)
And he said to them, "Do you
not understand (oi!date)
this parable? Then how will you understand (gnw/sesqe) all the
parables? ... " (v13)
In the first of the above references, the indissoluble tie
between perception and knowing is very pronounced. It will be
resumed in the recapitulation of the two miracles of loaves
(Mark 8.14-21), which miracles of course, reiterate the theology
of semiotic forms of both hearing and seeing. For this
evangelist then, as for those who adopt his narratives, if in
fact both Matthew and Luke do, the bond between perception and
knowing is complete.
In yet another two stories of miraculous healing, that of
Jairus' Daughter and The Haemorrhagic Woman who
touched Jesus' garment (5.21-43), the idea recurs. In the latter
story, sentience of two distinct kinds, hearing and touching
occurs first:
She had heard the reports
about Jesus, and came up behind him in the crowd and touched
his garment (5.27)
Then follows the occasion of knowing:
But the woman, knowing (ei)dui~a) what had been
done to her, came in fear and trembling and fell down before
him, and told him the whole truth. (5.33)
In the subsequent healing of The Daughter Of Jairus, the
expression occurs in the context of an injunction to silence,
and is followed by a reference to assimilation:
And he strictly charged them
that no one should know (gnoi~)
this, and told them to give her something to eat. (5.43)
It is difficult to separate this story from that which Mark has
interleaved within its two halves, The Haemorrhagic Woman.
The two pericopae share many motifs: both persons healed are
females, both are referred to as 'daughter', the figure 'twelve'
is common to both pericopae, and both accounts refer to touch,
and however indirectly, that is, modestly, to the idea of the
menses associated with the ritual impurity of women. This chain
of ideas should in fact be extended to cover the next healing
miracle story, The Syrophoenician Woman's Daughter
(7.24-31), which has several things in common with the first two
of these three narratives dealing with women and female
children:
And from there he arose and
went away to the region of Tyre and Sidon. And he entered a
house, and would not have anyone know (gnw~nai) it; yet he
could not be hid. But immediately a woman, whose little
daughter was possessed by an unclean spirit, heard of him, and
came and fell down at his feet. (7.24-25)
Mark's recension may have borrowed the idea of Jesus' renown
from the first story, and that of prostration before Jesus of
the hapless and importunate parent from the second. At any rate
it is as clear an indication of the importance of knowing to the
evangelist, as say faith or desire, or will. We could quote all
instances of the various expressions used in the gospels which
refer us to this mode of intentionality - knowing. Some of these
as well as in those texts already cited, will include instances
where cognates of the verb to know occur: Mark 9.30, 10.38,
10.42, 12.14, 12.24, 13.29, 13.33, 13.35, 14.68, 14.71. (We
shall later discover a deep-seated theological connection
between the two miracles of loaves and knowing, as well as their
more obvious linking with desire or appetition. This is
forcefully portrayed in the recapitulation of the two feeding
events (Mark 8.16-21). And since we have interpreted these to
the theologies of both forms of perception, hearing and seeing,
it is hardly surprising that the discourse should contain so
many references to the same in various guises: 'perceive,
'understand' (twice), 'hearts hardened', 'fail to see', 'fail to
hear', 'remember'.)
But even given that we are employing common language
expressions, and so searching for nothing more arcane than the
kinds of things already spoken of, will, desire, knowing and so
on, and notwithstanding the prominence of the various
psychological-epistemological entities in question, which we are
arguing are determinative of the specificity of the gospels, and
as such in relation to the central question of time, not every
evangelist will manifest the same penchant for clear and precise
enunciation as in particular John will. There is a obvious
inclination on the part of that evangelist to announce at every
opportunity, the term which designates the epistemic mode proper
to that gospel. But it would be misleading to expect of each
situation, the clear and precise expressions: 'desiring',
'knowing', and so on. We shall later see in the case of John,
the verb 'to know' exceeds his use of expressions which fit his
native intentional outlook.
Where the gospel of Mark is concerned, equally significant to
the latter idea is the presentation of Jesus as teacher. The
function of teaching, and the casting of Jesus in the role of
teacher is highly significant to our case, and is so perhaps
more emphatically than any penchant for a term or group of
them indicating the specific epistemic (cognitive) or psychic
(conative) mode.
The situation is somewhat muddied by the longstanding received
wisdom which appraises Matthew as the specifically teaching
gospel. This is a gross misrepresentation. If the two source
hypothesis is correct, which sees Matthew like Luke, as
dependent to a large extent, on the gospel of Mark, then it is
already rendered dubious. We are coming directly to the question
of the specific natures - both psychological and epistemological
- of the four gospels, for that devolves upon the connexity of
time and consciousness; but for now, we should enter a caveat
against any tendency to underestimate the significance to who is
arguably our earliest synoptist, Mark, of the function of
teaching, and the role of the teacher. We shall concentrate upon
the gospel of Mark in what follows. So then everything we have
already said concerning intentionality and the rest, and
everything else which will be posited in this essay, takes its
cue from the gospel of Mark. The entire hermeneutic of the
theology of semiotic forms accepts that particular gospel - the
gospel of 'knowing' so to speak, as its primary source. It is
hardly necessary to add at this point in the outline of
intentionality as it is operative within the specific and varied
quarters of the gospel, anything more concerning Mark.
The verb didaskei~n
'to teach' is first announced just where we might have expected,
just as we saw for the first instance of the concept of knowing,
in the setting of the synagogue, and equally importantly, in the
story of a healing miracle. These events carry so much freight
in this gospel, as in this hermeneutic, that it is hardly
possible to overestimate them. If we have failed to see the full
extent of Jesus' teaching in the gospel of Mark, and here is
meant precisely the specific thrust of this presented
hermeneutic, epistemological-psychological - in a word
'Christological' - much of the reason lies in the failure to
recognise that the value the healing miracles, and the messianic
miracles, carry for the evangelist is paramount:
And they were astonished at
his teaching (didaxh~?),
for he taught them as one who had authority, and not as the
scribes. (Mark 1.22) ... And they were all amazed, so they
questioned among themselves, saying, "What is this? A new
teaching (didaxh\)!
With authority he commands even the unclean spirits, and they
obey him." (v 27)
This first miracle story cements the kind of relationship
between the miracle catena and Markan doctrine that we are
proposing. Thus the first miracle story puts itself and all
subsequent narratives of the genre, miracle narratives, as part
and parcel of Markan doctrine. It is not to parables, of which
there are too few in this gospel, nor to lengthy theological
disquisitions of a kind we might associate with John, nor indeed
to historical narrative, one of Luke's favoured genres, that we
turn in the gospel of Mark for teaching. Such narrative genres
as these which occur in Mark, do certainly convey what we might
call Jesus' teaching; but they do not refer to Markan
metaphysics. In Mark teaching belongs to the purpose of the
miracle stories, and it is precisely those which occupy us here.
It is to the two miracle catena that we must look if we are to
understand the pedagogical thrust of the gospel of Mark. The
first such narrative, the healing of The Demoniac In The
Synagogue (Mark 1.21-28), then posits also a certain
connection between the episteme or epistemic mode of
consciousness, knowing, and the acoustic mode of sentience.
These aspects of consciousness will be determinative for Mark in
particular.
It is not necessary to comment on each and every occasion Mark
refers to the word 'teach' and its cognates; we note that he
uses the term 'teacher' of Jesus in the following: dida/skale - 4.38, The
Stilling Of The Storm; 9.17, The Healing Of The Deaf
Mute; 9.38; The Unknown Exorcist; 10.17, 20, Giving
To the Poor; 10.35, The Request Of James And John;
12.14, Paying Taxes To Caesar; 12.19, The Issue About
Resurrection; 12.32, The Great Commandment; 13.1,
The Destruction Of The Temple Foretold; dida/skalov ('teacher')
is used of Jesus in 5.35, Jairus' Daughter, and
14.14, The Instructions For The Celebration Of Passover.
In addition to the incidence just noted above of the verb
'teach', we find the same in the following: 2.13, 4.1, 2, 6.2,
6, 7.7, 8.31, 9.31, 10.1, 11.17, 18, 12.14, 35, 38, 14.49. This
is an appreciable sum, which taken together with the references
to 'knowing', constitutes much of the evidence for the
presentation of a consciousness ('intentionality') generally
describable as 'knowing', the episteme (epistemic or cognitive
mode of consciousness as distinct from the psychic or conative
mode), derived from sense percipience. The major presentation of
this tenet of Markan metaphysics however, we have not yet
commented on. It occurs in the recapitulation of the two
miracles of loaves:
Now they had forgotten to
bring bread; and they had only one loaf with them in the boat
... (8.14)
And they discussed it with one another, saying, "We have no
bread." And being aware (gnou\v)
of it, Jesus said to them, "Why do you discuss the fact that
you have no bread? Do you not yet perceive (noie~te) or understand
(suni/ete)? Are
your hearts hardened? Having eyes do you not see (ble/pete), and having
ears do you not hear (a)kou/ete)?
And do you not remember (mnhmoneu/ete)?
When I broke the five loaves for the five thousand, how many
baskets full of broken pieces did you take up?" They said to
him, "Twelve." "And the seven for the four thousand, how many
baskets full of broken pieces did you take up?" And they said
to him, "Seven." And he said to them, "Do you not yet
understand (suni/ete)?"
(8.16-21).
This passage is absolutely crucial to Markan doctrine, and so
accounts for the absence of lengthy discourses regarding what
are the central questions of not merely New Testament
metaphysics but Christian metaphysics. That is, it signals the
reason for the ostensible absence in the gospel of Mark, of
anything comparable to those genres in the other gospels whose
business is that of teaching. Until we begin to understand the
meaning of not only the miracles referred to in this pericope,
but also the accounts of the Eucharist, referred to in its
introduction (v 14), and the remaining Eucharistic miracle, The
Transformation of Water into Wine, as well as the three
complementary transcendent messianic events; and until we
recognise and understand the relationship of all seven of these
episodes to the creation story in Genesis 1.1-2.4a and beyond,
we will remain in a position no better than that of the
followers of Jesus as described by the evangelist
THE CONCEPTUAL COGNITIVE
Inadvertently we have already introduced this; it is frequently
mentioned in the healing miracle narratives, usually as the noun
'faith' - pi/stiv
(5.34) or the verb 'believe' - pi/steue (5.36). These two words, are used
interchangeably here. In the two contiguous pericopae just
referred to, The Haemorrhagic Woman and Jairus' Daughter, we
encounter the theme of faith. The initial picture we have of the
'woman who had suffered much under many physicians' as well as
the role of the crowd (vv 21, 24b, 27, 30, 31) suggests the
priority of knowing over believing. The woman's initiative in
having heard, that is, in learning, of Jesus in the first place,
like that of The Syrophoenician Woman a little bit
later, is what enables the healing in both cases. Moreover, in The
Woman With The Haemorrhage, the crowd functions
precisely as it does in the story of The Feeding of The Five
Thousand, a narrative which is related between these two
healing miracle stories. It acts as an exact marker of the
nature of the form of intentionality: knowing. Knowing is unlike
believing, in several important respects, the primary one being
of course the differentiation between perceptual consciousness
and conceptual consciousness. But knowing is depicted in both
the healing miracle, The Woman With The Haemorrhage, and
the messianic miracle, The Feeding of The Five Thousand,
in terms of its public nature; its context is irreducibly
social. It is shared and corporate. Believing on the other hand
is qualified in other distinctive ways. We must attend to the
details given in the messianic miracles, and recapitulated in
the healing miracle stories concerning such things as the
numbers of persons present. Such contents of the narratives
advance biblical epistemology consistently and purposefully.
There are other miracle stories in the gospels more closely
related to believing than either of these stories, although that
of Jairus' Daughter certainly does qualify as an epistemology of
belief, albeit belief in its aconscious mode which is yet
to be analysed. Part of the reason for this is its
Christological orientation. The Woman With The Haemorrhage
and The Feeding of The Five Thousand on the other hand
are theologies of the immanent Transcendent, that is, "the
Father" qua immanent. We shall find at every turn the
strongest possible correlation between desire/believing and the
identity of the Son; just as we shall see a corresponding
affinity between knowing/will and Transcendence.
The
Paralytic (Mark 2.1-12)
This particular healing story, the one which presents precisely
the epistemic mode 'believing', also involves a crowd. The crowd
here is clearly distinguishable from the person healed, which
was not so in the previous case, for the paralyzed man is borne
to Jesus by his four friends, and has to be lowered through an
opening in the roof in order to get close to him. There is
no mistaking however, even if in the absence of the secondary
criterion of privacy, the insistent number of terms in the
account directly following the description of the actual cure,
the (social) psychology of believing as a state of awareness, or
mode of intentionality. These several and highly cogent
references all support the categoreal distinction that obtains
between knowing, an irreducibly social and heteronomous
mode of intentionality, and belief, which the images of the
privacy of mentation picture as autonomous. The evangelist
reports that Jesus discerned the inner mental state of
'some of the scribes',
- 'questioning in their hearts' (v 6);
- 'they questioned within themselves' (v 8);
- '"Why do you question thus in your hearts?"' (v 8).
There is here a plethora of terms referring to the privacy of
thought itself. These must qualify any description of belief as
given by the initial mention of the 'four men' (Mark 2.3) on
whom the man is reliant for being brought to Jesus. It is
sometimes suggested that this is something of a statement
concerning the nature of belief. It is nothing of the sort.
Faith may be shared, but it remains irreducibly private, and
even more private than the immanent intentional mode which
envisions erotic desire. This is because its principle moment,
its defining category, its necessary condition is mind. It is
the paralytic alone to whom Jesus addresses the words which
effect his healing:
And when Jesus saw their
faith (pi/stin au)tw~n),
he said to the paralytic, "My son, your sins are forgiven." (v
5)
The form of address is signal, for as just averred, of the four
conscious modes of intentionality, belief and desire are
manifests of the Son. After the account of the cure, the entire
remainder of the pericope has to do with internal and private
states of consciousness (vv 6-12). The weight of this conclusion
qualifies the significance of the initial setting. Faith does
not remain the condition of any single individual, it is always
shared. But in itself, it must be set at variance with knowing
exactly in respect of its psychological nature. It is the
citadel of the believing self which Mark here puts not against
the social and public nature of knowing, as of its aconscious
counterpart. But there must be no misunderstanding of the nature
of faith on this score. It stands in comparison with The
Transfiguration, the messianic miracle which most isolates the
Son. Hence the stream of expressions which constitute the
controversy story, effectively the most important pedagogical
element in the narrative, should be understood in relation to
the nature of faith. There is nothing in this account which
contradicts what we already know from the examination of
our own selves, our own minds, of our own 'hearts' (vv 6, 8) or
'spirit' (v 8), or 'within' ourselves (v 8) - that is through
the existence of the mind itself. This is the realm of faith.
There is finally nothing 'social', nothing 'public' about it.
We are affirming quite clearly, that the substantial difference
between knowing and believing, as modes of epistemic or
cognitive intentionality, that is, as distinct from desiring and
willing, is one of the essential differences between perceptual
(knowing) and conceptual (believing) polarities of mind or
logos. The same applies
of course to the difference between desiring and willing, only
they are conative, that is appetitive forms of consciousness;
what we might otherwise call 'feeling', affective, or emotive
modes of intentionality, rather than 'thinking' modes. The word
thinking here does insufficient justice to the idea of knowing;
for we have just above used this term - 'thinking'/'thought' -
in connection with the private and intellective, that is, the
conceptual side of consciousness. But there is no appropriate
expression in English which stands adjacent to the process of
believing, which is of course properly speaking 'thinking' in sensu strictu. So for
the moment, we use this expression - 'thinking'/'thought' - as
an umbrella term to cover both forms of consciousness, believing
and knowing, the one a conceptual mode, the other a perceptual
mode of intentionality, so as to map the difference between
episteme and psyche, cognitive and conative, emotive and
intellective, feeling and thinking. The study of the messianic
events confirmed as one of the indices epitomising the certain
difference between transcendent and immanent episodes, this the
real alterity between the privacy of thought, here belief, and
the publicity of speech. In view of what we have just observed
concerning the motifs of crowd, publicity, speech, reports and
so on, in The Woman With The Haemorrhage, this throws
into even greater relief the statement of Jesus concerning The
Paralytic. Hence the overtly public nature of his
forgiveness of the man carried to him, occurs in the greatest
possible relief to the actual focus of the occasion, which
centres on the inner, private, mental state of the individual.
The contrast is reflected in that of the crowd, including 'some
of the scribes', with the individual paralytic.
No gospel is without a substantial number of references to
believing and to faith. But of all four, it is to John that we
turn for the definitive account of the same. The extraordinarily
high incidence of such references must have contributed much of
the reason for the inclusion of that gospel within the New
Testament canon. No other evangelist compares to John in this
respect; from the inception of his gospel, he has the firmest
grasp of the centrality to Christian discipleship of this
attitude, disposition, state of consciousness, mode of
intentionality; that is, faith. He has this because he has the
firmest grasp of any evangelist of the centrality to Christian
metaphysics of the existence of mind. The further discussion of
this particular form or mode of intentionality depends on its
analysis in the fourth gospel, of whose soteriology it is the
foundation. We shall come to consider the intimacy of belief
with that particular gospel, John, directly, and also the
relationship between the other gospels and specific forms of
intentionality. But for now we must concentrate further on the
theology of belief as given in the miracle narratives. Once
again it is time to consider not the healing stories, but the
messianic miracle. Surprisingly enough, this particular
messianic event, The Transfiguration, is not told in the
gospel of John, although it is present in each of the synoptic
gospels. The Johannine equivalent of this, the theology of the
transcendent Son, is the last of the miracle stories in John,
that of The Raising of Lazarus.
The
Transfiguration (Mark 9.2-13)
Let us be clear about the relation of this narrative to the
unfolding hermeneutic. We are now dealing with the gospel, not
the story of creation as such. In the healing miracle catena,
there are twelve or so events. These replicate in toto the categories of
both 'beginning' (transcendence) and 'end' (immanence),
Genesis and the gospel. That is, six healing miracles replicate
the conceptual categories, and the remaining six the perceptual
categories. Thus we are able to point to that particular healing
miracle, which like the story of Day 1, covers the entity mind;
and similarly, the episode from the same cycle, which stands for
the complementary rubric in the immanent series. These are
respectively the stories of The Paralytic and The
Leper; the first concerns mind, the second haptic
imagination.
The Transfiguration is according to the postulates laid down in
this hermeneutic, the theology of a form of consciousness whose
centre of gravity is in the first place, the phenomenon of
haptic sentience. Its equivalent in the healing miracle cycle is
the The Leper. Both texts address the reality to
consciousness of the sense-percipient mode of touch; but most
significantly, touch in a manner that is completely juxtaposed
to touch in the body of memory. The Transfiguration is
about haptic imagination, not haptic memory. The latter is the
concern of the first messianic event, Transformation Of
Water Into Wine. Both of these messianic miracles are of
course Christologies. In the overall scheme of things, both
testify to the identity of the Son, rather than either the Holy
Spirit or to Transcendence ("the Father").
Now haptic imagination for all its espousal of transcendence,
remains beholden to the haptic as a form of sentience. That is
the primary quality of this mode of consciousness. And sentience
itself, that is sense-percipience, is as a rule, immanent in
kind. Its normative and categoreal denomination is that of
immanence rather than transcendence. Hence the intrinsic value
of haptic sentience pertains to haptic memory, not haptic
imagination. As such, the status of transcendence belonging to
haptic imagination, or to any form of imagination for that
matter, must be qualified. We have accordingly at every turn
qualified the transcendent messianic events as nevertheless
belonging to a series of episodes - messianic miracles - which
are firstly defined taxonomically as immanent. At the most
radical and elementary level, all the messianic events are
immanent, just as all the things disclosed in the creation
theology are transcendent. At a second level however, we have a
set of somewhat ambiguous elements in either case: the
'transcendent' messianic miracles, and the 'immanent' elements
in the creation series, which are the forms of unity,
space-time, mind-body and male-female. The former do not
exemplify immanence unequivocally, just as the latter fail to
exemplify transcendence without remainder. Thus transcendence
and immanence do not represent categories incapable of further
definition . Neither is unexceptionable.
So where 'transcendent' messianic miracles qualify themselves as
ambiguous, a propos of immanence, just as do the forms of unity,
which are the 'immanent' occasions in relation to the
transcendent categories proper, they do so in two ways. They
qualify any hard and fast notions we may have of immanence
itself, and similarly any fixed notions we may have about
perception. The term haptic imagination has two parts, the first
of which denotes the mode of sentience, while the second
affirms the categoreal aspect. In either case, the entity in
question is indeed in question. The result is that we must
revise our understanding of both sense percipience and here at
least, the categoreal paradigm also.
The Transfiguration thus firstly depicts the centre of
consciousness grafted to haptic sentience and to the
imaginal rather than mnemic form of the same. This entails
apparent contradiction or equivocation as we have noted. In the
second place, its governing intention is really the conceptual
form - mind. So as for the categoreal issue, the fact of
transcendence (here imagination), rather than the aspect of
sentience (here the haptic), the thing that manifests the
identity of the Son (transcendent) intrinsically, normatively,
and unequivocally, is mind. And to this, haptic imagination must
defer. The story of Day 1, the story of mind which announces the
entire biblical corpus dominates The Transfiguration.
There can be no such story as this without a prior story of
mind, and the same is true of all the transcendent messianic
miracles. That is why they may look like mere copies of the
theology of creation contained within the first half of Genesis
1.1-2.4a.
If then there is no messianic miracle denoting the category
mind, precisely because this has already been disclosed, and was
disclosed at the very inception of scripture, and because the
real task of the messianic series is to complete the theology of
mind by the revelation of the perceptual modes of consciousness
rather than repeat the conceptual polarity, then even so, The
Transfiguration can and necessarily must recur to the
prior normative, definitive entity, mind. For it is this which
discloses intrinsically the identity of the transcendent Son:
And after six days... (Mark
9.2, par. Matthew 17.1)
Luke appears to contradict this for his introduction reads 'Now
about eight days after these sayings ... ' (9.28). We shall not
comment on this fact here but to note that Mark and Matthew
constitute the majority reading.
This introduction is important because it validates the claim
that the messianic miracle series exists as the logical and
theological complement of the creation series, and without that
we are at a loss to understand any and all of these episodes,
and finally at a loss also to comprehend the Eucharist in its
theological setting. Mark's and Matthew's introduction to the
Transfiguration are instantly comparable to the introduction of
the fourth gospel as a whole. So that if John lacks the last of
the messianic miracles - just as Mark lacks the first, then
clearly his gospel comports with the purpose of these same as
given by the introduction to The Transfiguration. The absence of
the last messianic miracle from John, is as the absence of the
first from Mark, perplexing. Clearly both are intended as
counterparts, and both are critical to a full and complete
Christology. But any shortcoming in this matter, is of course
made good by the inclusion of healing miracles in both gospels.
Thus Mark contains The Man With The Withered Hand, which
covers the immanent Christology, whose theological expression is
grounded in The Transformation Of Water Into Wine. For
his part, John includes, and it is the last episode of its kind
in his gospel, The Raising Of Lazarus, the Christology
of transcendence which we shall discuss shortly concerning the
concept of belief. Similarly, this is an alternate rendering of
the theologoumenon of The Transfiguration. John's last
miracle story resumes motifs present in the opening hymn to the
Word, notably those of light and time which of course loom so
large in the story of creation.
Returning to the gospel and its presentation of that form of
intentionality to which we refer to as epistemic or 'thinking' -
though here we certainly do not mean knowing, for that belongs
to the province of the perceptual - returning that is, to
the ideational or conceptual 'cognitive' mode of intentionality,
which belongs properly not to the gospel but to the creation
narrative, there are more than sufficient indices in the miracle
story which signal the connection we are making between belief
and the elementary conceptual epistemic mode, that is, between
belief and mind. The first of these we have just quoted and
highlighted above. The intention of Mark's introduction, like
John's, remains unmistakable in its reversion to, that is, in
deferring to, the theology of mind. This occurs in spite of the
fact that the logical business of the miracle story is the
depiction of a form of sentience. In addition to the invocation
of the creation narrative roundly proclaimed in the
introduction, another pointer to the normative status of mind as
the counterpart of haptic imagination is the following:
And there appeared to them
Elijah with Moses; and they were talking to Jesus. (Mark 9.3,
cf. Matthew 17.3, Luke 9.30)
The meaning of the presence of such figures cannot be decided
without recourse to the concept of belief. One thing else is
equally certain, that is that like the introduction they invoke
the concept of time. For both transcend the immediate present;
both figures 'appear' as it were from another time, or other
times. This is doubly perplexing in the case of Elijah as 'a'
Son of man. Elijah is arguably the more important of the two, as
we see in the pericope which follows the actual miracle story.
As 'a' Son of man, he is linked with both the past and the
future, whereas Moses is linked only with the past. The 'Son of
man' concerning whom Jesus speaks to his disciples firstly in
the future tense - 'until the Son of man should have arisen ( e)k nekrw~n a)nasth~?)
from the dead' (Mark 9.9) - troublingly becomes elided
with Elijah-John of whom Jesus lastly says - '"But I tell you
that Elijah has come ( e)lh/luqen),
and they did to him whatever they pleased, as it is written of
him."' (v 13) This adroitly draws as close a comparison as
possible between the fate of Jesus qua Son of man and
that of Elijah-John qua the same. For the previous verse which
concerns 'the Son of man' as explicitly identified with neither
John nor Jesus reads:
And he said to them, "Elijah
does come first to restore all things; and how is it written
of the Son of man, that he should suffer many things and be
treated with contempt?" (v 12)
Certainly the text here draws a comparison between Jesus and
John and their sufferings and deaths. And even if The
Transfiguration is somehow a theology of glory, epitomised
by the radiance of Jesus' garments and confirmed by Peter's
remark - "Master, it is well that we are here ... " (v 5) - such
a theology does not rule out these ideas of suffering and death,
first outlined in the prior text (8.34-38).
Furthermore, if the persona of Elijah may leave us somewhat just
as confused as Peter, particularly in relation to issues about
time, the introduction to the miracle story is no less
apparently convoluted:
And he said to them, "Truly,
I say to you, there are some standing here who will not taste
death before they see that the kingdom of God has come ( e)lhluqui~an) with
power." (9.1)
In either case, the conceptual form mind, or the perceptual
category haptic imagination, the axiology is one and the same.
Just as the creation of the light is valorised, the first of a
series of such processes:
And God saw that the light was good; and God
separated the light from the darkness. (Genesis 1.4 NRSV)
The same is given in Peter's remark (Mark 9.5 - kalo/n) in The
Transfiguration, just as it was in The Transformation
Of Water Into Wine by the remark of the steward of the
feast (John 2.10 - kalo\n).
This guarantees the Christological rationale, whether of
(virtual) transcendence or actual immanence, shared by these two
particular miracle narratives. But we must observe carefully
that in one instance this value - 'good' - the specifically
Christological form of value, is what we shall term 'intrinsic'
and in the other 'extrinsic'. This varies between the two sets
of occasions; so that where the pair haptic memory : body is
concerned, that is, in the case of immanence, it is the
perceptual category, haptic memory which functions
intrinsically, or what is the same thing, normatively. For
haptic memory is as we have seen, unequivocally immanent in its
kind. In the case of these entities, the perceptual is the
normative ('intrinsic') category.
In the case of the pair haptic imagination : mind, the situation
is the opposite. For here, where it is a question of
transcendence, the real, actual, 'intrinsic' bearer of
transcendent good is mind rather than haptic imagination. In the
case of transcendent good, the conceptual, transcendent entity,
not the perceptual one, is the normative category. We must not
enter any further here these concerns which belong to axiology;
they lie well beyond the compass of this study which has enough
to contend with. But this much must be put in the interests of
making clear the real factors inherent in the meaning of both
Christologies.
We may now return to the epistemic mode belief, which is
according to Christian philosophical psychology, the property of
mind. Each of the radicals classified in the two narrative
cycles, has one and only one mode quintessentially exemplary of
it. Just as the intentional mode desire belongs to haptic
memory, meaning that it acts as the utmost instance of this
particular mode of intentionality, meaning that sexual desire is
the paragon of desire itself, so then mind is the defining
occasion for what we mean by the intentional mode belief. We
refer to this relationship between the radicals and their
respective exemplary intentional modes as canonical or
sovereign, applied to the latter, the state of consciousness.
Desire is the canonical form of intentionality relative to
haptic memory. Belief is the canonical or sovereign intentional
mode of mind. Certainly, if the final, or rather the first and
foremost theology of mind in its conceptual forms, or logos
asarkos, is to be found in Genesis 1.1-2.4a, and therefore
if the real subjects of belief are those very six entities there
categorised, then we must note also that time itself is of the
very fabric of this same conceptual polarity of mind, or logos. The introduction to
The Transfiguration therefore does not only present us
with the perceptual category haptic imagination; nor with the
comparability of this mode of sentience to the conceptual form
mind as the consequence of a common axiological nature. It also
clearly explicates the real propinquity between mind and time,
as between Son and "Father". It is to this essential affiliation
that the phrase 'After six days' first alerts us.
Nothing in the story of 'beginning' falls outside the purview of
temporality, it is the very fabric of the categories, each of
which is classed under the order of a particular 'day'. The very
word itself, 'beginning' marks the category time, in its
essential relatedness to mind. The same, the tenet that time and
mind are essentially related, forms a major premise of this
essay. It guarantees the internal coherence of the categoreal
schema of Markan metaphysics.
We can find no mention at all of belief in the Genesis pericope.
Here that John like Mark, takes up the story. We have already
seen that he specifies the psychic ('feeling') mode, namely
will, which the conceptual forms generate. This was announced in
the hymn to the logos
(John 1.13), which no less plainly than the introduction to The
Transfiguration in Mark and Matthew (if, so it seems, not
Luke), reverts to the story of 'beginning', as to the theology
of conceptual forms. But prior to that we find:
The true light that
enlightens every man was coming into the world. He was in the
world, and the world was made through him, yet the world knew
him not. He came to his own home, and his own people received
him not. But to all who received him, who believed (pisteu/ousin) on his
name, he gave power to become children of God; ... (John
1.11-12)
Thus both evangelists, Mark (and Matthew) with the story of the
last messianic miracle, and John in the opening hymn to the word
become flesh, interpret the theology of conceptual forms, the
theology of 'beginning', in relation to the process of belief.
Several of the motifs of the opening of the fourth gospel will
be resumed in the last miracle story, that of Lazarus, and if
this is as we argue, the Johannine healing miracle story which
presents the subjects of the The Transfiguration, then
we must examine it here.
The
Death of Lazarus (John 11.1-44)
The sheer size and scope of this narrative, and its location in
the gospel underscore its significance for the evangelist. When
the author(s) of the messianic miracle series determined The
Transfiguration as the last of the six texts comprising
that chain, and when the fourth evangelist contextualised the
story of Lazarus, they had in mind the same purpose. For John at
least, whose gospel has no account of the Eucharist parallel to
the synoptic and Pauline accounts, the formulation of those
entities which constitute the biblical doctrine of mind ends as
it began, focused theologically on the person of the Son as on
the entity mind itself, the embodiment of that very identity.
It is not clear to what extent John intends to itemise the
category of haptic imagination under this story. In its
contextualised antithesis to his first miracle narrative, which
certainly is about haptic sentience, it would seem that he is
aware of the importance of the same to Christian
psychology/epistemology. The previous two miracles deal with
sentient forms of consciousness: The Walking On The
Water (6.16-21) itemises acoustic imagination, and The
Man Born Blind (9.1-12) catalogues optic imagination. The
latter, the second last Johannine miracle story shares with the
last imagery dealing with light and time (John 9.4, 5 cf. 11.9,
10; cf. 11.37). Hence it seems that these last three miracle
stories in John recapitulate the progression of the three
'transcendent' miracles from the messianic cycle clearly
referred to in chapter 21. That is, the organization of the
second half of the 'signs' in John accords with the pattern:
acoustic imagination (The Walking On The Water) - optic
imagination (The Man Born Blind) - haptic
imagination (The Raising Of Lazarus), in keeping
with the consistent references to the messianic series in the
epilogue.
On the other hand, while there is in the story of Lazarus no
clear index of creation theology comparable to Mark's 'After six
days', the references to 'two days' (11.5), 'twelve hours
in the day' and 'if any one walks in the day' (v 9), as well as
the repeated references to Lazarus' death 'four days' prior (vv
17, 30) and of course that to 'the last day' (v 24), all suggest
this pericope as being consonant with the purposeful
recapitulation of the theology of conceptual forms in Mark's
introduction to his last messianic miracle story. And if these
several references were insufficient, there is yet another which
connects this miracle narrative and that of the Transfiguration
which can be directly associated with the theology of creation -
the theology of the 'Days'. The text following the story of
Lazarus (11.45-57) describes the plot to kill Jesus. Whereas The
Transfiguration dwelt upon the similarity between John
(the baptiser) and Jesus, and tended almost to conflate their
identities in the single (?) persona of Elijah in the
case of the former and the 'Son of man' in the case of the
latter, the Johannine narrative develops the theme of a
similarity between Lazarus and Jesus. Immediately following the
story of the plot against Jesus is that of The Anointing At
Bethany, the introduction of which reads:
Six days before the Passover
... (12.1)
This suggests that there is no difficulty in construing the
Lazarus pericope in light of the six conceptual forms, that is
the 'six Days' of beginning. Thus John's text allows for
the identification of either category, perceptual or conceptual,
haptic imagination or mind. Whatever the provenance of the
various miracle story traditions, the parallels are striking.
Once again, John here returns to the theme of belief:
So the chief priests planned
to put Lazarus also to death, because on account of him many
of the Jews were going away and believing (e)pi/steuon, varr. e)pisteusan) in Jesus.
(John 12.10-11)
As for the theology of perceptual forms, the actual resurrection
of Lazarus from the dead involves the voice of Jesus:
So they took away the stone.
And Jesus lifted up his eyes and said, "Father, I thank thee
that thou hast heard me. I knew that thou hearest me always,
but I have said this on account of the people standing by,
that they may believe that thou didst send me." When he had
said this, he cried with a loud voice, "Lazarus, come out."
(John 11.41-43)
Once again this reiterates certain thematic elements of The
Transfiguration:
And a cloud overshadowed
them, and a voice came out of the cloud, "This is my beloved
Son; listen to him." (Mark 9.7)
Prior to this 'Elijah with Moses ... were talking to Jesus' (v
4), and the later pericope (vv 9-13) contains two further
references:
And as they were coming down
the mountain, he charged them to tell no one what they had
seen, until the Son of man should have risen from the dead. So
they kept the matter to themselves, questioning what the
rising from the dead meant. (vv 9, 10)
The role of the 'voice' in the Johannine miracle story confirms
the earlier passage:
"Do not marvel at this; for
the hour is coming when all who are in the tombs will hear his
voice and come forth, those who have done good, to the
resurrection of life, and those who have done evil to the
resurrection of judgement." (John 5.28, 29)
Any resumption in the Johannine miracle story of the theology of
creation does not of course preclude the possibility of a
simultaneous intent to deal with the perceptual category haptic
imagination. The clear link in all of the texts which we have
just mentioned, between the acoustic mode of sentience and the
conceptual category time, is clear evidence of the connectedness
of the perceptual and conceptual polarities of mind. There is an
obvious reference to haptic perception in John's text:
It was Mary who anointed the
Lord and wiped his feet with her hair, whose brother Lazarus
was ill. (John 11.2)
And if the first miracle story in John used one sentient
mode, taste (John 2.9), in order to present another, the haptic,
the same connection may be intended in the last miracle story,
this time the link being that between smell and touch.
Mary took a pound of costly
ointment of pure nard and anointed the feet of Jesus and wiped
his feet with her hair; and the house was filled with the
fragrance of the ointment. (John 12.3)
This of course resonates immediately with the two references in
the miracle story to the same, the sense of smell, the second of
which is explicit:
Now when Jesus came, he found
that Lazarus had already been in the tomb four days. (11.17)
... Jesus said, "Take away the stone." Martha, the sister of
the dead man, said to him, "Lord, by this time there will be
an odour, for he has been dead four days." (v
39)
Of course there is no mention of any physical contact between
Jesus and the dead man, unlike Mark's story of The Leper.
Such contact would render Jesus ritually impure. We can find
however, a better reason for the absence of physical
contact between Jesus and Lazarus, and for the allusiveness to
touch of such references as we do in fact find. We should repeat
here that the driving force of all forms of imaginal perception
is non-sensual. That is precisely what the term 'haptic
imagination' conveys, and wherein lies its differentiation
from 'haptic memory'. Touch as actual, realised touch is
an occasion of haptic memory, not haptic imagination. In John's
story as in Mark's Transfiguration narrative, every
effort is made to distinguish the fundamental difference of this
mode from its mnemic form, in spite of their common perceptual
ground. Every effort is made by either evangelist to convey that
whereas haptic memory, that is, the 'erotic', establishes a
prevailing centre of consciousness in human mentation, one which
we commonly dignify by the word 'love', haptic imagination does
likewise, and does so in virtue of its haptic nature, or
sameness. Hence we may speak of it also in terms of 'love'. Yet
for all that sameness, and simultaneously, it remains radically
different, radically other, as is given by the contrastive
expressions memory and imagination, and correspondingly past and
future, immanence and transcendence. A major aspect of that
difference preoccupies both evangelists.
We should add here also, the apparent association between the
figure of Lazarus and that of 'the disciple whom Jesus loved'.
There are two references in the miracle story which promote this
association, the first being in the introduction:
Now Jesus loved Martha and
her sister and Lazarus. (John 11.5)
An even stronger image emerges in the course of the narrative:
When Jesus saw her weeping,
and the Jews who came with her also weeping, he was deeply
moved in spirit and troubled; and he said, "Where have you
laid him?" They said to him, Lord, come and see." Jesus wept.
So the Jews said, "See how he loved him!" (John 11.33-36)
The enigmatic portrayal of the 'beloved' disciple and the
singularity of the relationship between Jesus and Lazarus have
given rise to the speculation that the two are one and the same.
So for example, in a text (John 1.35ff) which some
consider to be the introduction of the same disciple, we find
the same expression, "Come and see." (v 39) albeit in a
different form. If there is any such tie between Lazarus and
'the disciple whom Jesus loved', then the final picture we have
of the latter from chapter 21.20-23 adds to it, and does so in a
manner which yet again recalls not only the Elijah-John persona
of The Transfiguration, but also the remark at the
beginning of Mark's text concerning the '"... some standing here
who will not taste death before they see that the kingdom of God
has come with power."' (Mark 9.1):
The saying spread abroad among the brethren that this disciple
was not to die; yet Jesus did not say to him that he was not to
die, but, "If it is my will that he remain, until I come, what
is that to you?" (John 21.23)
In conclusion then, it would appear certain that John's last
miracle story is comparable to the last of the messianic
miracles, The Transfiguration, in so many respects, not
the least of which is the dual presentation of the perceptual
form of consciousness - haptic imagination, and the conceptual
form of consciousness - mind. If that is so, then it is because
both are instantiations of the uniquely Christological form of
value 'the transcendent good'; the only difference being that
one, namely the conceptual radical mind, is the intrinsic or
normative instance of the same.
A propos of the relation between mind and belief, the Johannine
story leaves us in no doubt:
Jesus said to her, "I am the
resurrection and the life; he who believes (pisteu/wn) in me,
though he die, yet shall he live, and whoever lives and
believes (pisteu/wn)
in me shall never die. Do you believe (pisteu/eiv) this?" She
said to him, "Yes Lord; I believe (pepi/steuka) that you are the Christ, the
Son of God, he who is coming into the world." (11.25-27)
There is a multitude of other references in John's gospel to
this form of intentionality or mode of consciousness, that is,
believing. Any serious treatment of the more than sixty such
instances would be a study in itself. We will have further
occasion to comment on some of them in dealing with the modes of
intentionality specific to each gospel. The point here is that
the absence of any explicit statement about the same in the
creation theology is overruled by the clear references to the
same which we meet in the gospels. It will be the Son whom we
find linked with the mode of intentionality belief, just as
Transcendence is associated with that of will. In the creation
theologies the latter intentional mode, will itself, the
psychological crux of the entire story of creation, remains
unspoken, although it is pervasively implicit. There were, as we
discovered, significant references to both knowing and desiring
in the second creation story. These square perfectly with the
immanentist perspective of that text, which defers to perceptual
consciousness. But neither conceptual mode of intentionality,
neither will nor belief, is actually articulated in either
creation narrative.
Until some sort of flesh can be assigned to the former, if only
because as noted the category mind : body is weighted neither in
favour of transcendence nor immanence, but persists as their
equipoise, as innately mediatory, until then, the disclosure of
the intentional mode proper to logos must remain in abeyance. That is why the
gospel of John in particular is of such import. The theological
business of the stories of creation certainly encompasses the
identity of the Son. Theologies of recapitulation, of the
'second Adam' such as we find in Paul for example, are founded
on such a premise. Insofar as the entire compass of the P
narrative is the logos
itself, mind, we can propose that belief is as necessary a
concept to 'beginning' as is will. Theologically belief can not
be taken other than in relation to the identity of the Son; just
as psychologically, and metapsychologically, it cannot be taken
other than in relation to the conceptual categories or mind
itself.
Hebrews
Therefore, as the Holy Spirit
says,"Today, do not harden your hearts, as in the rebellion,
on the day of testing in the wilderness, where your fathers
put me to the test and saw my works for forty years. Therefore
I was provoked with that generation and said, 'They always go
astray in their hearts; they have not known my ways. As I
swore in my wrath, They shall never enter my rest. (kata/pausi/n)'"
(Hebrews 3.7-11)
And to whom did he swear that they should never enter his
rest, but to those who were disobedient? So we see that that
they were unable to enter because of unbelief (a)pisti/an). (Hebrews
3.18-19)
Therefore, while the promise of entering his rest remains,
let us fear lest any of you be judged to have failed to reach
it. For good news came to us just as to them; but the message
(o( lo/gov) which
they heard did not benefit them, because it did not meet with
faith (th~? pi/stei)
in the hearers. For we who have believed (piste/usantev) enter
the rest (kata/pausin),
as he has said, "As I swore in my wrath, 'They shall never
enter my rest,'" although his works were finished from the
foundation of the world. For he has somewhere spoken of the
seventh day ( e(bdo/mhv)
in this way, "And God rested (kate/pausen) on the seventh day ( e(bdo/mh?) from all his
works." And again in this place he said, "They shall never
enter my rest (kata/pausin)."
Since therefore it remains for some to enter it, and
those who formerly received the good news (eu)aggelisqe/ntev)
failed to tneter it because of disobedience, again he sets a
certain day (pa/lin tina\
o(ri/zei h(me/ran, sh/meron), "Today (sh/meron),"
saying through David so long afterward, in the words already
quoted, "Today (sh/meron), when you hear his voice, do not
harden your hearts." For if Joshua had given them rest, God
would not speak later of another day (meta\ tau~ta h(me/rav).
So then, there remains a sabbath rest (sabbatismo\v) for the
people of God; for whoever enters God's rest (also ceases from
his labours as God did from his. (Hebrews 4.1-10)
Let us therefore strive to enter that rest (kata/pausin),
that no one fall by the same sort of disobedience. For the
word of God (o( lo/gov
tou~ qeou~) is living and active, sharper than any
two-edged sword, piercing to the division of soul and spirit,
of joints and marrow, and discerning the thoughts and
intentions of the heart. And before him no creature is hidden,
but all are open and laid bare to the eyes of him with whom we
have to do. (Hebrews 4.11-13)
The Epistle To The Hebrews is one of the few New Testament books
containing extended and explicit references to the P story of
creation. It also recurs to Psalm 95.7-11:
For he is our God; we are the
people of his pasture, the sheep he owns. Today, if only you
would obey him!
He says, “Do not be stubborn like they were at Meribah,
like they were that day at Massah in the wilderness,
where your ancestors challenged my authority, and tried my
patience, even though they had seen my work.
For forty years I was continually disgusted with that
generation, and I said, ‘These people desire to go
astray; they do not obey my commands.’
So I made a vow in my anger, ‘They will never enter into the
resting place (kata/pausi/n)
I had set aside for them.’” (Psalm 95.7-11 NET Bible)
It will be to the gospel of John in particular that we will
attribute the conceptual, cognitive form of intentionality,
faith. But prior that, we note the presentation in a New
Testament text, which like the gospel of John, not only is
concerned with the reality of faith, again like that gospel,
recurs to the P creation narrative. Just as we found in the J
narrative of creation, where we would otherwise least have
expected them, the announcement of the two perceptual forms of
intentionality, knowing and desire, since we associate these
with the theology of immanence which is formally and fully given
only in the messianic series, we find in Hebrews, again quite
unexpectedly, the presentation of the conceptual, cognitive
intentional mode, faith. It is unexpected for the same reason;
namely that we would logically associate it with the creation
narrative, as with the theology of transcendence, and the
epistemology of the conceptual. But like the conative,
conceptual form, will, it is not explicitly given in either the
P or J narrative. The gospel of John as well as Hebrews more
than makes up for this apparent omission. Once again also, this
indicates the extensive relatedness of the two canons, and of
what for our purposes here, are their specific contents;
theologies of transcendence and immanence, and epistemologies of
the conceptual and perceptual polarities of mind.
The gospel of John and The Epistle To The Hebrews share also a
common metaphysical ground which may be broadly defined as
Platonic. It is also often described as 'dualistic'. This may be
generally true of Platonism and Middle Platonism, but it does
not apply to the fourth gospel, if by it we mean the belief in
two distinct realms, which have no means of interchange, no
effective relation to one another. The very first 'sign' in John
alerts us to the idea of process or becoming, and the same is
confirmed by the last event of the messianic series. There is no
abiding separation between the 'above and below', 'the heavens
and the earth', transcendence and immanence. The isomorphism of
the Days and the messianic events squarely proscribes this, as
does any grasp of the logical affinity between polarity and
analogy. The reiteration of the categoreal paradigm within each
taxonomy, that of the conceptual forms and that of their
perceptual counterparts, militates against the attribution of a
Procrustean 'dualism' to John as to biblical metaphysics as a
whole. Those Johannine texts such as the following, in which we
see initially at least, evidence suggestive of so simplistic a
conceptual framework, must be understood always in light of the
isomorphism between the events of 'beginning' and the events of
'end'. This is both balanced and nuanced, robust and subtle:
And he said to him, "Truly,
truly, I say to you, you will see heaven opened, and the
angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man.
(John 1.51)
Jesus answered him, "Are you a teacher of Israel and yet
you do not understand (ginw/skeiv)
this? Truly, truly, I say to you, we speak of what we know (o(/ oi!damen), and bear
witness to what we have seen; but you do not receive our
testimony. If I have told you earthly ( e)pi/geia) things and
you do not believe (ou)
pisteu/ete), how can you believe if I tell you
heavenly ( e)poura/nia)
things? No one has ascended into heaven (ou)rano/n) but he who
descended from heaven (ou)ranou~), The Son of man.
(John 3.10-13)
These are the first of many such motifs in John which must be
taken as referring to the essential rapport between the
categories listed in the creation story and those which follow
in the gospel. The quotation from Hebrews is party to this same
schema. It explicitly names the Sabbath day and the concept of
God's rest in keeping with the same. Therefore if faith looms
almost as large in Hebrews as it does in John, this should cause
no surprise in view of the logical consistency of the
metaphysics which we are in the process of outlining. We shall
treat in greater detail the presentation of faith in Hebrews in
the discussion of the gospel of John, the last of the four
gospels to be addressed. But it should by now be apparent that
the two conscious, cognitive forms of intentionality are knowing
and believing. As related elementary modes, the former
perceptual, the latter conceptual, these stand to one another as
do the conscious, conative forms, desiring and willing. These
then are the four modes of conscious intentionality. In each
case, that of the perceptual polarity of mind and that of its
conceptual polarity, there are two modes; one conative, that is
affective, emotive, or feeling mode and the other cognitive,
that is epistemic, or thinking mode.
The conative, perceptual mode, is desiring. Every one of the six
centres of perceptual consciousness, the subjects of the six
messianic miracles, is susceptible of this form of
intentionality. Thus the three forms of memory, and the three
forms of imagination each possess their own distinct species of
desire. Desire is at the same time, most itself, in the occasion
of haptic memory. Thus sexual desire is the archetypal,
sovereign, canonical, or essential form of desire. This is part
of the doctrine of normativity.
The cognitive, perceptual mode is knowing. Here once more, each
of the six perceptual forms of consciousness instantiates this
form of intentionality. There is thus a modus cognoscendi expressed
by each perceptual radical in turn, making for a total of six
generic species of knowing. Knowing is as desiring is, a
function of perceptual mind. The intrinsic expression of this
particular mode is given by acoustic memory. Acoustic memory
therefore is the single defining occasion of this mode of
conscious intentionality. The product of acoustic memory will
function as the canonical or sovereign form of knowing. It will
be exemplary of knowing just as the product of haptic memory,
sexual appetition, is of desiring.
Conceptual mind is the subject of the creation cycle, which
exists in relation of logical analogy to the messianic cycle.
The conative, conceptual mode is willing. This means that the
three pure conceptual forms, and three forms of unity which are
the conceptual categories depicted in the creation story, all in
turn exhibit the conative, conceptual mode of conscious
intentionality, willing. All six conceptual categories act as
occasions for the manifestation or exemplification of this
conscious process, willing. Of these six expressions of will,
that generated by the conceptual form space is the defining
moment. The idea space is that particular pure conceptual
form which realizes the inherent nature of what we understand by
the term willing.
The cognitive, conceptual mode is believing. Hence, as for
willing, so for believing; there are in all six specific
varieties of the mode of conscious intentionality, belief. That
specific pure conceptual form mind, is the final exemplar of
this form of intentionality. In other words, mind is the
definitive occasion of the intentional process believing. Even
so, all six conceptual categories are occasions for the
instantiation of this process.
That there is a specific mode of conscious intentionality proper
to each gospel, is a major thesis of this essay, and it stems
from the proposition that the four forms of intentionality are
related to time itself, and that the nature of mind is time
'transformed'; the process of one - time - becoming the process
of the other - mind. This last idea, the theory of mind, belongs
to the hermeneutic of The Transfiguration, and
we shall discuss it in the final section of the essay. But there
is yet is another aspect to consider. Each of the four forms of
intentionality we have postulated thus far concern the
conscious. Thus we have considered only that half of the
creation taxonomy and of the messianic series which was
described as being normative. The four forms of
intentionality we have enumerated briefly correspond only to the
normative member of the analogous pairs manifest in the
correlation cycles of 'beginning and end', creation and
salvation, Days and messianic events. These are normative in
virtue of being the intrinsic expressions of value, which in a
given sense, is coterminous with 'God'.
There remain four corresponding modes of intentionality which we
must describe as other-than-conscious, or aconscious. These
arise from both sections of the categories which replicate the
binary paradigm transcendence : immanence, such that the
transcendent, conceptual forms admit three corresponding forms
of unity, which appear to us as virtually immanent, and the
three normative perceptual modes which are the three phenomenal
forms of memory, admit three forms of imagination, which
correlatively, are ostensibly transcendent. It is this aspect or
order of consciousness we see portrayed consistently as
ambiguous, and precisely the texts which so demonstrate it,
whether creation rubrics, messianic miracles or healing
miracles, which complete the account. The modes of
intentionality will, desire, knowing and believing, therefore
are each alike determinants of our conscious life. However, they
each have a corresponding or complementary mode, an aconscious
parallel. It is now necessary to give a summary account of each
case, that is, of each form of intentionality which is the
aconscious mode or form of intentionality corresponding to its
conscious counterpart.
The reckoning here with the fourfold structure of the gospel is
overtly psychological-epistemological. It diverges fundamentally
from previous methods resting upon historical reasoning, 'the
history of the tradition', to reckon with the form and nature of
the gospel. We stress again and again that the same,
psychology-epistemology, remains identical with Christology. The
task of explicating mind, that is logos, the word, is indistinguishable from
that of the doctrine of the identity and work of the Son. Hence
no apology is made, nor need be made for the method pursued in
this essay. It is overtly and irreducibly Christological
in its basic premise, that of the identification of the Son with
the phenomenon mind or consciousness itself.
The formal intention in the isomorphism of the two textual
cycles therefore squares with the fact that the normative
occasions of conceptual and perceptual mind are just that;
normative. Further modes of intentionality will be superfluous
to need. So to the explication of haptic imagination, and indeed
of any other radical of consciousness which is not an intrinsic
bearer of value, in other words, which is non-normative, the existing
modes of consciousness are more than adequate. Hence all four
modes of aconscious
intentionality are capable of exposition in terms of the extant
elemental, radical, simple, normative modes, to wit: desiring, willing, believing, and knowing. These forms of
conscious intentionality are equal to the task of explicating
the modes of aconscious intentionality. Such is implicit in the
apparent duplication of the form and content of the narratives.
There is really no better way than this to explicate this aspect
of the doctrine of mind which we encounter in Genesis and the
gospel.
2
THE ACONSCIOUS
In keeping with the parallel metaphors before us, those of
light/darkness, and sun : moon, or day : night, (morning :
evening), and so on, we will expect that each of the four forms
of conscious intentionality has its analogous aconscious form.
In practical terms, the former, the conscious modes, function as
analogues of the four seasons of the solar cycle; the latter,
the aconscious modes are analogous to the phases of the lunar
cycle, which again has four distinct point-instants. These
figures need not restrict the hermeneutic in that they will form
a procrustean bed. They serve as hermeneutical prompts or cues.
Thus for example, we shall argue that the time of The
Transfiguration is congruent with the interval midday, due
to the prevalence of the solar imagery in the texts, and the
clear reference to the Day 1 rubric. This is warranted by the
analogy which allows us to assign optic semeia to the various
members of the series, and to extrapolate the theology of
perception to the theology of the conceptual mind. In pressing
the details of another analogy, that regarding the
correspondence between waking conscious life, and the diurnal
intervals during which the light is increasing up to the point
of its zenith, represented by midday, and so by Transfiguration,
and following this, formulating the analogy between the miracle
at the wedding at Cana and the period centred about midnight, we
shall put that the haptic memory constitutes a radical of mind,
which due to its representative intentional mode, desire,
structures the conscious order, and that correspondingly the
haptic imagination by dint of the intentional mode proper to it,
rightly belongs to the aconscious. There are very many and
different aspects of temporal periodicity to which these same
structures and their semeia are relevant. Thus the normative
radicals, with which we have first dealt until now, include the
three perceptual centers of mind which are its memory, and which
are given in the mandala by the nocturnal optika, all belong to
the conscious order.
A second point should be made a propos of nomenclature. A
battery of theories of mind and hence doctrines of the
other-than-conscious mind exist. The idea originated in
antiquity, and as we shall see in the history of ideas in the
west, is at least as old as Aristotle. The sheer variety of
terms used to refer to this other-than-conscious mind may seem
bewildering: unconscious, subconscious, nonconscious are just
some. Here the use of the term aconscious is intended to
emphasise the independence of the present hermeneutic. No system
whether of Aristotle or Whitehead will be adopted here; instead
various components from various systems or epistemologies will
be used in the hermeneutic. The fundamental source for the
doctrine put here remains biblical, as must necessarily be so
for any epistemology/psychology which purports to be also a
Christology.
Essentially, the above argument concerning the normative
conceptual forms, and the normative forms of sentience, also
describes the conscious mind, and its modes of (conscious)
intentionality. That is, those radicals which are the
intrinsic or normative bearers of value constitute the
conscious intentional mind. Thus the conceptual form space is in
a certain sense responsible for the intentional mode will, even
though each of the remaining five conceptual forms are occasions
for the expression of this same process. We shall refine further
on the relationship just denoted by the term 'responsible for'.
We have described this close tie between the radical of
consciousness and the intentionality as sovereign or canonical.
The specific kind of willing generated by the conceptual form
space, is definitive for that particular mode of intentionality.
So the other occasions of willing also have about them something
of this 'spatial' expression of the conation. That is, the other
forms of willing all accept as their model or parent, what is
definitively given in the case of the relation between the will
and the conceptual form space.The same applies to the cognitive
conceptual mode. Thus whereas mind is the radical or categoreal
occasion of the process we denote by the words 'believing' and
'faith' and so on, but the remaining five conceptual forms share
or adapt this. So if the concept of the body, or yet again, the
concept of the symbolic masculine can and do act as the
conceptual form space does in their particular expressions of
will, then all of the remaining five conceptual forms take their
cue from one particular conceptual form, that of mind, in their
expression of the intentionality of belief. So the idea of space
generates a particular species of belief, even though this is
not the canonical and sovereign expression of this particular
mode.
The same applies to the perceptual consciousness. Acoustic
memory defines knowing, just as haptic memory defines desire.
But the other five perceptual radicals of consciousness manifest
these same modes in varying degrees. The last qualification is
necessary, because it admits to consideration the various
hierarchies; hierarchies of will, of faith, of knowing, and of
desire. But the details of that need not here concern us. We
must rather address the other half of the doctrine of mind. This
is the theory of the aconscious. We shall deal with it in fairly
summary form in order to present the categoreal schema in its
entirety, which will later call for comment in relation to the
study of specific gospels, and other texts of both canons. The
picture thus far may be briefly summarised as follows:
But this image says nothing of that half of the creation
narrative consisting of Days 4, 5, and 6, accounting for
the forms of unity, just as it omits half of the messianic
miracles, the three miracles of 'virtual transcendence',
accounting for the three forms of imagination. The components of
mind addressed in these narratives must also be acknowledged,
for they are indissolubly linked with other members of their
kind within their series, and with their correlates belonging to
the alternate series. We must therefore represent
iconographically the full coherence of the structural patterns
of 'beginning' and 'end'; both as these are within themselves,
and as they are in relation to one another. The above image must
be inclusive of the radicals constituting the aconscious. We
shall revisit here several important factors which have to do
with time, which we have already engaged, and yet again with the
'sign of Jonah' saying.
Firstly as to time, let us note that indeed only one half of the
annual cycle is represented above by the conscious, that is,
normative, order of mind as portrayed in the texts. We are
utilising the template of the annual cycle due to the analogous
relationship between the seven Days of the archaeological week,
and the seven teleological messianic events. We have reduced the
'hebdomad', mentioned repeatedly in Hebrews in connection with
the 'rest' of 'God', and this is central to the further
interpretation of 'the sign of Jonah' and the link between the
aconscious and death, the latter being suggested by the logion as well as by the
references in Hebrews to kata/pausi/n. That is, we have opted to deal
initially with Days of creation proper, and messianic miracles
proper, leaving out of consideration for the sake of simpilcity
the Sabbath-Eucharist parallels. The optic semeia signify each
of the six members in both sixfold categories, conceptual and
perceptual. These they arrange representatively
according to the analogy, the isomorphism, obtaining between the
two narrative cycles. So for example, the 'first' optic 'sign',
the first member of the visible spectrum, 'red', indicates both
the conscious conceptual radical space, tantamount to the event
of beginning itself, and the aconscious perceptual radical
acoustic imagination. It does so indistinguishably. This solves
one immediate problem, the representation of a total of
twelve entities, since there are only six semeioptika in all, as
we have omitted the Sabbath-Eucharist initially for the sake of
simplicity.
First however it is essential to stress the presence in the
iconographical model of the four cardinal point-instants. These
are correlates to the specific ratios of conscious to aconscious
orders in the gospels. We are firstly not as
concerned with the Pneumatological categories. They indicate
most importantly the process or graded transition from an
initial to a final point-instant. They are these initial and
final point-instants in the annual temporal cycle which,
following the hermeneutic of Ezekiel 1 and 10 and subsequently
those portions of The Apocalypse already cited, indicate for us
the variation in the ratio of diurnal to nocturnal intervals, as
they indicate the two solstices and the two equinoxes. They
stand for the four cardinal point-instants of the year
representatively of the gospels in their variation from one
another. Their interpretation a propos of the doctrine of
intentionality regards the division of consciousness into two
orders: conscious and aconscious. As already put in the above
iconography, that particular half of the annual cycle
represented, signifies the conscious order. We have called it
normative, since in every case, the three members of either of
its halves are logically unequivocally defined in terms of the
categoreal paradigm, transcendence : immanence.
This means that the conscious mind is not simply the business of
the pure conceptual forms, which would involve relegating the
perceptual to a second rank. The perceptual forms of memory, and
these include the haptic, which is responsible for the
intentional mode desire, are constitutive of the conscious to an
equal degree as are the pure conceptual forms. In other words,
the conscious order is signified by the entire spectrum of
semeioptika; it includes the signs for the nocturnal as well as
the diurnal intervals. There is no direct analogical equation
between day : night as analogous to conscious : aconscious, a
process which will be repeated in the aconscious itself, which
likewise will consist of the full spectrum of signifiers. This
designation of the aconscious must be read against the
temporal references in 'the sign of Jonah logion', and are
seminal to the theology of death, that is, to eschatological
doctrine. Both the doctrine of intentionality and
its origins in the radical constituents of mind as delivered to
us in the creation taxonomy and the gospel narratives, are vital
to understanding time and the theology of death, or what is the
same thing, Christian eschatology.
Thus in the above paradigm we have applied the diurnal-nocturnal
division of the messianic miracles, or again, what is the same,
the 'morning and evening' pattern of the Days. This
representation has resulted in an equal division of the
conscious order in terms of both the conceptual and the perceptual. The
immanent messianic miracles replicate the three analogues to the
half of the twenty-four hour cycle in which the light is
diminishing, whereas Days 1, 2 and 3 of creation stand as the
diurnal intervals of the same. The point to note here is then
that the figure of day-night is not mapped tout court directly onto
the division conscious-aconscious, as if it were simply a matter
of the difference between 'waking and sleeping' orders of mind
or consciousness. For both are signified as present in the
conscious, day and night, morning and evening. This makes for a
much subtler doctrine. But even though the diurnal-nocturnal
twenty-four hour cycle is indispensable to the final designation
of both conceptual and perceptual categories by the semeioptika, the overarching template
is not that of the diurnal-nocturnal. For the very good reason
that the sevenfold schema will not at once fit squarely into the
twelvefold, nor will it execute the hermeneutic of the precisely
fourfold division of the gospel.
Those semeioptic signifiers in the above diagram which denote
the perceptual conscious do indeed simultaneously mark nocturnal
intervals so portrayed in the stories of immanent messianic
miracles. Additionally, the semeioptika proper to the three
transcendent miracles which are correlated with the three
transcendent rubrics of the creation story denoting the three
pure conceptual forms, logically serve to assign the latter to
specific diurnal intervals as well as to the corresponding
quarter of the annual cycle, that of summer. But the more
important function here served by the semeioptika of the
perceptual conscious is to figure the spring quarter. In effect
then, we have first to reckon with the fourfold pattern of the
annual cycle. The two quarters of which represented above
depicting the conscious order in terms of the annual cycle, are
thus those of spring and summer. In either case the initial
phase is of the same type, conative, and the final phase also,
for it is cognitive. The graded transition is in both cases from
conative to cognitive as for the forms of intentionality.
Here then we have put in summary iconographical form the very
first part of the doctrine of intentionality or consciousness.
We have introduced the four elemental, normative modes of
intentionality, as they are affiliated with their normative
radicals or categories, and associated these with the four
cardinal point-instants of the annual temporal compass. These
are desire, knowing, will and belief, which are innately
linked with the categories haptic
memory, acoustic
memory, space
and mind respectively.
As simple as it may seem, there is a great deal of information
in the above iconography, and we must add yet more to it in
order to set out in its entirety the categoreal schema as this
applies to the doctrine of intentionality, the form of the
gospels, and the beginnings at least of a Christian
understanding of time, including eschatological doctrine. What
remain to be added now are the six categories which delineate
the aconscious order. These are as follows:
We must now outline some of the major issues concerning the
aconscious, and its relation to the conscious. We need to recall
that in the case of the pure conceptual forms, transcendence is
thorough, pure, unmitigated. These entities absolutely and
unequivocally transcend the corresponding immanent occasions in
which they are also co-opted; namely mind : body, male : female,
space : time, and these are ambiguous, ambivalent, equivocal as
to the categoreal distinction, transcendence : immanence. That
is, they are immanent occasions of what are otherwise
transcendent entities, and so they manifest transcendence
ambivalently. They are non-normative, and extrinsic as to the
axiological functioning of mind. The identity of mind, consists
in its absolute transcendence of the form of unity mind : body.
So whereas mind in itself persists, there can be no body in
itself, that is, no body which is without mind. The same applies
to the neighbouring pure conceptual forms, the symbolic
masculine and space.
Now the corollary characteristic equivocation applies to the
forms of imagination in respect of immanence. For immanence
proper is the necessary conjunction of memory and
imagination. Here conjunction is normative. Thus just as
there is no memory without imagination, whether it be haptic,
optic, or acoustic, there may be imagination in each of these
modes of sentience, which at least seeks the transcendence of
memory. The forms of imagination are therefore transcendent
versions of what are otherwise irreducibly immanent entities -
the modes of sentience. Like the forms of unity, which are not
truly, not purely transcendent, the forms of imagination are
neither truly nor purely immanent. As such they too are
non-normative expressions of their native forms of value; they
express their values extrinsically.
Both these taxa of
radicals the forms of unity and the forms of imagination,
inhabit a twilight world where their definition according to the
categoreal paradigm is problematic; for they manifest features
of both transcendence and immanence, or what is the same thing,
they confer real ambiguity upon consciousness. We therefore
described the former as categories of 'virtual transcendence',
and the latter as categories of 'virtual immanence'. They are
essential to the comprehensive Christian understanding of the
nature of consciousness, just as they are to Christology.
Now this ambiguity thus must be a primary feature of aconscious
mind. For everything we have previously discussed in relation to
the intrinsic conscious mind was recognisably either
unambiguously transcendent - the pure conceptual forms, or
unambiguously immanent - the forms of memory. Hence the first
thing to note concerning the Christian doctrine of mind which is
other than conscious mind, is its characteristic ambiguity, its
paradoxical nature. We have emphasised this at every turn in the
discussion of the forms of unity and the forms of imagination.
The radicals mind : body, masculine : feminine, space : time,
the three forms of unity, and haptic imagination, optic
imagination and acoustic imagination, the three forms of
imaginal sentience, impart to mind everything that can be
subsumed under the description 'ambiguous'. We shall further
elaborate upon this ambiguity later.
Before we approach the issues surrounding the aconscious forms
of intentionality, we must clarify one thing concerning the
relation of both the conscious and aconscious forms of
intentionality to the radicals of mind - the three conceptual
forms, the three forms of unity, the three forms of memory and
the three forms of imagination. In other words, what is the
precise relation of the various forms of intentionality to these
twelve constituent entities of mind? We previously indicated
this relation by saying that the radicals are responsible for
the forms of intentionality. It is necessary to elaborate this
relationship. We have already indicated also that a special
relationship obtains between a specific radical and a specific
mode of intentionality, for example, that between haptic memory
and desire, or acoustic memory and knowing, or space and will,
or mind and belief. Such a special relationship is denoted by
the words 'canonical' or 'sovereign'. But This does not prevent
that the same form of intentionality covers all six members of
its class, meaning that there are in all six generic occasions
or expressions of each, desire, knowing, willing and believing,
identifiable on the basis of the relative categories.
It may seem from the previous content that one mode of
intentionality is exclusively specific to just one of the twelve
radicals. That is because the series of six radicals, now
conceptual, mental, or ideal, and now sentient, perceptual, or
physical, establish a hierarchy among themselves in response to
the intentional modes. The radicals are one or the other; either
conceptual or physical. There are just six of each; and even
though we must be alert to the ambiguous nature of the three
forms of unity and the three forms of imagination, for they do
not stand as clearly and certainly as transcendent and immanent
respectively, they are nonetheless members of those very
categories. Taxonomically at the first level, the forms of
imagination are immanent as belonging to the perceptual
polarity, and just so, the forms of unity are transcendent as
belonging to the conceptual polarity. This logical fact does not
contravene their innately equivocal disposition. It entails the
recognition that perceptual forms of intentionalityand
conceptual forms of intentionality apply indiscriminately as to
the division between the conscious and aconscious.
This means that every one of the conceptual elements of mind,
the three pure conceptual forms and no less, the three forms of
unity, adopts a certain conceptual mode of intentionality. Thus
in the case of belief, a particular variety of belief will be
the product of each of these six entities. There will be a total
of six different species of belief, each one pertaining to
a particular transcendent category - mind, masculine,
space, mind : body, male : female, space : time. The same will
apply for all modes of intentionality, whether of the conscious
or aconscious order. And since there are two conscious modes of
intentionality relative to the conceptual polarity of mind -
namely belief and will - and yet another two, the two
aconscious intentional modes of the conceptual order, which we
are yet to discuss, there will be twenty four such categories.
There will be twenty four expressions of the conceptual mind;
the product of the four modes of intentionality, two conscious
and two aconscious, and the six conceptual forms.
The same applies to perceptual mind. We have introduced only the
two modes desire and knowing, which are the property of the
sentient or physical polarity of mind. These are both conscious
forms of intentionality. Thus we shall have to reckon with six
archetypal forms of desire, and six archetypal forms of knowing.
And furthermore, after we will have elaborated the modes of
intentionality which are aconscious rather than conscious, there
will be similarly six of one type and again six of another, for
there are two aconscious modes of intentionality which
correspond to the conscious modes.
If therefore the above discussion gave the impression that there
was one only 'archetypal' form of desire, for example, that
notion must be discarded. Haptic memory establishes a centre of
consciousness which presents itself as the 'archetypal' form of
desire. In terms of a hierarchy of desire, such a contention is
tenable. There is a sense in which haptic memory is the
definitive form of desire. But another five expressions of the
same mode of intentionality, resting on the other five sentient
radicals of consciousness, exist. There are six archetypal forms
of desire, and the erotic as established by the single radical
haptic memory, is hierarchically at least, the paragon of these.
The same applies in each case. Thus where we spoke of belief
vis-à-vis the radical mind, any impression that this is the only
occasion of belief must be corrected. It is not. There are in
all six such occasions, for there are six entities comparable to
mind, the six categories of transcendence. Mind is the occasion
of belief to an ultimate degree, just as haptic memory is the
physical radical expressive of desire to the highest degree.
This is the doctrine of the hierarchy of forms. We should be
aware of this in the following discussion and as applying to the
previous one. For whether conscious forms of intentionality or
aconscious forms of the same is at stake, the result is the
same. Every mode of intentionality has six expressions according
to the doctrine of mind given in the creation and salvation
theologies, the stories of 'beginning and end'.
But equally, every mode of intentionality organises either the
six conceptual categories or the six perceptual categories
hierarchically. This organisation institutes the basis of the
serial orders we find in the creation story and the messianic
series. It provides our method in establishing the aconscious
modes of intentionality. So we are about to examine the two
sentient modes haptic imagination and acoustic imagination, and
the two forms of unity soma
(mind : body) and space : time, with a view to understanding the
Christian doctrine of the aconscious. These four categories all
share the common axiological basis of being non-normative. They
do not express their respective forms of value intrinsically. So
according to the hierarchy of forms, they define the parameters
of the various modes of aconscious intentionality. We need to
understand the texts delineating these four radicals. These
include the two passages from the creation series and the two
messianic miracle stories; but equally the four pericopae within
the Markan healing miracles whose subjects are the same four
radicals. These stories we have in part already examined, they
are: The Deaf Mute Boy (Mark 9.14-28) - acoustic
imagination; The Leper (1.40-45) - haptic imagination; The
Haemorrhagic Woman (5.24b-34) - space : time; and Jairus'
Daughter (5.21-24a, 35-43) - mind : body.
It is necessary to recall here the rationale for the precise
number of modes, and the number of exemplary or paradigmatic
occasions of these - just four. We mean of course by the latter,
the fact that each of the four modes, whether conscious or
aconscious, has one and only one paramount expression or
occasion, one sovereign or canonical exemplification. In the
case of desire, this is the perceptual category haptic memory as
noted; in the case of belief it is the conceptual form
mind.These are the two conscious Christological forms of
intentionality. If in all there are four modes of conscious
intentionality and an equal number of modes of aconscious
intentionality, the tally will be eight. This means that each
subset or class of three radicals has only two definitive or
paradigmatic occasions. Thus in the case of the pure conceptual
forms, that is mind, symbolic masculine and space, there are
only two forms of intentionality, namely will and belief, which
express one of these radicals to the utmost degree. We have
presented the argument that for belief, this is mind. This
means, that mind is the ultimate occasion for the mode of
(conscious) intentionality belief.
Mind, as conceptual form, or pure idea, supplies the process of
belief with its definitive reality. The other pure conceptual
form from this triad, space, is the occasion for the canonical
expression of will. So we must emphasise that one of the three
radicals, here pure conceptual forms, does not express a given
intentional mode to its maximum. For where there are in all
three radicals, there are only two intentional modes capable of
definition to such a degree. In each subset, that radical
exempted from the final or definitive expression of a mode of
intentionality is depicted more or less as a copy of another. So
in the previous example, the Day 3 rubric, that of the symbolic
masculine, we have a text which follows fairly closely that of
Day 2. The same motif water, and the same concept spatial
expansiveness, recur. In the gospels, correspondingly we have
the two miracles at sea, with the apparent 'copy' being that of
The Stilling Of The Storm. In the feeding miracle series,
one event, The Feeding Of The Four Thousand, again
appears ostensibly at least, as a copy of the prior miracle of
loaves and fish.
A major part of the explication of this apparent 'copying', or
'duplication' of a rubrical text or messianic miracle story has
to do with the fact that the hierarchical organisation of the
eight modes of intentionality always leaves one member in each
subset unaccounted for in terms of the formal tetradic character
of the modes themselves, a topic to which we shall return in the
later discussion of the Pneumatological texts. Of course in each
case there is always an initial member, a radical least
expressive of the particular mode of intentionality. So in the
previous example, that of belief, space is the mental occasion
least susceptible of this very mode of consciousness for its
class, that of pure conceptual forms. There is some variance,
some real difference, as between conation and episteme, so also
between the conceptual forms space and mind. The conceptual
radical space is properly and canonically suited to the
intentionality of willing; that of mind to believing. The
symbolic masculine supersedes space in its degree of
fittedness to belief, and finally mind constitutes the final
definitive occasion for the same process, belief. Where however
will is concerned, the process is reversed. For here the
conceptual form mind establishes only an initiating opportunity
and the one least susceptible of the actual process willing,
according to its taxonomic status. It is superseded by the
conceptual form symbolic masculine, which is in turn superseded
by the conceptual form space.
The conceptual form symbolic masculine thus once again remains
betwixt and between; for in neither process, that of belief nor
that of will, does it achieve the final expression of the mode
of intentionality. Hence the apparently 'duplicate' radicals of
consciousness - the symbolic masculine, male : female, optic
memory and optic imagination - whose texts look so much like
doubles of an original, these elements remain incapable of
expressing either end of the hierarchic spectrum, conative or
cognitive, to their maximum degree. They do not constitute
either the initial nor final phase of the triadic relations
between intentional forms.
The first of the texts we must review we have already discussed
at length, those of The Transfiguration Of Jesus,
and The Leper. The intention of these is the same - the
portrayal of the centre or radical of consciousness we refer to
as haptic imagination. So it is most appropriate here, at the
outset of proposing the doctrine of the aconscious, to list the
entire twelvefold series of healing miracles in its relations to
the categories of Days and messianic events.
THE TWELVE CATEGOREAL
HEALING MIRACLES
We have already utilised stories of healing in this study, even
those from the gospel of John. Because both cycles mesh as to
the categories of transcendence and immanence, this is a
standard part of our procedure. In understanding the theology of
the aconscious, the healing miracle series comes very much to
our assistance. For this cycle accepts as its premise the
entirety of the two related cycles, 'beginning and end'. Mark's
twelve or so healing miracle stories replicate the categories of
both cycles - creation and salvation. There are six such
narratives which deal with perceptual consciousness, and six
which reformulate the categoreal forms of the Genesis narrative.
We referred previously to the first set, they are as follows:
1.
The Series Of Healing Miracles - Perceptual
The Cleansing Of A Leper (Mark 1.40-5) - haptic imagination
The Man With A Withered Hand (3.1-6) - haptic memory
A Deaf And Dumb Man (7.32-37) - acoustic memory
A Blind Man At Bethsaida (8.22-26) - optic imagination
The Boy With An Unclean Spirit (9.14-29) - acoustic imagination
Blind Bartimaeus (10.46-52) - optic
memory
2.
The Series Of Healing Miracles - Conceptual
The six miracle stories which reiterate the categoreal forms of
the creation narrative, that is the conceptual consciousness are
as follows:
The Man With An Unclean Spirit (Mark 1.21-28) - space
The Paralytic (2.1-12) - mind
The Gerasene Demoniac (5.1-20) - symbolic masculine
Jairus' Daughter (5.21-24a, 35-43) - mind : body
The Haemorrhagic Woman (5.24b-34) - space : time
The Syrophoenician Woman's Daughter - (7.24-31) - symbolic feminine (male : female)
The only miracle story omitted from the above lists is that of Simon
Peter's Mother-In-Law, (Mark 1.29-31), which is uncommonly
cursory, even for Mark. Effectively it counts as a preamble to
the summary or general statement about healing (Mark 1.32-34),
of which there are other examples in the gospel. The story of Peter's
Mother-In-Law could be seen as a statement of the category
of the symbolic feminine. However it is preferable to leave it
from reckoning due to its brevity, and its dependence on the
healing-summary type of statement. An argument for its inclusion
in the gospel of Mark, which attends to the fact of a deliberate
editorial parallel between the first three episodes, The
Demoniac In The Synagogue, Simon Peter's-Mother-In-Law,
and The Leper, with the later tripartite catena
consisting of The Gerasene Demoniac, Jairus'
Daughter, and The Haemorrhagic Woman, will reveal
that Peter's Mother-In-Law, and The Demoniac In The
Synagogue, have together been edited with this same catena
in mind. The editing of The Leper appears to have
departed from this procedure, it may have been edited earlier
still. But at any rate The Mother-In-Law of Peter
is possibly an early attempt to itemise or include within the
twelvefold schema, an event typologically and taxonomically
representative of the category symbolic feminine. The later
story of The Syrophoenician Woman, which stands apart
from the catena, while obviously belonging to it, better
fulfills this purpose. Hence, we omit from consideration the
former, especially due to its brevity, accepting in lieu of it,
The Syrophoenician Woman as the theological text which
proposes the category symbolic feminine.
HAPTIC IMAGINATION
And he called to him the multitude with his
disciples, and said to them, "If any man would come after me,
let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me. For
whoever would save his life will lose it; and whoever loses
his life for my sake and the gospel's will save it. For what
does it profit a man, to gain the whole world and forfeit his
life? For what can a man give in return for his life? For
whoever is ashamed of me and of my words in this adulterous
and sinful generation, of him will the Son of man also be
ashamed, when he comes in the glory of his Father with the
holy angels." (Mark 8.34-38)
"Truly, I say to you, there
are some standing here who will not taste death before they
see ( i!dwsin)
that the kingdom of God has come with power. " (Mark 9.1)
And there appeared to them Elijah with Moses; and they were
talking (sollalou~ntev)
to Jesus. And Peter said to Jesus, "Master (r(abbi/), it is well
that we are here; let us make three booths, one for you and
one for Moses and one for Elijah." For he did not know (ou) ga\r h!//?dei) what
to say, for they were exceedingly afraid. And a cloud
overshadowed them, and a voice came out of the cloud, "This is
my beloved Son (o( ui(ov
mou o( a)gaphto/v); listen to him." (a)kou/ete au)tou~, vv
4-7)
So they kept the matter to themselves, questioning (suzhtou~ntev) what (ti e)stin) the rising
from the dead meant. And they asked him, "Why do the
scribes say that first Elijah must come?" (vv 10-11)
If we revert time and time again to the text of The
Transfiguration, that is because it is basic to
Christology and hence to the doctrine of mind. Clearly the
tradition was important in the eyes of the early church, for
which reason we have a version of it in an epistle (2 Peter
1.16-18). In a previous discussion of the pericope, part 2 of
the second part of Miracles
As Metaphysics: A Hermeneutic of Mark, 2 TheMessianic Miracles: A
Hermeneutic, we spoke of 'Desire
Versus 'Desire'?' That discussion drew comparisons
between both Christologies, The Transformation of Water Into
Wine, and The Transfiguration. The encapsulation
of the second term in inverted commas was intended to redefine
the concept of desire in the light of haptic imagination as
opposed to its formulation in haptic memory. It was also our
first foray into the question before us - that of the mode of
(aconscious) intentionality proper to haptic imagination.
Such a comparison stems from the obvious complementarity of the
two Christological miracles. Both narratives gravitate about the
concept of love, and Mark's reference to Jesus as "my beloved
Son" (or "my Son, my/the Beloved") make this all the more plain
(Mark 9.7). To understand part of the first Christology
contained in the story of the miracle at Cana is to understand
the psychology of desire, since this is the normative member of
the pair haptic memory-haptic imagination, and the normative
occasion of desire proper, so the same is true of the latter.
For the concept of love stands as a common denominator for both
Christological miracles, and identifies their shared axiological
identity. It acts as a major signifier of haptic mind in its
entirety. For that reason we introduced the theme of desire in
the previous study.
Haptic
Imagination Desiring
The mode of intentionality, desire, is effectively one of the
conscious mind, because it belongs essentially to those radicals
of consciousness which are normative as to value, and are
intrinsically immanent: haptic memory, optic memory and acoustic
memory, in degrees of a graded hierarchy. As for desire itself,
it is appropriated by the aconscious radicals - here haptic
imagination - even though its origins are in the conscious form,
haptic memory. This will be the case for every mode of
intentionality, a fact which we have constantly emphasised.
There will thus be conscious and aconscious forms of both desire
and knowing, even where these two modes of intentionality are
proper to the conscious itself. Conversely, the conceptual
modes, will and belief, belong as conscious forms of
intentionality, to the conscious - that is to the normative
occasions of transcendence, the three pure conceptual forms.
Nevertheless, the three forms of unity also appropriate these
modes. The conceptual aconscious, the three radicals mind :
body, space : time, and male : female, function as occasions for
the conscious modes - both will and belief. The perceptual
aconscious does the same vis-a-vis the conscious perceptual
modes - knowing and desiring. The mode of 'desire' proper to
haptic imagination is clear - it is the desire for purity of the
kind manifested here, as elsewhere in the literature, under the
figure of 'garments' (ta\
i(ma/tia Mark 9.3) of Jesus, the figure for the skin.
The 'derma', the body's external 'covering' ('tent') is the haptikon or haptic semeion
for this radical of perceptual mind. We instinctively associate
the skin with touch, and so with purity and impurity. What this
pericope articulates as a Christology of transcendence and the
meaning of the figure 'the Son of man', which we have equated
with the symbolic masculine, evokes the fullest scope of
religious aspiration, the cost of which is the forfeiture of
secular goods, one's family, and everything subsumable
under the headings 'life' and 'the whole world'. Conscious
desire simpliciter
which pertains to the radical haptic imagination is nothing less
than the quest for self-realisation in self-transcendence. It is
the desire for purity, the desire which sits at the heart of a
variety of religious traditions, in a sense, the least of which
must be either Judaism or Islam precisely because of their lack
of just such ascetic idealism, and their consequent commitment
by default to forms of secular idealism. I do not mean to
suggest that Judaic traditions were and are not concerned with
purity and impurity. Indeed they were and remain so
pre-occupied. But clearly the miracle story here speaks of the
transcendence of the erotic form of appetition. There is all too
little evidence of such a concern in either religious system,
Judaisms or the Islam traditions, equivalent to its prevalence
in Christianity.
Thus the desire which stems from haptic imagination as the
desire for purity, is explicitly given in both miracle stories,
The Transfiguration and The Leper. The form of
actual desire, desire simpliciter which is the product
of haptic imagination is certain and a recognisable trend within
both major Eastern religious traditions, those of Sanatana
Dharma and Buddhism. The phrase 'the multitude with his
disciples' certainly has something about it of the
universalistic. It should be taken with the mention in the
miracle story itself of the two personae 'Elijah with
Moses'. Such personae
were ready at hand to a writer steeped in the Judaic religion,
and if neither can be said to represent the ascetic tradition,
so inimical to mainstream Jewish religion with its emphasis on
marriage and the family, then that initial problem is overcome
by the later elision of John the baptiser first with Elijah and
next with 'the Son of man' (9.11-13). For John is nothing short
of peremptorily ascetic. Mark's narrative, The
Baptism Of Jesus (Mark 1.9-11), which includes the
ascription to Jesus of the same title "my beloved Son" (or "my
Son, my/the Beloved"), thus resonates loudly with The
Transfiguration. The term 'multitudes' (to\n o!xlon) cannot
refer simply to the narrow circle of Judaic religion, just as
Elijah/John the baptiser cannot be restricted in its meaning to
either the mythical figure nor to John, nor to both only. Thus
while haptic imagination is an occasion of desire simpliciter, a desire which
is in one sense the very antithesis of actual, canonical,
sovereign, desire, since it reconfigures the erotic to the point
of subverting it altogether, it is also responsible for a form
or mode of aconscious intentionality which is itself cardinal,
or canonical, and stands in analogous relation to belief as does
the aconscious to the conscious.
The words of this introduction and the miracle story itself
would be prophetic for the Christian tradition in the centuries
to come, with the historical manifestation of this form of
appetition in the monastic traditions of the Christian East and
West, even as The Transformation Of Water Into Wine and
the subsequent Johannine narrative, The Cleansing Of the
Temple would be for the supersession of the same in the
historical event known as the Reformation. But not prophetic
only. For, remarkably enough, just as the combination of Moses
and Elijah portend not only Torah and prophets respectively, as
personae they inhabit juxtaposed domains of past and
future. This introduction therefore, like the meaning of the
actual event, lays claim to the wholesale tendency in human
religious consciousness towards purification and renunciation,
and looks back equally as it looks forward. Both Christological
messianic miracles are momentous then in this respect.
Haptic
Imagination Knowing
We will in a future part of the hermeneutic, delineate the
specific varieties of 'knowing', 'desiring', and so on,
which proper to each of the perceptual radicals. The precise
definition of each and every radical in terms of each of the
four modes of conscious and aconscious intentionality will
assist in their demarcation. Even though that undertaking in
detail lies beyond the scope of this essay, we can see fairly
plainly from the quotations above, replete as they are with
references to discourse, that haptic imagination as a modus cognoscendi or mode
of knowing, is to be linked with those episteme broadly
described by discourse itself; episteme defined as 'linguistic',
'semiotic', 'semantic' and so on. These will constitute the
epistemic (cognitive) range of this perceptual radical,
rendering it consonant with the intentional mode proper to
haptic imagination itself, as we are now about to see.
THE INTENTIONALITY DUE TO
HAPTIC IMAGINATION
Every perceptual radical has its own expression of desire and,
since it has its own expression of knowing, it has thus its own
expression of the desire for reason. The intentional mode of
which haptic imagination is the final expression is thus in a
certain sense one of 'desire', but desire other than, even if
necessarily related to, sexual desire, the product of haptic
memory and the ultimate occasion of desire simpliciter. It is
intimately related to the mode of knowing just referred to.
That aconscious form of intentionality which is specifically the
product of haptic imagination, with its conative quest for
purity, is clearly related to the process of knowing. That is,
its object is "'my beloved Son'" (o( ui(ov mou o( a)gaphto/v). Whitehead puts
it thus: "The ages of faith are the ages of rationalism."
(1930:73) The religious quest, the aspiration for the complete
purification of the self from the self qua actual desire, which inevitably mires it,
has historically existed in tandem with the creative advance of
culture, and the general advance of reason. Religious
institutions in the East and West have historically always been
centres of learning and cultural advancement for this very
reason. The ascetic ideal as the outcome of aconscious affective
intentionality is at its most effective when allied with the
quest for understanding. Nothing so concentrates the mind as a
particular object which stands before it as yet unknown
and which it nevertheless desires with a force equivalent to the
force of sexual desire. All of this is conceived in the story of
the last messianic miracle.
Perhaps no other miracle story raises as many questions as does
this one. It is shrouded in mystery, the very thing envisioned
by the cloud, and yet there is the clearest intention on the
part of the witnesses to comprehend the event, and on the part
of the traditores to convey its meaning, the clearest desire to
know. This then is the effect in the aconscious and conscious
mind of the perceptual radical haptic imagination. It is the
feeling or appetition towards intellectual gratification - the
desire for reason or logos
itself, and for its own sake. Such an entity can be conceived as
the attempt by mind or consciousness to grasp, handle, feel,
touch, prehend things by means of naming them. Language will in
large measure be attributable to this perceptual form, haptic
imagination, just as it will be to the conceptual form mind as
is tacitly given by the identity of the logos from whom the radical
haptic imagination, and mode of intentionality alike, the desire-to-know, both accrue.
Having just previously observed that the normative occasions of
conceptual and perceptual awareness are in all six, and that
furthermore one of each kind of these is clearly given in the
texts as an ostensible duplicate, the one in both cases which
refers to the identity of The Holy Spirit, we know that only
four elemental modes of intentionality occur. The ambiguity
native to the aconscious, and hence to its own modes of
intentionality coupled with these observations, therefore
justifies our description of the mode of aconscious
intentionality proper to haptic imagination in terms which we
have already employed. We can say thus that the desire for
reason itself is the same as the desire-to-know. This is nothing new to
psychology. The first mention of such a form of consciousness
comes in Aristotle, at the very beginning of Metaphysics. That it is
fundamental to Christian doctrine as to practice and further to
culture, is apparent in the story of Jesus' Transfiguration.
This mode of intentionality lends itself to the perceptual
polarity of mind in its entirety. So while its full
exemplification belongs to haptic imagination, in varying
degrees all forms of perceptual mind are capable of its
manifestation, including of course haptic memory. Haptic memory
is not simply concerned with erotic desire. It has its
appropriate form of 'knowing', and consequently must be
susceptible of the intentional mode 'desire-to-know'. The figure
'six' in the introduction of the narrative, reminds us certainly
of the analogous relation between the conceptual and perceptual
radicals of mind, of which there are six each. But it posits
also The Transfiguration itself in its function as
the last of the perceptual forms - haptic imagination - clearly
in context. The serial order of the messianic miracles and the
mention of this figure are together the clearest argument that
the aconscious motivating force portrayed here, the one which
seeks intellectual satisfaction on a par with the erotic
compulsion towards physical gratification, is susceptible of
each and every mode of perceptual consciousness. Thus all six
perceptual episteme, or modus
cognoscendi, each of the six kinds of knowing, is
established is prone to this intentional form. Whatever can be
known, can be desired to be known. The objective content of
knowing is equally susceptible of our intellectual desire.
One aspect of this seriality which can be mentioned here in
passing, relates to a strain of developmental psychology
throughout the gospels. We shall see everywhere in this study
the close connectedness between time and mind. Thus one avenue
for the hermeneutic of the messianic miracles will address the
basic tenet of such psychology - namely that certain forms of
consciousness are given as due to certain phases of one's life.
The placing of the story of Transfiguration last, where it
stands in clear contradistinction to the first event, the
miracle at Cana which roundly posits the reality of sexual love
and the concept of desire simpliciter, not only postulates the
corresponding difference between these as perceptual forms of
consciousness, it posits as well the modes of intentionality
which are their inherent or necessary functions in the
same pattern. Thus if the desire-to-know stands in some sense at
opposite remove from desire itself, that is, if intellectual
desire and sexual desire can be juxtaposed in the serial
organisation of the miracle series, part of its hermeneutic must
raise the issue of the trajectory of the life course, with its
changing emphases. It will be only through time that the entire
spectrum of what interests us as persons will be able to achieve
its fullest satisfaction.
We should enter here a rider against any polemic concerning the
arrogation to older and to aged persons of this mode of
appetition, at the expense of the young. The Daughter Of
Jairus, the healing miracle which clearly connects to The
Transformation Of Water Into Wine, is described as having
been 'twelve years of age' (Mark 5.42). We have stressed that
all immanent radicals of consciousness are necessarily conjunct
with their transcendent complements. This means of course, that
haptic memory must comprise haptic imagination, while the
inverse is not the case. There is no haptic memory sans haptic
imagination. The same applies to the modes of intentionality
which are necessary to the cardinal radicals. The erotic form of
appetition always has its intellectual component. We are
familiar enough with the Old Testament usage in Hebrew of the
verb 'to know' in this sense of 'carnal knowledge' so-called.
That said, we must also allow the complete independence of the
aconscious mode from its correlate. There is, even if it occurs
in a qualified sense, the sense arising from the equivocal,
ambivalent, ambiguous nature of a 'transcendent' member of a
series of categoreally immanent entities, a sense in which
haptic imagination exists in itself, disjunctively from any
trace of haptic memory.
The very same principle applies to modes of intentionality.
Those which are categoreally immanent must obtain in conjunction
with their transcendent counterparts. Accordingly then,
there is in the same sense precisely, a mode of aconscious
intentionality which likewise obtains in itself; this is the
intentional mode the desire-to-know. We shall elaborate this
doctrine as we proceed. Here we encounter the first example of
the four modes of aconscious intentionality which stand as
counterparts to the four conscious modes. Hence sexual desire,
desire proper or simpliciter as we have referred to it,
must be juxtaposed from the point of view of the life-course,
that is of time itself, to the desire-to-know, intellectual
desire. And this entails the complementarity of a conscious form
of intentionality (desire) to an aconscious form
(desire-to-know). The former will prevail as a dominant pattern
of emotive experience during the first stages of one's life, and
the latter during the latter. Such is the obvious delivery of
the arrangement of the miracle stories before us. Even so, it
will be apparent that the former must include the latter
precisely due to immanence. Hence sexual or erotic desire,
necessarily enlists the very form of appetition known as the
desire-to-know, even though the latter can and must persist in
itself and for itself alone. If this seems to obviate its
identity, then so be it. Identity as such belongs to
transcendence, and such identity as immanence is susceptible of,
must always be second order identity compared to that of
transcendence.
We have noted just now the sort of aconscious
intentionality which answers to the description
conative-perceptual. Haptic imagination is defined as
taxonomically or categoreally immanent; even though it involves
non-sensuous perception, and possesses characteristics which
align it with transcendence, it remains determined as immanent,
that is as a perceptual form. Hence the affective or conative
mode proper to it is on a par with that of haptic memory. In the
first place, it is a species or variety of 'desire'. However it
is desire of an order other than erotic desire, being the
desire-to-know. Both expressions 'desire' and 'know' evoke the
perceptual polarity. Desiring simpliciter
and knowing simpliciter
occur in virtue of perception. Moreover, we must concede the
recognition which accords to the initial term of the compound in
the expression 'desire-to-know'. If this is not the same thing
as 'desire' simpliciter,
then neither is it the same thing as 'knowing'. As a species of
desire, it is affective in kind. Knowing is not affective but
cognitive. These points must be made clear. We shall in a
subsequent section of this essay, clarify some of the
differences between the conscious and aconscious with reference
to the ambiguity native to the latter.
This makes our future procedure in the discussion of aconscious
intentionality all the clearer. In establishing the first of the
aconscious forms of intentionality, we have also set down
certain parameters for what is to follow. The remaining three
modes must cohere in conformity with the four forms of conscious
intentionality. This does not mean only that two of the four
with which we are now dealing will function as cognitive and two
as conative. True enough, this pattern obtains for aconscious
modes as it does for the conscious modes. There exists an
appetitive or conative sort in each polarity, conceptual and
perceptual, and correspondingly an intellectual or epistemic
sort of each of the same two kinds.
The aconscious modes will stand in one-to-one relationships with
their counterparts. In the case just noted therefore, desire
subtends to desire-to-know the relationship implicit in the
complementarity of the first and last messianic miracles which
account for the centres of consciousness haptic memory and
haptic imagination respectively. The latter two perceptual modes
are the respective 'beginning and end' of the former, the
intentional modes. Both are 'Christological' modes proper to logos ensarkos, or
perceptual consciousness; the first being a conscious process of
intentionality and the latter an aconscious process.
There are of course two 'Christological' conceptual forms, those
of logos, that is logos asarkos or
transcendent mind, the pure conceptual form, and mind : body,
the form of unity. As for the latter, we can see immediately
that soma or mind :
body is tolerably close to the form of sentience just mentioned,
haptic memory, and that it realises transcendence equivocally.
Due to this ambivalence, comparable to that of the equivocal
realisation of immanence by haptic imagination, it will
determine aconscious mind, and will give rise to a form of
intentionality which must stand to belief just as the
desire-to-know stands to desire. We can on the basis of the
triune structures inherent in both textual cycles, begin to
understand the various relationships between the various
radicals themselves and their proper forms of intentionality.
The relationship of desire-to-know to belief is already entailed
by the clearest relation between haptic imagination and mind.
Both centres of consciousness identify the transcendent Son.
Mind does so unequivocally, that is normatively, since it is a
pure conceptual form. Haptic imagination does so ambiguously as
noted. The modes of intentionality native to these are
respectively the conscious one of believing and the aconscious
one of desiring-to-know. Since both radicals function in their
respective series as identifying the transcendent Son, both can
be signified as above by the same optikon, or optic semeion, that of yellow, or
as we may say 'gold'. It is to this essential relation between
these two psychological modes, that the quotation from Whitehead
about faith and reason also testifies. The relation between
these two particular psychological modes, and others which
likewise conform to the analogy of 'beginning' and 'end',
must later occupy us. Certainly the clearest connectedness each
of these modes maintains with the other will influence our
understanding of them. It may indeed surprise us to realise just
how closely the gospel posits both factors of our psychological
experience. Believing is pictured here as in the very closest
proximity with the phenomenon of intellectual curiosity, that is
with intellectual desire. A fuller examination of the emerging
doctrine of mind will enable us to further put this
relationship, for certainly that is already guaranteed by the
texts, one whose logical foundation is analogy, the method
original to metaphysics.
Other parameters which will have already settled part of our
future course must now be observed. There is simply no need to
introduce more terms. The four radical or cardinal states
of intentionality - knowing, desiring, believing and willing -
are just that. Such must follow from the doctrine of the
normativity of the conceptual forms and perceptual forms
which are their essential exponents. There need be no
unnecessary multiplication of terms. The verbs 'desire' and
'know' denote (conscious) mental processes or forms of
intentionality. We have compounded them to introduce a third
such entity: 'desire-to-know'. We repeat, this is identical with
neither simple (radical) form of intentionality. That is, the
desire-to-know is completely other than either process,
'desiring' or 'knowing'. Nor does it refer to second order
desire so-called by certain schools of contemporary
philosophical psychology. It means what it says:the
impetus given by a perceptual radical of mind, namely haptic
imagination, whose objective is understanding, meaning, in a
word, the Word itself, logov.
Furthermore the term 'desire-to-know' does not posit a special
relationship between the two. That is, it is not another name
for 'desiring and knowing'. We shall assess more clearly this
relationship later. Indeed there is one, for both are pure
perceptual modes. Both concern forms of memory, the first
haptic, the second acoustic, which are normative for their class
or taxon, purely
immanent, (purely perceptual) categories. In every case where
there is a pair of such modes - two pure perceptual modes, two
pure conceptual modes, two modes of imaginal sentience, two
modes produced by the two modal (essential) forms of unity - in
each of these cases, a special relationship obtains. This
devolves upon the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.
Desire-to-know is intelligible as that process which issues in
knowing. There is an emerging pattern at work here, which
involves the interplay between conscious and aconscious
intentional processes, and of which we can speak in terms of
supervenience. One mode supervenes upon another according to the
dictates of the principle of causality. Thus will and desire,
both conscious intentional modes, issue in supervenient
intentional modes belonging to the aconscious. In the present
case case, the desire-to-know is itself aconscious, and its
supervening mode, obviously knowing, is conscious. In a sure
enough sense the initial verb 'desire' is another name for
cause. All conative modes share this feature - all are causal.
To speak of will or of desire, is to speak of the conscious and
aconscious motivating forces in human and subhuman awareness.
The difference is one of the categoreal distinction between
ideas or conceptual forms in the case of will, and percepta in
the case of desire. Party to this self-same difference, is the
temporal vector aboriginal to each. Desire in its elemental,
normative, and therefore conscious occasions, consists in terms
of sentient memory. Its objective is always the retrieval of
some thing, state, property of things, relation and so on. In
other words, it is always clearly the quest for recurrence of
something already settled, actualised, determined. To desire
what in some sense has not already been, is categoreally not
possible. This is already vouched for by 'memory'.
With will, a conative function of conceptual forms, and this
includes the three forms of unity, it is surely otherwise. Will
projects the self forward towards some future end, or state,
which remains not as yet actualised. Pure conceptual ideas are
always of this nature - space, mind and the symbolic masculine -
they are as such, potentialities for consciousness, but no less
real for that. Their corresponding forms of unity lend them
actuality; even so, the transcendent status of the space of
space : time, and the mind of mind : body, and the symbolic
masculine of the anthropic category male : female, ensures that
these ideas are susceptible of will. "Your kingdom come, your
will be done ..." puts with unequivocal ease the true direction
of the purposiveness of the will as opposed to that of desire.
The innate temporal-vectoral quality of will is one of
present-future.
Here then is a fundamental, metaphysical, and psychological
differential between the two conative modes. Accordingly the
optic semiosis represents forms of memory and their
inherent modes of conscious intentionality, knowing and
desiring, by those semeia from one end of the spectrum, the blue
end so-called. The pure conceptual forms along with their own
inherent modes of conscious intentionality, believing and
willing, are signified by semeia from the opposite end, that is
the red end of the spectrum.
But that said, the aconscious modes now before us which
correspond to these, and of which we have reviewed the first,
namely the desire-to-know, throw this differential into doubt,
and effectively reverse it. The ambiguity of the desire-to-know
as to immanence, is equivalent to its ambiguity of vectoral
orientation. For it consists not in keeping with memory, as the
vector past-present, but rather as the word 'imagination' itself
heralds, in keeping with the perspective present-future. This we
normally associate with will. The intention of the
desire-to-know is like will, and like transcendence itself. It
is bound to the realm of the future which exists discretely in
relation to the present. In this manner it contradicts the
intrinsic quality of desire, introducing paradox to mind and
standing as a mode of aconscious intentionality rather than
conscious intentionality:
And a leper came to him
beseeching him, and kneeling said to him, "If you will (qe/lh?v), you can make
me clean." Moved with pity, he stretched out his hand and
touched him, and said to him, "I will (qe/lw): be clean."
(Mark 1.40-42)
The next step will be to discern that mode of aconscious
intentionality which reconfigures the conscious mode, willing.
We can expect this will be a paradox in that its vectoral
quality too will reverse the normative pattern of will. Whatever
this species of aconscious will is, it will be premised on the
vector past-present, which according to the Markan mandala is
innate to the categoreal form, the form of unity space : time.
The conscious intentional mode 'desire' is identifiable as
Christological, as is the aconscious intentional mode, the
'desire-to-know'. There exist other Christological forms of
intentional awareness, one of which of course is believing. This
too will have its corresponding aconscious form, and this will
be likewise pistikos,
a mode of believing. Our next topic however, is not that
particular aconscious mode which reinvents belief. It
concerns instead that aconscious mode of intentionality which
reconstructs the will. Both modes, conscious will and the
aconscious remodelling of the same, identify the Transcendent
("the Father"). Thus whereas belief and desire, and their
aconscious equivalents manifest the Christ, the Son, the various
modes of will and knowing evince Transcendence. We may refer to
the latter as 'Transcendental' for this very reason.
THE INTENTIONALITY DUE TO SPACE : TIME
The
Conceptual Form Of Unity Space : Time
We contended above that will is that form of intentionality
which the synoptists and the fourth evangelist all connect
directly with "the Father", the Transcendent as we prefer to
say, and that equally it was ultimately and pervasively implicit
in the story of creation. The intentional process willing, must
be a function of ideas or conceptual forms, the entities
categorised in the story of the archaeological week. We said in
passing that there is a distinct correlation between will and
space, which supports these same arguments. Thus if the primary
subject of creation qua
'beginning', is the identification of the tri-dimensional
spatial manifold with that very event, then the delivery of our
quotidian experience conforms the philosophical psychology of
the creation theology. Birds fly, fish swim, so goes the general
image of Day 5, which stands in a complementary relation to Day
2, the rubric of 'the heavens' (myima#$@fha), that is space in itself and
for itself. The entire second half of the creation story can be
understood as iconographic of the spatiotemporal manifold, that
is of space-time, since there is no such entity as time in
itself.
There is no mistaking this meaning. The waters above/waters
below division of the Day 2 story is an image of spatial
dimensionality; and with it, the image of the expanse of waters
gathered together in the Day 3 narrative, coheres. Even the Day
1 story, although it does not mention the sun, moon and planets,
for that belongs to its own particular complement, Day 4,
nevertheless speaks of light and darkness, and we can hardly
conceive of these without accordingly imagining 'the heavens'.
Thus all three rubrics in the first half of the narrative
comprise an image of the three dimensional spatial continuum,
and all four rubrics of the second, present an image of movement
and hence time, by which we mean of course space : time. The
seventh Day speaks of the preceding acts of creation in a
summation:
And so the heavens (myima#$@fha) and the
earth with all their adornment were completed.
And on the seventh day God completed the work that he had
done. And on the seventh day he rested from all the work that
he had done.
And God blessed the seventh day and made it holy; because
on it he rested from all his work which God had created by his
action.
This is the origin of the heavens and the earth when they
were created. (Genesis 2.1-4a)
It is not possible to read this without an accompanying sense of
purposive fulfillment, that is of the accomplishment of a plan,
design, the will, on the part of God. Thus the Sabbath rubric
draws together in one whole, the entirety of the prior fiat. If the gospel will
subsequently mark the Eucharist as belonging in kind with the
immanent messianic events, so bringing their tally to four
rather than three, then the proleptic tendency in the creation
narrative, especially its second half, its prospectus towards
'end' which is here depicted as 'rest', at the very least allows
for the kind of relationship which we have urged between these
'last' four Days and the actual, pure, immanent events, which
are the four feeding episodes of the messianic series.
Where then the first three Days signify transcendence, the
Sabbath being reckoned logically as belonging to the second half
of the creation narrative, warrants our reading the second half
of the narrative as a whole, as complementary to the first, and
justifiably as the complementary image of the four-dimensional
spatiotemporal manifold. This redoubles the significance of the
same two entities, transcendent space which exists in itself,
and space : time, for the creation story, since these have
already been the subjects peculiar to the particular pair of
rubrics, Day 2 and Day 5 respectively. The created living forms
- in addition to the planets - all move. This mobility, which
reflects time, reflects likewise the will of the creator, but,
as we shall directly note, will in its aconscious form. There is
no conceptual form other than space which can serve as the very
foundation of this form of intentionality.
Movement is the guarantor of our experience of will, and of a
comparable if not similar experience in animals, particularly
those collected in the Day 5 rubric, birds and fish. The latter
of course move more freely still than we are able to, since for
bipedal humans movement is often confined to a planar surface.
We can of course climb and descend inclines, but in no manner
that compares to the creatures mentioned. Certain migratory
species of these animals furthermore, are capable of traversing
vast distances at particular times of their life-cycles.
Unwittingly or not, the author of the creation narrative could
scarcely have chosen a more fitting image of, a metaphor better
suited to the spatio-temporal continuum than that conveyed by
this rubric. We need to emphasise in close connection with the
distinctions between the categories space and space : time, that
it is the former which instantiates the identity of
Transcendence and which acts as the ground for the intentional
mode, will. If we associate changing the place of a body,
movement, the exercise of the various members of the body for
which they were designed, with the phenomenon of will, we are
doing so in virtue of the intrinsic appurtenance of space to the
temporal order. We have emphatically put that time void of
spatiality does not exist. It is the space of space : time, the
'heavens' of 'heavens and the earth' which ensures the existence
of this intentional mode. So in observing the theme of movement
in the second half of the creation narrative, which in its
fourfold form answers the threefold first half, as immanence
standing in relation to transcendence, and space : time standing
in relation to transcendent space, we should nevertheless not
confuse the finer point. Will proper, will simpliciter, belongs to
transcendent space, and not to space : time. That intentional
mode which obtains by reason of the categoreal nature of the
spatiotemporal order is doubtless a species of will.
Just as the categories haptic memory and haptic imagination
occasion the two intentional forms, desire and desire-to-know
respectively, in every case of an analogous dyad, that which
concerns us being space and space : time, the proper forms of
intentionality will be so related. This combined with the fact
just mentioned concerning causality and supervenient relations
between modes of intentionality already directs what the
hermeneutic should seek to advance our understanding of the
category 'time', or to put it more formally space : time, and
also the question of that specific form of intentionality for
which this category is responsible.
We shall here utilise as elsewhere, that particular one of
Mark's twelve miracle narratives which categoreally nominates
the entity in question. The Haemorrhagic Woman addresses
the conceptual form space : time. To extricate this pericope from its context
is not a simple matter. Mark 5.21-43 bears characteristics of
having been more or less seamlessly composed. The two
narratives, Jairus' Daughter and The Haemorrhagic
Woman are intended to interpret one another. The third
story of a woman (7.24-31) is also somehow involved in this
chain of events. If we attach the story of The Gerasene Demoniac
(5.1-20) to the catena,
then the inclusion of the story of The Syrophoenician Woman
makes even more sense. Just as distinct thematic concerns are
shared by the two central narratives, the first of which the
evangelist interrupts in order to enclose still more closely the
central event, similarly, the two outer events involving The
Gerasene Demoniac and The Syrophoenician Woman
have several key elements in common:
- both cures are exorcistic in type (5.2f cf. 7.25f);
- both exorcisms involve impurity or uncleanness, the
subject of an extended discourse prior to the last miracle
(7.1-8, 14-23) ( 5.2f cf. 7.25f);
- connected to the latter and to the previous discourse
on purity, both healings refer to animals feeding (5.11 cf.
7.27-28);
- on the first occasion Jesus negotiates with the unclean
spirit 'Legion' (5.7-13), and during the later event
he negotiates with the woman herself (7.27-29). This
last member of the chain, The Syrophoenician Woman
thus refers back to the first. In this way, both pericopae, first and
last, present the symbolic masculine. But the first
narrative, the story of The Gerasene Demoniac
is the more exclusively focused on the same. The categoreal
subject of the last exorcism then, is the symbolic
feminine, which, like each of the forms of unity, must
include its transcendent term.
The concepts of gender and sexuality are paramount here. All
four healings in the catena
5.1-7.31 are of a piece; that is, all four events establish a
continuous block in which certain themes close to the Markan
perspective and to his doctrine are central. What is equally
true is that of these four, the narrative of The
Haemorrhagic Woman stands at the zenith so to speak, of
this series of events. If we look at the text, this conclusion
is unavoidable. Thus not only structurally and formally are the
separate incidents so organised as to secure the centrality The
Haemorrhagic Woman, but narrative content itself
also ensures the paramount significance of her healing. The
significance of which we will investigate later on when we come
to the issues surrounding the fourfold form of the gospels. For
we will contend that each of the four conforms to a pattern of
specific intentional modality outlined in this essay. This
healing story, so important to Mark, operates as a virtual
signature text, and is vital to the argument that the gospel of
Mark, like every other gospel, is suffused with one particular
dyad of intentional modal perspectives. For Mark, the conscious
intentional mode of this dyad is knowing; its corresponding
aconscious mode we are about to see. Due to the integration of
these several healing stories, before concentrating on that of
The Haemorrhagic Woman, some general and important observations
are called for.
The
Healing Miracle Stories Which Recapitulate The Three Forms of
Unity - The Spatiotemporal, The Psychophysical And The
Anthropic
Firstly, it is necessary to note, even if summarily, how the
texts reiterate the formal countenance of the actual events they
describe. I am arguing that the formal pattern here is something
like a parabola, whose arms diverge from this peak event. The
Haemorrhagic Woman crowns the chain of events. It stands
as the ultimate point towards which the miracle narratives arch;
beginning with The Gerasene Demoniac, and observing the
link of this with the prior episode, The Stilling Of The
Storm; and from which they then descend, beyond the
intervening text to the story of The Syrophoenician Woman. The
meaning of the healing of The Haemorrhagic Woman, Mark's
figurative representation of the conceptual category space :
time, must then reckon with the following shape of the texts.
The Markan catena of healings which begins at 5.1, and ends only
with The Syrophoenician Woman's Daughter, has as its
climactic point towards which and from which all else is
arranged, the description of the cure in The Haemorrhagic
Woman:
And immediately the haemorrhage ceased; and she
felt in her body that she was healed of her disease. (5.29)
As its apogee this verse determines the structure of the catena in its parabolic or
chiastic outlines:
The
Haemorrhagic Woman (5.24b-34)
For she said, "If I touch even his garments, I shall be
made well." (v 28)
and came up behind him in the crowd and touched his
garment.(5.27)
She had heard the reports about Jesus, (v 27)
and was no better but rather grew worse. (v 26)
and had spent all that she had, (v 26)
and who had suffered much under many physicians, (v 26)
And there was a woman who had had a flow of blood for
twelve years, (v 25)
|
The Haemorrhagic Woman
And Jesus, perceiving in himself that power had gone
forth from him,
immediately turned about in the crowd, and said,
"Who "touched my garments?" (v 30)
And his disciples said to him, "You see the crowd
pressing around you, and yet you say, "Who touched
me?" (v 31)
And he looked around to see who had done it. (v 32)
But the woman, knowing what had been done to her, came
in fear
and trembling and fell down before him, and told him the
whole truth. (v 33)
And he said to her, "Daughter, your faith has made you
well;
go in peace and be healed of your disease." (v 34)
|
Jairus' Daughter
(5.21-24a and vv 35-43)
Jairus'
Daughter
And he went with him. (v 24a)
And a great crowd followed him and thronged about him.
(5.24b)
... and besought him, saying, "My little daughter is at
the point of death.
Come and lay your hands on her, so that she may be made
well, and live." (v 23)
Then came one of the rulers of the synagogue, Jairus by
name; and seeing him, he fell at his feet
... (v 22)
... and he was beside the sea. (v 21b)
And when Jesus had crossed again in the boat to the
other side, a great crowd gathered about
him. (v 21)
Gerasene Demoniac
And he went away and began to proclaim in the Decapolis
how much Jesus had done
for him; and all men marvelled. (v 20)
|
Syrophoenician Woman's
Daughter (7.24-31)
But immediately a woman whose little daughter was
possessed by an unclean spirit,
heard of him, and came and fell down at his feet. (v 25)
Now the woman was a Greek, a Syrophoenician by birth.
And she begged
him to cast the demon out of her daughter. (v 26)
And he said to her,
"Let the children first be fed, for it is not right to
take the children's bread
and throw it to the dogs." (v 27)
But she answered him, "Yes, Lord; yet even the dogs
under the table eat the children's crumbs." (v 28)
And she went home, and found the child lying in bed, and
the demon gone. (v 30)
Then he returned from the region of Tyre and went
through Sidon
to the Sea of Galilee ... (v 31)
|
Gerasene Demoniac and
Syrophoenician Woman's Daughter
Gerasene
Demoniac (5.1-20)
Now a great herd of swine was feeding there on the
hillside; (v 11)
And he begged him eagerly not to send them out of the
country. (v 10)
And Jesus asked him, "What is you name?" He replied, "My
name is Legion;
for we are many." (v 9), "What have you to do with me,
Jesus, Son of the Most High God?
I adjure you by God, do not torment me." (v 7)
And when he saw Jesus from afar, he ran and worshiped
him; (v 6)
And when he had come out of the boat, there met him out
of the tombs a man with an
unclean spirit, (v 2)
They came to the other side of the sea, to the country
of the Gerasenes. (v 1)
|
Syrophoenician Woman's
Daughter (7.24-31)
But immediately a woman whose little daughter was
possessed by an unclean spirit,
heard of him, and came and fell down at his feet. (v 25)
Now the woman was a Greek, a Syrophoenician by birth.
And she begged
him to cast the demon out of her daughter. (v 26)
And he said to her,
"Let the children first be fed, for it is not right to
take the children's bread
and throw it to the dogs." (v 27)
But she answered him, "Yes, Lord; yet even the dogs
under the table eat the children's crumbs." (v 28)
And she went home, and found the child lying in bed, and
the demon gone. (v 30)
Then he returned from the region of Tyre and went
through Sidon
to the Sea of Galilee ... (v 31)
|
The above arrangement of the text is intended to highlight its
parabolic structure. If we accept that the Jairus'
Daughter pericope
has been meaningfully placed around the story of The Haemorrhagic
Woman, then we are led to view the two narratives at the
outermost reaches of the catena,
The Gerasene Demoniac and The Syrophoenician Woman's
Daughter, in the same way. The net result of this is the
emphasis it places on 5.29, the verse detailing the very instant
of the cure of The Haemorrhagic Woman. This makes the
verse fully functional in the sense that its very shape reflects
its meaning, a feat which then extends to the two arms of the
text arching backwards in time and forwards in time from the
same point, the zenith of the parabolic arch, and so comprising
the two exorcistic cures, which do indeed have a very great deal
in common. It indicates what will be for this particular
evangelist an abiding concern, the concept space : time, and its
proper intentional mode, reflected in his gospel at so many
turns.
This structure is intriguing as to time and place. For its
outermost reaches consist of two distinct stories. Not only do
they share a remarkable amount of content, but the overarching
structure of the catena confirms their identical nature.
This shared content is immediately announced in the proper names
'Legion' and 'Syrophoenician'. Further to which as noted are the
motifs: exorcistic disease, uncleanness, feeding, animals,
negotiation. This is much more than merely adventitious. The two
exorcistic miracles occur in differing places and at differing
times, but might they perhaps not be in effect, one and the same
event essentially? We are bound to ask just such a question
because of the lucid shape of the series. The main event
inasmuch as it portends the resurrection appears to be The
Daughter Of Jairus, consisting in two distinct halves. But
prior even to this of course is the central episode which I will
contend contains a key to Markan metaphysics where the
disposition of the fourfold gospel is concerned. This story of The
Haemorrhagic Woman is one continuous event, it flows. But
it has a very obvious climax, indicated for us by the verb
'ceased' ( e)chra/nqh,
v 29). If the narrative up until this point moved inwards, it
now stops, turns, and begins its trajectory externally, that is
outwards.
This type of exercise, it is well known to us as chiasmos, is
constrained by the printed page. And the same constraints have
perhaps made it difficult to arrange the text on this page in a
way that fully serves the eloquence of its formal articulation.
The general or overarching pattern is that of an initial illness
and a concluding cure. But this is also the pattern of the
individual units which are comprehensively related as the
unitary chain. The first person, The Gerasene Demoniac,
will be cured no less than the last; just so, the last must be,
initially at least, ill, otherwise there is to be recovery. And
so we find with the two episodes at furthest extreme from the
central event, certain concessions are made to common sense, as
well as to actuality, and that these overrule any pedantic
adherence to the pattern. There is no fastidious application of
the reflexive structure which the chiasmos represents, and the
time sequence of certain elements in the stories is thus not
perfectly mirror-like of the previous situation, that is to say,
never artificial or disingenuous. This ought to suggest that the
narratives are grounded in historical actuality as well as
having been understood and interpreted by those who have written
them.
It may be that The Syrophoenician Woman is a later
addition to the recension of the gospel. Indeed a significant
amount of text stands between these two exorcistic healing
narratives. Even so, we should notice that some scrupulous
editor perhaps, has made the point of mentioning the locale as
well as the sea, at the conclusion of the last healing miracle,
just as it marks the inception of the catena; the same figure, sea, being a
clear index of the symbolic masculine as of the identity of the
Holy Spirit. We encountered this figure in the Day 3 rubric of
the Genesis creation story, a story to which the previous event,
The Stilling Of The Storm certainly recurs. The
narrative intention is thus very sure. It is absolutely
congruent with the occurrence of the same chiastic structure as
the organisational principle of the messianic miracles, another
means whereby the two cycles, messianic miracle and healing
miracle, are integrated. This may lead us to inquire as to the
provenance of the miracle catena.
At the very least it is possible that the editing of both the
messianic miracle series and this chain of healing miracles in
Mark were executed by one and the same person.
One indubitable inference to be drawn here is that of the value
to the evangelist of the pericope
which functions as the axis about which all else turns. That
Mark's story of TheHaemorrhagic Woman
signified a great deal to him is obvious. Theologically it is,
if not identical to the story of The Feeding Of The Five
Thousand, which, with its companion piece, The Walking
On The Water, occupies the centre stage of the messianic
series - then connected to this, as denoting the conceptual
equivalent of a perceptual form. The conceptual form of unity
space : time, denoted in the story of Day 2, has as its
counterpart in the messianic miracle series, The Feeding Of
The Five Thousand, denoting acoustic memory. Both identify
Transcendence. But the first, the conceptual form of unity,
pertains to the aconscious, whereas the last belongs to
the conscious order of mind. Even though the subjects of the two
narratives vary as to the difference between conceptual
radical - time, that is, space : time qua idea, in the case of the creation story -
and perceptual form - acoustic memory - in the case
of the messianic feeding miracle story, nevertheless they both
relate the same theological reality, namely the Transcendent
("the Father"), now in terms of 'virtual' immanence and now in
terms of actual immanence. This accounts for the repeated
references to 'daughter.' In one of the peripheral adjoining
stories which address the identity of the Holy Spirit, The
Syrophoenician Woman, and Jairus' Daughter, which
addresses the identity of the Son, the same occurs. In this way,
the catena itself
reflects something of the universal category, that of
childhood, to which the roles of Transcendence and the
Holy Spirit are necessarily related. For Mark however, it is
apparent that Transcendence is a key component in all of this.
These several miracles, however we count them given that the
evangelist is grappling with the dialectic between identity
(transcendence) and unity (immanence), enact the categoreal
forms of unity. All three-four stories concern one and the same
type of mental entity which we have called a form of unity, and
which number three. These are conceptual realities, part of the
radical anatomy of mind. But although conceptual or ideal
entities, they are not pure conceptual forms. As concepts
consisting of two conjunct terms - space and time, mind
and body, male and female - where the second term always
comprises the first, and suborns it to some extent, and where
the first exists in itself, they import ambiguity to the pure
conceptual mind. Thus they mitigate identity. Unity is set
against identity according to the categoreal paradigm, where the
first term corresponds to pure identity and the last to unity.
These forms of unity, equivocal, ambivalent members of the taxon transcendence, the
class of conceptual entities, reformulate transcendence itself
in the light of immanence. They ostensibly share features more
appropriate to the forms of pure memory. As such, they
circumscribe the domain of the aconscious, and the modes of
intentionality which they generate likewise determine the
province of the aconscious.
The healing miracles of this chain thus reconstitute that
succession of categoreal forms of unity listed under the rubrics
of the second section of the creation, Days 4-7. Not
surprisingly many of whose themes now resurface here in the
gospel. If we extend this block even further, to include the
immediately prior event, The Stilling Of The Storm (Mark
4.35-41), this pattern is even surer, since this is the
messianic miracle which functions as counterpart to the story of
Day 3, the rubric categorising the symbolic masculine. The Day 3
rubric is adroitly placed, since it terminates the true
categories of transcendence, of which it remains the least
representative. This is because the anthropic form of unity is,
with the body itself, the most immanent of all the things
specified in the creation theology. Hence the announcement of
the symbolic masculine in the Day 3 narrative as entailing the
anthropic category which remains weighted in favour of
immanence, is the announcement simultaneously of that section of
the creation taxonomy which deals with 'immanent' transcendence,
or as we have said, 'virtual immanence', that is, the three
forms of unity.
The important thematic matters from the immanent half of the
creation narrative recurrent here in Mark are those of the
sub-human creation, the propagation of species, both sub-human
and human, and of course the attendant concepts of human
sexuality, and assimilation. The ordering of the events in the
gospel follows the precise order in which the creation deals
with these same categories: Day 4 - soma; Day 5 - space : time; Day 6 - male :
female. These three categories are the subjects of the
narratives: soma or
mind : body is recapitulated in The Daughter Of Jairus; the
spatiotemporal manifold, that is space : time in The
Haemorrhagic Woman; the anthropic form of unity, male :
female in both first and last episodes, which reiterate the
symbolic masculine and symbolic feminine respectively, The
Gerasene Demoniac and The Syrophoenician Woman.
The Haemorrhagic Woman
Something of the importance attached to these narratives we can
judge partly by their length. The Gerasene Demoniac is
one of the lengthiest texts of its kind. This makes good any
lack on the part of the creation narrative itself to deal with
the categories. But of the three categoreal forms of unity, Mark
selects that of space : time for greatest emphasis. The reasons
attaching to this are germane to Markan psychology-epistemology.
They will follow from the psychological-epistemological
perspective of this gospel as to no others. The situation of the
woman is identical to all who come after Jesus, in time, a
meaning lying behind the introduction to the story:
And a great crowd (o1xlov polu\v) followed
him and thronged about him (v 24a)
We find similar references in the subsequent narratives, and in
the story of Jairus' Daughter, they (polla/ - 'the many'
(5.38)), are given the dubious role of 'weeping and wailing
loudly' (v 39). This crowd forms a backdrop to both episodes,
and is more closely linked to The Haemorrhagic Woman.
She never escapes from the crowd, and her healing, unlike that
of any of the other figures, The Gerasene Man,
or Jairus' Daughter, or Syrophoenician Woman's
Daughter, must take place openly in a public space. The
public and social setting of the miracle is vital to our
understanding of the intentional mode it signifies.
She had heard the reports
about Jesus, and came up behind him in the crowd ... (v 27)
This line again places her on a footing level with our own, for
it sits with the public nature of the genesis of faith. The
social overtones of the event cement the profound link between
this miracle and that of The Feeding Of The Five Thousand,
as between the idea space : time and the radical acoustic
memory. Both the conceptual form, time and the perceptual form,
acoustic memory identify the immanent Transcendent. Their
relationship is analogous to that of the conceptual form mind
and the perceptual form haptic imagination, both of which
identified the transcendent Son.
But it is the graphic description of her illness, an experience
which isolates her from the 'great crowd', which affects us
most. Mark is not sparing in his use of language here, and if
the presentation of the illness of the daughter of Jairus puts
the crowd in a somewhat tragicomic light, there is no lightness
of touch in:
... who had had a flow of
blood for twelve years (ou)sa
e)n r(usei ai3matov dw/deka e1th), and who had
suffered much under many physicians, and had spent all that
she had, and was no better but rather grew worse. (vv 25-26)
The figure 'twelve', while it articulates the totality of the
two sixfold series, also connotes the twelve months of the
lunar year, consisting of 354 days or twelve moons, here given
graphically as the congenital condition of the feminine body,
prone as it will be to menstruation, and the measure of time. As
a cipher, it suggests all three dorms of unity: space : time,
symbolic feminine, and mind : body. Thus it secures the
relationship of this event with the next - ('she [Jairus'
daughter] was twelve years of age' ( v 42)), and with the final
event of the chain, The Syrophoenician Woman's
Daughter. Other features in the texts accomplish the same
end; for example the terms 'daughter'. The woman herself says at
the very instant of her recovery:
And immediately the
haemorrhage ceased; and she felt (e1gnw) in her body (tw~? sw/mati) that she
was healed of her disease. ( v 29)
The body is explicitly named here. It is proper to the
surrounding events which depict the physical maturation of the
'little daughter' (v 23). For the connection forged by the
evangelist between these two episodes, justifies our
understanding of her condition vis-à-vis that of the woman. The
description of her age, the involvement of the 'tumult, and
people weeping and wailing loudly' (v 38), the mention of food,
all strive to the same end. Mark is describing the onset of
menses in the girl. This is the reason for the structural links,
the interpolation of the story of the woman within the two
halves of the story of the girl, as it is for the referential
details which bind the narratives into one continuum.
In just one fell swoop then, by means of a portrait of the human
condition as that of the body of woman, in all its vulnerability
to the vagaries of time, conceived under the phenomenon of
menstruation, Mark recounts the three categoreal forms of unity
- the somatic form of unity, the mind : body, first adumbrated
in the Day 4 rubric; the temporal form of unity, space : time,
the subject of the story of Day 5; and the anthropic form of
unity, male and female, given in the creation rubric Day 6. He
links them categoreally just as the creation taxonomy had
previously. For this evangelist the conceptual form of unity
space : time, if not actual space : time itself, functions
comprehensively. Its connectedness to both remaining entities of
its class entitles it to a consideration afforded by no other
evangelist. In one sense, it is not too much to say that Mark's
Haemorrhagic Woman is virtually his own alter ego. He is not alone
in his epistemic-psychic predilection in this regard. Every one
of the four evangelists will demonstrate a similar partiality
for specific categories. But it is not the categories themselves
so much as their own canonical modes of intentionality which are
the real and evident subjects of their predilections. Thus what
matters most to the author of this pericope, and to the author or authors of the
gospel as a whole as much as to its editor or editors, if these
are not one and the same, is that particular intentional process
which arises from the conceptual form of unity space : time.
These ideas, the three categoreal forms of unity, soma or the body, the
time of the spatiotemporal manifold, and the anthropic form of
unity male : female, are themselves as interwoven as the very
texts of this miracle catena.
If time itself is somatic or bodily, which it certainly is in
the case of woman, who experiences a periodic cycle of
fertility, then the soma
is temporal. It is as much temporal for a male as it is for a
female. The Day 4 rubric posited the planets, chiefly the sun
and moon, as figures for the body, that is the mind : body. Like
the other things contained within the second section of the
creation story, they manifest cyclical movement. The same
metaphors, sun and moon, might suggest themselves as figures for
male and female respectively. However it is preferable at least
initially, to view them as metaphors for consciousness; the
first being the metaphor for conscious intentionality, the
second for aconscious intentionality, irrespectively of the sex
of the particular person's body. (In the discussion of the
gospel of Luke, we shall revert to this metaphor for the soma,
particularly in regard to its third member, that of the stars.
For this effectively both combines and abrogates both relata,
male and female, in a third entity, not a third sex, but their
relation(s), in that it portends childhood itself as the
universal human condition. And if we align at the metaphorical
level, the masculine-solar imagery and the diurnal-conscious on
the one hand, and the feminine-lunar imagery and the
nocturnal-aconscious on the other, then we are left with the
issue of their relation. These topics belong to the further
discussion of the Day 4 rubric.)
Markan doctrine emphatic as it is of time, nevertheless takes
full account of the other two entities with which it is most
immediately connected; the soma,
and the human. The last, the symbolic feminine, for that is what
the anthropic means, must always be understood as form of unity.
The feminine always comprises the masculine. There is no
feminine in itself nor for itself. Thus these two figures, The
Woman With The Haemorrhage and The Daughter Of Jairus,
signify the composite nature of the feminine. There is no need
to add another description of time under the aegis of the
symbolic masculine. This is already accounted for, already
reckoned by the anthropic category, the feminine. If there were
any doubts about this, they should be allayed by the prior
healing event, that of The Gerasene Demoniac, and the
significantly later episode of The Syrophoenician Woman's
Daughter. For both these narratives clearly nominate the
symbolic masculine, the first in the aspect of transcendence,
the second in that of immanence, where it belongs to the
anthropic category, symbolic feminine. They have been placed in
this chain of events in virtue of their connection with the role
of the two women central to the Markan portrayal of temporality
- The Haemorrhagic Woman, and somaticity - Jairus'
Daughter.
And immediately the
haemorrhage ceased; and she felt in her body (e!gnw tw~? sw/mati)
that she was healed of her disease. And Jesus, perceiving ( e)pignou\v) in himself
that power had gone forth from him, immediately turned about
in the crowd, and said, "Who touched my garments?" And his
disciples said to him, "You see the crowd pressing around you,
and yet you say, "Who touched me?" And he looked around to see
who had done it. But the woman, knowing (ei)dui~a) what had been
done to her, came in fear and trembling and fell down before
him, and told him the whole truth. And he said to her,
"Daughter, your faith (pi/stiv)
has made you well; go in peace, and be healed of your disease.
(5.29-34)
Those terms which, because they are explicit, most concern us,
are given above in the Greek. We are in the process of arguing
that the epistemic perceptual mode proper to this particular
gospel, is that of knowing. Hence it comes as no surprise that
in this one of the two signature healing miracle stories which
denote the specifically Markan perspective, that term should
appear. Even if this mode of intentionality, knowing, is a
conscious one, whereas this story addresses the corresponding
aconscious mode, its appearance here is entirely justifiable.
The overture to the healing contains an ironic aside directed at
the medical science of the day:
And there was a woman who had
had a flow of blood for twelve years, and who had suffered
much under many physicians, and had spent all that she had,
and was no better but rather grew worse. (5.25-26)
As to the second term, 'faith', which appears again in the
ensuing drama enveloping the little girl, we need to note how
common it is. 'Faith' is often mentioned as ingredient in a cure
by this evangelist. It occurs in the healing of A Boy With
An Unclean Spirit (9.14-29, at vv 23 and 24), and that
of Blind Bartimaeus (10.46-52, at v 52). Not all
of these occasions are one and the same. It is obvious that both
of these episodes concern perceptual modes rather than
conceptual modes. We have argued for a systematic correspondence
between the conceptual and the intentional mode belief proper.
Hence hearing and seeing as implicated in the events here, have
to do with the (cognitive) process knowing, not believing. That
faith/believing is central to Christian psychology is beyond
question. We noted the extraordinarily high incidence of the
same in the fourth gospel. (John correspondingly, will manifest
a very high word count for the verb 'to know' and its cognates,
higher in fact than the tally for 'faith'/'to believe'.) It is
not surprising that this term, like others, is neither a
necessary nor sufficient condition serving to define the
intentional mode in question.
We have already noted its occurrence also in the healing of the
paralytic (5.2). There it did function as signal of the specific
form of intentionality native to mind, the subject of the
narrative. That is, we argued that faith simpliciter, as a conscious
form of intentionality, pertains to the category mind. What
follows from the parameters set down above, and the schematic
hermeneutic of the gospel itself, in relation to the story of
creation, is then that the category mind : body (soma), will also produce a
related form of intentionality, this time an aconscious one. We
are postulating that the category soma, that is, mind : body, will thus be
responsible for an aconscious mode of intentionality, which is a
species of believing. It is, as we see in the ensuing narrative
about the unconscious little girl, for this precise reason the
word appears (pi/steue
believe (v 36)).
Thus where the word 'body' appears in The Haemorrhagic Woman,
and the word 'faith' too, these terms are directed at the story
of Jairus' Daughter. In spite of their certain connexity, the
body rather than time, is what produces an aconscious mode of
intentionality which is a form of faith, answering to the
conscious mode faith simpliciter,
the product of mind. Space : time will function in consciousness
as the partner of transcendent, or pure space. Since the latter,
space simpliciter, or space in itself is responsible for
will simpliciter, a
conscious form of intentionality, time (space : time) will
generate an aconscious variety of will.
This really leaves one intelligible option above all others, and
one which advances the Markan Christology. That mode of
aconscious intentionality generated by the conceptual category
time must be the will-to-believe.
We shall see in due course that one of the defining
characteristics of this intentional mode is its public and
social quality. If the crowds establish the setting for the
event, then they do so with the purpose in mind of depicting the
will-to-believe in
distinction both to will simpliciter
and belief itself. For the texts which will present the
conceptual basis of these two modes of consciousness, that is
intentionality, both deploy imagery which is anything but
public. Thus the first thing to note in connection with this
form of intentionality, whereby it compares immediately with the
conscious equivalent, namely knowing, is that it transpires
against the backdrop of one's being within a class of persons.
Unlike Jairus' Daughter, no name whatsoever serves to
distinguish 'the' woman. Her anonymity is representative in this
respect, and shorn of any qualities that might portray her in an
individual, a personal, a unique light. Her membership of a
class consisting of others from whom in some way she remains
indistinguishable, is what she conveys in this story.
Here then is the second of the aconscious modes. Like the
previous one, the desire-to-know, the product of haptic
imagination, it operates in certain relations to other forms of
intentionality. Where the desire-to-know stands in a sense
antithetically to desire simpliciter, for the former is the
result of haptic imagination and the latter that of haptic
memory, the will-to-believe
must also stand in opposition to will simpliciter. The former is the consequence of
the conceptual category, form of unity space : time, while the
latter remains the consequence of the pure conceptual category
space. So also we can now determine similar relations between
modes of intentionality which function identically within
their given series. This consists less of antithesis in the
sense just mentioned. We must be aware of a variety of modes of
antithesis. There are several. Already within the creation
narrative we determined at least three such. Thus the relation
subtended by haptic imagination to mind is analogous to their
respective modes of intentionality, desire-to-know vis-à-vis
faith. The consistency of these two intentional processes, is as
the relation between the will-to-believe and knowing, which are
the intentional modal analogues of time and acoustic memory
respectively. The former is an aconscious form, the latter the
conscious one. These relationships will be made clearer as we
proceed, and it is here precisely that the theologies of
semiotic forms are indispensable.
Returning to the story of the woman, we can now begin to
understand the role of the crowd. The role of the crowd is
definitive for both occasions, The Haemorrhagic Woman
and The Feeding Of The Five Thousand, the subsequent
messianic miracle. These deal with the subjects we have just
mentioned: the conceptual category time and its innate mode of
intentionality, the will-to-believe,
and the perceptual category acoustic imagination, and its
corresponding intentional mode, knowing. Both incidents identify the immanent
Transcendent, the immanent "Father". In both events, the
individual is contextualised within the group. If we never hear
the name of this particular woman, that suits the depiction of
the entity in question perfectly. The psychology of both the
will-to-believe, and of knowing, is irreducibly social. The self
involved in such processes is an irreducibly social self.
This will not always be so for given radicals and their
corresponding modes of intentionality, to which purpose we
sometimes find personal names mentioned in stories of healings,
and sometimes patronyms; for example, Jairus, Lazarus,
Bartimaeus. We can see this in the contours with which the very
narrative itself is imbued. So for example in Jairus'
Daughter we read: Jesus '... put them all outside, and
took the child's father and mother and those who were with him
... ' (Mark 5.40). This is a quite different affair from the
previous incident. It refers in the first instance to the body
as a fundamental ingredient in human conceptual awareness, and
of course to the actual physical maturation of the little girl.
These are indeed less public aspects of our consciousness than
that of space : time. Just so the form or mode of awareness that
is, mode of intentionality, to which the soma, mind : body gives
rise, while it is related to the will-to-believe, must be other
than it. It is therefore necessary to acknowledge the full
weight of the verse which introduces the faith of the woman with
the flow of blood:
She had heard the reports
about Jesus ... (v 27)
One does not arrive at faith independently of one's society, but
through membership of a class of persons, and this same class
will be largely constituted by acts of social intercourse. Here
once more we find that the conceptual form squares perfectly
with the perceptual form, acoustic memory, which points
immediately to the realm of speech and to the public arena. This
is a very important reason why the reference to 'faith' in The
Haemorrhagic Woman must not be taken on a simplistic
level, nor at mere face value. In one sense, the expression
'faith' belongs as we shall see, more properly to the
'little daughter', that is to what the healing of Jairus'
Daughter concerns for Markan psychology, whence Jesus'
remark :
"Do not fear, only believe (pi/steue)." (v 36)
The adult woman does indeed have faith; but just as
significantly she would never have had it without having heard
the 'reports about Jesus'. We can and must therefore distinguish
between those acts of faith which derive foremost or even fully,
from our social milieu. Religious culture is no stranger to
multitudinous gatherings in which people act in conformity to
their membership of a crowd. And this willingness of persons so
grouped together in accordance with their common cultural
property is exactly what the evangelist portrays in this story.
If there is no immanent messianic miracle involving a greater
crowd than that which delineates the acoustic memory, The
Feeding Of The Five Thousand, then there is no healing
miracle more public in nature than that of Mark's Haemorrhagic
Woman. She never once steps outside of her given social
circle; she is never differentiated for us from the crowd; she
is never more than 'a' woman who had had a flow of blood. This
does not at all detract from the import of either her illness or
its outcome. In the scheme of things she is well placed and just
where she belongs. Her story is valuable to us precisely because
it details the essence of the provenance of faith, the necessity
to it of culture. We see it virtually lampooned, even if only
momentarily, in the narrative immediately following, in which
Mark refers to the 'tumult (qo/pubon)
weeping and wailing loudly' (v 38). Matthew gives it a slightly
more attractive accent, and with more emphasis on the link
between cult and culture also, with his mention of the 'flute
players' and so on (Matthew 9.23). Jesus himself, according to
Mark's characteristic perspicacity, will call this into question
by means of the certain juxtaposition he maintains between the
two narratives: 'And when he had entered, he said to them, "Why
do you make a tumult (qopubei~sqe)
and weep? The child is not dead but sleeping?"' (v 39). Putting
the appurtenance of religious hysteria to the psychology of
crowds aside, or to put matters more finely, to social
psychology, we cannot mistake the meaning of The
HaemorrhagicWoman.
Of course its index in the categoreal taxonomy was the
Day 5 rubric, which pictured the creation of those creatures
inhabiting the two realms formerly described as 'the waters
above' and 'the waters below', under the Day 2 rubric. ("Birds
of a feather flock together.") There is indeed therefore a
strong connection made to the notion of place, or space. And
this is again taken up in the Johannine narrative of The
Healing At The Pool (John 5.1-9), which John too
contextualises as closely as possible with the relevant
messianic event, The Feeding Of The FiveThousand (John
6.1-14). The synoptists and John are thus as one on this point
of the relation between the conceptual form, space : time, and
the analogous perceptual form, acoustic memory, since both
identify the Transcendent in terms of its immanent polarity.
The parabolic form of these miracle stories, has as its
centrepiece, the woman prostrate before Jesus, approaching him
with the utmost reverence and in genuine humility as the outcome
of her illness. The same pattern can and does intend the
phenomenon of social hierarchy. There are of course more than
enough stories containing images of such persons: that of The
Leper, another instance of ritual impurity, who approaches
Jesus 'kneeling' (1.40), or that of The Gerasene
who,'when he saw Jesus from afar he ran and worshiped him'
(5.6), and indeed Jairus who 'fell at his feet, and besought him
...' (vv 22-23).
But the woman, both because she is a woman, and because of the
opprobrium attached to her illness, is of any figure in this
sequence of events, the most abject, the most lowly. Even The
Syrophoenician Woman who, as a 'foreigner', is above
her, shows mettle enough and sufficient self-respect to counter
Jesus' invitation to negotiation, whose topic is the same
reality, social hierarchy. Add to this the fact that 'she had
spent all that she had, and was no better but rather grew
worse.' (v 26) Once again she contrasts with Jairus, who
meets us, if not Jesus himself does, as the prosperous
bourgeois; 'one of the rulers of the synagogue' (v 22), a title
which we hear twice more (vv 36, 38). Matthew pictures him as a
virtual patron of the arts by means of the reference to the
'flute players, and the crowd making a tumult' (Matthew 9.23).
Measured against such a man of property, the social standing of
the woman with a haemorrhage is as next to nothing; even when
the deed is done, immediately after her cure her status appears
to be the same:
And he looked around to see
who had done it. But the woman, knowing what had been done to
her, came in fear and trembling (fobhqei~sa kai\ tre/mousa) and fell down (prose/pesen) before
him, and told him the whole truth. (vv 32-33)
The setting, and the portrait of the woman's psychological
condition therefore sit perfectly with what Mark tells us in
terms of the narrative structure. A society consists of a
multiplicity of persons of various states and conditions, that
is to say, classes. Hierarchic status requires gradations which
organise things or persons into superior and inferior. The link
with time is immediate, and often we find it in other logia in the gospel which
relate the gospel itself to its antecedent Jewish roots. The
saying which concluded the miracle at Cana is a case in point,
where the 'good wine' has been, as if inexplicably, served last
(John 2.10). Another instance also from John, is preparatory to
this:
The next day he [John the
baptiser] saw Jesus coming toward him, and said, "Behold, the
Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world! This is he of
whom I said, 'After me comes a man who ranks before me, for he
was before me.'" (John 1.29-30)
John 5.1-9
This puts so nicely the paradoxical and
all encompassing status of Jesus himself, who is portrayed in
this gospel as in others, as the one who serves. But there is
another passage in the gospel of John, which broaches the main
themes of The Haemorrhagic Woman. Before passing to the
next story, Jairus' Daughter, and to the next subject,
the categoreal form soma,
so tellingly connected to this one of time, a brief survey of
the Johannine miracle story will repay us.
Now there is in Jerusalem by
the sheep Gate a pool, in Hebrew called Bethzatha, which has
five porticos. In these lay a multitude of invalids, blind,
lame, paralyzed. One man was there who had been ill for
thirty-eight years. When Jesus saw him and knew that he had
been lying there a long time, he said to him, "Do you want (qe/leiv) to be healed?"
The sick man answered him, "Sir, I have no man to put me into
the pool when the water is troubled, and while I am going
another steps down before
me." Jesus said to him, "Rise, take up your pallet,
and walk." And at once the man was healed, and he took up his
pallet and walked. (John 5.2-9)
The words italicised hold vital clues to the psychology of the
event, and to its 'sociology'. We shall examine the
relation of each to each in the succeeding course of this essay,
especially a propos of the gospel of Mark. That the both are
linked goes without saying. This text resonates so strongly with
the Markan miracle story we have just considered, that one is
almost hard put to understand how other details, such as
specific time, and specific place, the duration of the illness,
the two persons involved and so on, are as different as they
actually are. The two salient themes of social hierarchy -
'"...another steps down before me ..."' - and time, loom
large. The figure of another stepping down (katabai/nei) fits
perfectly one of the criteria exhibited with preternatural
facility by the acoustic semeia, which are soon to be the
subject of the gospel as that of the feeding miracle. We have
postulated that the feeding miracle story is about acoustic
memory, the contents of which are signified by the members of
the twelve tone 'scale'. Acoustic sentience no less than time,
thus informs us with the basis of our understanding of
hierarchy, a matter we must leave for future study.
On this occasion Jesus is said to have intuitively known that
'the man had been lying there a long time' (v 6). In addition to
this, we are informed that he 'had been ill for thirty-eight
years' (v 5). Taking this together with the figure of descent
into the water, and the figure 'five' in the introduction, we
can only wonder if the allusion to the Day 5 rubric, the
categoreal exposition of this conceptual form, time, was
fortuitous or deliberate. So the differences between the Markan
healing miracle and this account of a completely other occasion
in the gospel of John, are as nothing next to their
comparability.
Not only do both narratives show a distinct preoccupation with
the concept of time, but their contexts are identical. The story
in Mark, accepting it as the central occasion in the chain of
events, is the healing miracle prior to the messianic miracle, The
Feeding Of The Five Thousand. We have already commented on
the logical relationship between the two. John has organised his
two miracle stories in exactly the same way. If this narrative
(5.1-9) is the Johannine equivalent to the Markan narrative
(5.24b-34), which is more than likely, then both have been
clearly edited with the connection to the messianic event in
mind. Thus both John and Mark are determined to draw out as
fully as possible the affinity between time qua
conceptual category and the 'isomorphic', or analogous
perceptual form, acoustic memory. John interposes an extended
set of discourses between The Healing At The Pool and
the messianic feeding miracle. In all of which we find the
following references to both, that is, to time and to hearing:
'sabbath' (5.9,10, 16, 18);
'"he who hears my word"' (v 24); '"the hour is coming and now
is when the dead will hear the voice of the Son of God, and
all those who hear ... "' (v 25); '"for the hour is coming
when all who are in the tombs will hear his voice ... "' (v
28); "'As I hear I judge ... "' (v 30); '"'His voice you have
never heard, his form you have never seen; and you do not have
his word abiding in you ... "' (vv 37-38).
What impresses us here however, is the psychological portrait of
the man who is ill. The word 'will' recurs frequently in this
gospel, for it comports with John's transcendental perspective,
which logically emphasises the identity of Jesus in
relation to "the Father" (Transcendence). That topic, namely the
epistemic-psychic orientation specific to John, we are coming to
directly. We first noticed this term in the hymn to the logos. It recurs again in
the intervening texts just observed:
"For as the Father raised the
dead, and gives them life, so also the Son gives life to whom
he will (qe/lei
(5.21)) ... "I can do nothing on my own authority; as I hear,
I judge; and my judgement is just, because I seek not my own
will (qe/lhma) but
the will (qe/lhma)
of him who sent me." (v 30)
This miracle story must be taken as evidential of the postulate
we are putting, even though our brief is for the most part with
the gospel of Mark. There is a clear-cut case for this tenet of
Markan doctrine; namely that where acoustic memory gives rise to
a form of intentionality with which it is inseparable, to wit
knowing, the corresponding conceptual category, time, as idea
determinative of consciousness itself, gives rise to the
aconscious intentional mode, the will-to-believe.
We have examined two of the modes of aconscious intentionality:
the desire-to-know and the will-to-believe. All four aconscious
modes will consist of the rudimentary forms of consciousness:
desiring, knowing, willing, believing. Since these are of one of
only two kinds, either conceptual - willing and believing - or
perceptual - desiring and knowing - these composite modes will
be either 'pure' or 'impure'. It is reasonable to expect an
equitable spread of all possibilities: the combinations can
consist of conceptual-conceptual, perceptual-perceptual, which
are the two species of 'pure' modes, and conceptual-perceptual
and perceptual-conceptual, which are the two species of 'impure'
modes. Both cases we have examined are of the first type,
'pure'. For both willing and believing are processes functional
of the conceptual polarity of mind; and desiring and knowing are
both functions of perceptual mind. We may predict an even spread
across the board. That is, we can predict the remaining two
forms of intentionality to be those of the 'impure' kinds.
Logically one should combine a conceptual coefficient with a
perceptual radical, and in the case of the other, mutatis mutandis, the
coefficient should be perceptual and the second element
conceptual. The internal coherence as well as the
comprehensiveness of the doctrine of intentionality will demand
this.
INTENTIONALITY DUE TO MIND : BODY
Having arrived at the point of consideration of The Daughter
Of Jairus Markan catena,
whose value to the writer can be gauged in part by its logical
and textual proximity to The Haemorrhagic Woman, we
remarked the incidence of the term soma in the latter text, and assigned its
importance to the episode which envelops the woman's healing.
The two stories are carefully interwoven, and we have argued
that at the base of Mark's presentation lies a description of
the passage of a little girl into sexual maturity and the
accompanying onset of menses. Touch plays a vital role in the
healings of both 'daughters', yet for all that, neither of these
texts categorises haptic sentience. Both are about ideas or
conceptual forms, and their ingression in human and animal
consciousness. All three-four events in this chain consist in
virtue of addressing the conceptual mind. This accords perfectly
with the discourses on purity, which intervene after the two
central messianic miracles, and before the final member of the
chain; the following should suffice as examples:
"This people honours me with
their lips, but their heart is far from me; (Mark 7.6) ...
And he called the people to
him again, and said to them, "hear me, all of you, and
understand: there is nothing outside a man which by going into
him can defile him; but the things which come out of a man are
what defile him." (vv 13-14)
" ... Do you not see that
whatever goes into a man from outside cannot defile him, since
it enters not his heart but his stomach, and so passes on?"
(Thus he declared all foods clean.) And he said, "What comes
out of a man is what defiles him. For from within, out of the
heart of man come evil thoughts, fornication, theft, murder,
adultery, coveting, wickedness ... (vv 18b-22)
The ruling metaphorical construct here is that which is common
to the feeding miracles, assimilation, the standard or chief
metaphor for the processes of sentience, that is the four modes
of sense-percipience: seeing, hearing, touching and
tasting-smelling. The discourses on purity, located subsequently
to the two messianic miracles, The Feeding Of The Five
Thousand and The Walking On The Water,
whose subjects are the two acoustic modes, occur in tandem with
the shift of emphasis back towards conceptual rationality and
affectivity. In other words, those intentional modes which are
species of believing and willing, are leading mental agents
deciding the purity of one's conscious existence.
These dialogues are thus well placed. For just as The
Haemorrhagic Woman explicitly expounds the entity
will-to-believe, so we saw in each of the narratives associated
with it, the element water. This can be traced directly back to
the story of creation. In Jairus' Daughter, we do not
find this element, its mention would be superfluous, so
meticulously has the evangelist rendered the connection between
the conditions of the two women. Indeed, the forms of aconscious
intentionality which correspond to space : time and mind : body,
the subjects of these stories, are no less sympathetic to
one another than the categoreal radicals themselves which
generate them in their canonical instances. In view of this
connection, the final clause in The Daughter Of
Jairus is succinct:
And he strictly charged them
that no one should know this, and told them to give her
something to eat. (Mark 5.43)
This conclusion serves to index the event as 'virtually'
immanent in kind, even if it does not belong to that set of
occasions which deal with actual sense-percipience, and to posit
the haptic semeion.
Hence it need not and cannot indicate haptic memory. That is,
this story does not concern touch and the entailed phenomenon of
sexual desiring and its corresponding form of knowing. It is
about the body as a rudimentary element of conceptual
consciousness. Of course it can and does mean that what follows
in the case of the little girl will be sexual experience of some
kind. There is no gainsaying the honesty and psychological
insight of this gospel on such a matter. Only we should not miss
the tone in these texts which is always chaste, even if it
is ingenuous. Mark is therefore saying by means of this
conclusion that which we argued about the miracle all along,
namely that it is a dramatic exposition of the idea of
bodiliness, which is notably and indissolubly linked with time.
And more importantly still he is affirming the manner in which
this ingresses in human and sub-human consciousness.
While he was still speaking,
there came from the ruler's house some who said, "Your
daughter is dead. Why trouble the Teacher any further?" But
ignoring what they said, Jesus said to the ruler of the
synagogue, "Do not fear, only believe (pi/steue)."
(5.35-36 )
We saw above that one of the central categories of Markan as
well as Johannine metapsychology is that of faith, which we here
identify with the term 'believing'. Moreover, we stated that
this is an inherent function of the conceptual form mind, the
Christological category envisaged in the story of the first Day.
Hence the metaphor for the same, one which John will redeploy
consistently throughout his gospel, is light. Now it must
follow from the argument put so far, that where a form of unity
corresponds to a pure conceptual form, as does space : time to
transcendent space, the intentional modes which are due to those
same categories must also correspond. If then will simpliciter is proper to
space, then will-to-believe is the aconscious mode proper to the
form of unity space : time. This can only mean one thing, and it
is corroborated for us in the resumption of The Daughter Of
Jairus as cited above: that a species of believing must be
innate to the conceptual form of unity mind : body. For if the
mind is responsible for faith, that is, believing, then mind :
body must be responsible for that variety of believing which the
aconscious generates.
Calling upon factors of Markan Christology so far disclosed, we
know that the two remaining forms of intentionality must be of
the 'impure' kind. They will compound simple intentional modes
which are mixed, both conceptual and perceptual. Thus, if the
intentional form inherent in the soma qua idea
accepts the process 'believing' as its foundation, then the
secondary process must be either that of desiring or knowing.
The answer in this case is more than obvious. Common sense and
the miracle narrative posit faith-in-desire
as the obvious aconscious intentional mode. The only
alternative, faith in knowing, makes no sense at all. Moreover,
the story of the little girl is everywhere underscored as we
have seen, with the notion of desire. The body itself is the
very locus of desiring. All forms of appetition are addressed to
the mechanisms of sense-percipience, or 'somisms' as we may call
them. The story of Jairus' Daughter may not be about desire in
its rudimentary (conscious) form. That does not preclude that it
is about desire. It is, and it is about an aconscious mode to
which we shall refer, in keeping with the categoreal scheme set
out here, as faith-in-desire.
This is in many ways equivalent to what Santayana for one,
refers to as 'animal faith', belief in substance, belief in
nature, belief in matter and so on. But neither concept,
substance nor matter, has any purchase in Markan metaphysics,
even if in some sense, the concept of nature is tolerably close
to that of the symbolic feminine. Moreover the account phrased
in terms of substance is an ontological one. The accent in Mark
is Christological, that is to say, epistemological. What really
concerns us, is how the mind functions, not claim and counter
claim about what exists. Or rather, what exists, first and
foremost, is this form of intentionality, belief-in-desire; and it is
the conceptual and aconscious underpinning of desire itself. It
is to be regarded equal in importance to the latter, as it is
the foundation of appetition, of desire itself. We will put the
case for such assertions later. What is most apparent then is
the theological and psychological value of this story for the
evangelist. It is notable, and sits with its companion piece, The
Haemorrhagic Woman, at the epicentre of Markan doctrine.
All categories have signifiers, and these are the semeia
which are themselves the contents of percipience. Thus there are
in all three semiotic series - the acoustic series, the optic
series and the haptic series, signs or signifiers of the
conceptual-perceptual radical. The haptic semeia are members of the
body, and they are routinely disclosed in the healing stories.
They pertain to the notion of embodied conation/cognition.
Firstly, the signifier for soma,
mind : body, as given in The Daughter Of Jairus, as for
the companion text, The Haemorrhagic Woman, which
presents the concept time, (space : time), is not the womb. For
put simply, the subject of these narratives is not the symbolic
feminine, although this belongs to the same subset of
categories, forms of unity, as space : time and mind : body, the
subjects of the narratives under discussion. The semeion for The
Haemorrhagic Woman, is carefully disclosed in the text,
and is explicitly figured in her approach to Jesus 'from behind:
it is the spine, the back, the dorsal region of the body whose
signification of time was previously discussed in relation to
embodied knowing in the first essay. This sign renders more
aptly and palpably than any other conceivable member of the
haptic semiotic series, the idea of hierarchy.
The semeion for the
category soma or mind : body, is as we have noted
already, the gut. The Old Testament book of Jonah focuses this
haptic figure, the belly, not only in the action of the
whale, whose swallowing of Jonah is a construct for death as
separation from God, but also as given in the fabulous stories
concerning the fasting of all of the animals as well as that of
the inhabitants of Nineveh. This, like the story of Jairus'
Daughter, configures in terms of the haptic sign what we
mean by belief-in-desire.
We shall investigate it in relation to Luke, and of course, in
relation to the intentionality of belief simpliciter, that is,
conscious belief. The category of mind : body as a rudiment of
consciousness is responsible for the intentional form belief-in-desire; and the
category mind, is responsible for the intentional mode belief.
Thus the forms of intentionality stand in relation to one
another just as their analogous categories do. The
concluding injunction in the miracle of healing - 'give
her something to eat' (5.43), another reason for not mistaking
this as a story about desire simpliciter
- reminds us of this sign. No other member of the body as sign
can put with such consummate tact just what we mean by faith-in-desire.
If both semeia, that
of the back as sign for the conceptual category time, and the
stomach as sign for the conceptual category the body, are other
than the semeion, the
womb, which remains the sign for the symbolic feminine, then the
relatedness of these both with this latter is tacit. Just so,
the two modes of aconscious intentionality will-to-believe
and belief-in-desire must be acknowledged as
typologically feminine; that is to say of course, masculine and feminine. A great deal
remains to be said concerning the narratives and of course the
modes of intentionality. For example in The Haemorrhagic
Woman, the word 'truth' functions as an evident token of
Transcendence. Then there are the questions concerning the
meanings of the chiastic structure of the messianic miracles for
psychology. Clearly in the case of Mark's ordering of these
healing events, Jairus' Daughter and The
Haemorrhagic Woman, the combined categoreal and
intentional forms are given as marking particular stages of the
life course. The same must apply to a 'sociological'
perspective, since this is already evoked as central to the
meaning of the radical, time itself, as expounded in the gospel
miracle and in the rubric Day 5. But we cannot digress from the
task at hand, which must be to set down the doctrine of
intentionality in its barest outlines. It will be under the
banners of specific gospels that we shall investigate in finer
detail these narratives as to the meaning of the aconscious
forms of intentionality. We repeat here, the discussion of the
aconscious introduces no new terms. The simple, elemental,
conscious forms of intentionality - knowing, believing, desiring
and willing - are sufficient for the entire doctrine. Occam's
razor insists that we do not multiply categories unnecessarily
with a fulsome disregard of both Mark's own economy and
elegance, and the principle of parsimony. But the elaboration of
the intentional modes, particularly of the aconscious ones must
await its proper context.
INTENTIONALITY DUE TO
ACOUSTIC IMAGINATION
We have two primary texts to consider as referent to this centre
of consciousness: the messianic miracle, The Walking On the
Water (Mark 6.45-52), and The Healing Of A Boy With An
Unclean Spirit (Mark 9.14-29).
In Mark, the presentation of the intentional mode inherent in
acoustic memory is at once recognisable:
The apostles returned to
Jesus, and told him all that they had done and taught (e)di/dacan) ... (Mark
6.30)
Now many saw them going, and
knew ( e)pe/gnwsan)
them, and they ran there on foot from all the towns, and got
there ahead of them. And as he went ashore he saw a great
throng, and he had compassion on them, because they were like
sheep without a shepherd; and he began to teach (didaskei~n) them many
things. (vv 33-34) ...
But he answered them, "You
give them something to eat." And they said to him, "Shall we
go and buy two hundred denarii worth of bread, and give it to
them to eat?" And he said to them, "How many loaves have you?
Go and see." And when they had found out, they said, "Five,
and two fish." (vv 37-38)
We have already commented on the significance of the verb 'to
teach'. In Mark's recapitulation of the two similar feeding
miracles (8.14-21), the relation to 'knowing' of both forms of
sentience thereby signified, acoustic and optic, is indeed
pronounced. It is not necessary to cite the text again; the
expressions which announce the same intentional mode, knowing,
both positively and negatively are indeed multiple: '"perceive
... understand ... hearts hardened ... having eyes not see ...
having ears not hear ... remember ... how many ... how many ...
not yet understand"' (vv 17-21). We could further extend this
list to cover related expressions in the introduction: '"leaven
of the Pharisees ... leaven of Herod" ... discussed ... "why do
you discuss the fact that ... "' (vv 15-17)
Now, at the conclusion of The Walking On The Water,
whose subject is acoustic imagination, which consists
sympathetically with acoustic memory, the subject of the
immediately prior feeding miracle, we read:
And they were utterly
astounded, for they did not understand (sunh~kan) about the
loaves, but their hearts were hardened (pepwrwme/nh). (Mark
6.51b-52)
In the later exposition (8.14-21) recounting the two miracles of
loaves and fish, both words cited here in the Greek will recur
(vv 17, 21). What is this if not confirmation of the
connectedness of the two events as they concern the very things
articulated - one's mental disposition, one's consciousness,
will, knowing and the like? Mark never leaves us in any doubt.
John is slightly more oblique and characteristically ironic:
Lifting up his eyes, then,
and seeing that a multitude was coming to him, Jesus said to
Philip, "How are we to buy bread, so that these people may
eat?" This he said to test him, for he himself knew (h1?dei) what he would
do. (John 6.5-6)
The significance of the several numerical references in all of
these accounts must also be weighed as evidence for the
postulate that acoustic memory is formally linked with knowing.
Much of the business of knowing has to do with mathematical
reckoning, and the Greek for 'disciple' - maqhta\v - suggests as
much. (I will argue however, that mathematical reasoning
is unavailing in unravelling the hermeneutic of the numerals
with which all three feeding miracle narratives are replete, and
that we are to look to acoustic semiotics for their full-scale
explication.) We may say the same of seeing, which is mentioned
both by John and Mark in varying ways. But for the moment, we
are emphasising the four cardinal modes of intentionality,
and the four cardinal modes of either conceptual or perceptual
awareness, the inherent occasions from which in their turn they
accrue. Acoustic memory has a significantly longer ingression in
consciousness than optic memory, for not only do we learn to
speak in advance of learning to read, but we are prone to some
sort of intrauterine acoustic sentience even prior to
birth itself. So concerning the latter, the texts make the clear
and unmistakable link between hearing and knowing.
Two inferences already support the occurrences of such terms in
the text cited above, which propose 'knowing' as the first
component of the intentional mode proper to acoustic
imagination. This messianic miracle is contiguous with the
immediately prior Feeding Of The Five Thousand, both
episodes occupying the centre of the chiasmos. Since both of
these miracles have to do with acoustic sentience, the first
with memory, the second with imagination, we reason that the
same intentional radical is common to both: knowing. This is in
keeping with the postulate that both miracles which are about
haptic sentience, The Transformation Of Water Into Wine,
and The Transfiguration Of Jesus, have as their
respective intentional modes desire and the desire-to-know, a
pattern repeated in relation to will, and again in relation to
belief. Acoustic imagination must logically therefore fit the
same principle of organisation.
We can reasonably expect on another basis also, the
occurrence of a kind of knowing as the necessary product of
acoustic imagination. Every other one of the four rudimentary
processes, desire, belief, and will, has occurred. We know also,
that given the possible combinations, an even spread will
require that this last form of consciousness must be a
perceptual feeling of a conceptual feeling. We have already
described the two pure aconscious modes: desire-to-know
(perceptual-perceptual), and will-to-believe
(conceptual-conceptual), as well as one of the impure modes,
faith-in-desire (conceptual-perceptual). The remaining form of
consciousness would therefore answer to the description
perceptual-conceptual. The first term, 'knowing', accords with
the first part of this description. On the basis of the same
expectation of an even spread among the second terms, the answer
regarding the second term will be immediately forthcoming. But
let us examine the stories first.
The Walking On The Water presents us with a nucleus whose
logion is the same in all three versions we have - e)gw/ ei)mi mh\ fobe~isqe
- "I am (It is I); have no fear." (Do not be afraid." Mark
6.50)). There is some slight variation in the details, and the
fuller accounts are:
And he saw that they were
making headway painfully, for the wind was against them. And
about the fourth watch of the night he came to them, walking
on the sea, He meant to pass by them, but when they saw him
walking on the sea they thought it was a ghost, and cried out;
for they all saw him, and were terrified. But immediately he
spoke to them and said, "Take heart, It is I; have no fear."
(Mark 6.48-50)
...but the boat by this time
was many furlongs distant from the land, beaten by the waves;
for the wind was against them. And in the fourth watch of the
night he came to them, walking on the sea. But when the
disciples saw him walking on the sea, they were terrified,
saying, "It is a ghost!" And they cried out for fear. But
immediately he spoke to them, saying, "Take heart, it is I;
have no fear." (Matthew 14.24-27)
When they had rowed about
twenty-five or thirty stadia, they saw Jesus walking on the
sea and drawing near to the boat. They were frightened, but he
said to them, "It is I; do not be afraid." (John 6.19-20)
The first part of the saying is usually connected to the
self-identification uttered by 'YHWH' to Moses on Mount
Sinai:
Moses said to God, "If I go
to the Israelites and tell them, 'The God of your fathers has
sent me to you,' and they ask me, 'What is his name?' - what
should I say to them?"
God said to Moses, "I am that
I am." (hyeh:)e r#e$):
hyeh:)e) And he said, "You must say this to the
Israelites, 'I am has sent me to you.'" God also said to
Moses, "You must say this to the Israelites, 'The Lord - the
God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and
the God of Jacob - has sent me to you. This is my name,
forever, and this is my memorial from generation to
generation.'" (Exodus 3.14-15, NET).
The argument for a rendering of the Hebrew in the future tense -
"I will be who I will be" - stressing the active quality of the
Qal imperfect verb, comports with the transcendent perspective
of the miracle, namely its temporal orientation of
present-to-future. Just as transcendence concerns the
independence of God to the created order, something of this is
envisaged in the relation of Jesus to the disciples in the boat.
Gratuitousness as opposed to determinism was a defining factor
of transcendent as against immanent messianic events. At the
same time, the Hebrew terms 'name' and 'memorial', at the
centres of their respective clauses, equally square with the
broader definition of the miracle as immanent, as are all
messianic events when considered in opposition to the categories
of 'beginning'. Acoustic imagination is, even if transcendent,
that is, imaginal, nevertheless an immanent form of
consciousness inasmuch as it is perceptual and not conceptual.
For us however, the closest of any Old Testament narrative to
the miracle story, must be that of Day 2 of the creation series.
This identifies the 'beginning' itself with the inception of the
spatial manifold. This does not mean that it is a precedent,
which in some sense the narrative of the revelation of God to
Moses on Mount Sinai is, a propos of the formulaic
self-identification attributed to Jesus in the miracle story.
For what the creation story lists, are the conceptual entities
constitutive of mind or consciousness; and what the messianic
events list are the corresponding forms of perceptual mind; here
of course, acoustic imagination. The two textual cycles are
isomorphic, and analogous. So if we speak of precedence, as in
the case of the second half of the 'beginning' series deferring
to the pure immanent, feeding, messianic miracles, then we must
equally acknowledge that the 'transcendent' messianic miracles
reciprocally defer to the pure conceptual forms, the categories
of Days 1, 2 and 3. This is the meaning of normativity and the
concept of intrinsic rather than extrinsic value, which attaches
to it.
The story of Day 2, is the story of the separation of the
'waters above' from the 'waters below'. It conceptualises
spatial dimensionality in a clear and certain way, and this
extends to all three of the initial rubrics, simply because they
are subsumed under the greater rubric 'heavens'. The opening inclusio 'heavens and the
earth', separated the entire text into corresponding halves,
with the first, the inceptive section, standing for the spatial
or 'heavens' half', and the second, the immanent or 'earth' half
standing for the spatiotemporal. Not this alone, but also the
fact that every one of these first three events occasions
separation, or fission, and the consequent attribution of true
identity to the entity posited in utter alterity from its
putative other.
Thus the first three Days can and do stand as iconographical of
the three-dimensional manifold of space, that is, 'the heavens',
transcendent space. In the miracle story, we see and hear Jesus
himself in the very same place; midway as it were, between the
heavens or waters above, and those below. He does not replace
'the firmament of heavens', the uniform manifold of space
itself. Even so, the semantic thrust forward of the Genesis
rubric to the gospel miracle is of real moment. For it gives us
a construal of acoustic imagination, indeed of all three forms
of imaginal consciousness. It puts him, the Jesus identified at
the heart of this and every other transcendent miracle, as the
point of disjuncture between present and future. Concomitantly
it establishes his presence as the fissure between conscious and
aconscious percipience. We will comment later on the aptness of
this image to the doctrine of the aconscious in relation to
death as given in the reference to 'fantasma' - 'ghost', a common theme delineated
in all of the transcendent messianic miracles and which concerns
the aconscious.
We have linked the normative conceptual form, the idea of space
as a categoreal ingredient of our conscious mind, with the
psychological or conative intentional mode, will. This
mode should now come into play a second time in the aconscious,
since all four modes must be repeated in this order. There are
only four elemental modes, and the four modes of aconscious
intentionality are all compounds, that is they recombine the
same four rudimentary modes. This entails that each rudimentary
mode occurs twice; once as the coefficient, that is, the initial
or premising (feeling/prehending) intention, and secondly as the
final or ultimate (felt/prehended) intention. It will be seen
that the four aconscious modes reformulate a fourfold pattern
which is congruent with that of the aconscious modes. Thus
finally, each aconscious mode has a conscious mode analogous to
it. It is this larger pattern of fourfold conscious-aconscious
modality that manifests the formal disposition of the gospel a
propos of time.
Anyone following the argument put here will be aware that (a)
what is the initiating intentional force in this case must be knowing, since that is the
denominator common to both modes of acoustic sentience; and (b)
that the single remaining element of the compound intentional
mode is will.
Also, that this psychological mode must be of the 'impure
kind', comparable to faith-in-desire (conceptual-perceptual),
but again different, and that it must however conform to the
pattern perceptual-conceptual. For this brings into equilibrium
the count of two pure
modes of aconscious intentionality, (desire-to-know and
will-to-believe), with the two impure modes of the same, faith-in-desire, and
knowing of some kind. Knowing fits the description of the first
intentional form. Given such facts, we are led to identify the
intentional mode proper to acoustic imagination in just these
terms: knowledge-of-will.
Let us test this thesis against the narratives. As for the
messianic miracle, its conclusion leaves us in no doubt, as we
began to indicate in the citation above:
And he got into the boat with
them, and the wind ceased. And they were utterly astounded, for they did not understand
about the loaves, but their hearts were hardened. (Mark
6.51-52)
Mark here reverts to the previous miracle of the loaves, as
denoting the normative occasion of knowing. Certainly this
miracle pertains to knowing. Every effort has been made to link
it with its complement, The Feeding Of The Five Thousand.
Yet for all that, the two episodes are in some sense
antithetical. This difference, the difference between mnemic and
imaginal forms of the same perceptual radical, the acoustic, is
vividly illustrated by John's version of the events. For the
first words of Jesus to his followers who have pursued him to
the opposite side,
'the other side of the
sea (pe/ran th~v
qala/sshv)', are:
"Truly, truly, I say to you,
you seek me, not because you saw signs, but because your ate
your fill of the loaves. Do not labour for the food which
perishes, but for the food which endures to eternal life, which the
Son of man will give to you; for on him has God the Father set
his seal." (John 6.26-27)
We are thus talking not about knowing simplicter as such, but about a kind of
knowing, another and aconscious mode of intentionality which has
a conceptual ('eternal') side to it. John sustains this profound
contrast between the two contiguous events, and we must
accordingly maintain a contrast between knowing and
knowing-will. We noted in this gospel occurrences of the
expression 'will' above (5.6, 21, 30), where they served to
delineate the intentional mode will-to-believe, and where of
course they were irrefragably linked with Transcendence ("the
Father"). It is precisely here, subsequently to The Walking
On The Water, in an extended discourse on Jesus as '"the true bread from heaven ... the bread of God
... which comes down from heaven,
and gives life to the world"' (6.32-33), that the same term,
will, resurfaces emphatically:
"For I have come down from heaven, not to do my own
will (qe/lhma), but
the will (qe/lhma)
of him who sent me; and this is the will (qe/lhma) of him who
sent me, that I should lose nothing of all that he has given
me, but raise it up at the last day. For this is the will (qe/lhma) of my Father,
that every one who sees the Son and believes in him should
have eternal life;
and I will raise him up at the last day." (John 6.38-40)
Mark's
Healing Miracle Denoting Acoustic Imagination
The story of The Boy With An Unclean Spirit (Mark
9.14-29) presents us with a clearly cut instance of a miracle of
the transcendent kind. So for example, we find the theme of
amazement (v 15), even if somewhat oddly early on in the piece,
before the actual recovery of the boy; so too, the gender of the
sufferer, and the privacy motif (vv 25, 28). Party to this,
there are no mothers nor daughters in sight, and the drama
consists of the exchange between Jesus and the father of the boy
who is ill, and to some extent, the incompetent disciples. In
Mark, exorcisms occur only in events whose theological rationale
is either identity, Transcendence or the Holy Spirit. They never
concern the Son. This particular episode is as a healing
involving acoustic sentience, firmly grafted to the former
identity, "the Father":
Belief is mentioned more than once:
And he answered them [the
disciples] "O faithless (a!pistov)
generation, how long am I to be with you? How long am I to
bear with you? Bring him to me." (9.19)
And Jesus said to him, "If
you can! All things are possible to him who believes (pisteu/onti). " And
immediately the father of the child (o( path\r tou~ paidi/ou) cried
out and said, "I believe (pisteu/w);
help my unbelief (a)pisti/a?)!"
(vv 23, 24)
At first glance, the description of the boy in the throes of his
cure, as well as the actions of Jesus, and yet again the
succeeding mention of the house, again somewhat oddly, all seem
very similar to Jairus' Daughter:
And after crying out and
convulsing him terribly, it came out, and the boy was like a
corpse; so that most of them said, "He is dead." But Jesus
took him by the hand, and lifted him up, and he arose. And
when he had entered the house his disciples asked him
privately, "Why could we not cast it out?" And he said to
them, "This kind cannot be driven out by anything but prayer."
[varr: and fasting] (vv 26-29)
This is the second time only in a Markan healing miracle story
that we encounter the idea of death. The same theme was integral
to the Johannine narrative about Lazarus. Accordingly, we
treated all three stories in the context of the aconscious mind.
It supports the function of this episode, like The Daughter
Of Jairus, as portraying the aconscious:
... "My little daughter is at
the point of death (e)sxa/twv
e!xei) ... (5.23) some who said, "Your daughter is
dead (a)pe/qanen).
... (v 35) "The child is not dead (a)pe/qanen) but sleeping." (v 39) cf.
And after crying out and convulsing him terribly, it came
out, and the boy was like a corpse (nekro/v); so that most of them said, "He is
dead (a)pe/qanen)!"
9.26)
Bearing in mind the conspicuous similarity the evangelist here
draws between this event and the healing of Jairus' daughter, it
is worthwhile to pursue the evident contrast and the
possibilities afforded by the variant reading of the ultimate
verse, which is well enough attested. In fact a majority of
texts contain the phrase - kai\
nhstei/a - against the textus receptus. But first, let us note just
how many are the similarities of the two events.
The introductions to both narratives are comparable, with the
'great crowd' figuring on both occasions (5.24b cf. 9.14). Next,
Jesus is importuned in either case and acquiesces to the request
(5.23, 24a cf. 9.17-19), in the first instance going with Jairus
to his house, and in the second requesting that the boy be
brought to him. The crowd once again is mentioned, and somewhat
like the chorus of a tragedy, voices its faithlessness:
While he was still speaking,
there came from the ruler's house some who said, "Your
daughter is dead. Why trouble the Teacher any further?" But
ignoring what they said, Jesus said to the ruler of the
synagogue, "Do not fear, only believe." (5.35-36) cf.
And one of the crowd answered him, "Teacher, I brought my
son to you ... and I asked your disciples to cast it out, ...
and they were not able." ... And he answered them. "O
faithless generation, how long am I to be with you? How long
am I to bear with you? Bring him to me." (9.17-19)
Note here also the references to Jesus as 'Teacher'. The
situation of Jairus' daughter is referred to more than once;
there is Jairus' own description of her condition, that of the
'some who said', and lastly that of Jesus himself (5.23, 35,
39). In the later healing miracle we hear twice the graphic
description of the plight of the boy in identical terms (9.18,
20), then a further report from the mouths of 'most of them',
'"He is dead."' (v 26) This is soon to be disproved, thereby
reverting to the third description, the dominical one, in the
previous story '"The child is not dead but sleeping."' (5.39)
Next there is the privacy theme. It is modulated in the first
episode, because immanence almost always criteriologically
involves publicity, as a secondary index, and that event is
immanent in kind. In the second episode, to which privacy as a
secondary criterion of transcendence rightly belongs, it is
therefore modulated, at least when first articulated. Its
mention in the final scene properly posits the motif of privacy
in keeping with transcendence, and leaves us in no doubt. Is the
apparent awkwardness of this motif in the first story, and its
modulation in the second an effort to sustain the correlation of
the two stories? The difficulty arises over the use of the same
criterion, public/private, of two events which are typologically
contrastive, yet which the evangelist, for other reasons, is at
pains to correlate:
And they laughed at him. But
he put them all outside, and took the child's father and
mother and those who were with him, and went in where the
child was. (5.40) cf.
And when Jesus saw that a crowd came running together, he
rebuked the unclean spirit ... ( 9.25)
And when they had entered the house, his disciples asked
him privately ... (v 28)
We have already introduced both ideas, the ostensible death of
the sufferer, and that of faith/faithlessness. These also serve
to draw the pericopae
into close comparison. Both cures engage the same action by
Jesus, allusively to resurrection:
Taking her by the hand he
said to her ... arise (e!geire)
... immediately the girl got up (kai\ a)ne/sth) and walked ... (5.41-42) cf.
But Jesus took him by the
hand and lifted him up (h!geiren)
and he arose. (kai\
a)ne/sth, 9.27)
Finally, in both cases there is mention of the illness in
relation to age to children:
... she was twelve
years of age. (5.42) cf.
And Jesus asked his father,
"How long has he had this?" And he said, "From childhood."
(9.21)
Why are there so many similarities in these two events which are
nevertheless theologically very different? To put the same
question differently, what are the other reasons Mark has for
wanting us to draw comparisons between the stories of the
daughter and the son? If we allow this question, the force of
the conclusion, including the variant, 'and fasting', comes into
full focus. For then, the real difference appears between the
two occasions as immanent and transcendent respectively, since
feeding is a primary marker of immanence.
The best possible way of answering this question, is I believe,
with regard to the idea we are pursuing here; that of a mode of
intentionality proper to the acoustic imagination, which
compares to belief-in-desire
and yet which is altogether different from it. The last two
forms of intentionality we have been considering are those whose
infrastructures are the concept of bodiliness (Jairus' Daughter)
which gives rise to the form belief-in-desire,
and the perceptual form acoustic imagination (The Boy With An
Unclean Spirit), to which the intentional form knowledge-of-will is
inherent. These consist as something of a pair, just as did the
previous two forms of aconscious intentionality, the
desire-to-know and the will-to-believe. We can see very plainly
that the latter are both epistemic in their final
determinations. One is about knowing, the other about believing.
Certainly they are prehensions of prehensions, or feelings of
feelings, to use Whitehead's terminology. That is they are
intentions about intentions. This is central to the Markan
doctrine of the aconscious. All forms of aconscious
intentionality are compounded in this sense. These two then, are
cognitive; they are both focused ultimately on epistemic ends,
knowing or believing. Furthermore, both are pure. For the
co-ordinates in the one case desiring and knowing are both
perceptual, and in the other, willing and believing they are
conceptual.
Here however in the last two modes of the aconscious to concern
us, belief-in-desire
and knowledge-of-will,
the ultimate end is conative rather than cognitive. This makes
them similar, just as the previous two are. Both modes, that
inherent in soma or
the concept of the body, and that inherent in acoustic
imagination, while they are premised on a cognitive (epistemic)
co-ordinate, now believing now knowing, are finally focused on
conative ends. Whether this is desire (belief-in-desire) or whether it is will (knowledge-of-will) we can
momentarily ignore. The comparison between them is sustainable
on this basis. They are similar in one other important respect.
If the previous two aconscious modes were pure, consisting
either of two co-ordinated conceptual modes, or two co-ordinated
perceptual modes, both the latter two modes examined here, are
'impure'. One, that which is occasioned by the body as idea, is
a conceptual prehension (belief) of a perceptual intention
(desire); the other, which we are presently examining, is a
perceptual prehension (knowledge) of a conceptual intention
(will). Thus knowledge-of-will,
the mode of aconscious intentionality innate to the acoustic
imagination, combines the two variant modes knowing and willing,
in that order. It is perceptual-conceptual, and as such, is an
'impure' mode, just like the belief-in-desire.
This it seems to me is the only manner of reckoning with the
profound similarities and dissimilarities between the two
healing miracle stories, The Daughter Of Jairus and The
Boy With An Unclean Spirit. Both
co-ordinates in the two cases are at variance. To believe
is other than to know, just as to will is other than to desire,
according to the fundamental disparity between conceptual and
perceptual polarities of mind. Here then, there is a redoubled
difference. For even though the two forms of intentionality may
be compared as both impure compounds, they are opposed to an
extraordinary degree.
Now we can reckon also with the distinct possibility that the
variant reading of the last verse of the latter text throws more
light on what we mean by 'knowledge-of-will'.
For the mention of 'fasting', no less than prayer, puts will in
a position where it militates against desire. We need to draw a
certain distinction between will proper and the knowledge-of-will. For the
former is elemental, conscious and a conceptual mode of
intentionality, and the latter is aconscious and a compound and
perceptual form. But will cannot function in vacuo, any more than
desire can. It is this underpinning in each case that the two
modes, knowledge-of-will
and belief-in-desire supply to their respectively ordered
conscious modes. We shall have to say much more concerning this,
the relationship between the various modes, one conscious and
the other aconscious, which are identifiable on one and the same
theological basis, as the two modes will (conscious) and knowledge-of-will
(aconscious) are manifests of Transcendence ("the Father"). For
it goes to the very heart of the thesis we shall propose
concerning the fourfold gospel.) Conscious will is thus fed or
informed by the aconscious psychological function, the knowledge-of-will. It is
this which is lacking in the disciples, not will per se.
Let us be perfectly clear about the conclusion:
And when he had entered the
house, his disciples asked him privately, "Why could (h)dunh/qhmen) we not
cast it out?" And he said to them, "This kind cannot be driven
out by anything but prayer and fasting. (vv 28, 29)
We have at least twice before in the story,already met this
notion of power, capacity or ability. The father has already
informed Jesus of the inability of the disciples; (Mark 9.18 - i!sxusan; cf. Luke 9.40
and Matthew 17.16 - h)dunh/qhsan).
It is at the heart of the exchange between Jesus and the father
of the child:
" ... but if you can (du/nh?) do anything,
have pity on us and help us." And Jesus said to him, "If you
can (du/nh?)! All
things are possible (dunata\)
to him who believes." (v 23)
On this count, the concept of power, here the power over the
deathly force dominating the boy, is certainly proximate to the
concept of will. We might almost say the 'belief' in will, for
that too is a term which figures several times in the narrative.
But one does not believe in will anymore than one knows desire.
These are tautologous constructions. To believe in will is
already to will; and to know desire is already to desire. Or, to
put the same matter in other terms, will is instrumental to
belief just as desire is instrumental to knowing. We shall
comment further on this same relationship between the conative,
initial mode and the cognitive final mode as it is represented
in the mandala. It is of fundamental importance to Markan and
biblical metapsychology. We need to observe here for now that
will simpliciter
however is susceptible of knowing, and is so by dint of
experience. Once we have achieved something we regarded
initially as difficult and perhaps even impossible, we are in a
position to know our own will as that power or capacity we may
exercise over a force that dominates or forces that dominate us
against our own intentions. This is why the variant reading
which adds 'fasting' to the praxis of prayer, conforms to the
dialogue concerning power. For like prayer it is something
comparable to will in the sense of being a mental or conceptual
discipline. It is here at the last, now where the similarities
between the two psychological entities in question,
belief-in-desire and knowledge-of-will, have been secured, that
their equally important and real difference can be stated. Mark
now utilises the privacy motif to good effect, and the actual
disparity between the two healings, Jairus' Daughter and
The Boy With An Unclean Spirit, is clearly exposed.
Much more needs to be said concerning this and other pericopae. We have omitted
mention of the relevant messianic miracle in the gospel of
Matthew, The Walking On The Water, because it is at
variance with the other accounts. We shall in due course refer
to it, and see just how closely it complies with the
psychological perspective peculiar to that gospel as to no
other. However, there is one expression in the Matthean healing
miracle story, The Boy With An Unclean Spirit (Matthew
17.14-20), which we should not fail to notice, and which
simultaneously reverts to one of the paradigms for Markan
metaphysics and leads into the next topic in this survey, namely
the relation between the analogous conscious and aconscious
modes. Of course, the fact that the story refers more than once
to the death-like state into which the illness casts the boy,
which we noted was a point of comparison with the condition
suffered by Jairus' daughter, should be taken as evidential of a
state of consciousness determined by the aconscious mind. But it
is the description by Matthew using an ancient term for his
particular illness that interests us equally in this same
context:
And when they came to the
crowd, a man came up to him and kneeling before him said,
"Lord, have mercy on my son, for he is an epileptic (selhnia/zetai) and he
suffers terribly ... (Matthew 17.14-15)
"But in those days, after that tribulation, the sun will be
darkened and the moon (selh/nh)
will not give its light, and the stars will be falling from
heaven, and the powers in the heavens will be shaken. (Mark
13.24,25, parr. Matthew 24.29, Luke 21.25 cf. Acts 2.20)
The word 'moon' is by no means a commonplace in the gospels,
though all three synoptists are familiar with it. The
root of the expression here given as 'epileptic', is selh/nh, meaning 'moon'.
This is one of the few instances where all three
motifs, sun, moon and stars, of the Day 4 rubric recur in the
synoptic gospels. Luke's use of the word 'moon' in
relation to the coming of the Son of man in close proximity with
the word 'signs', shmei~a,
returns us to that rubric. Matthew too has the same term, shmei~a, only it occurs
earlier in his version of the Markan apocalypse (Matthew 24.3).
That rubric presented us with the creation of the sun, moon and
stars, the very things which produce light and regulate the
seasons and times. The hermeneutic treated this radical in the
creation story in tandem with the Day 1 rubric, which posits the
conceptual form mind. Accordingly, we argued that the subject of
the later and immanent Day 4 rubric, is the form of unity mind :
body. This might be mapped against the anthropic category male :
female, even to the point of pressing the analogy of the stars,
as a figure for offspring, so much a concern of the theology of
immanence.
Something of the gist for us now of this seemingly primitive
conception of the psychophysical, can be reaped. If we posit the
metaphor sun-moon as a literary representation of the soma or mind : body, that
is, precisely qua constituent of consciousness itself,
then it also serves as one of several paradigms for the
relation between conscious and aconscious. For we have been
employing the term 'consciousness' to comprise both conscious
and aconscious intentional processes. One of the most ready to
hand conceptions of that order or domain of our mind other than
the waking conscious, is the state of consciousness associated
with sleep, hence night, hence the moon. But we cannot make a
simple equivalence between these two halves of the diurnal cycle
and the two orders of consciousness. The 'sign of Jonah', the
Passion predictions, and other sayings, will suggest that just
as the conscious is signified by both of the halves of the
twenty-four hour cycle, both diurnal proper and nocturnal
proper, so too is the aconscious. It will be the annual cycle in
which all twelve components or radicals of mind are arranged
that we may find the paradigm immediately suited to our wider
purposes, as it is inclusive of the hexadic references of the
Christological messianic events as well as the dodecad referred
to in The Feeding Of The Five Thousand. This event is of
prime importance to the theology of semiotic forms. For this
reason, each order, the conscious and the aconscious, utilises
repeatedly, the full spectrum of semeioptika.
We have observed the self-replication of the categoreal
paradigm, transcendence : immanence within each narrative cycle;
the transcendent theology of Days, and the immanent theology
constituted by the messianic series. The presence of an
ambivalent category in either series, being the forms of unity
in the Day series, and the forms of imagination in the messianic
series, these two subsets which present us with 'virtual immanence' and 'virtual transcendence'
respectively, and which at every turn are marked by ambiguity,
these and precisely these, circumscribe the biblical doctrine of
the other-than-conscious mind, which we refer to here as the
'aconscious'. This brings to the clarity and robustness of the
normative, a nuance and subtlety requisite to any understanding
of this order of consciousness. Its effect is to maintain
that conscious mind is operative throughout the entirety of the
diurnal-nocturnal cycle, and the aconscious mind likewise. There
is no simple equation of one to the other, the conscious to the
diurnal and the aconscious to the nocturnal. The immanent
messianic events which portray the perceptual memory are
analogous to nocturnal intervals, and as normative, represent
the conscious order; whereas the miracles of 'virtual transcendence',
denoting perceptual imagination, in spite of their signification
of the aconscious, are analogous to the diurnal intervals of the
same twenty-four hour cycle. It is the annual template with its
clearly demarcated four solar quarters which will best
illuminate the structural features of both series, 'beginning
and end', as they disclose both orders of consciousness, the
conscious and the aconscious, and both polarities, the
conceptual and the perceptual, and also, both divisions of
intentional modes, cognitive and conative. Where the
diurnal-nocturnal template is indispensable to our method, is in
the assignation of atemporal interval, albeit a
diurnal-nocturnal one, to the messianic events, that is, to the
perceptual categories, and thereby analogously, to the Days,
that is, to the conceptual categories. We shall elaborate on
these matters in what follows.
If then we have not introduced a raft of different words to
denote the workings of the aconscious or other-than-conscious
mind, if we have instead reproduced those already given as the
elemental and radical modes to be attributed to the conscious
mind, and so if we understood the aconscious in terms of their
reconfiguration in compound forms, as intentions of prehensions,
the desire-to-know and
the will-to-believe,
and again as prehensions of intentions, the belief-in-desire and knowledge-of-will, this
accords with the Genesis paradigm. Seldom reappearing in the
gospels, it is remarkably evoked in Mark's passion narrative
even if only implicitly:
And when the sixth hour had
come, there was darkness over the whole land until the ninth
hour. (15.34)
The passion narrative, on account of its being punctuated with
references to time (15.1, 25, 29, 33, 34, 42), is that
continuous text in Mark's gospel which we can readily
associate with the stories of creation. And since this is so, it
allows for and reinforces that correspondence between the
Sabbath and the Eucharist to which we have previously referred.
John's passion narrative shows the same congeries of
associations with extraordinary economy in the depiction of the
proof of Jesus' death:
But one of the soldiers
pierced his side with a spear, and at once there came out
blood and water. (John 19.34)
That this takes us back to The Transformation Of Water Into
Wine, is obvious. That narrative reporting Jesus' answer
to his mother's request presaged the text here - 'And
Jesus said to her, "O woman, what have you to do with me? My
hour has not yet come."' (John 2.4) Where Mark clearly evokes
the Genesis rubric, so does John. For even though he does not
allude to the light-time construct in the rubric, the miracle at
Cana is the messianic event parallel to Day 4. Where the former
is about haptic memory, the latter is about soma. In
both cases, the perceptual radical of mind or the conceptual
one, one and the same identity, the immanent Son, is disclosed.
John's two accounts emphasise immanence in the fullest sense of
the word, because they evoke the anthropic category, male :
female. This as noted, can be mapped analogously against the
form of unity mind : body. To do so, confers upon the aconscious
the greatest significance because the immanent term, the
feminine, and correspondingly the body, soma, always comprise the
transcendent term, the masculine, and correspondingly mind. The
aconscious is not reduced to being a pale and subliminal
reflection of the conscious, but is understood in its sense of
completeness and totality. So we have as a metaphorical model
for consciousness in the fullest extent of its intentional
structures: the ciphers of sun and moon, consequently day and
night, diurnal and nocturnal, which are repeated in either case,
in both orders, conscious and aconscious.
We can now extrapolate from the pattern of fourfold solar-lunar
temporality to the iconographical representation of mind as
consisting of conscious-aconscious forms of intentionality. This
brings back into focus the issues surrounding the form and
varieties of the gospel itself. First we needs must summarise
the above findings, and to do this there is no better way than
to use the optic semeia. The previous discussion has
brought to light an important relation between causal or
conative forms of intentionality, and their resulting forms.
This is one benefit accruing from the consistency of the
language used. It will propose certain features stemming from
metaphysical method, namely analogy, which will assist us in
better grasping the aconscious modes. Thus for example the
desire-to-know results in a cognitive mode, knowing, and the
will-to-believe results in believing. This is a process we can
refer to as supervenience.
There are two basic sets in which the patterns of supervenience
are manifest, and these couple with the grouping of the parallel
modes, just mentioned. That is, they operate in conjunction with
conscious-aconscious forms which we will predicate as specific
to the mental and affective perspective of each of the four
gospels in keeping with the fundamental paradigm of the mandala,
that of the four seasons. These two sets which combine the
patterns of supervenience and of conscious-aconscious paired
modes of intentionality are best introduced iconographically as
follows:
THE
RELATION OF SUPERVENIENCE OF FORMS OF INTENTIONALITY
A variety of relations between intentional modes obtains. Some
of these are already inferred automatically by the nomenclature
we have used as well as by the above diagrams. We spoke of the
conscious and aconscious, modes standing in 'parallel' to
one another, for example those of will parallel to
knowledge-of-will, and belief parallel to desire-to-know. These
'parallel' forms of intentionality stem from radical conceptual
and perceptual categories which are determined as analogous to
one another; they reflect the one-to-one correspondences given
in the morphology of the two textual cycles, creation and
salvation. Each conceptual radical is 'mirrored' by a perceptual
equivalent. The ensuing analogous relations obtaining between
modes of intentionality thus function in tandem with the
relations of supervenience. We indicated the relation of
supervenience between two modes as already inferred by the
conative forms in both orders of consciousness, the conscious
and the aconscious. The last of these helps greatly in
determining the meaning of those forms of intentionality less
transparently intelligible, such as belief-in-desire and
knowledge-of-will, since there are not only relations, but
relations of relations. Hence knowing follows from, or
supervenes upon, desire-to-know, a relation which is analogous
proportionately to the relation between desire and
knowledge-of-will. The previous mandala illustrated such
patterns, in having grouped the four sets of parallels with
their supervenient relations into two simple contrastive groups.
Examination of the relations as well as of the nomenclature
should reveal however the close connection of the members of
each of the two. It would be a mistake to understand the two
groups themselves as anything other than organically
interdependent. Their correlation takes us on the next step of
explaining these instances of relatedness and towards the thesis
concerning the gospels.
We may speak of these two groups outlined in the previous
iconography provisionally distinguishing a common enough
division made in epistemological discourse, that between
theoretical or speculative and practical or applied reason.
There will be other means of comprehending the distinction, a
major one will employ the acoustika,
but before that can be undertaken, we need to complete the
presentation of the semeioptika
regarding the annual and twelvefold paradigm. The basis however
of the twofold grouping in the previous mandala can be explained
at once: that group signified by conscious, cognitive and
aconscious, conative intentional forces, namely: belief;
knowing; will-to-believe; desire-to-know - all of which answer
to theoretical logos, logos
asarkos, all configure moments, point-instants, in the
year, culminating in the summer solstice, during which the light
is increasing. It is for this reason that we have, even if only
conditionally, referred to them as signifying that aspect of logos, 'theoretical'
reason. We shall put this same distinction in another mandala
directly. But we note also that the other grouping, consisting
of aconscious, cognitive and conscious, conative forms of
intentionality, given in the second mandala above, namely:
belief-in-desire; knowledge-of-will; desire; will. This second
grouping, in which the conscious forms both conceptual and
perceptual are conspicuously conative forces, and whose
cognitive forces lie within the aconscious, exists in rapport
with the first by reason of its semiotic configuration of the
half of the year in which the night, here the cognitive
aconscious, gains ground over the day, now the conative
conscious. These then are modes of intentionality which may well
be defined in relation to the logos
ensarkos, the practical reason of epistemological
discourse.
Care must be taken however not to sever these halves of reason
one from the other. For just as we introduced the cosmic,
planetary and global image of the creation narrative pursuant to
the hermeneutic in the second part of the previous essay, Miracles As Metaphysics, we
can now agree that the two above systems of intentional forms
are simultaneous. The globe is one whole, and at any given time
it consists of a diurnal-nocturnal ratio in juxtaposition. There
is need therefore to understand that at any point in either of
the two cyclical processes, there is concurrently an alternative
in the juxtaposed 'hemisphere'. To take the example concerning
the Christological modes: belief occurs simultaneously with
belief-in-desire, in a locus to which it is antithetical in some
way, since the first is representative of the diurnal interval
at the point of midsummer, and the latter of the diurnal
interval at midwinter in the
opposing sphere simultaneously. This is not to mix the
two things in question; they are decidedly antithetical. It is
designed rather in order to prevent any vision of the
iconography itself which fails to reckon with its encompassing
capacity. The above mandala also, concern the canonical forms of
intentionality, about which we shall have to say more in due
course.
The same applies to the remaining Christological forms of
intentionality, since the conscious one of which, desire, is
representative of the nocturnal interval at midwinter, when the
nocturnal is at its maximum duration, or as we may infer, force,
intensity and so on; while the desire-to-know is represented by
the opposing, but nevertheless simultaneous night, that of
midsummer. Even while they occur in oppositional locations, or
hemispheres, these remain nevertheless simultaneous. Again this is
far from saying that the two processes are one and the same. But
it is to utilise the metaphorical construct to its fullest
extent, and consequently to avoid any bifurcation other than the
epistemological-psychological method sorting the categoreal
forms of intentionality according to another criterion essential
to Christian metaphysics. We shall have to account for this in
any hermeneutic addressing the eschatological dimension of the
aconscious, that is, its relation to death. Consequently, the
apocalyptic literature will be our best guide here.
The same thing must obtain in the case of the Transcendental
forms of intentionality. We use the term 'transcendental' here,
to identify those intentional processes which instantiate
Transcendence, "the Father" of classical theological discourse.
If we can speak of a process or intentional mode of knowing,
then we must also speak equally of the intentional mode
knowing-will. The two are not coterminous - but they are related
as signified by the construct of simultaneity according to the
paradigm we are using. In this case, the first, knowing, answers
to the peak moment of a cognitive force, which acts
as a boundary. Its global or planetary analogue is the nocturnal
interval at the spring equinox. It is partnered by an equally
powerful form of intentionality, the will-to-believe, which
although aconscious, is analogically figured the diurnal
interval of the same place and time, and which likewise evinces
Transcendence.
The second part of the equation is the relation subtended
between will-to-believe itself and will simpliciter. Again, both of
these are 'Transcendental' in nature. Like the two species of
knowing, both find their theological rationale in the identity
of 'God, the Father', that is, Transcendence. But the
spatiotemporal figure for will-to-believe devolves upon the
imagery of the day at the inception of winter, when the light of
day has just begun to decrease, the manifest of its aconscious
status, at the very point immediately succeeding the autumn
equinox. Analogically as immediately subsequent to the
spring equinox, will is represented by the day at the
inception of summer, in the opposing order, that of the
conscious mind. Once again, these two modes of
intentionality, will and will-to-believe are given as
simultaneously obtaining in oppositional hemispheres, that is,
as occurring at the same time in different places, just as is
the case for knowing and knowing-will. It is difficult to pin
down exactly just what this 'simultaneity' must denote; time,
which is space : time, is the key factor, and that is why we
must pursue each of the four gospels, and equally, the
apocalyptic literature as we shall see directly, in their turn.
For they alone will illuminate the doctrine of mind in its
broadest outlines. But at the centre of all this imagery lies
the relation between mind and time; for there is neither one
without the other, just as there is neither the Son without the
Transcendent, "the Father".
This particular set of supervenient relations occurring between
intentional modes, is already implicit in the terminology we
have used, only we have not as yet drawn attention to it. There
is a clearly causative defined relation between the
desire-to-know and knowing, just as there is analogously between
desire simpliciter and
knowing-will. The latter mode in each case is an effect,
of the initiating mode or conatus. Again, the
will-to-believe must relate to belief itself analogously to the
relation between will and the belief-in-desire. These four
instances of related modes are so obvious that we have left
their description until now. They will assist us later in
explaining in more detail what we mean by knowledge-of will or
knowing-will, and believing-desire or faith-in-desire, although
the meaning of these expressions should be already intelligible
in part. We need to note in passing here, that supervening
cognitive forms of intentionality are related to their conative
forms in neither the same way as are the coherent ('parallel')
modes which establish the perspectives of the four gospels, nor
that of the hybrid forms of intentionality which fuse members of
the same taxa.
Here there is no distinct congruence of value as in the coherent
or 'parallel' modes of intentionality operative specifically
within each of the four gospels. So for example, the relation
between the will-to-believe and belief, is altogether dissimilar
to that between the will-to-believe and knowing, the two
coherent ('parallel') modes of intentionality which determine
the theology of the gospel of Mark, to take one example. Nor are
the four instances of supervenient relations among intentional
forms comparable to the synthetic intentional forms which are
the four hybrid Pneumatological instances of
intentionality. Instead we are dealing with the way in
which a particular mode of intentionality leads to another, or
the way in which the one supervenes the other. These
supervenient relations also traverse the conscious-aconscious
divide, and this is part of the meaning of supervenience.
THE RELATION OF CANONICAL CATEGORY TO INTENTIONAL MODE:
CONDITIONALITY
In the previous discussion we have used the various terms:
'derived from', 'necessary to', 'determined by' and so on, to
express the relation of a given mode to a specific radical of
consciousness, and meaning the same thing, we have said that a
specific categoreal radical is 'responsible for' a given mode of
intentionality. We have also termed this relation one of the
'inherence' in the radical by the specific mode of
intentionality. By saying that the manifestation or expression
of the intentional mode by that particular radical is its
'sovereign' or 'canonical' or 'exemplary' occasion, we are
indicating the same fact. By radical of consciousness we mean of
course the entities first described in the two textual cycles,
creation and salvation. They are the six conceptual forms in the
former case, and the six perceptual forms in the latter. These
are the elementary subjects of the narrative cycles Genesis
1.1.s and the messianic series. The first duty of the literature
is to posit them. They are foundational to biblical metaphysics,
and we refer to them accordingly as categories. They are the
primary, ultimate, pervasive, radical generalities of existence
understood by consciousness and pertain in the first instance to
such, mind, that is consciousness itself. Thus they concern the
reflexive aspect of this mind which secures the possibility of
communication between persons, and arguably, the possibility of
thought itself of the person as unique and individuated. So for
example we averred that the conceptual form mind is responsible
for the intentional mode belief, or what is the same, that
belief inheres in this conceptual radical of consciousness, or
is derived from it, and that the particular variety of belief
thus generated by mind, is its 'canonical' expression, the
'sovereign instance' of what is meant by 'belief' in the first
place
CONDITIONALITY
We must here begin to examine the relation between dyads
consisting each of a conscious and an aconscious form of
intentionality, outlined above by means of identical optika, which we referred
to as the 'parallel' forms of intentionality. There are four
such, and they fit the unique psychological mindsets of the four
gospels. They are as follows: analogously to the autumnal and
vernal equinoxes respectively, (1) aconscious knowledge-of-will and
conscious willing; and
(2) aconscious will-to-believe
and conscious knowing;
and analogously to the summer and winter solstices respectively,
(3) aconscious desire-to-know
and conscious believing;
and (4) aconscious belief-in-desire
and conscious desire.
The former two are enantiomorphic, meaning that the relatedness
of the dyads themselves is analogous to the concept of bodily
sidedness. For the aconscious and conscious are in equal
proportion in both cases, as is true of the relation between the
durations of day and night at the equinoxes. In the latter two
cases, the ratio of the aconscious to conscious is diametrically
opposed, following the given relation of the diurnal and
nocturnal intervals at the solstices.
Hence the desire-to-know is subordinate in degree to belief,
whereas belief-in-desire is subordinate in degree to desire. We
are not interpreting the conscious modes as analogues of the
diurnal and the aconscious modes as analogues of the nocturnal.
Thus even though The Transfiguration marks the duration
centred on midday, it stands, representatively of an aconscious
radical, analogously to the nocturnal interval at the summer
solstice. And even though the Day 4 rubric signifies a diurnal
interval, the diurnal interval of the midwinter solstice, it
functions representatively of an aconscious radical. As for the
equinoctial dyads, the Day 5 rubric marks the diurnal interval
at the spring equinox, and this signifies an aconscious order,
as do all members of the creation series belonging to the second
half of the taxonomy; and finally, the autumnal dyad, consists
of both the Day 2 rubric, and The Walking On The Water, which
also occurs during the first of the diurnal intervals, the
former being normative, signifies the conscious component, while
the latter, belonging to the members of the messianic series
which are taxonomically depicted in terms of 'virtual transcendence',
must concern the aconscious.
These structural features of both series introduce the thesis
concerning the specific natures of the gospels themselves as
precisely fourfold. The occurrence in the story of The
Feeding Of The Four Thousand of the same figure, four, in
keeping with the proposition that the logical subject of this
narrative is to denote the existence of the optic memory as a
centre of consciousness or perceptual radical of mind, belongs
to this very thesis regarding the tetradic form of the gospel.
If the messianic series is itself likewise part of the semantic
of this particular miracle narrative, that is, if that
particular unit of the tradition, the sevenfold messianic
miracle series has been handed down as written rather than oral
gospel, we have further evidence for the meaning of the same
figure, four, the most immediate numerical sign of immanence
that we possess. It answers to the existence of precisely four
conscious (simple) and four aconscious (compound) intentional
modes.
The standard statement regarding conditionality asserts: 'if p,
then q' and 'p only if q'. This is equivalent to saying that
'the truth of p is sufficient for the truth of q' and 'the truth
of q is necessary for the truth of p' respectively; or that 'the
truth of the consequent ('q') is necessary for the truth of the
antecedent 'p'', and that 'the truth of the antecedent is
sufficient for the truth of the consequent'. Such
phrasing should make perfectly obvious at once the
relation that holds between the (antecedent) radical, whether
perceptual or conceptual, and its (consequent) intentional
form. We shall find each of the four moments of the 'parallel'
modes, conscious-aconscious, related on the basis of their
axiological identity in the section, which deals with the
specific character both epistemic and psychic, of the four
gospels, but first we need to recognize the full integrity of
the relation between categoreal radical and intentional mode, in
each of the four instances.
Let us take an example obvious to common sense, that concerning
desire vis-à-vis haptic memory. There is in a
certain sense, no way for anyone to desire without the
experience of the radical of consciousness. In other words, if I
can be said to desire in the sense of the word as here used,
then I must also entertain a memory of experiences of this
haptic mode of sense-percipience: 'if haptic memory, then
desire'. Here, the antecedent category necessitates the
consequent intentional mode. There must be the memory of past
occasions of the appetition arising from the haptic mode of
sentience and its subsequent satisfaction for the experience of
desire. Not just haptic desire itself, but desire in general,
which will stem from this particular form of sense-percipience.
The various expressions of desire according to other perceptual
modes will take their cue from the defining occasion of this
intentional form as it obtains in haptic memory.
In order to amplify this example of conditionality as the prime
definition of the relation between a radical of consciousness
and an intentional mode, we need to say something however
briefly, concerning the clear connexity between touch and
smell/taste. This is assumed in the clear association drawn in
the gospels by the miracle at Cana and the Eucharist, just as it
is by the deliverance of our own experience: nothing that is
tasted can avoid being touched. All three feeding miracles
invoke the Eucharist, not the least the first of these. The
Feeding Of The Five Thousand stands to the Transcendent
and The Feeding Of The Four Thousand to the Holy Spirit
in the same way as does The Transformation Of Water Into
Wine to the Son. They are epiphanies as manifesting
sense-percipient in terms of the structure of human
consciousness. The first is the single Christological and purely
immanent event of the messianic series. Hence it is crucial to
any real doctrine approaching 'incarnation', the reason for its
appearance first in the gospel of John, hence also its
connection to the Eucharist is intelligible.
Assimilation is a congenial instance of the intentional mode
desire, and we shall argue of the perceptual mode, knowing also.
It is the prototype of perceptual modes of intentionality, the
conceptual scheme at the very basis of the immanent messianic
miracles, if not the series in its entirety. As foundational to
existence itself, assimilation may dignify the various forms of
desire. An evolutionary psychology, such as we find in the
creation taxonomy and in the stories of the healing of The
Gerasene Man and The Syrophoenician Woman's Daughter, supports
claims regarding the elementary nature of the
olfactory-gustatory mode of sense-percipience. Thus we can say
that the mode smell-taste functions as a substrate of
sorts for each of the three 'phenomenal' modes of
sense-percipience. The three Eucharistic miracles are couched in
terms of the actual Eucharist for this reason. The petition for
'daily bread' in the Lord's Prayer makes plain the fact that our
survival depends on the operation of this protean or substratal
mode of perception. The relation thus of the actual mode
smell-taste to the perceptual-mnemic forms of intentionality,
desiring and knowing, and beyond to the perceptual forms of
intentionality derivative from the perceptual-imaginal
categories, the desire-to-know and the knowledge-of-will,
deserves our careful attention. As does the question of a
possible relation between the olfactory-gustatory mode of
sentience and the four conceptual forms of intentionality. This
is implicit in both creation narratives, the first and the
second. For without its counterpart, the Eucharist, the
Sabbath remains a more or less vacuous concept .
That said, what we should note in passing here, is that if we
have not predicated of the combined sentient modes smell-taste,
peculiar or inherent forms of intentionality, that is because
the gospel depicts the same as the precedent to all three forms
of phenomenal sentience. Every one of the immanent
messianic miracles subscribes to the assimilation metaphor,
appetition followed by satisfaction. But what the Eucharist
proper as a messianic event denotes, is no mere form of
appetition, but the very thing itself - the sense-percipient
mode smell-taste. Hence its archetypal status for all other
forms of appetition. The haptic, acoustic and optic are phrased
in terms of this most rudimentary of all modes of sentience,
smell-taste. This is further evidence, if that were required,
for an evolutionary psychology operative within Markan
metaphysics. Upon the related modes of intentionality,
belief-in-desire and desire, the entire apparatus of
assimilation, in the literal sense, will depend. Concomitantly,
the related or 'parallel' modes knowing and will-to-believe are
also germane. If day to day survival depends in whatever way
upon the conscious processes of desire and upon its aconscious
parallel, the faith-in-desire, then it depends also upon knowing
and its aconscious correlative, the will-to-believe. We are
therefore bound to affirm the existence of states of
intentionality approximate or akin to these, in all conscious
living creatures. The continuance of life requires not only the
operation of desire motivated by hunger and thirst. Every living
thing must also know the difference between good and bad as the
difference between food or drink which sustains life and that
which terminates it.
While ever its life endures, there is no possibility of a human
or animal not experiencing belief-in-desire, ('animal
faith'), as defined here, as well as desire itself, according to
the mode of smell/taste. Likewise, the experience of states of
intentionality in animals akin to the paired modes
will-to-believe and knowing should be assumed. The
earliest stages of life whether they occur within an uterus or
an egg, will be marked by this rudimentary sense-percipient
mode. Viviparous, oviparous and ovoviviparous creatures alike
are from the inception of their existence, subject to the
experience of smell-taste in however embryonic a form. Hence at
this level, the function of the same four modes of
intentionality in an embryonic form must be guaranteed. Two of
them, the aconscious modes, belief-in-desire and the
will-to-believe, we can trace back to categories outlined in the
second half of the creation story, the categories soma or mind : body and
time, which are certainly linked. One of these at least, the
story of Day 5, employs figures from the animal kingdom. This
rubric denotes the categoreal form time. It would seem worth
contending provisionally at least, not only that animals
entertain such a concept, time, but that even vegetative forms
of life may too have some rudimentary grasp of it. If that is
so, then such living forms have the capacity in some degree to
participate in the intentional processes consequent upon these
same radicals.
Such arguments have ramifications for the meaning of the
Eucharist. Since it is in short the pre-eminently salvific
event, they must extend its compass beyond the confines of which
we have been prepared to admit in the past. (Surely this is one
of the implications of The Syrophoenician Woman's Daughter
too.) They will further the soteriology of the gospel in
connection with doctrines of samsara
and rebirth such as we find in those religious traditions of the
East which, having inherited the Jain principle of ahimsa or non-violence,
have tended to regard the sub-human world with vastly more
respect and consideration than the theistic traditions of the
West.
To insist upon the links subtended by the Eucharist to the first
Eucharistic miracle, and to the complement of the latter, the
last miracle, under the auspices of conditionality, as a working
definition of the relationship between the radical of
consciousness and the specific intentional mode inherent in it,
is to make more concrete still that relationship. For the
perceptual modes which the Eucharist itself denotes for the
purpose of Christian metaphysics, the combined ones of smell and
taste which we have characterised as fundamental, can be
conceived in terms of this relationship. The mode smell-taste is
the perfect example of the conditional relation between category
and intentional mode. No radical of consciousness, here the mode
of smell-taste, then no appetition in the literal sense of the
word. No Eucharistic category then neither desire nor knowing in
the 'sub-human' consciousness in the strict sense. Moreover, the
existence of the conscious intentional modes, 'parallel' to
belief-in-desire and will-to-believe, which are desiring and
knowing respectively, will be thrown into doubt. Between the
first thing, a sentient mode in some degree or kind shared by
all living organisms, and the second, a mode of intentionality,
the bond is a fait accompli.
The first entity is sufficient for the second: 'if p then q'.
This must remain the model for the relation between all the
categories and their inherent modes of intentionality.
Two points should follow. The first concerns the subject object
distinction, for this is the alternative means of putting the
path from category to intentionality. To underscore the fact
that perception itself always entails things, stuff, objects, data, is to make perception
the sufficient condition for the perceptual, conscious modes of
intentionality - desiring and knowing. Whatever else desiring
and knowing are, they involve objects. This is irrefutably
posited in the feeding miracle stories themselves, replete as
they are with figures and quanta. The experience of touch
functioning in the mode of desire must involve the touch of
something or someone in particular: a specific and given thing
is desired as tangible. The case for knowing is essentially no
different. It must entertain its own particular object. In the
mode of haptic memory, as briefly stated previously, knowing
assumes the form of technological rationality. This is rather
more like 'knowing how' than it is like 'knowing that'. In other
words, it is not the beginning and end of knowing as such; it
does not manifest knowing in its canonical or sovereign form.
Knowing will assume its full identity as a perceptual, conscious
mode of intentionality distinguishable from desiring, relatively
to acoustic memory, not haptic memory. Nonetheless,
technological consciousness, the mode of knowing which devolves
upon haptic memory, is a form of knowing. It has its own data, its very own given
objects. Technological consciousness and erotic consciousness
stem from one and the same radical - haptic memory. The only
difference is that between conation and cognition, or as we say,
between desiring and knowing. The data of one may be among the data of the other - as we
are about to see when we address issues pertaining to the
Paraclete. But what is clear at all costs is the fact that the
intentional mode both arises from and brings full circle,
precisely what we mean by the specific radical in the first
place. Thus desire and haptic memory serve to define each other;
but the radical, haptic memory is the beginning and end of the
intentional mode desire. It is prior or antecedent, and a
sufficient condition for the intentional mode.
What we have now argued for the perceptual categories applies as
well to the conceptual categories. The only difference in this
case is between a state of awareness, or mode of intentionality
in which the focus rests with the subject rather than with the
object. These categories are not forged in final and irrevocable
isolation of either polarity of consciousness from its other;
perceptual and conceptual. What we shall see is in the case of a
perceptual mode, a specific subject, although the focus remains
fixed on the object qua
object. So too for a conceptual mode. If in believing, or
willing a 'something', the person is aware of it, it
nevertheless remains true that the real and full force of the
awareness is on what we might call the self. That is, it remains
fixed upon the actual believing or willing subject. This is
fundamentally what the two terms, object and subject imply.
Hence, if no state of awareness which is in the first place
externally related to an object is without a given subject, the
obverse applies. The explication of this nexus between subject
and object, as functions of the polarisation of consciousness
into conceptual and perceptual sides, is a major element of the
theology of semiotic forms. But either way, for objects as for
subjects, the relation of a category to its inherent mode of
intentionality is implicit in these very terms.
This fact, that perceptual modes of intentionality necessarily
engage objects or somethings, and that conceptual forms of
intentionality similarly involve someones, or subjects, are
mutually inclusive. The subjects and the objects are in effect
nothing other than the actual entities referred to as
'transformed' and 'transfigured' in the first and last messianic
miracles respectively. They are not to be taken in isolation
anymore than the two basic psychological tenets of these
Christological narratives, Eros
and Thanatos. We are
coming to a fuller exposition of this matter. It is essential to
grasp here, as a second important demonstration of the relation
occurring between a radical of consciousness and its necessary
form of intentionality, the reciprocity of subjects and objects.
Thus to speak of haptic memory (Eros) or to speak of any kindred perceptual
radical, is to speak of a something, an object, since it is to
speak of the thing as desired, known, and so on. The notion of
an object of perception is tantamount to the notion of a
perceptual mode of intentionality. Similarly, to speak of mind
as in the context of logos qua Thanatos, is to speak of a someone, a subject.
This for its part, is to speak equally of a conceptual
mode of intentionality. For does it not of its own accord mean
the identity which believes, wills, and so on? The
sense-percipient object, and the sense-perceiving subject,
locked as they are in relation, are thus evidential of the
necessitation of modes of intentionality by the perceptual and
conceptual radicals of consciousness. The larger explication of
this aspect of Markan metaphysics, stated in the very explicit
references to 'breaking' and 'fragments' of portions remaining
and the rest in the Eucharistic miracles, must delve more deeply
into mereological issues germane to the same.
The second and final point must add to the brief discussion
above of the Eucharistic mode of perception and its relation to
desire in particular. Any undermining of the affinity between
sense-percipient taste and the intentional mode desiring, runs
counter to common sense as well as counter to the witness of the
gospels. But there remains the task of assessing the Eucharist
itself, and its actual epistemological designatum, the compound mode smell-taste, in
connection with the various perceptual modes of intentionality.
That cannot be undertaken here. What we should add however, is a
note concerning the notion of need as against desire. This is
not meant as a salve to conscience, given the long and
acrimonious account of desire not just by the theistic
traditions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam; but by so many
other religious schools of thought.
In Hinayana Buddhism of course, and in certain Hindu traditions,
generally the attitude towards 'desire' is nothing less than
adversarial. It is therefore refreshing to find, as we shall
find, in the gospel of Luke, an approach which stands in the
clearest opposition to the veritable barrage of calumny levelled
at this, the poorest of relatives among the family of forms of
intentionality for religious consciousness. So if we seem to add
to the long litany of complaint against desire issuing from
religious quarters in making this last point, that is not what
we mean to do at all. The point concerns the notion of need.
Indeed it is necessary to differentiate this from the
intentional mode. Need and desire are neither coterminous nor
mutually exclusive. Thus one's 'daily bread' one may both need
and desire. This is possibly the best of all cases, since it
guarantees a vital part of what we mean by 'satisfaction'.
Satisfaction in the truest sense requires hunger or thirst, that
is, it requires need; and desire of itself may not generate
satisfaction. This is by way of saying that desire may stand of
its own accord, without genuine need. Any comment about not only
the Eucharist itself, but the Eucharistic miracles which accept
it as their prompt, must include a comment along these lines. So
pertinent are these narratives to a world in which vast tracts
of humanity still want in the direst need for 'daily bread' -
and not food alone. We mean of course the things which ensure
health and some measure of human happiness if not prosperity.
Finally, the view adopted here, is that conditionality is not
equivalent to causality. Saying that given radicals or
categories of consciousness necessitate given modes of
intentionality along the lines posited above, does not amount to
saying that the former are the causes of the latter.
THE GOSPELS ARRANGED ACCORDING TO THE ANNUAL FOURFOLD CYCLE
The following mandala encapsulates most of the argument
proposed thus far, and also anticipates the further discussion.
It is as part of the latter where the concepts of ontogeny and
phylogeny enter. These were first introduced in the third essay
of Miracles As Metaphysics,
where the same terms, albeit from biological discourse, were
engaged in response to questions concerning the numerability of
mind. This greatly concerns us, especially regarding the
eschatological doctrines of the Christian faith, which in recent
years have seen the virtual disappearance of concepts such as
the personal, that is, ontogenetic, immortality of the soul or
mind. These same issues thus recur in the four great
eschatological texts which must also necessarily form a part of
the exposition of the Markan Mandala, the reason for
having said previously, that we must pursue more than the
gospels. We have referred already, if only briefly to two of
these texts, Ezekiel and The Apocalypse. These in a very clear
sense respond to the radicals symbolic masculine and optic
memory respectively. Thus the former sits within the context of
the categoreal schemata of 'beginning' just as the latter does
within that of 'end'.
That is to say, the one, Ezekiel, sets before us the
Pneumatological category of the transcendent, conceptual form,
symbolic masculine, which we find so often referred to in that
book as 'Son of man'; whereas the other, The Apocalypse, is the
literary epiphany of a category of pure immanence, optic memory.
The remaining two expositions within the literature can be
listed here: the first is the book of Job, which clearly
presents the category symbolic feminine, and of course the New
Testament book of The Acts, which is fundamentally iconic of the
perceptual radical optic imagination. All four texts, the two
from the Hebrew scriptures, and the two New Testament writings,
are first and last fixed on the identity of the Holy Spirit.
Even though our central concern is essentially that of the four
gospels, and so the identities of the Son, and Transcendence,
nevertheless it is also the case that we cannot ignore the
connexity between these and the same four texts which propose
the Pneumatological doctrines on an equal basis. In the
following mandala where we see the same four gospels
iconographically portrayed in terms of the four cardinal points
of the annual solar cycle, those of the two equinoxes and the
two solstices, the actual processes serving as ligatures between
these cardinal, that is, canonical point-instants, also have
individual representatives within both canons. Therefore we will
make use of these same texts: Ezekiel and The Apocalypse, Job
and The Acts. The mandala which posits the integration of the
radicals of consciousness as well as their sovereign forms of
intentionality in tandem with the the cosmic imagery of the
'four living creatures' relative to the fourfold structure of
the annual cycle, can be put as follows:
In each half of the top section of this iconography we have
listed each of the three radicals belonging to the same class or
taxon, in their graded
hierarchies. These orders comply with the patterns of the
creation taxonomy and the messianic series, to both of which,
serial order is fundamentally important as it will be to the
notion of time itself, and hence to mind. In both halves of the
lower section we have listed the intentional modes 'inherent' in
their respective categories. This 'inherence' is not the same as
confinement. We have put a proper definition of it in terms of
conditionality; that is, we have accounted for the relation
between the canonical instance of eight modes of
intentionality and their affiliated categoreal radical, whether
conceptual or perceptual. But we must not forget for example,
that all six perceptual forms participate in modes generated by
the various four perceptual radicals. In other words, the three
forms of memory and also the three forms of imagination, are
each in their turn occasions for each of the four intentional
modes: desiring; knowing; desiring-to-know; and knowing-will.
Similarly instantiation in the case of the conceptual polarity
is equally wide-ranging. There are in all six conceptual
radicals, six constituents of consciousness taxonomically
posited in the creation story; three pure conceptual forms, and
three forms of unity. All six such categoreal ideas or
conceptual radicals, are occasions for the four intentional
modes generated in turn by the various cardinal, that is,
canonical, conceptual forms: willing; believing; willing-belief;
and believing-desire.
Conditionality is tantamount to canonical or paradigmatic
representativeness. So for example, that species of desire
occasioned by haptic memory, in effect, erotic desire, is the
representative form of this mode of intentionality, taking an
example from the perceptual polarity. But there are in all six
species of radical desire. All six conceptual radicals are
occasions for belief; but only one of these, that of mind,
generates the specific kind or variety of belief which we
recognise as such. In other words, one particular form of
belief is sovereign over all others as the defining instance of
what we mean by the word 'belief'. Thus the canonical, or
sovereign, or representative form of knowing, its epitome, is
occasioned conditionally by acoustic memory; that of desire by
haptic memory; that of belief by mind; that of will-to-believe
by time and so on. Nevertheless the intentional modes, be they
conceptual or perceptual, range over the entire spectrum of the
two polarities, conceptual and perceptual. There are six radical
forms of each intentional mode, but only one canonical or
sovereign instance of each of the eight modes, reviewed so far.
The above positioning of the non-normative radicals and their
innate modes of intentionality is deliberate. It attempts to
bring into 'parallel' those conscious modes with the aconscious
counterparts. The directional or vectoral quality of the semeia is not simply that
of left to right, as we see. For the initial phase in each case
is that of the causal, or conative mode, a mode of either will
or desire. This will be better and fully explicated, as will
many other features of Markan metaphysics given here, by means
of the acoustic semeia,
the twelve tones of the acoustic series. The dodecaphonic semeia clearly arrange the
entire gamut of radicals into a hierarchy of forms, several
aspects of which the above iconography is meant to display. Such
means are equal to the full exposition of the appropriation of
the various radicals of consciousness of modes not inherent to
them. So for example, we will be able to posit knowing in its
full scale, as it is occasioned by the five modes of perceptual
mind other than acoustic memory, and so on. Indeed other
relations between the modes of intentionality, and the relations
of their relations obtain. But it is not necessary to
enter these here, because so much of it can be properly
articulated only by the acoustic semiosis. Since the optic semeia are the best
introduction to the theology of semiotic forms, it is fitting to
begin with them as we have done here. Two points relevant to the
next stage of the study can be entered, and they are as follows:
- There are four sets of canonical instances of
non-hybrid modes of intentionality 'parallel' to one
another, each consisting of one conscious and the one
aconscious polarity. These manifest the same given identity,
and this will be either Transcendence or the Son, for as we
see, there are no non-hybrid intentional modes proper to
those radicals which exemplify the Holy Spirit. Accordingly
they are designated by the same semeioptika, the same optic semeia. These four sets
of two modes stand in the same relation to one another. They
are of course (1) will
and knowledge-of-will,
(2) knowing and will-to-believe, for
Transcendence; and (3) desiring
and believing-in-desire,
as well as (4) believing
and desiring-to-know,
for the Son. It is this fourfold group of modes, each
consisting of a conscious and an aconscious polarity, that
we will later have to pursue in relation to time and
furthermore, in the quest to address the tetradic form of
the gospel, and the specific contents of each gospel.
- There are however, two remaining 'parallel' sets of
modes of intentionality, which although they are hybrid, as
we are about to see, are also demonstrable as canonical, and
which complete the doctrine of intentionality. These are the
four occasions in either categoreal polarity, conceptual or
perceptual, which identify the Holy Spirit: symbolic
masculine and optic imagination in the case of transcendence
and virtual transcendence, and optic memory and symbolic
feminine in the case of immanence and virtual immanence. The
same are figuratively proper as processive between the four
cardinal members of their respective taxa. These same
Pneumatological radicals of consciousness we need to
investigate a propos of the doctrine of intentionality
before advancing further to the study of the fourfold form
of the gospel.
THE FOUR CLASSES OF RADICALS
There are four kinds of persons (pudgala): those
that go from light to light, those that go from darkness to
darkness, those that go from light to darkness, and those
that go from darkness to light; of these do thou the
first! (Nagarjuna's
"Friendly Epistle", Journal Of The Pali Text
Society, Translated by Heinrich Wenzel, London, Henry
Frowde, 1886, stanza 19.)
The earth was still a desert
waste, and darkness lay upon the primeval deep and God's wind
was moving to and fro over the surface of the waters.
And God said: Let there be light! And there was light.
And God saw, how good the light was. And God separated the
light from the darkness. And God named the light day, but the
darkness he named night. (Genesis 1.2-4)
And God said: Let there be lights in the vaults of the
heavens, to separate the day and the night; let them serve
there as signs to determine the seasons (mydi(jw0ml:w tto)ol:),
days and years.
And let them serve as lights in the vault of the heavens,
so that it may be light on earth. And it was so.
And God made the two great lights: the greater light to
rule over the day, and the lesser light to rule over the
night, and the stars too.
And God put them in the vault of the heavens to give light
over the earth,
to rule over the day and the night and separate and to
separate light and darkness. And God saw how good it was.
And it was evening, and it was morning, a fourth day.
(Genesis 1.14-18)
Nagarjuna's typological psychology differs from the pattern
which is emerging here, in relation to the form of the gospels,
in a variety of ways; nonetheless it intuitively seizes upon a
basic feature of the natural world, the annual cycle with its
four marked seasons. (For more on the use of the
light/darkness metaphor as a metapsychological typology in
Buddhist doctrine see Bikkhu Kantipalo, 'Access To Insight: The Wheel of
Birth and Death', in the section titled 'The First Ring', June
2007, Buddhist Publication Society.) As noted, the first
intimation we have of the value of this for metaphysics is
delivered in the Day 4 rubric. Thus far we have been modelling
some of the doctrinal elements of the metaphysical gospel by
means of very simple sexpartite and tripartite linear
iconographic representations, using the semeioptika. But the
dodecad is equally fundamental to the same pattern as expounded
in the coherence of the six Days and the six messianic miracles,
and again reformulated in the twelvefold system of healing
events/disciples, which of course resumes in part at least, the
previous tradition of the twelvefold tribal system, a
theological construct developed even more strongly in The
Apocalypse. The convergence of the two, the co-incidence of the
fourfold and twelvefold is plainly proposed by the product of
the two ciphers for transcendence and immanence respectively, 3
and 4.
Each of the four classes or taxa
contained within the categories consists of three members. Some
of the simpler two-dimensional mandala will consist of a tabular
arrangement of the same two groups of six semeioptika. The
twelvefold schema which we find not only in both Ezekiel and The
Apocalypse, was also visually expressed in the 'ephod', the
breastplate of the high-priest, which represented the
twelve tribes of Israel by means of precious coloured
stones. To all intents and purposes, this too is nothing more or
less than a mandala. It will not be necessary to investigate
every one of these traditions. But we need to indicate here
pursuant to the doctrine of intentionality, its remaining
theological concern. We have already put the canonical
relationship between the 4-8 cardinal modes of intentionality
and the Transcendent and the Son; willing and knowing, and
desiring and believing respectively. We began by outlining the
importance to of the theology of the Holy Spirit, as is given in
the fact that we have to do with the written word at every turn.
Even if from the introduction of the semeioptika as well as from the Johannine
epilogue, we noticed the ascription to the Spirit of movement,
change, and process always from a conative and so, causal, form
of intentionality, whether a species of willing or of desire, to
a cognitive, and immediate one, whether of believing or knowing,
we have still to say more concerning this very process.
Beginning with Ezekiel, the classical Pneumatological exposition
contained in the Tanakh, we encounter the theme of movement and
change as a primary attribute of this identity in the Godhead.
The theologies of semiotic forms which employ both types of semeia, optic and acoustic,
will insist on this same function, transition, as germane to the
Spirit, a property echoed in the chiastic arrangement of the
messianic series which locates the Pneumatological events as the
second and second last of the three members of the two
subgroups. It is necessary to fully profile the basic contents
of the doctrine of intentionality, and in order to do just that,
we have now to address the forms of intentionality proper to the
Holy Spirit. This will bring into full focus one example of the
dodecadic aspect of the pattern.
It may seem that we have forgotten to mention this, the third
identity germane to Trinitarian theology, the Holy Spirit. The
Son is recognisable in the various forms of faith and desire,
and The Transcendent ("The Father") likewise in the various
modes of knowing and will, a postulate which follows from the
peculiar relationships between the Christological conceptual and
perceptual radicals and their intentional modes faith and
desire, and the analogous relationships between the modes
knowing and willing and the perceptual and conceptual
categories proper to the Transcendent. To the Holy Spirit no
particular forms of intentionality are assigned as yet. The
issue is an outstanding one, and brings into focus the first of
the relations we need to examine. If we have left until now the
completion of the doctrine of intentionality in regard to this
identity, that is precisely because it was necessary first to
outline the non-hybrid modes of intentionality, whether simple,
for example desire, or compound, for example desire-to-know. It
is important to recognise here, that the compound forms of
intentionality, all of which belong to the aconscious, are
nevertheless non-hybrid. In other words, the desire-to-know is
not the same thing at all as desiring and knowing. If there is just such a thing as
desiring and knowing,
and we are about to argue that there is indeed, then this is
altogether other than the simple mode desire, just as it is
different from the simple mode knowing, and yet again, different
from the compound mode desire-to-know. Just as surely, as optic
memory differs from haptic memory, from acoustic memory,
and from haptic imagination. Thus even though the
Pneumatological forms of intentionality appear to borrow as it
were, from the extant modes, in that all four are hybridised
forms of the latter, they nevertheless possess these same hybrid
forms which they define canonically. In this respect the
Pneumatological radicals of consciousness are identical to the
Christological and Transcendental categories. There are as such,
four forms of intentionality for which the relevant
Pneumatological radicals act as the sovereign, that is,
canonical instances.
As we noted, conative or causal forms of awareness are of two
sorts: will, by which we mean will simpliciter and the will-to-believe in the
case of conceptual forms, and desire which is desire simpliciter and
desire-to-know in the case of perceptual forms. Cognitive or
epistemic forms of consciousness are likewise divided according
to the emerging difference between conscious and aconscious
polarities. The primary model for this division accords with the
rubrics of Day 1 and Day 4 of the creation story, which present
the light/darkness : night-day relation, and so present the
Christological conceptual categories mind and mind : body. In
that the entire creation narrative rests on the light-time
metaphor, the narrative in its entirety concerns the same
entities, mind and mind : body, principally the former, due to
the governing tendency of transcendence, the primary inclination
of the theology of creation. We adopted as the cue for any
working hypothesis regarding the division between conscious and
aconscious orders, the fundamental distinctions in the creation
Christologies, namely light/darkness
and day : night.
It will be necessary to return to these figures as we proceed.
For one thing, it is apparent that the radicals which
necessitate two aconscious intentional modes, haptic
imagination, necessitating the desire-to-know, and acoustic
imagination necessitating the knowledge-of-will, are represented
in the miracle narratives as transpiring during diurnal
intervals, or periods of increasing light. The
Transfiguration occurs during the day, and indeed during
the period of the sun's zenith. But it is clear that the
Festival Of Booths, which in some sense acts as its precedent,
was an autumn, that is, harvest festival. Hence, it marks the
inception of autumn, and we have represented it as such in the
arrangement of the taxa.
The Walking On The Water, denoting acoustic imagination,
takes place during the very first part of the day when light is
increasing. Yet we have said of both in the discussion above
regarding the specific forms of intentionality, that their
canonical forms of intentionality suggests the nocturnal, in
keeping with their aconscious status. Accordingly, those three
immanent messianic events which purport the three forms of
memory occur within the afternoon to midnight. In spite of this,
we have argued according to the annual paradigm argued that the
canonical modes of intentionality which they in turn
necessitate, are conscious. We shall say more concerning the
significance of these intervals in due course. The resolution of
the problem concerns the integration of both cycles, lunar and
solar.
We opted to set out above the categories, not just of the
creation story, but correspondingly those of the messianic
series, by means of the semeioptika,
in their simplest form. Thus we have selected one of the terms
of the light-time conceptual scheme, that of the 'season'
mentioned in the Day 4 rubric. For this pinpoints our topic of
the specificity of each of the four gospels. To use the optic semeia, which are nothing
other than reflected light, so to illustrate the various
radicals of consciousness and their related and equally various
modes of intentionality, therefore fits with the narrative.
These same optika are not just metaphors. All that is
suggested by the word 'sign' (shmei~on - Mark 8.11-13, John 2.11), must be
admitted in any procedure germane to the theology of semiotic
forms. There is a given sense in which the semeioptika are functional
analogues of the radicals of consciousness and consequently of
the modes of intentionality which these generate.
If then, the discussion of intentional forms thus far has failed
to refer to The Paraclete in a measure equal to the references
to the Son and the Transcendent, it is obvious that there are
categories assigned to this identity in both series. How are we
to account for these? How are we to address the apparent
deficiency regarding intentional modes proper to the Paraclete?
The last of the mandala above of itself already begins to
propose the answer. For it sorts the arrangement of the two
series which observes the closest connection between conative
and cognitive, the causal form of intentionality and the
responsive or reactive one, according to the four taxa, the four sorts of
conceptual or perceptual entities classified in the two
sevenfold series. This does not mean that, as arranged above
according to the annual/seasonal and global paradigm, the latter
follow from the former. The will-to-believe is causal of
believing; the desire-to-know of knowing; desiring is causally
connected to knowledge-of-will, and finally, will is connected
causally to faith-in-desire. These supervening relationships are
not the ones set out in the above diagram. What we have there
instead are the two intentional modes, the first conative -
causal - and the second cognitive - caused - as both of these
are derivative from the four sorts of radicals, or orders, taxa, themselves. Thus to
take one example, desiring and knowing are necessitated by two
different categories, radicals of consciousness, but these
belong to the same class or taxon.
For the condition for each is a particular form of memory. This
common denomination of members of the four taxa is vital to the
understanding of the hybrid forms of intentionality, and serves
furthermore to differentiate them from compound modes. For in
every one of the four cases of the Pneumatological forms of
consciousness, or what is the same thing, the hybrid modes of
intentionality, the same applies: namely the taxonomic standing
of each is one and the same. But whereas in two cases of
compound, aconscious forms of intentionality, the
knowledge-of-will and the belief-in-desire, the component
intentional forms belong to disparate taxa; this is never so for the hybrid forms of
intentionality.
In the mandala above, there are two modes, initial and
final, corresponding to the four cardinal, seasonal,
point-instants of the annual cycle. Each of the four taxa contain the
conditional radicals necessary for the two hybrid modes. The
radicals themselves vary; thus haptic memory is the condition
for desire, and acoustic memory is the condition for knowing.
But these two radicals belong to the same taxon or class: they are
forms of memory. Here we can briefly review one of the most
basic aspects of the hermeneutic: the fact that there are four
distinct taxa or
classes of radicals of consciousness divulged in the homologous
series, creation and salvation, beginning and end. The four taxa are those we examined
in the first part of The
Markan Mandala:
TRANSCENDENT TAXA
Genesis 1.1-2.4a - Conceptual Polarity
|
IMMANENT TAXA
The Messianic Series - Perceptual Polarity
|
transcendence
|
virtual immanence
(immanent transcendence)
|
virtual transcendence
(transcendent immanence)
|
immanence
|
pure conceptual forms
Days 1
Day 2
Day 3
|
forms of unity
Day 4
Day 5
Day 6
Day 7
|
forms of imagination
1) Transfiguration
2) Walking On Water
3) Stilling the Storm
|
forms of memory
4) Transformation
5) Feeding 5,000
6) Feeding 4,000
7) Eucharist
|
1 mind (faith)
2 space (will)
3 symbolic masculine
|
4 mind : body (faith-in-desire)
5 space : time (will-to-believe)
6 male : female
Sabbath
|
1) haptic imagination (desire-to-know)
2) acoustic imagination (knowing-will)
3) optic imagination
|
4) haptic memory (desire)
5) acoustic memory (knowing)
6) optic memory
7) olfactory/gustatory memory
|
Here we should briefly review the discussion of the four classes
which was the outcome of the first part of our study, by first
attending to the incidence of the categoreal paradigm 'heavens
and the earth' as this sorts with the various Christological
titles and the internal and external structure of the
categories:
space : space-time
('beginning
mind : mind-body
and
male : male-female
end')
The internal triadic structure of each of the three forms of
unity also conforms to the paradigm transcendence : immanence.
Additionally, we have already seen that two forms of unity,
space : time and male : female, stand in a particular relation
to one another. These, the primordial and eschatological forms
of unity, taken in analogous relation, answer to the binary form
of the paradigm. The two categories together recapitulate the
same order. Their relationship brings to light the paradoxical
and central character of mind : body, and fulfils the totality
of the morphological scheme as announced in the opening words of
Genesis. Another way of putting the same is as follows:
Transcendence
:
Immanence
space : time :: mind : body :: male : female
The extensive relation of the three categories reifies the
'image and likeness of God'. It has both triadic and dyadic
formal aspects. These are inseparable from one another, and
establish the recurring patterns of this text as of the
messianic series.
Transcendence
: Immanence
space : time :: mind : body ::
male : female
The words italicised denote the categoreal analogy of
transcendence, and the words underlined, the categoreal analogy
of immanence. These converge at the Christological category.
This co-ordination as the Christological category of juxtaposed
transcendent and immanent is encapsulated in the various
Christological formulae 'beginning and end', 'first and last',
'alpha and omega', by means of the copula 'and'. The
Christological entity, the category of mind : body is
accordingly accentuated in its transcendent pole: that of mind
proper. That is, mind persists in itself and for itself,
independently. It is nevertheless also accentuated in its
determination as immanent form of unity, soma, the conjunction of
mind and body, in virtue of the principle of immanence, unity.
Mind is equal to space in its transcendence, just as the
mind-body unity enjoys parity with the anthropic form of
unity, which is weighted in virtue of immanence. The categoreal
analogy of immanence defers to the deliveries of the messianic
series. Thus where 'earth' is first announced in the creation
story, its abiding and real significance is given in the
isomorphic messianic series. There of course it is defined as
the conjunctive relation between forms of imagination and forms
of memory. That is to say, that the latter, the forms of memory
- which is what the word 'earth' must finally signify - always
comprise their alternate pole, a specific form of imagination.
Optic memory therefore, the most exclusively or definitively
immanent form of memory, always necessarily contains or includes
optic imagination. This conjunction of optic imagination and
optic memory redefines the anthropic category such that the
symbolic masculine is embodied in optic imagination and the
symbolic feminine in optic memory. There is no pure memory void
of an imaginal consciousness, memory in itself and of itself,
least of all, optic memory. Memory according to the categoreal
analogy of immanence, whereby the masculine symbolises the
imaginal and the feminine the mnemic, but in a way which accords
with the essential, unitive or conjugal union of these relata, is indeed the
synthesis of past and future sense-percipient occasions, even
where the imaginal sense-percipient forms of these unions can
and do obtain in themselves to some degree, and ostensibly
remain non-perceptual.
TRANSCENDENT TAXA
(1)
Pure Conceptual Forms
These are ideas in the truest sense of the word. They attest
transcendence and so stand independently of their co-option by
the forms of unity. The space of the form of unity space : time
is other than 'immanent' space : time just as mind in se, the transcendent
conceptual form, persists in alterity to the soma, the psychophysical,
or mind : body unity. We have already seen that the forms of
unity substantiate the aconscious, whereas the pure conceptual
forms inhabit the conscious. The symbolic masculine however,
blurs this picture somewhat; since it represents a transcendent
occasion of what is weighted in favour of immanence. Thus the
form of unity male : female, is the definitive expression of the
anthropic category. Space on the other hand remains obstinately
transcendent. The Christological categories, mind and mind :
body, are weighted in favour of both transcendence and immanence
respectively.
(2) Forms Of Unity
These are space : time, mind : body and male : female as
fundamental constituents of consciousness. They are immanent
determinations of what are otherwise taxonomically transcendent
realities and so assume the characteristics of immanence. This
means that in terms of their effects, they may bear comparison
with the forms of memory, which are taxonomically purely
immanent. The creation narrative, in listing them in serial
continuity with the pure transcendent forms, proposes the three
forms of unity as transcendent, although their paradoxical
status means that we might just as legitimately construe them in
terms of immanence. Thus they are criteriologically
conceptual. It may seem most difficult to concede as
conceptual, the body, and again the anthropic, male and female.
We tend naturally to associate the body and its sexual
determination with anything other than the conceptual.
Nonetheless, in the first instance, these must be classified as
concepts and not percepts, even though both as existing at the
end of the spectrum of conceptual forms opposite to that of
space and mind. However, like these latter, the body and the
anthropic category are indeed, as conceptual forms of
unity, ideas. As such, they furnish the aconscious polarity of
conceptual mind along with the conceptual form of unity space :
time. At the broadest level, the role and function in
consciousness of these three entities is truly comparable to the
role and function of the transcendent forms, even though they
seem to operate like the forms of memory. Hence they occasion
the modes of intentionality will and belief, which accrue
initially to the two transcendent forms space and mind
respectively.
Where the logical appreciation of the conceptual categories was
given in the creation account in terms of modes of antithesis,
we noticed that the forms of unity subvert what is proper to
transcendence, identity as the operation of disjunction,
fission, separation from an 'other'. We might therefore say of
the logical modality of these constituents of consciousness, the
conceptual forms of unity, that they embody a 'conjunctive
diaeresis', a 'combinatorial analysis'. These oxymorons express
their irreducibly ambivalent nature, their inherent proneness to
the equivocal.
IMMANENT TAXA
(1)
Forms Of Imagination
The ambiguity attendant upon the attributes and functions of the
imagination is ineluctable. The forms of imagination are
transcendent determinations of what remain congenitally immanent
in kind. Thus, we cannot deny the ambiguous natures of either
the forms of imagination or the forms of unity. One way of
coming to terms with this is to think of both in terms of the
language given in the relevant texts. The second half of the
creation narrative is dominated by the motif of the propagation
of living species. It looks forward to the motif of
multiplication in the immanent messianic miracles, there, of
provision of food. Of course the Genesis story makes the
connection between this process and the phenomenon of nurturing
also. We can therefore think of the forms of unity as adding
something non-essential to the pure conceptual forms. On the
other hand, we can conceive the forms of imagination as
abstractive from, or reductive of, the forms of memory. This is
already implicit in the miracle narratives depicting imaginal
consciousness. Each of the three episodes is marked as
evanescent or fleeting, and as having a dream-like quality. In
other words, they are depicted in terms of the loss of
something, or the reduction of something. The Stilling Of
The Storm clearly refers to this idea of loss with its
sense of the imminence of death: "perishing". There is similarly
a penumbra of death and loss evoked in the other two events of
the class, The Walking On The Water, by means of the
word "ghost", and The Transfiguration Of Jesus, which
contains a lengthy discourse on death and resurrection.
If therefore the picture we have of memory presents us with the
notion of multiplication in keeping with the same pattern given
in the second half of the creation story, where it is living
species that multiply, correspondingly, the first part of that
narrative utilised the event of separation, division,
disjunction. This is proleptic of the way in which the workings
of imagination will be understood in the gospels. Imagination is
thus we can say reductive. It takes away something from memory,
and this same something which it abstracts, or 'subtracts',
belongs in itself to the phenomenon of death, just as do the
conceptual forms themselves, which function as the normative
equivalents of the imaginal mind. This normativity should be
understood as inherent and authoritative. It is definitional of
transcendence, so that if imagination itself is to be
understood, it must be so in relation to the pure conceptual
forms. They are presented in terms of the disjunctive form of
antithesis; light separated from darkness, above separated from
below, land separated from sea, and plants of one kind separated
from plants of another kind. It is only in the latter case, that
of the symbolic masculine, with its clear relation to the
imaginal, that there is any modification of this reality. Hence
if we were to describe the antithetical nature of the
imagination, we must take into account the fact of its innately
perceptual disposition. We might say of its division from
memory, that it is a 'disjunctive synthesis', an expression
redolent of the ambiguous character of the aconscious.
This ambiguity is reflected in that imaginative consciousness
engages 'non-sensuous perception'. The concept of the
imagination put here redefines both the ideas of perception and
imagination. For it defines imagination inextricably with
perception, while the concept of transcendence seems to qualify
the notion of the sensuous to the point of annihilation. One
difficulty in conceiving perceptual imagination is the
misconception that future events are not real in the same way
that past events are. Future events may be not yet actualised in
the same way that past occasions already are, but they are as
potential, no less real in virtue of that. The sense in which
the imaginal consciousness consists of discrete and identifiable
forms may also seem problematic. If imagination is involved in
the functioning of memory, how then can we argue the existence
of thoroughly independent imaginative centres of consciousness?
We have not stated such a case. In the last resort, imagination
is beholden to memory, from which nonetheless, it differs. Just
so, the forms of unity are beholden to the pure conceptual
forms. As defining transcendence and immanence, the three pure
conceptual forms and the three forms of memory respectively,
express at the barest or most radical level, the taxonomic
principle, the categoreal paradigm, transcendence : immanence.
These six radicals of consciousness alone are consequently the
normative occasions of the various values inherent in the
categories.
(2)
Forms Of Memory
Where the story of creation stresses the conceptual polarity of
consciousness for Christian epistemology, this is answered and
ultimately balanced by the unstinting and consistent appraisal
of the perceptual which we encounter in the gospels at every
turn. We should see this as squaring perfectly with the
'incarnation'. The normative mode for perception is that
designated by the common language term, memory. Thus the modes
of haptic, acoustic and optic memory stand juxtaposed to the
three pure transcendent forms with the greatest degree of
contrast.
There is no dearth of speculative systems of
philosophy-psychology which describe the nature and functions of
memory in our mental and affective lives as humans. The great
distinctiveness as well as the advantage of Mark's doctrine of soma is that it secures the
co-operation of memory and imagination with sense percipience.
At one stroke then, Markan metaphysics resolves the issues
surrounding what memory is and how it works. The recurrent
metaphor for the latter is assimilation, and so
appetition-satisfaction. Every one of the miracles which
elaborates the doctrine of mnemic consciousness uses this
figure.
Immanence declares the unity of relata which to some extent are oppositional,
contrastive, antithetical. The forms of imagination, haptic,
acoustic and optic are seconded if not suborned in the same
unity. There is no memory without imagination. The contribution
of memory to consciousness, a contribution that is inseparable
from the functioning of sense perception in its various modes,
is also inseparable from imagination. Thus, imagination too
participates inextricably in the activities of sentient memory.
The principle of immanence, the unambiguous sense in which
immanence espouses manifold unity, entails that memory in itself
can not exist. Memory is necessarily compounded, multiplied
even, with imagination. We ought not to understand the contrast
between memory and imagination in absolute terms, those of the
theology of transcendence. There is no absolute and lasting
distinction possible between the forms of memory and the
corresponding forms of imagination, contrastively to the utter
disparity between pure conceptual forms - space, mind and
symbolic masculine - and the forms of memory. Memory is defined
as the co-operation of both actual past sense-percipient
occasions in which imagination was itself already implicit, and
the future non-sensuous, but nevertheless perceptual occasions
in virtue of which the latter obtains.
Thus far the discussion of intentionality has been framed in
terms of four distinct simple forms - will and belief, which are
conceptual modes of intentionality, and desire and knowing which
are perceptual modes. To this group of four conscious modes, we
added the corresponding compound modes: will-to-believe and
belief-in-desire, and desire-to-know and knowledge-of-will. In
accordance with the rule of parsimony no new terms were
necessary. This followed the conceptual scheme of the two
narrative cycles, which recapitulated the taxonomic paradigm
within each of the already defined categories. Now we are on the
verge of articulating the way in which intentionality is
generated by those radicals of consciousness evincing the Holy
Spirit. For the discussion has not yet addressed these remaining
four Pneumatological radicals of consciousness: the symbolic
masculine, the male : female form of unity; and both optic
imagination and optic memory. We must now pursue these in
relation to the doctrine of intentionality.
The above table presents the four taxa or classes of categories. In each of the
four cases, a pair of conative-cognitive radicals are grouped
together as belonging to one of the four taxa: pure conceptual
forms, forms of imagination, forms of unity, and forms of
memory. Additionally, each of the four classes contains three
members, although, if we include the Eucharist, as we
shall, then the class of radicals 'forms of memory' has in all
four members. These two figures, three, the numerical cipher
representing transcendence qua identity, and four, which stands for
immanence and correspondingly for the principle of unity,
establish the outlines of the two series as a whole. They yield
the twelve entities fundamental to Christian epistemology. Just
eight of these same twelve entities are responsible for what we
have called variously, intentional modes, forms of
intentionality, and so on. These are listed above in the bottom
four frames and their necessary intentional modes are listed
parenthetically.
There are four conscious such modes, and four aconscious modes.
The conscious modes are simple, the aconscious modes are
compound. Each of these eight modes stands in a specific
relation to a particular category. The category or radical is
the necessary condition of the intentional mode. Thus four of
the archaeological - creation - categories and four of the
eschatological - salvation - categories, determine what we call
intentional modes, the fundamental feature of which will be a
relation between a subject and an object. The four categoreal
radicals from Genesis which serve as conditional for their
respective modes of conceptual intentionality are:
(transcendent) space - the mode willing; mind - the mode
believing; space : time - the mode will-to-believe; and mind :
body - the mode faith-in-desire. Even though all six
radicals of consciousness taxonomised at the most basic level as
transcendent, that is, conceptual, are opportunities or
occasions for all four conceptual modes of intentionality listed
thus far, only one such radical exemplifies that intentional
mode with its definitive form, or as we may say, its canonical
expression, its sovereign occasion.
The four categoreal forms of the messianic series serving as
conditional for the remaining four perceptual modes of
intentionality, are: acoustic imagination - knowledge-of-will;
haptic imagination - desire-to-know; acoustic memory - knowing;
and haptic memory - desiring. The sequence of this list is given
correspondingly to the sequence of the previous list. Once
again, the entire series of six perceptual radicals expresses
the four perceptual modes of intentionality listed thus far.
Thus there are six identifiable occasions of knowing, desiring,
knowing-will, and desiring-to-know. However, only one of these,
the category or perceptual radical which acts as the sufficient
condition of the relevant mode, defines the intentional mode
canonically. For example, haptic memory is the condition
necessary to the canonical form of intentionality desire
Two patterns emerge here: the paired conscious modes of
intentionality are those which are fitted to the intervals of
increasing diurnal light - spring and summer, while the
aconscious forms of intentionality answer to the seasons during
which the darkness increases, that is, the days shorten and the
nocturnal intervals increase - autumn and winter. There is a
further distinction between the conatus and the cognitive
intentional mode in each case. The first or initial mode is
always conative, as providing the impetus, the second or final
mode is always cognitive as a realisation of the epistemic
tendency inherent in the taxon.
Nagarjuna's Friendly Epistle quoted above, if it does
not directly refer to the four seasons of the year, can be said
to allude to this pattern. Many other traditions, those of
native American Indians for example, have sacred illustrations
or mandala which reproduce the four cardinal points of the
compass, which are then interpreted as analogues to the four
seasons. It is the spatiotemporal rather than spatial structures
that must interest us here. Although we are not proposing
that the temporal exists independently from the spatial. But
such traditions as we find in native American cultures and
others both older and younger, reproduce the fourfold pattern of
temporality, the comprehensive and quintessential aspect of the
model to which we will appeal in order to explicate the form of
the gospel. The practice of Christian meditation will be
observant of these fundamental contours of temporal existence
and their subsequent relatedness to human consciousness.
The first noticeable feature of the mandala in this connection
is the binary division of the year into periods of increasing
and decreasing light. One half of the year consists of
increasing light against decreasing darkness, and this comprises
the year immediately following the spring equinox until the
summer solstice. Corresponding to this half of the year are the
forms of memory and the pure conceptual forms respectively, and
their inherent modes of intentionality, all of which are
conscious, that is to say, normative. So we notice that the half
of the year during which the dynamic relation between light and
darkness involves an increase in the former at the expense of
the latter, is analogous not only to conceptual forms. Ideas or
concepts are not privileged above all else, as they might
otherwise be by a Christian Platonic system for instance. Hence
the whole gamut of semeia,
is deployed in signifying these categories and their relative
modes of intentionality. The semeioptika
involved are not only those which designate the transcendent
pole, red-orange-yellow, but also those which signify the
perceptual pole in its purest form, that of unmitigated
immanence, green-blue-violet. If the order of the latter is
reversed here for conscious modes of intentionality, the
corollary aconscious orders will invert the previous set of semeia,
just as, in a sense, the aconscious orders subvert their
conscious counterparts.
Three pure conceptual forms, and their corresponding intentional
functions, are analogically represented by the summer, signified
by red-orange-yellow, and three pure perceptual forms with their
own innate or necessary intentional functions are the analogues
to spring, signified by violet-blue-green. As a result, will and
belief and the intentional function yet to be assigned to the
symbolic masculine, do not formulate a priority arrogating to
itself the sole analogous signification of light, first
announced in the creation story. For we must reckon also with
the fact that the half of the year to which summer belongs is
preceded by the spring, and in the Markan mandala, we see that
this is clearly the province corresponding analogously to the
perceptual memory and its proper intentional functions, of which
the two so far reckoned are desiring and knowing. If we must
insist on the application of a differential, it should involve
the careful distinction between light : darkness in the former
cases, the conceptual, and night : day in the latter, in the
cases of the perceptual, resuming the terminology of the
creation account. For both the conceptual categories and the
conceptual intentional modes are simples, reflecting their
disjunction from the corresponding forms of unity, whereas the
perceptual radicals and the perceptual modes of intentionality
are compounded; haptic memory comprises haptic imagination, just
as desire comprises the desire-to-know, and acoustic memory
comprises acoustic imagination, just as knowing comprises
knowledge-of-will. The latter two radicals like their respective
two intentional modes, replicate the conjunctive mode of
antithesis.
The other half of the year comprises the ensuing period, from
immediately after the summer solstice as far as the winter
solstice, and includes autumn and winter until the very point of
midwinter. The categoreal analogues in this case are forms of
imagination and forms of unity, and their inherent modes of
intentionality, all of which are aconscious, and beset by
paradox. In all then, these are the four periods referred to in
Nagarjuna's Friendly Epistle. quoted above: darkness to
light - spring; light to light - summer; light to darkness -
autumn; and darkness to darkness - winter. The difference
between Markan metaphysics and that of Nagarjuna being that no
one figure is to be favoured over any other.
The coloured diagrams above and below illustrate the serial
contiguity of the radicals of consciousness and their
corresponding modes of intentionality. They sort the categories
into four orders according to the totality of the narrative
cycles, creation and salvation, and thus emphasise the
processive aspect of time as it shapes consciousness. One such
basic aspect of consciousness in which we recognise the
principle of immanence, unity, focuses this contiguity among the
radical categories: both the two conceptual and two perceptual
categories, and consequently that of the various modes of
intentionality necessitated by them. The sheer continuity
between the radicals of consciousness is maximal in the case of
immediately proximate or neighbouring radicals. The same is best
illustrated by the optika.
These have the capacity, which the acoustic semeia do
not, of blending imperceptibly, one into the next. The tones of
the dodecaphonic scale, are hierarchically graded as punctuated,
and their more or less equally recurrent interval is the
semitone. They are twelve in number, discrete and individuated
so as to render all but impossible, the blurring of identity in
the interests of unity. But in addressing the identity of the
Holy Spirit, it is the phenomenon of unity that confronts us,
and this is best demonstrated by the optic semeia. Optic
sense-percipience itself identifies the Holy Spirit, a subject
which we are about to pursue.
So for example, there is an immediate continuity, proximity, in
consciousness, between the pure idea space and the idea the
symbolic masculine, just as there is between the latter and the
pure conceptual form, idea, mind. Even though we affirmed that
the comprehensive division between conceptual and perceptual
means that all six conceptual radicals function as occasions for
all four conceptual modes of intentionality, and that the same
applies to the six perceptual categories and the four perceptual
modes of intentionality, let us for the moment keep this aspect
of the mandala as simple as possible, so that we will concern
ourselves only with the four distinct periods or seasons, the
analogues to which are of course the four taxonomically
ordered triads. In other words, let us confine the examples to
the four distinct taxonomic divisions: pure conceptual forms,
forms of imagination, forms of unity, and forms of memory. These
four classes of radicals correspond to the year beginning with
summer. Additionally, let us concentrate on the four intervening
radicals of each of these four taxa; for they have not yet been reckoned
according to the doctrine of intentionality, the reason why we
have yet to account for the Holy Spirit in terms of the same
tenet of Markan metaphysical doctrine.
We can see that those four radicals which are intermediate in
each of the four groups, are those which have no proper or
individuated mode of intentionality, no mode that is,
susceptible of identity, and that these same four radicals
instantiate the Holy Spirit, spoken of in The Nicene Creed and
the Athanasian Creed in terms of 'procession'. What we have just
said about continuity and proximity of radicals to one another
will concern the intentional modality to be ascribed to the
same. These are the four radicals: the symbolic masculine, the
male : female form of unity, or symbolic feminine, optic
imagination, and optic memory. First let us make a simple
observation about the four texts as a whole, which provide this
tenet of the theology of Trinity in both narrative cycles,
Genesis and the gospels.
THE
PNEUMATOLOGICAL RADICALS AND THEIR INTENTIONAL MODES
TAXA
|
CONATIVE 'AND'
COGNITIVE INTENTIONAL MODES
|
transcendent conceptual
(conscious)
symbolic masculine
|
willing + believing
(light to light - summer)
|
transcendent perceptual
(aconscious)
optic imagination
|
desiring knowledge + knowing will
(light to dark - autumn)
|
immanent conceptual
(aconscious)
symbolic feminine
|
willing belief + believing desire
(dark to dark - winter)
|
immanent perceptual
(conscious)
optic memory
|
desiring + knowing
(dark to light - spring)
|
The key word here is 'and'. We have had to deal with this
before, and not surprisingly, in the same context, that of
immanence, which brings into focus the identity of the Holy
Spirit. In every case of a 'procession' between a causal or
conative intentional mode and the final, caused, and
cognitive mode, the relation is what is best described as
'instrumental'. This topic must later occupy us, but the
point to observe here, in contradistinction to the relations
of supervenience already noted, is that of the means of
process from perceptual to perceptual category, or
conceptual to conceptual category as the case may be, and
the continuous passage from conatus to episteme. The same processive, or
contiguous rather than supervening relation, should be taken
as analogous; thus will is to belief, just what desire is to
knowing and so on. This may be conceived under those
commonest depictions of the identity in question, the Holy
Spirit, announced in the creation story, and consistently
given in Ezekiel, which involve movement and change. In the
haptika, when we come to consider them, we shall see
the very same. We know already the two semeia for
the symbolic masculine and symbolic feminine, the phallos
and womb respectively. These also suggest movement as the
continuously processive evolution of all created living
things. But this should not be confused with that which we
know of the Christological categories, and to which we have
referred 'transmutation', meaning both 'transformation' and
'transfiguration'
The other haptic semeia
of the perceptual categories, optic memory and optic
imagination, can be given here: the arms and the legs,
respectively. Both are announced in Mark's two narratives of
the healings of blind persons, The Man At Bethsaida
(Mark 8.22-46) and Blind Bartimaeus (Mark 10.46-52)
respectively. Thus to begin to understand instrumentality as
the proper articulation of the relation between an initial conatus and a final episteme belonging
always to the same taxon, will be to contemplate
these members of the soma.
It should be observed most carefully however, that neither
sign, phallos nor womb, has anything to do with desire simpliciter. All four
of these Pneumatological semeia
recapitulate their definition as organized according to the
seasonal template answering to the radical fourfold
disposition of the gospel(s). That is, they each in varying
ways concern the idea of movement. At a later point in this
essay, first in relation to the gospel of Luke, we shall
comment further on the import of the haptic semeia. For they too
shed light upon the narratives, as upon their immediate
subjects. But it is now necessary to complete the full
enumeration of forms of intentionality, and to introduce
both their trinitarian rationale and their innate
axiological strand.
The
Pneumatological Texts
That we have not attributed specific modes of intentionality
to the identity of the Holy Spirit squares with the fact
that every one of the narratives concerning the
Pneumatological categories bears the imprint of being a
double of another rubric or miracle story. Thus in Genesis,
Day 3 is ostensibly pre-empted by Day 2, and Day 6 by Day 5,
while the stories of The Feeding Of The Four Thousand
and The Stilling Of The Storm, may appear as little
more than duplicates of the two central events in the
messianic series, The Feeding Of The Five Thousand
and The Walking On The Water respectively.
We claim this as already notable in the texts which specify
this identity. In every case these are ostensibly replicas
of the prior narratives. This is easy enough to see
concerning the messianic events, and hence the perceptual
modes. For in all but one case out of four, we have copies
of the contiguous events, The Feeding Of The Five
Thousand and The Walking On The Water, which
present the acoustic radicals of consciousness, and
correspondingly the modes of knowing, both conscious and
aconscious respectively. Only the gospel of Luke fails to
supply a recension of the second episode. Thus multiple
attestations would seem to argue for the early and original
provenance of these narratives. Concerning either
Christological occasion, there can be no quarrel. The
depictions of these, whether the rubrics of the creation
taxonomy, or the miracle stories of the messianic series, do
not manifest the apparent duplication by the Pneumatological
texts of the Transcendental theologies. Since we possess
three accounts of The Transfiguration,
all of which comply with one another, and one account of the
miracle of Water Transformed Into Wine, which no
other gospel contradicts, these episodes, the standard
depictions of the haptic consciousness and their inherent
modes of desire, are equally established as fundamental
doctrinal tenets. No putative duplicates are extant here.
The gospel of Luke is indeed a somewhat hit and miss affair
where the messianic series is concerned. Of all three
complements of events, it has no complete member. Thus
for the Transcendent, there is only The Feeding Of
The Five Thousand; for the Holy Spirit, The
Stilling Of The Storm; for the Son, The
Transfiguration. Though the last shortcoming is also
shared by the gospels of Mark and Matthew. And if the gospel
of John has only one complement, the two miracles which
identify the role of the Transcendent, it more than
compensates for this in the clear outlines of the miracle
stories taken as a whole. For there are in all just seven
such episodes in John, whether messianic or healing signs,
and the reiteration of the morphology of the creation
taxonomy, though modified, is abundantly clear.
It may not be desirable, let alone possible, to decide which
miracle of loaves is a copy of the other, and which miracle
at sea is alike a copy. In fact, such an enterprise may well
be misconceived, if as we have emphasised, the messianic
series morphologically resumes the creation story. But one
thing is apparent in any scrutiny of the gospels: that the
adaptation of the morphology of the creation taxonomy does
involve some novelty. For the messianic events are
structured as a chiasmos, not as two sets of parallel
rubrics. This has the effect of bringing into greater relief
the first and last episodes, the Christological ones, since
they are the least contiguous, and also of bringing them
into contrast of some kind with the most contiguous events,
the central occasions, the theologies of Transcendence. This
is because there are two points of entry, or exit, since
there are two clear boundaries. We mean the complement of
events which occurs at the centre, those identifying The
Transcendent, and the complement which occupies the
peripheries, events which identify the Son. Thus even where
it may be finally impossible to propose both a particular
sea miracle story and one miracle story of loaves and fish
as a duplicate of an original, the chiastic structure of the
series, whichever way we look at it, specifies as
processive, that is, continuous, the two occasions which
disclose the identity of the Holy Spirit.
The situation in the creation narrative is decidable on the
basis of textual sequence. In a text in which beginning is
much, if not in a certain sense everything, the first of the
two proximate rubrics in each case, Day 2 rather than Day 3,
and subsequently Day 5 rather than Day 6, must be allowed
its sway. If we are pressed to establish only provisionally
some sort of priority for the messianic events, then we can
only suggest that the Transcendent occasions which are the
prior ones in the creation narrative, might therefore act as
guides. So that the messianic events answering to these will
be the 'original' ones: The Feeding Of The Five Thousand
and The Walking On The Water.
These remarks are preparatory to the ensuing step in our
study. Even if there is in neither order of intentionality,
conscious nor aconscious, a specifically 'original' mode of
intentionality proper to the the Holy Spirit, who begins to
seem a persona non grata, it is equally so that the
function of this identity in relation to consciousness is
not only indispensable but also paramount. The value
associated intrinsically with the anthropic category, male :
female, and extrinsically with the category of the symbolic
masculine, as well as with the optic memory and optic
imagination, once again intrinsically and extrinsically
respectively, that value, is beauty. This is the one
pre-eminently immanent form of value, responsible for
securing the propagation of life itself as surely in
the human as in the animal realm, so entrenched is it in the
consciousness. Its overriding mark is unity. These facts
alone, the human and animal sense of aesthetic value and the
unity of consciousness itself, would seem to ensure both the
permanence and prominence of those of its ingredients we
identify as the image and likeness of the Holy Spirit.
We can begin the exposition of the role attaching to the
Holy Spirit by means of further explaining the unity between
the conative and cognitive, epistemic, modes of
intentionality, which share the same taxon or class.
In the discussion of modes of antithesis with which we began
the study of the miracle stories, we proposed that immanence
is a virtual synonym for this identity. The immanent
categories, the anthropic, and optic memory, are
perfect examples of what we mean by immanence, for its
guiding principle is unity. The anthropic is a oneness, a
unity; expressing not only the consistency of male and
female, but also the consistency and contiguity of human
existence with its animal past. This concerns us, even if at
the same time we must urge a difference in kind between
ourselves and our nearest kindred creatures, as the roots of
our human consciousness must lie with them. We have already
met in the forms of intentionality will-to-believe and
belief-in-desire, something of these roots of human
consciousness. Mark we saw, is at pains to expound this in
the miracle stories connected with the same intentional
modes. Those members of the Tanakh which answer to the forms
of unity more clearly than any others, Daniel, Job and
Jonah, are replete with animal imagery, which as often as
not, is reflective of human existence.
Immanence then, and the Holy Spirit in particular, set unity
in opposition of some sort with identity. It is the blurring
of identity which we glimpse in the continuous process of
one intentional mode to another, the integration of modes
belonging to one and the same taxon. Just as the modes
themselves are necessitated by the radicals, the radicals
determined by the Holy Spirit are the conditions sufficient
for the integration. Here then, we have arrived at the
answer to the question concerning the taxonomical relation
between a initial conative mode and its final
cognitive/epistemic consequence. As for specifically unique
modes of intentionality attributable to the Holy Spirit,
there are none. What there are instead are hybrids of
existing modes, within the conscious and aconscious orders
both, according to the four classes or categories or
radicals, that is, the four taxa, and their necessary modes of
intentionality. Unlike two of the compound, aconscious,
forms of intentionality, hybrid modes of intentionality thus
always preserve the taxonomic status of their components.
There is no continuous passage from one class to another, as
there is for the relations of supervenience. Supervenience
thus itself does not denote intentional modality.
What this means then is that none of the four hybrid forms
of intentionality is merely relational. The supervenient
relations between desire and knowledge-of-will, or yet
again, that between desire-to-know and knowing, are not in
themselves comparable to the relation between desire and knowing.
'Desiring-and-knowing' is not intelligible as a relation at
all any more than is desiring itself, or knowing itself, or
yet again, either desire-to-know itself or knowledge-of-will
itself. Just as these are intentional modes susceptible of
identification on the basis of their arising from sufficient
and necessary conditions, the same must apply to all four
hybrid modes of intentionality: they exist as forms of
intentionality in their own right. Care should be taken to
accord them status on par with the other eight forms of
intentionality. The index of the immanent as of the
Pneumatological is ever the same: unity. The hybrid forms of
intentionality bear this hallmark to the fullest extent.
There is as a result no effective differentiation between conatus and episteme in each of
their instances.
Hence the eschatological and Pneumatological strand
of the doctrine of intentionality must grasp the fact that
their are four groups or classes, taxa, of categories, or radicals of
consciousness, and that this makes provision for the
incidence of unity among the modes of intentionality
themselves, but not notably among the actual radicals
themselves. This follows from the distinction made by the
categoreal paradigm, transcendence : immanence, at the
broadest, first, level, resulting in the categories of
conceptual and perceptual, and then furthermore, from the
recapitulation of the same structuring principle at the
next, second level, within those two classes already extant.
If as a result, the forms of imagination and the forms of
unity equally, possess characteristics which mark them as
equivocal with respect to the categoreal paradigm, so much
the better. For this will equip them to account for the
aconscious. Whether we are concerned with the two conscious
or with the two aconscious taxa, the pattern of hybridism is the
same. There is in each of the four instances a conjunction
of the conative and the cognitive forces of consciousness.
If we were to adopt a metaphor from the literature, we could
not do better than to choose that of light-heat. For light
generates heat, such that the heat - let it represent the
affective, conative, causal mode - and the light - which
will stand for the cognitive/epistemic mode - are here
indiscernible, and are so with reference to the Holy Spirit.
Luke, that untiring proponent of the Holy Spirit,
particularly in The Acts, thus uses the image of 'tongues of
fire' (glw~ssai w(sei\
puro\v) as well as that of 'a sound ... from heaven
like the rush of a mighty wind' (Acts 2.2, 3) to depict the
day of Pentecost subsequently to the resurrection. The
semiotic forms of the visible spectrum can be taken in this
context; as signifiers of both the conative and cognitive,
in a manner which proscribes their differentiation.
The inseparable bonding of the various forms of
intentionality as listed, is attributable to the Holy
Spirit. Its incidence more than compensates for any apparent
lack in the doctrine of intentionality vis-à-vis this
identity in consciousness equal to what has already been
ascribed to the Transcendent and the Son. No differentiated
mode of intentionality is peculiar to the Holy Spirit, even
though conceptual radicals as well as perceptual radicals
are. Instead, there is simultaneous fusion of the two forms
of intentionality, one conative the other cognitive, or
epistemic, common to one and the same of each of the four
classes of categories. This fact of their synthesis or
thorough integration is as fundamental as the intentional
modes themselves. This is so because it concerns aesthetic
judgement, the sense of beauty. If the principle of
immanence is unity, and if the identity of the Holy Spirit
effectively circumscribes what we mean by immanence, then
this same principle, unity, is assuredly given in aesthetic
judgement, just as it is in the thorough integration of each
of the four conative-and-cognitive forms of intentionality
belonging to the same taxon.
It must be clear concerning the hybrid modes of
consciousness that there is no seamless merger of either
conceptual categories nor perceptual categories themselves.
Nothing of the sort occurs. I cannot see a voice, or hear a
scent, or taste a colour, in spite of the 'synaesthetic'
experiences of a very small percentage of the human
population. There is no conjunction among themselves of
either the various forms of memory, the forms of
imagination, the conceptual forms, or the forms of unity.
What are indissolubly and indiscernibly brought together are
the intentional modes themselves. It should be clear also by
now, that four different instances of 'hybridization'
transpire, because there are four classes of intentional
modes prone to fusion. The synthesis of intentional forms
does not remain the exclusive prerogative of just one mode
of 'perception' alone, as suggested by process metaphysics;
that which is equivalent to the forms of memory in Christian
and biblical metaphysics. There are indeed four such
processes, as outlined above, and it is the task of the
theology of semiotic forms to account for them, and other
related processes, in full.
Resuming the postulate of
graded transition between the neighbouring or contiguous
radicals, which the semeioptika are the best fitted
of any semtioic series to express, those radicals of
consciousness which manifest the Holy Spirit and which are
void of specific modes of intentionality are connected to
both peripheral radicals, the one responsible for the
conative intentional mode and the other for the cognitive
intentional mode. The same continuously 'processive'
categories must accede to those very intentional modes
proper to each of their adjoining neighbours in the
hierarchy or series. Thus if the symbolic masculine is akin
to both space on the one hand, and to mind on the other,
then the intentional modes proper to the latter, namely will
and belief respectively, should in some way both inhere in
the conceptual form symbolic masculine. We can say the very
same of each of the other three taxa; that is, of
the other six radicals according to their consistent
taxonomical integration. Thus optic imagination will be
party to both modes of intentionality, the desire-to-know
and the knowledge-of-will in a single aconscious process.
The former, since this is necessitated by its adjunct on one
side, haptic imagination, and the knowledge-of-will, since
this is the intentional mode necessitated by the other
adjoining category, acoustic imagination. The two forms of
unity space : time, with its necessary intentional form,
will-to-believe, and mind : body, with its inherent or
necessary intentional mode, belief-in-desire, both adjoin
the radical category male : female. Hence the intentional
mode proper to this, the symbolic feminine will be their
combination. Finally the two forms of memory, the haptic
memory responsible for desire, and the acoustic memory,
responsible for knowing, have as their intervening category
optic memory. Both of these forms of intentionality,
desiring-and-knowing as a single intentional process, occur
necessarily as the product of this particular perceptual
radical.
Our discussion of the four taxonomic divisions of
consciousness according to the triadic radical series and
their inherent or necessitated modes, notes in each case a
beginning and end of a season. That is, a general feature of
time, from which we can extrapolate to mind following the
indications set out in the gospels and the four other
members of the canons already mentioned. So the initial part
of spring is analogous to the radical haptic memory, and to
the intentional mode desire, whereas the final part of the
same is given as analogous to acoustic memory and the mode
of intentionality knowing. Such temporal passage is
contiguous, a seamless unity. What does this mean for our
understanding of the relation between these two radicals, as
well as the relation of the two corresponding modes of
intentionality? The same applies to each of the four cases.
The determinate asymmetry of time entails a relationship
between the initial or causal and final or reactive radicals
of consciousness as between their initial and final modes of
intentionality.
One and the same paradigm represents the initial phase as
always corresponding to a conative intentional mode. That
is, the beginning of any 'season', is assigned a form of
will or a form of desire. These are the causal moments in
each process. Here however we must be careful not to neglect
the concept of final causality. Causality does not admit
exclusively of a 'before' where actual time is concerned.
That is, causes must be acknowledged as lying not only
during the past. The understanding of transcendence will be
ill served, if we do not recognise the reality of final
causality. Here the word 'final' does not function as it was
used just now in relation to the initiating and concluding
phases of a given triad of radicals and their inherent forms
of intentionality. 'Final causality' is meant to
convey the meaning of a future cause, a cause which
functions teleologically as a lure, and which lies not in
the actual settled past, the before, but ahead in the not
yet. To speak of 'final causality' in this sense,
synonymously with the meaning of 'future' causality, is
merely to point out the parallels between Markan metaphysics
and the tradition stemming from Aristotle and revived
recently for example, in Whiteheadian metaphysics, in
defiance of the virtually wholesale trend to equate the
concept of causality with that of pastness. This
trend has been largely due to an obscurantist and
reductionist reading of evolutionary theory, in the hands of
some of its enthusiasts, in spite of the fact that it is a
theory incapable of generating metaphysical doctrines. In
this regard its difference from 'religious' consciousness is
blindingly obvious.
Those modes of final causality are signified by semeia indicative of
transcendence, the optika
proper to the conceptual form space and its inherent
intentional mode, willing, and to the haptic imagination,
and its inherent mode, the desire-to-know; red and yellow
respectively. The alternative classes or taxa,
represented by the remaining semeia, thus constitute causality of the
other kind. Thus desire simpliciter
and the will-to-believe are likewise causal in the given
sense of the word, and readily conceded. They represent what
is antecedent to the supervening intentional form,
knowledge-of-will in the first case, and belief in the
second. But we cannot neglect that there is a 'transcendent'
or 'final', that is, teleological, cause operative in
consciousness, complementary to each of these: the
desire-to-know, and will simpliciter.
These both function as future, or final, or teleological
causes.
The axiological identity of the four Pneumatological
categories is indubitably beauty. This is writ in biblical
metaphysics every bit as large as it is in our daily life.
Those religious cultures which emphasise the experience of
beauty, such as Islam, Taoism and certain Japanese and
Chinese Buddhist traditions, as well as cosmologies such as
process philosophy, also demonstrate heightened visual
sensibilities, and jointly stress immanentist viewpoints,
many of which might be summed up by the term 'nature', a
term which may serve as a approximate synonym for the
symbolic feminine. They offer invaluable insights into the
Christian doctrines of immanence and those concerning the
identity of The Paraclete. In the Hebrew scriptures, there
is probably no single better demonstration of the importance
of the same perspective to the Judaeo-Christian tradition
than the book of Job, which implicitly addresses the
phenomenon of nature, including all it contains that is
evidently unjust, as the province of beauty. But the wisdom
literature generally is also motivated by this same
ingredient in human and animal consciousness, the profound
sense of beauty, which constitutes the guiding axiological
impulse of these traditions. In the New Testament canon we
find it again in The Apocalypse.
There is no need to quote again those lines in the creation
story which declare the appearance of humankind on the world
stage, the first of the Pneumatological categories we come
across. The J narrative of creation binds both the anthropic
categories and the sense-percipient mode of vision in its
portrait of the moral psychology of shame. Both signs, phallos
and womb must be associated with these
categories, symbolic masculine and symbolic feminine. In the
P narrative the creation of humankind takes place on the
last of the six days, and that brief account, envisages it
as separated from and yet closely allied to the creatures
which precede it. If this is paradoxical, it is even so an
encompassing understanding of the connexity of all living
things, a concept so essential to the immanent perspective.
Again and again, we have put the principle of immanence in
terms of the single word 'unity', juxtaposing it as it is
formulated in the categoreal paradigm transcendence :
immanence, against the alternate term 'identity'. Christian
metaphysics thus celebrates both factors as of the highest
generality, applying equally to God as to the world.
The story of the creation of humankind elevates it and it
alone as formed 'in the image and likeness of God'. This is
our best introduction to the axiological credenda which
everywhere impose themselves upon us in the literature we
are engaged with, and again in our lives. 'Credenda', even
if a little orotund, is certainly the correct term. Like all
values, beauty no less than the other more habitually
admitted, albeit contested ones, truth and goodness, remains
intractably the stuff of belief. But the belief in beauty is
the least polemical of the three as pertaining to immanence,
because it can be said to fight shy if not avoid altogether
any reference to the word 'God', this after all is the
meaning of immanence, is it not, the earthly, and beauty is
that pre-eminently earthly form of value? Aesthetic
judgement is in a sense the most natural of the three forms
of judgement; it accompanies so much of consciousness. There
is as always, more than meets the eye at stake here. For
beauty, in the person of Adam, or in the form of the
masculine in particular, and more particularly still, in the
person of 'Son of Adam', that is 'Son of man', must be
identified as transcendent. In other words, this figure
represents a beauty of a heavenly rather than earthly order.
It is a concept which we cannot evade, and will be as
fundamental to human understanding as its epistemic
instantiation, mathematics. The difficulties native to such
an idea, such a form of beauty, as paradoxical as it is,
needs must occupy us if we are to allow Christian
metaphysics on its own terms.
Desiring-and-knowing, as an example of the hybridisation of
intentionality, are susceptible of unity, which will render
their differentiation all but impossible. This occurs not
only because both are taxonomically identical as mnemic
perceptual modes of intentionality, it also occurs
precisely because the subject of one and the subject of the
other are contiguous or proximate, and as such, share
structural elements. To take an obvious example, that of
haptic memory and the impulse towards erotic satisfaction,
sexual desire. Now this same haptic memory as the occasion
of sexual desire is also the occasion of knowing. Touch as a
form of sentience, and as disposed in purely immanent terms,
those of haptic memory, is responsible for a cognitive as
well as the conative mode of intentionality, desire. The
former, broadly speaking, will be identifiable as
technological rationality. Haptic memory establishes the
basis of technological consciousness as modus cognoscendi, or
form of knowing. It is beautifully illustrated for us in The
Man With The Withered Hand; the hand is the semeion for the haptic
memory. As such, the hand is the haptic icon for both the
conative and the cognitive mode; for both erotic desire, and
technological cognition respectively. The relation of the
conative and cognitive intentional modes, whose single and
common denominator is the haptic memory, is that of unity,
when we are in the act of making an aesthetic judgement.
That is to say, the judgement of beauty embodied in haptic
memory experiences the two subjects of the conation and
cognition at once, and there is consequently no real
differentiation between desiring and knowing.
When haptic memory occurs in the mode of desire, its subject is the symbolic
feminine, that is male : female. This is the subject of sexual
appetition. But when haptic memory functions in the mode of
knowing, its subject
is the neighbouring form of unity, space : time. This is the
subject of
technological knowing. That these two forms of unity, these
two conceptual radicals, the symbolic feminine and space :
time are proximate, or contiguous, secures the very
possibility of the fusion of desiring and knowing.
This was first set down in the creation taxonomy, in the
rubrics of Day 6 and Day 5 respectively. The rubrics are
distinct, but sequential; identifiable, but also capable of
unity. In our examination of the miracle catena in Mark which
included the stories of The Daughter Of Jairus, The
Haemorrhagic Woman, The Syrophoenician Woman
and so on, we noted the reiteration of the same postulate;
that of the epistemological and psychological contiguity
between mind : body, space : time and male : female: Day 4,
Day 5, Day 6. Thus any aesthetic judgement concerning haptic
sentience, precludes the distinction between desire and
knowing. We can imagine or conceive this as the graduated
shift between the optika, blue and green
respectively, as representative of these modes of
intentionality. There are semeioptika
whose identification as either one or the other of these
hues is practically impossible. Less distinctly, we can
posit the same form of aesthetic judgement, as the
integration between the equivalent haptic semeia, womb and back,
that is the dorsal site of the body. These were tellingly
pictured for us in the healing miracles, The
Syrophoenician's Daughter and The Haemorrhagic
Woman. When we come to the akoustika however, the semiosis is
altogether different. For there are quite distinct semeia representative
of the narratives as of the radicals, even though they are
contiguous, which refuse to be merged in just the same way.
There is a complete synthesis possible between the two
intentional modes necessitated by radicals. And it is
precisely this which determines aesthetic judgement, rather
than the two remaining forms of judgement, the judgement of
the good, and the judgement of the true. The acoustic
semiosis will not put the capacity to integration with the
same aplomb as the members of the two semioses which are
functionally predisposed to unity - the optika and to a lesser
degree the haptika,
the signs composing the visible spectrum, and the somatic
signs, the various members of the body, serving the
'representation' of the self to the self. We do find in
various traditions of musical culture, microtonal
expressions of the scale which offset the division of the
scale into discrete dodecaphonic elements. But the real
import of the acoustic semiosis remains grafted to the
dodecaphonic division of the octave. For that posits as
succinctly as possible the principle of identity. The
value of the optika
particularly for any practice of prayer and meditation, will
lie precisely in its virtue of representation of the
synthesis of the various forms of intentionality. That one
such mode may blend imperceptibly with another, for example
desire and knowing, is best put for us by the visible semeia.
The purpose to which they, the optika, are best fitted both theologically
and as objects of meditation, is the representation of the
susceptibility of unity of the four groups of two
taxonomically yoked canonical intentional modes: knowing and desire, will and belief, desire-to-know and
knowledge-of-will, and finally the will-to-belief and
belief-in-desire. In this capacity they disclose
the identity and nature of the Holy Spirit, who is
identifiable in human consciousness, as the bases for the
four forms of aesthetic judgement. For all such totalities
or hybrid modes of intentionality serve the same end, the
judgement of the beautiful.
All six conceptual forms, space, mind, the symbolic
masculine, space : time, mind : body, and male : female,
present the various occasions of the two hybrid conceptual
modes of intentionality: willing
+ believing and willing-belief
+ believing-desire. Conceptual radicals, whether
the pure conceptual forms constituting the conscious, or the
forms of unity constituting the aconscious, are each in
their turn susceptible of these two hybrid modes of
intentionality. Thus too, all six perceptual radicals
function according to the two hybrid modes of perceptual
intentionality, whether conscious or aconscious. These
radicals are haptic memory, acoustic memory, optic memory,
haptic imagination, acoustic imagination, optic imagination.
Every one of these six constituents of consciousness
provides an occasion for the two hybrid modes of perceptual
intentionality: (1) desiring
+ knowing, and (2) desiring-to-know + knowledge-of-will.
The discussion here of the four sets of related conative and
cognitive, or epistemic, forms of intentionality has
not been a diversion. It was necessary in order to complete
the Trinitarian rationale of intentionality. For whereas the
Transcendent and the Son both have been represented by
various intentional modes of both orders, conceptual and
perceptual, and both dimensions of consciousness, conscious
and aconscious, then it is also true that processes of
aesthetic judgement entailing the necessary fusion of the
conative and cognitive, conceptual and perceptual, conscious
and aconscious, account for the Holy Spirit a propos of
intentional modality. The fact that unity is here everywhere
present, confirms the presence of this identity as it does
of immanence generally. Aesthetic judgement is essential to
human and sub-human consciousness, but its discussion could
not have even begun without adequate preparation consisting
of the analysis of simple and compound, and conscious and
aconscious, forms of intentionality. To this list, we may
now add the four hybrid forms of intentionality. In all
then, we can finally enumerate the twelve various forms of
intentionality as follows:
FOUR
SIMPLE CONSCIOUS INTENTIONAL MODES
|
FOUR
COMPOUND ACONSCIOUS INTENTIONAL MODES
|
FOUR
HYBRID INTENTIONAL MODES
CONSCIOUS AND ACONSCIOUS
|
Conscious Perceptual Modes
to desire (conative, Christological)
to know (cognitive, Transcendental)
|
|
Conscious
Perceptual
Mode
to desire + to know (conative + cognitive
Pneumatological)
|
Conscious Conceptual Modes
to will (conative, Transcendental)
to believe (cognitive, Christological)
|
|
Conscious
Conceptual
Mode
to will + to believe (conative + cognitive
Pneumatological)
|
|
Aconscious Perceptual Modes
to desire-to-know (conative, Christological)
to know-will (cognitive, Transcendental)
|
Aconscious
Perceptual
Mode
to desire-to-know + to know-will (conative +
cognitive, Pneumatological)
|
|
Aconscious Conceptual Modes
to will-to-believe (conative, Transcendental)
to believe-in-desire (cognitive, Christological)
|
Aconscious
Conceptual
Mode
to will-to-believe + to believe-in-desire (conative
+ cognitive, Pneumatological)
|
THE
CONCEPTUAL ACONSCIOUS IN GENESIS AND THE GOSPEL
Having completed the comprehensive survey of the modes of
intentionality, we are in a better position to broach the
discussion of the form of the gospels. We have classified the
modes of intentionality in various ways, but one of the most
important of these has involved their distinction as either
conscious or aconscious. We can now say more about this. The
model for the same distinction reverts to the standard
Christological metaphor of light which is first encountered in
the two Christological rubrics of the creation story, Day 1,
where light and darkness are separated, and Day 4 where day and
night are brought into relation. In the messianic series we do
find a similar reference in The Transfiguration,
in which light plays an important role. At first glance, it
might seem that nothing in The Transformation Of Water Into
Wine alludes to the stories of Day 1 and Day 4. Yet one
can hardly fail to notice the introduction, which serves to link
this story with its transcendent complement, The
Transfiguration: 'And after six days ... ' (Mark 9.2) c.f.
'On the third day ... ' (John 2.1). A further reference in the
Johannine narrative - '" ... My hour has not yet come."' - (John
2.4), cements the relevance of this miracle as of the Markan
account, to the creation narrative as precedent. Indeed if any
doubt remained, it should be finally and fully dispelled by the
mention that 'six stone jars were standing there, for the Jewish
rites of purification, each holding ... ' (John 2.6).
John's link between purification, a theme clearly seminal to The
Transfiguration, and the three conceptual forms and three
forms of unity, is well worth exploring. But of course the real
accent in that story is reserved for the water made wine, not
the water itself. That water was such a fundamental motif to the
creation narrative we saw repeatedly. In John's miracle story it
performs a variety of functions. In addition to the immediate
evocation of that narrative, it certainly also suggests the
symbolic masculine. Water and wine, later re-invoked as the
water and blood manifesting the death of Jesus, thus symbolise
in no uncertain way, that to which the narrative points in the
first instance - sexual love, which provided the very means for
the incarnation of the Word. (Whether John can be said to hold a
view espousing the virgin birth of The Christ cannot be
determined on the basis of this text, nor any other in his
gospel. The summary manner in which Jesus deals with his mother,
and the cryptic, almost gnomic utterance, '"O woman, what have
you to do with me?"' (2.4), will avail of nothing in this
connection.) But we cannot lose sight of the fact that we are
here introduced to the very first of the six perceptual
categories. The normative three of which, the forms of memory,
as recounted in each of the three Eucharistic miracles,
denominate perceptual memory. The same three forms of memory,
whether haptic, optic or acoustic, are all characterised by
binary structure. They each consist with a polar ingredient of
the same sense-percipient mode. That is, each form of memory in
itself contains the correlative form of imagination. The two
morphological elements, which we also see in the forms of unity,
as they appear to copy immanence, are expressed as the two relata of the
eschatological conceptual category, male and female. It it this
therefore, which ought to guide our understanding of the way in
which the two elements, water and wine, are deployed in the
first miracle story. They allude to the imaginal and mnemic
modules by means of the metaphorical status of the water and
wine, figures for the male and female of the eschatological and
anthropic radical.
The event denotes physical, that is sexual, love, a fact already
marked for us by the telling interchange between Jesus and 'the
sixth disciple', Nathanael (John 1.45-51). This last passage of
course ends in the vision promised to the disciple that [he]
'"you (plural) will see (o1yesqe)
heaven opened, and the angels of God ascending and descending
upon the Son of man."' This figure redoubles the
clear referentiality of the episode. If it does not quite
ascribe a kind of sacramental value to the act of sexual
intercourse between lovers, then that is in keeping with the
overall cast of the gospel where the sacramental is concerned.
But surely the verse has something to do with a metaphysical
view regarding the provenance of the soul at conception. This
rescues the meaning of physical congress from any purely erotic
exercise, from mere transactional satisfaction of an appetition
and nothing more. The mention of 'angels of God' suggests if
anything, severance of the human experience of sexual love from
that of animals. We should not forget that the Day 4 rubric,
which taxonomises the conceptual form soma, or the body, the conceptual counterpart
of the perceptual radical haptic memory, the essential subject
of the story of the miracle at Cana, is the only member of its
subclass which does not contain references to animals. And if
there are no exorcisms in John - although there is a reference
to 'the devil', and subsequently one to 'have [having] a demon'
( John 8.44-48), and another to 'Satan' (John 10.27) concerning
Jesus' betrayal by Judas - the introduction to the miracle story
envisaging the ascent and descent of angels upon the Son of man,
is one of the few references in this gospel to supramundane
beings.
Angelology is relevant to any discussion of what we have
here called the 'aconscious' mind. As far as the Day 4 rubric is
concerned, such a thing as the 'aconscious mind' itself is
already implied in the language which speaks of 'sun, moon and
stars'. We read and interpreted this rubric as the
creation-theological postulate regarding the form of unity mind
: body. Thus whereas the transcendent theology set before us the
disjunction of light and darkness, the complementary theology of
immanence in the second half of the creation story, presented us
with the conjunctive relation between day and night. Here then,
'moon and stars' can act as preemptive to the metaphysics of the
gospels, which accepting the cue, amplifies the doctrine of mind
not only in relation to an ontology which includes such things
as 'angels', 'demons', 'Satan' and the rest, but, what is
more readily acceptable to us in later modernity,
the animal realm, from which arguably we must be descended.
Certainly we have seen this realm of the sub-human mentioned
several times in the healing miracle stories, further to its
presence in the second half of the creation narrative, and just
as certainly, the evangelists have linked it as a metapsychology
of the aconscious to the 'demonic' and to the dead.
The two main strands of biblical angelology which will occupy us
combine at a stroke, these sub-human and super-human realms. One
of them we have already introduced, the visions of Ezekiel and
the author(s) of The Apocalypse which speak variously of
'livings creatures' and 'cherubim'. These beings, the four
living creatures which ultimately stand in relation to the
gospel, representatively of its fourfold structure, and as we
shall argue, of the doctrine of intentionality which is
confirmed also by the story of The Feeding Of The Four
Thousand, are both sub-human and super-human. The other
reference in scripture to similar beings is that of the
inaugural vision of Isaiah 6, which mentions the seraphim. This
mythology is not so extensively reworked in The Apocalypse,
although there is indeed an allusion to it in the description of
the heavenly worship, in which the four living creatures
themselves repeat the songs of the seraphim (Apocalypse 4.8).
These two references are absolutely basic to any angelogical
doctrines which may concern us. The striking things in each
case, apart from the combination both makes between the animal
kingdom and the celestial realm, are their structural aspects.
We have already proposed the basic configuration of the four
living creatures is immediately germane to an understanding of
the sequential patterns in The Apocalypse as bearing on that of
the formal nature of the gospels. We shall do likewise in the
case of the similar vision of Isaiah.
The forms of imagination and the forms of unity are suffused
with paradox, for on the one hand the two conceptual forms of
unity, space : time (Day 5), and mind : body (Day 4) do not
fully conform to transcendence, that is to the conceptual
polarity of mind. The are depicted in the creation taxonomy as
immanently transcendent, proleptically to the forms of memory to
a large extent. On the other hand, forms of imagination
similarly mitigate the class, immanence. For unlike the forms of
memory, they exhibit certain features which we associate with
transcendence; so whereas they are classed as immanent, that is
as belonging to the perceptual side of mind, they are
nevertheless transcendently immanent. These two categories,
forms of unity and forms of imagination constitute the realm
which we have described by the term 'aconscious', meaning
'other than conscious'. In biblical metaphysics it will more
often than not be presented by two disparate but clearly related
metaphors. The first of these is the angelogical vocabulary, the
second and more familiar one represents the realm of the
sub-human world. There is of course a certain symmetry here as
between suprahuman and subhuman, as there is between the two
cycles. And if we refer to the transcendent messianic miracles
as 'transcendent immanence' or 'the transcendence of immanence',
or 'virtual transcendence', or some such term, and to the forms
of unity as 'immanent transcendence' or 'the immanence of
transcendence', or 'virtual immanence', this is the reason.
Philosophically there is a long-standing precedent for this
procedure. It concerns the history of the philosophy of
substance. If substance is posited as a fundamental category of
being, ontology, then matter alone may not possess substantial
status. Intuitively, ontology suggested that matter must be
complemented by another substance, denoted by a variety of
terms: mind, spirit, soul, psyche. The Aristotelian tradition
settled for 'form' as the category contrastive to 'matter'. The
Cartesian raised the contrast between matter and mind to the
level of metaphysical dualism, but left unanswered, or as
incapable of being answered satisfactorily, the question of
their relation.
The Cartesian tradition also, notoriously by modern standards,
refused to concede any real mental status to animals. This
robbed them of the capacity to suffer. For some time, Western
science itself was incapable of acknowledging that animals were
sentient and prone to states of awareness comparable to our own.
It is here of course that we must begin to understand the
biblical doctrine of the aconscious. Not because of the
precedents set either by evolutionary theory or by philosophy,
although of course we must allow for their contributions, but
because given the significance of the creation story as an
epistemology and a Christology both, it is there that we first
encounter the animal realm; but not there alone. In our brief
survey of the healing miracles, we found in several stories the
same. In The Gerasene Demoniac, the healing episode
which recapitulates the category of the symbolic masculine, and
in the later story, The Syrophoenician Woman's Daughter,
the equivalent in the healing miracle series to the category of
the symbolic feminine, we found similarities to obvious to
ignore. These included the concept not only of the sub-human or
animal world, but also that of what the evangelist designates in
both cases by the term pneu~ma
(Mark 5.1, 8, 13 and 7.25). In the literature this word is
variously rendered 'breath', 'spirit, 'disembodied spirit',
'human soul' and so on. It is also the noun in the term Holy
Spirit. In both stories of healing miracles, the word was
qualified by the adjective 'unclean' - a)kaqa/rton (Mark 5.2, 8,
13, and 7.25). Both narratives also use cognates of the word daimo/nion. The Gerasene
man is referred to after the cure as 'the demoniac (daimoni/zomenon - the one
possessed by an evil spirit) sitting there, clothed and in his
right mind' (Mark 5.15), and again as 'the man who had been
possessed with demons' - daimonisqei\v
(v 18). In the later episode we find : '... And she begged him
to cast the demon (daimo/nion)
out of her daughter' and '" ... the demon (daimo/nion) has left your
daughter"' (Mark 7.26, 29). One of the transcendent messianic
miracles similarly posits something akin to what the exorcistic
cures present us with. In The Stilling Of The Storm,
which is a Pneumatology, like the other texts mentioned here,
the vocabulary is unmistakably that of an exorcistic healing.
In both stories there is a certain link between animals and
these references to an unclean spirit/demon. Theologically
both pericopae concern
the identity of the Holy Spirit. The link with the categoreal
forms, masculine and feminine is clear cut and the best clue of
any towards what concerns us here, the similarity of the forms
of imagination and the forms of unity as comprising the
aconscious. We do not find animals mentioned in the feeding
miracles nor the miracle at Cana, but we did notice an abundance
of them in the second half of the creation narrative. That is
where the forms of unity are categorised. There is no reason to
expect such references in the narratives dealing with what we
have called forms of imagination. We shall find them represented
again in three very decisive occasions of Old Testament
literature, which best encapsulate the three forms of unity:
mind : body, space : time and male : female. These are of course
the books of Jonah, Daniel and Job respectively. But clearly
operative within these texts is a link of some kind between the
sub-human and the 'super-human', the animal and the demonic, to
which the references in the healing narratives are the first of
any clue.
If we look to the New Testament texts which are corollaries to
the creation rubrics detailing aconscious mind, namely, the
three transcendent messianic miracles, we find the same pattern
which links the two 'other than human' realms. These references
follow a pattern. They most characteristically refer to
darkness, sleep and death. The same pattern accords to both the
'sign of Jonah' saying and the similar references in the passion
predictions and John to 'three days and three nights', and the
template which orders the categoreal radicals of the aconscious
analogously to that half of the year comprising both seasons,
autumn and winter, during which the ratio of light to darkness,
diurnal to nocturnal, moves in favour of the latter. We need to
reassess all six narratives in view of the emerging image they
provide of the aconscious order of mind.
1a)
Day 4
This is the first of the Genesis rubrics to begin the taxonomy
of the aconscious. In keeping with the story of Day 1, that of
the formal separation of light from darkness, the theology of
conceptual mind, the second half of the narrative
correspondingly begins with the presentation of the conceptual soma. The reality of
beginning is paramount here, even though it belongs logically to
the category of space ('heavens'). But it should be noted that
if the soma as a
conceptual radical of mind enjoys a kind of primordial quality
akin to that of the conceptual radical space, they nevertheless
differ. There is also a certain amount of paronomasia on the
Greek, 'arche' for the verb 'to rule' - a!rxw - and the word
'beginning' - a)rxh\
- are cognates. We meet a resonance of these terms in the
homologous story of a miraculous healing in the expression
'ruler of the synagogue'.
And God said: Let there be
lights in the vault of the heavens, to separate the day from
the night: let them serve there as signs to determine the
seasons days and years.
And let them serve there as lights in the vault of the
heavens, so that it may be light on the earth, and it was so.
And God made the two great lights: the greater light to
rule (LXX: a)rxa/v)
over the day, and the lesser light to rule (a)rxa/v)
over the night, and the stars too.
And God put them in the vault of the heavens to give light
over the earth,
to rule over the day and the night and to separate light
and darkness. And God saw how good it was.
And it was evening and it was morning, a fourth day.
(Genesis 1.14-19)
We may note also that the Greek Septuagint expression in the
above translation twice rendered 'to rule' in verse 16, since it
associates the body and space, sits well with the text and
also with its logical structure, both of which make the same
connection, as space is synonymous with 'beginning'. In the
past, the expression has been translated as 'beginnings', so
that the clause reads: 'the greater luminary for beginnings of
the day, and the lesser luminary for the beginnings of the
night'. The narrative within the Markan miracle corpus which
also defines the conceptual soma,
bears some resemblance to the Genesis text in that its three
main characters, the father, mother and the daughter, answer to
the metaphors sun, moon and stars. It is not possible to
press more of the detail of the miracle story into an
allegorical hermeneutic of the initial Genesis rubric, but
clearly Mark's narrative does reflect it. This metaphorical
construct should be interpreted as a portrait of the conceptual
form, soma.The
most relevant portions of the Markan text are:
1b)
Jairus' Daughter
Then came one of the rulers of
the synagogue (a)rxisunagw/gwn
parr. Luke 8.49, 13.14), Jairus by name; and seeing him, he
fell at his feet, and besought him saying, "My little daughter
is at the point of death. Come and lay your hands on her, so
that she may be made well, and live." And he went with him.
... (Mark 5.22-24a)
While he was still speaking, there came from the ruler's
house some who said, "Your daughter is dead. Why trouble the
Teacher any further?" But ignoring what they said, Jesus said
to the ruler of the synagogue, "Do not fear, only believe."
(vv 35-36)
And when he had entered, he said to them, "Why do you make
a tumult and weep? The child is not dead but sleeping (oi)k a)pe/qanen a)lla\
kaqeu/dei)." And they laughed at him. But he put them
all outside, and took the child's father and mother and
those who were with him (pate/ra
tou~ paidi/ou kai\ th\n mhte/ra kai\ tou\v met' au)tou~),
and went in where the child was. (vv 39-40)
It is instructive to read the lines concerning Jesus'
understanding of the condition of 'the little girl', an aptly
enough summary description for the manner in which the concept
of the body functions in consciousness, as per belief, here
presumably in the 'raising' with which the narrative ends, that
is, the resurrection. We see 'belief' mentioned in this as in
the previous story, The Haemorrhagic Woman,
which we interpreted regarding the intentional form
will-to-believe. Here of course, it is
belief-in-desire that presents itself as a basic intentional
mode of the aconscious mind. If the two forms of intentionality
are connected, then so too are their correlative conceptual
forms of unity, space : time and mind : body.
The mind : body then, or soma,
may best be understood as giving rise not only to stances
towards desire itself, which is the philosophical
belief/disbelief in the same, desire; its aconscious status
stamps it as nothing less than ambivalent. The body is subject
to death, and it is death which naturally enough, along with
darkness and sleep, is commonly used in the literature to
envisage what we have called the aconscious. This means of
course that attitudes towards sexuality (Eros) as well as those
towards death (Thanatos),
will both be shaped by the ambiguity native to the aconscious
radical, soma. Where
the story in Mark and its parallels in both other synoptic
gospels, is essentially useful in illuminating the conceptual soma, must remain the link
this narrative forges between the body and the immediately
contiguous forms in the series. One of these is space, and we
have already commented on the innate tendency to link 'bodies'
with 'space', that is, to understand the embodied, gendered,
conscious, and self-aware entities which we are, as capable of
changing our place relatively to other bodies. Part of the
relation of supervenience between their proper intentional
modes, will being that for space, and belief-in-desire being
that for soma, must be
due to this. Thus if will-to-believe is prior to belief, then
will simpliciter is
prior to belief-in-desire. A major facet of the latter instance
of two intentional modes related by supervenience, is the fact
that 'I' move my body about from place to place. But since two
quite disparate taxonomic divisions are involved here, the pure
conceptual, to which belongs the process of willing, and the
conceptual form of unity, to which belongs the soma, there is a still
closer contiguous conceptual form of unity to consider, that of
the symbolic feminine.
This, the other neighbouring form of unity, the other component
in mind which is nearest to that of soma, is more similar to it than conceptual
space. If then, there was derogation of the feminine in favour
of the masculine implicit or otherwise in the creation rubric,
for we do quite habitually think of 'the 'sun' as greater than
'the moon', this must be disregarded at once. Mark allows the
symbolic feminine its fullest epistemological and psychological
import. There is no denying on his part the role the symbolic
feminine plays in consciousness, nor its intimate nearness to
the conceptual form in question. This cuts to both paramount
families of desires of which the body remains the generatrix;
those of love and death. Here we must insist with Mark on
the symbolic feminine as the primary bearer of meaning.
The metaphorical ligature between 'the moon' and the symbolic
feminine must not infer the confinement of the aconscious to the
nocturnal half of the circadian process. We can of course relate
the six radicals of both categories, conceptual and perceptual,
to the twenty-four hour cycle. But we are already seeing in the
texts of the Eucharistic miracles, that normative, conscious, perceptual
categories fit the pattern of the nocturnal half of the
circadian cycle. There is an even spread of both diurnal and
nocturnal intervals in both orders, conscious and aconscious. So
the division conscious : aconscious cannot simply mirror that
between the two halves of the circadian period. We may even so
read the entire gamut of categories against the
sixfold-sevenfold pattern of 'days' first articulated in the
theology of creation. This would arrange each of the six
parallel components analogously to the night and day, 'evening
and morning', figuration. We can once again read the twelve
constituent categories analogously to the twelve equal divisions
of the annual cycle. This remains our dominant template. It best
determines the parallel radicals, the one-to-one correspondence
between conceptual and perceptual components as given in the
isomorphism of the creation and salvation theologies, those of
'beginning and end', according to the sixfold day cycle.
We are leaving out of consideration for now the seventh event as
a complicating factor, but shall nevertheless later account for
it. Here then, in the case of the categoreal soma, we are dealing with
what is at heart a conceptual form. Form of unity though it be,
and dual though it be as comprised of body and mind, so much like its
parallel, haptic memory, which consists of memory and imagination of one and
the same sense-percipient mode, it is radically, at the first
level of classification, an idea, a conceptual root of
consciousness. As such then, where the day : night template
offers itself to any understanding of the relation between soma and haptic memory, the
aconscious radical, soma,
corresponds to the diurnal and haptic memory to the nocturnal,
as these are measured by the winter solstice. This construct
will help us when we come to consider the gospel of Luke, for
which these two elements and their corresponding point-instant
in the year function as a guiding paradigm. That said however,
it is equally important if not more necessary, to appreciate the
analogical value of the annual fourfold cycle of 'seasons' to
which the Day 4 story refers. Its explicative capacity is wide
ranging. So it is necessary to assess the conceptual form of
unity soma, as
belonging to a class of three entities, which taken together,
are analogously intelligible in relation to that interval of the
annual cycle commencing immediately after the autumn equinox and
culminating in the winter solstice. These remarks follow what
was put just previously regarding the symbolic feminine. The
Genesis rubric defers to the gospel in the sense that the
normative value of the two elements, haptic memory, is there and
only there finally explained. We should not therefore read its
figure of 'the moon' a propos of the diurnal : nocturnal
template.
These same three figures, male, female and offspring, are
implicitly recurrent within the remaining two rubrics, Days 5
and 6. For indeed the whole second section of the taxonomy in
its broad outlines, denotes immanence contrastively to the
transcendence of the first
three Days. That is, the 'earth' section, rather than the
'heavens' section, has as its ruling or definitively final
event, the anthropic category, male and female. The same injunction is given in
both Days 5 and 6:
And God blessed them saying:
Be fruitful and increase and fill the waters in the seas, and
let the birds increase on the earth.
And it was evening and it was morning, a fifth day (Genesis
1.22-23)
And God blessed them, (saying): Be fruitful and increase
and fill the earth and make it subject to you! Rule over the
fish in the sea and the birds in the heaven and over every
living being that moves in earth! (v 28)
The increase and multiplication of the animals, like that of the
loaves and fish in the miracles, serves the need of humankind,
as well as that of the sub human realm itself, for food. The
link between such necessity and the generation of species is
tacit, and includes the plant life mentioned first in Day 3,
where of course, there was no similar injunction:
And God said: And so I hand
over to you every seed-bearing plant over the whole face of
the earth and every tree, with fruit-bearing seed in its
fruit; they are to serve you for food. (v 29)
In the second section of the healing miracle story dealing with
the soma then, the same three figures predominate: the
male and female parents, and their progeny. We should take care
not to construe the masculine principle in accordance with
transcendence as this is associated with "the Father". Both
parental figures, male and
female, or father and
mother such as we found in
Jairus' Daughter, are subsumed under the category of the
symbolic feminine. There is a trinitarian rationale operative
within the framework of the three forms of unity. Space : time
is clearly associated with "the Father", for which reason we
find The Haemorrhagic Woman referred to as 'daughter'
(Mark 5.34) by Jesus; and of course, the 'real' daughter, in the
sense that she exemplifies the Son, is Jairus' Daughter. But in
each story, that of Jairus' Daughter or that of The
Syrophoenician Woman's Daughter where the illness is
portrayed relatively to the relation of the child to its
parents, the latter ought to be understood in terms of both relata which constitute the
anthropic category, male and female:
And God created the human
race according to his image, according to the image of God he
created it, as male and female he created them. (Genesis 1.27)
And God created humanity, according to his image, according
to the image of God he created it, as male and female he
created them. (Genesis 1.27, Scullion's translations of
Westermann's tranlsations.)
The real focus of the story of Jairus' Daughter is
certainly the daughter herself. This is not the case for the
last pericope of the
chain, The Syrophoenician Woman's Daughter, where, even
though we do not hear of the father, both parents share the
limelight, and in which the exchange between Jesus and the woman
effects the healing of the daughter. In this case, the mother is
the focus of the narrative. Hence if the last three Days
effectively simulate the first three Days, they do so also in
virtue of the presentation of the identities of the Son, the
Transcendent, and the Holy Spirit respectively, as do the
corresponding healing narratives: Jairus' Daughter is a
Christology; The Syrophoenician Woman's Daughter is a
Pneumatology.
2a) Day 5
And God said: Let the waters
teem with living beings and let birds fly above the earth
across the vault of the heavens.
And God created the great sea monsters and every living
being that moves, with which the waters teem, each of its
kind, and every winged bird, each of its kind. And God saw how
good it was.
And God blessed them saying: Be fruitful and increase and
fill the waters in the seas, and let the birds increase on the
earth.
And it was evening, and it was morning a fifth day. (vv 20
-23)
This narrative has several vital points of contact with the
Markan healing episode which like it, denotes the conceptual
category, space : time. Both rubrics, Day 5 and Day 6 rubric (vv
21, 28), refer to movement. But the image of the waters in
particular accords with that of 'flow of blood'. After all, what
is in motion here is the course of the order of living things.
The illness of the woman with the flow of blood clearly relates
to the propagation of one's kind. This resonance is further
cemented by the parallel between the verb 'to teem', and the
situation of the woman, lost in the crowd milling about Jesus, a
crowd from which she is in fact barely distinguishable.
2b) The Haemorrhagic Woman
And a great crowd followed
him and thronged (sune/qlibon)
about him. And there was a woman who had had a flow of blood (ou!sa e)n r(u/sei ai(matov)
for twelve years, and who had suffered much under many
physicians, and had spent all that she had, and was not better
but rather grew worse. (Mark 5.24a-26)
Like the intentionality of knowing, that of the
will-to-believe is innately phylogenetic. It concerns very much
less the individual person rather than the specific time and
place in which one's birth is determined, if not predetermined.
This means nothing less than the milieu, the species at its
greatest extent as ranging over both time and place. It is more
than the family, more than the household, the oikos of the symbolic
feminine. Mark refers to 'knowing' firstly obliquely, and indeed
its inextricable bond with hearing and speaking:
She had heard the reports
about Jesus, and came up behind him in the crowd and touched
his garment. For she said, "If I touch even his garments, I
shall be made well."
And immediately the haemorrhage ceased ( e)chra/nqh); and she
felt in her body that she was healed of her disease.
And Jesus, perceiving ( e)pignou\v) in himself that power had gone
forth from him, immediately turned about in the crowd, and
said, "Who touched my garments?" (Mark 5.27-30)
But the woman, knowing (ei)dui~a) what had been
done to her, came in fear and trembling and fell down before
him, and told him the whole truth.
And he said to her, "Daughter, your faith has made you
well; go in peace, and be healed of your disease." (vv 33-34)
The detailed exegesis of these narratives belongs to specific
gospels. Indeed this particular narrative is quintessentially
Markan, in that it is the theology of those two forms of
intentionality, knowing and the will-to-believe, which shape his
gospel as they do no other, and indeed as no other modes of
intentionality shape his gospel. Clearly the woman's initiative
tells us much about mind itself as shaped by the conceptual
radical space : time. The duration of her suffering is
more than likely a major factor in her decision to act. And this
is the only instance in Mark's gospel where we learn of such a
detail. Her belief, but moreover, her willingness to
believe is representative. She is a token of 'the
crowd'.
The story occupies the apex of the events both before and after
it. The healing of the Gerasene man, and the first part of the
healing of Jairus' daughter precede it, and the second part of
the latter, followed later by the healing of the
Syrophoenician's daughter follow it. The structure perfectly
reflects the approach of the woman to Jesus, and his turning
around, and the second part of the episode:
She had heard the reports
about Jesus, and came up behind him in the crowd and touched
his garment.
And Jesus, perceiving in himself that power had gone forth
from him, immediately turned about in the crowd, and said,
"Who touched my garments?" (Mark 5.27, 30)
On this structure, reflective of the entire chain of events
beginning with the cure of the Gerasene man, we have already
commented. The events of the catena tend both towards and from
this central episode involving the woman. The verb 'ceased',
which means literally 'dried up', resonating with The Man
With The Withered Hand (Mark 3.1, 3: e)chramme/nhn, chra\n),
marks the epicentre of a parabola, which recapitulates the
spatial imagery of the Day 5 story, reverting to that of Day 2,
the rubric concerning 'waters above' and 'waters below'. It
certainly reinforces the image of fluidity, of a flow, albeit
here of blood. Many motifs confirm its essence as involving the
conceptual form, space : time - the sex of the person; the
mention of the length of her illness; its nature, being a 'flow
of blood; the detailed description of her approach to Jesus and
his resultant actions forming the contours of a parabolic arch,
reiterating the spatial-dimensional imagery of the creation
narrative; the setting of the episode within its context which
also corroborates the category. Further to that, is the
remarkable consistency of the 'water' metaphor in in these
several stories. The Johannine pericope, The Healing At The Pool (John
5.1-9), which proposes the very same centre of consciousness,
the conceptual radical, space : time, also utilises it, there in
keeping with the given sex of the man, as is true again of The
Gerasene Demoniac and the allusion to male sexuality in
the story of The Syrophoenician Woman, both of which
refer to the sea, (Mark 5.1, 11, 7.31).
Can we learn from either or both of these texts any general
truths which apply to the aconscious as it is composed of these
three similar conceptual forms - space : time, mind : body and
male : female? Of course the Genesis rubric infers most plainly
that the roots of this aconscious mind lie in our animal past.
If the forms of memory and the forms of unity are likewise
disposed in virtue of immanence, which consistently designates
the inheritance of the past by the present, the sense in which
existence is continuous with what is prior to it
chronologically, then we can at least see why the Day 4 story is
so apparently different from the remaining two rubrics. There is
a substantial variation between what is personal and even
private to me as mine, my ontogenetic self, which is my body,
and so too, the idea of it, even though it is a body among
others, a shared thing to some extent. The conceptual form of
space : time on the other hand, whose image in the creation
story first introduces the sub-human realm, differs
substantially from the soma
on this score. Their difference is not to be confused with the
intervening category, that of male : female. A clear disceprancy
between the conceptual form, space : time and that of mind :
body pertains to the former as phylogenetic and the latter as
ontogenetic. Just so their resultant modes of intentionality,
will-to-believe and belief-in-desire, are innately contrastive
in like terms. The ages of the woman and the daughter of Jairus
expose this difference. For the woman, the reproductive power of
the body has accomplished its role; for the little girl, it yet
awaits her. The two categories from the messianic series which
answer the conceptual forms of unity mind : body and space :
time, are haptic memory and acoustic memory respectively. These
are set out in the messianic series as the first, The
Transformation Of Water Into Wine, and third, The
Feeding Of The Five Thousand respectively. Part of the
intent of the sequential ordering of these events is clearly
visible in that John links haptic memory and all that it
entails, chiefly of course, sexual desire, with the inception of
adult life. We have yet to determine the kind of desire, as well
as the kind of cognition, to which acoustic memory is
foundational. But it is at some remove from erotic desire in the
scale of any developmental psychological understanding of the
messianic series. The awareness of the body and the awareness of
the transient temporality of existence while they do not
preclude one another, do mark different stages in the life
trajectory of the individual as of the race, as far as their
inceptions are concerned.
Care must be taken not to misunderstand the relation of
supervenience with that which orders categories and their
corresponding modes of intentionality, according to their
membership of same class. The two things, space : time and mind
: body, as determinants of consciousness belong to the same
class. Their intentional forms, will-to-believe and
belief-in-desire also belong to the same class. But
will-to-believe has belief simpliciter
as its supervening mode of intentionality; whereas
belief-in-desire itself supervenes upon will simpliciter. What relates
the two modes of intentionality is instrumentality, about which
we shall say more later. That there is a relation is assured,
for the two forms of intentionality are susceptible of
composition. Their synthesis is the business of the symbolic
feminine. Regardless of which, the one is also nevertheless set
against the other, the conative will-to-believe which the woman
epitomises, is certainly other than the belief-in-desire, the
intentional form of which the little girl stands
representatively.
3a)
Day 6
And God said: And so I hand
over to you every seed-bearing plant over the whole face of
the earth and every tree, with fruit-bearing seed in its
fruit; they are to serve you for food.
While to every animal on earth and to every bird in the
heavens and to every animal that creeps on the earth, (to
everything) that has the breath of life in it, (I give) every
sort of grass and plant for food.
And God saw everything that he had made, and how good (kala/) it was. And it
was evening and it was morning, the sixth day. (Genesis
1.29-31)
3b)
The Syrophoenician Woman
Now the woman was a Greek, a
Syrophoenician by birth. And she begged him to cast the demon
out of her daughter. And he said to her, "Let the children
first be fed, for it is not right (kalo\n) to take the children's bread and
throw it to the dogs." But she answered him, "Yes, Lord; yet
even the dogs under the table eat the children's crumbs."
(Mark 7.26-28)
The links established by this story with the prior
Pneumatological exorcism, that of the Gerasene man, with which
it has much else in common, demand detailed scrutiny, as
concerning sexuality, one of the major subtexts of this chain of
miracles. The pericope
also has clear points of contact with Jairus' Daughter.
In fact, it resonates with all the events in the chain which
began with that of the Gerasene, so that it pronounces an end of
sorts, indicating the last of the three categories which the
three healing miracles involving females, resume as formally
linked. These belong to the same taxon, they are each compound conceptual
forms, forms of unity. In The Syrophoenician Woman,
lastly we come, as in Genesis, to the anthropic category, male and female. The father of
the child is not mentioned here as he was in Jairus'
Daughter, though The Gerasene Demoniac stands
as a token of the symbolic masculine in its transcendent aspect,
if not in combination with the feminine. This explains something
of Mark's editing of the episodes, their structural integrity,
as well as their shared content. Themes germane and common
to the Day 6 narrative and the healing miracle story are
obvious: animal and human life, both associated and dissociated;
reproduction; and assimilation.
THE PERCEPTUAL
ACONSCIOUS
We can briefly complete this survey of the aconscious by
following the same procedure. That is, by similarly comparing
the classical texts, three messianic described variously as
those of 'virtual transcendence', 'transcendence of immanence',
' immanent transcendence', with their equivalents from the
healing series. These oxymorons put as well as anything else,
their paradoxical character, and they complete the presentation
of this order of consciousness. Where the forms of unity
compromise the identity of the pure conceptual forms and
introduce ambiguity, the forms of imagination subvert the
composite nature of memory, from which they extract themselves.
The result is the same. In the former case, identity is
suborned, in the latter, unity is diminished. The language
of 'separation' in the first section of the creation story, and
the feeding miracles and their recapitulation, both of
which speak of 'breaking ... giving ... taking up', these set
the normative parameters for the conceptual and perceptual poles
of consciousness respectively.
1a)
Transfiguration
All three accounts contain references to darkness and
death:
And a cloud overshadowed them
... (Mark 9.7)
He was still speaking when lo, a bright cloud
overshadowed them ... (Matthew 17.5)
As he said this, a cloud came and overshadowed them; and
they were afraid as they entered the coud. (Luke 9.34)
And as they were coming down the mountain, he charged them
to tell no one what they had seen, until the Son of man had
risen from the dead. So they kept the matter to themselves,
questioning what the rising from the dead meant. (Mark 9.9)
And as they were coming down the mountain, Jesus commanded
them, Tell no one the vision, until the Son of man is raised
from the dead." (Matthew 17.9)
And behold, two men talked with him, Moses and Elijah, who
appeared in glory and spoke of his departure ( e!codon), which he was
to accomplish at Jerusalem. (Luke 9.30, 31)
Only Luke refers to sleep:
Now Peter and those who were
with him were heavy with sleep (u(/pnw?), and when they wakened, they saw
his glory and the two men who stood with him. (Luke 9.32)
Matthew's account has the closest contact with the healing
miracle story as far as the mention of the sense-percipient mode
is concerned, the latter saying firmly connecting this messianic
event with The Walking On The Water:
When the
disciples heard this, they fell on their faces, and were
filled with awe. But Jesus came and touched (a(ya/menov) them,
saying, "Rise, and have no fear (mh\ fobei~sqe)."
1b)
The Leper
Three recensions of this narrative are extant. The
healing miracles corresponding to the transcendent messianic
miracles in the synoptic gospels, are not related in one
continuous block, as were those in Mark which answer to the
three conceptual radicals denoting the aconscious conceptual
pole, and which we have just examined. Remarkably however, the
gospel of John places the story of The Man Born Blind
(John 9.1-12) after that of The Walking On The Water
(John 6.16-21), and The Death Of Lazarus (John
11.1-41), completes his series of signs. This pattern reads the
serial order of the three transcendent messianic events, that of
acoustic, optic, and haptic imaginations
- The Walking On The Water, The Stilling Of The
Storm, The Transfiguration - according to the
isolation of the same three episodes, from the integrated
messianic series. That is the three equivalent Johannine
signs - The Walking On The Water (John 6.16-21), The
Man Born Blind (John 9.1-12), and The Death Of Lazarus
(John 1.1-44) - are
arranged serially as a whole, albeit with intervening texts.
This bears a strong resemblance to Mark's editing of the stories
of healings of the three females. John's editing is of course
referred to in the epilogue (John 21), by the cipher '153'. That
John structures the seven signs in this way, which sorts with
the fact that there is one only crossing 'to the other side'
(John 6.1, 22) in his gospel, would appear to confirm his
perspective, transcendence. Hence all three transcendent
Johannine signs are arranged in the second half of the gospel,
once the 'crossing to the other side' has taken place. It would
appear then that either the Johannine order has followed the
synoptic patterns or vice versa.
The privacy motif and the sex of the leper secure the
status of the healing as transcendent rather than immanent.
Further to which, the two references to 'will' (qe/lh?v v 40, qe/lw v 41), tie this
theology of imaginal consciousness and the conceptual polarity
mind, envisioned in the very next miracle narrative, The
Paralytic (Mark 2.1-12). The links with The
Transfiguration are every bit as plain; Moses is mentioned
in both stories (Mark 1.44 c.f. 9.4, 5), and the saying:
'And he sternly charged
him, and sent him away at once, and said to him, "See that you
say nothing to anyone ..."'( o(/ra mhdeni\ mhde\n ei)/ph?v
Mark1.44)
sounds very similar to:
'he
charged them to tell no one what they had seen ...' (diestei/lato au)toi~v i(/na
mhdeni\ a(\ ei!don dihgh/swntai Mark 9.9)
Haptic imagination is depicted in both narratives as ontogenetic
in character, in which regard it is utterly disparate from the
phylogenetic imagination of acoustic sense-percipience. There is
no reference to death in the healing event in any recension.
Matthew redoubles the tie to both Moses and Transfiguration
by means of his introduction:
When he had come down from
the mountain ... (Matthew 8.1)
This is the first of any miracle recounted in the gospel of
Matthew, a fact which may intend its recapitulatory relation to
the Day 1 rubric. In the gospel of Mark, the remaining two
healings of the class which present imaginal mind, The Blind
Man At Bethsaida (Mark 8.22-26) and The Deaf Mute Boy
(Mark 8.14-29), border The Transfiguration and its
associated pericopae
(8.27-9.13). Of these, only the latter mentions death. What is
equally significant, is that the story of Peter's Confession
and The Transfiguration contain several references not
just to the narratives concerning the deaths of John the
baptiser and Jesus (Mark 8.28 and 8.31 c.f. 9.13, 9.9), but also
to Jesus rising 'after three days' ( meta\ trei~v h(me/rav 8.31). This and other
references of its kind will much assist us in the elaboration of
the doctrine of the aconscious.
2a)
The Walking On The Water
Here the references to death are unmistakeable, and
only John does not include the word 'ghost':
And he saw that they were
making headway painfully, for the wind was against them. And
about the fourth watch of the night he came to them, walking
on the sea. He means to pass by them, but when they saw him
walking on the sea they thought it was a ghost (fa/ntasma/), and cried
out (a)ne/kracan);
for they all saw him, and were terrified. But immediately he
spoke to them and said, "Take heart, it is I; have no fear."
(Mark 6.48-50)
And in the fourth watch of the night he came to them,
walking on the sea. But when the disciples saw him walking on
the sea, they were terrified, saying, It is a ghost (fa/ntasma/)!"
And they cried out ( e!kracan)
for fear. But immediately he spoke to them, saying, "Take
heart, it is I, have no fear." (Matthew 14.25-27)
When they had rowed about twenty-five or thirty stadia, they saw Jesus
walking on the sea, and drawing near to the boat. They were
frightened, but he said to them, "It is I; do not be afraid."
Then they were glad to take him into the boat, and immediately
the boat was at the land to which they were going. (John
6.19-21)
2b) The Deaf Mute Boy
His illness is referred to by Mark three times:
And one of the crowd answered
him, "Teacher, I brought my son to you, for he has a dumb
spirit (pneu~ma a!lalon)
... (Mark 9.17)
And when Jesus saw that a crowd came running together, he
rebuked the unclean spirit (tw~? pneu/mati tw~? a)kaqa/rtw?), saying to
it, "You dumb and deaf spirit (to\ a!lalon kai\ kwfo\n pneu~ma), I command
you, come out of him, and never enter him again." And after
crying out (kra/cav)
and convulsing him terribly (polla\ spara/cav), it came out, and the boy
was like a corpse (nekro/v),
so that most of them said, "He is dead (a)peqa/nen)." (Mark
9.25, 26)
The ensuing narrative passes for the second time to a prediction
of the suffering and death of Jesus, which once again includes
the phrase 'and after three days' (meta\ trei~v h(me/rav
9.31).
3a)
The Stilling Of The Storm
This episodes bears all the traces of an exorcism, except
that nature rather than an individual person is the thing
healed:
And he awoke and rebuked ( e)peti/mhsen) the wind,
and said to the sea, "Peace! Be Still!" And the wind ceased,
and there was a great calm. (Mark 4.39)
The verb 'rebuke' is used in the story of The Demoniac In
The Synagogue ( e)peti/mhsen
Mark 1.25), the first and exorcistic healing in the gospel, ties
the narrative to the last of the same kind, The Deaf Mute
Boy (Mark 9.14-29. The two pericopae reiterate the relationship between
the Day 1 rubric and the corresponding messianic event, and
posit the conceptual form space and the perceptual form acoustic
imagination respectively. In this story of course, we are
dealing with optic imagination, whose corresponding conceptual
equivalent is the symbolic masculine. It is by no means merely
adventitious that all three persons involved in the cures
relating the three forms of imaginal consciousness are males.
The same applies to the aconscious as disposed by the forms of
unity. All persons healed in the three stories dealing with the
forms of unity were females. Here Mark clearly refers to the
creation rubric in which the sea plays its most prominent role,
that of Day 3, which concerns the symbolic masculine. It is
possible that this miracle narrative is intended to evoke the
figure of Jonah, although the absence of any reference to 'three
days and nights' such as the story provides is remarkably absent
if that is the case. Certainly the motif of death which the
reworking of the same persona and the book bearing his name in
'sign of Jonah' logia is consonant with the messianic miracle
narrative. The detail that Jesus was asleep may even refer to
the image of the sleeping Adam in the J creation narrative.
Clearly the healing miracle which follows immediately the
messianic miracle, that of The Gerasene Demoniac (Mark
5.1-20), notably an exorcism and thus in keeping with the
messianic event which has just taken place, and which takes
place in the vicinity of the sea, make clear the link between
the conceptual form, symbolic masculine, its own subject, and
that of the messianic event, optic imagination. Both stories are
redolent with the theme of death; Jesus' sleep during the storm
at sea itself functions metaphorically for this, the very thing
of which the disciples themselves are fearful:
the
But he was in the stern,
asleep on the cushion; and they woke him and said to him,
"Teacher, do you not care if we perish ( a)pollu/meqa)?" (Mark
4.38)
And when he had come out of the boat, there met him out of
the tombs (mnhmei/wn)
a man with an unclean spirit, who lived among the tombs (mnh/masin); and no one
could bind him any more, even with a chain; (Mark 5.2, 3)
Night and day among the tombs (mnh/masin) and on the mountains he was
always crying out (kra/zwn),
and bruising himself with stones. (Mark 5.5)
The
Blind Man At Bethsaida
This story likewise reverts to some of the imagery of the Day 3
rubric:
And he
looked up and said, "I see men; but they look like trees,
walking." (Mark 8.24)
Contextually, the story sits follows the recapitulation of the
two feeding miracles, the second of which and most recently
recounted (Mark 8.20-21), concerns optic memory. It is also
situated as closely as possible to the first passion prediction,
with its reference to 'after three days' (Mark 8.31) as noted.
DEATH
AND THE SIX SIGNS OF JONAH
We noted a certainly similitude between the persona
of Jonah as the book of the same name in its entirety and The
Stilling Of The Storm, although this association is not
explicitly exploited in any of the versions we possess of the
messianic miracle. The reason for this may well be that the
cycle of six messianic miracles as a whole is better considered
in relation to the figure and the book than merely the one
episode. Three of these events, precisely the three transcendent
messianic miracles, or miracles of 'virtual' transcendence which
resemble Days 1, 2, and 3 of creation, can and should be
accounted for in terms of a theology of death. They are all
equally suffused with the notion. These three alone of the six
messianic events denote those components of mind which determine
the perceptual aconscious, for the three feeding events refer us
to the normative, perceptual conscious, even though the six
messianic miracles as a whole, when taken finally in tandem with
the creation cycle rubrics are to be reckoned a propos of the
nocturnal as opposed to 'days'. There must be a link of some
kind with the six aconscious radicals and the 'sign of Jonah',
since the latter broaches various tenets relating to a biblical
doctrine of the aconscious as touching upon the theology of
death. That is to say, that the three Days figurative of
'virtual' immanence from the creation cycle, and the three
'nights' of the messianic series, the miracle of 'virtual'
transcendence. The 'sign of Jonah' saying and other similar
references to the 'three days and three nights' or 'three days',
therefore assuredly ramify this vital aspect of the doctrine of
mind. According to the twelvefold template which adopts the
annual cycle as paradigmatic of the logical organisation of the
four categoreal taxa,
these same six constituents of consciousness are organised in
the way previously described. But it is now possible to
incorporate the Christological formulation of the messianic
miracles, their hexadic morphology, with reference to the
specifically aconscious categories. Mark's references to 'three
days and three nights' in the three predictions of Jesus'
passion are as follows:
And he began to teach them that the Son of man must suffer
many things, and be rejected by the elders and the chief
priests and the scribes, and be killed, and after three days (meta\ trei~v h(me/rav)
rise again. (Mark 8.31)
for he was teaching his disciples, saying to them, "The Son
of man will be delivered into the hands of men, and they will
kill him; and when he is killed, after three days (meta\ trei~v h(me/rav
var. th trith
hmera = on the third day) he will rise."
(Mark 9.31)
... saying "Behold, we are going up to Jerusalem; and the
Son of man will be delivered to the chief priests and the
scribes, and they will condemn him to death, and deliver him
to the Gentiles; and they will mock him, and spit upon him and
scourge him, and kill him; and after three days (meta\ trei~v h(me/rav
var. th trith
hmera = on the third day) he
will rise." (Mark 10.33, 34)
Matthew refers twice to the 'sign of Jonah'; the second
time, there is no mention of the temporal construct;:
"... An evil and adulterous
generation seeks for a sign, but no sign shall be given it
except the sign of Jonah." So he left them and departed.
(Matthew 16.4)
However, Matthew's first reference reads thus:
But he answered them, "An
evil and adulterous generation seeks for a sign; but no sign
shall be given to it except the sign of the prophet Jonah.
For as Jonah was three days and three nights (trei~v h(mer/rav kai\ trei~v
nu/ktav) in the belly of the whale, so
will the Son of man be three days and three nights (trei~v h(mer/rav kai\ trei~v
nu/ktav) in the heart of the earth. (Matthew 12.39,
40)
The reference Matthew here makes, is to Jonah 2.1, or 1.16,
depending on the chapter and verse division which varies from
translation to translation:
And the Lord assigned a great
whale to swallow Jonah, and Jonah was in the belly of the
whale three days and three nights. (Jonah 1.17, Apostolic
Bible)
καὶ προσέταξεν κύριος κήτει μεγάλῳ καταπιεῖν τὸν Iωναν
καὶ ἦν Iωνας ἐν τῇ κοιλίᾳ τοῦ κήτους τρεῖς ἡμέρας καὶ τρεῖς
νύκτας (Jonah 2.1 LXX)
Unlike Matthew, there is only one reference to the same logion in Luke. Luke's
parallel to the Matthean pericope
about Signs Of The Times (Luke 12.54-56), mentions neither Jonah
nor 'three days and three nights':
When the crowds were
increasing he began to say, "This generation is an evil
generation; it seeks a sign, but no sign shall be given to it
except the sign of Jonah. For as Jonah became a sign to the
men of Nineveh, so will the Son of man be to this generation."
(Luke 11.29, 30)
The Markan parallel has:
The Pharisees came and began
to argue with him, seeking from him a sign from heaven, to
test him. And he sighed deeply in his spirit and said,
"Why does this generation seek a sign? Truly, I say to you, no
sign shall be given this generation." And he left them, and
getting into the boat again he departed to the other side.
(Mark 8.12, 13 parr. Matthew 16.4)
There is one further reference in Matthew to the 'three
days'. It is immediately prior to his first, and only story of
the resurrection, in which the chief priest and Pharisees
gathered before Pilate:
... and said, "Sir, we
remember how that imposter said, while he was still alive,
'After three days (meta\
trei~v h(me/rav) I will rise again.' Therefore order
the sepulchre to be made secure until the third day, lest the
disciples go and steal him away, and tell the people, 'He has
risen from the dead,' and the last fraud will be worst than
the first." (Matthew 27.63, 64)
In John as we shall later contend, the story of Lazarus
intersects with this strand of the tradition, for it functions
as the equivalent to The Transfiguration, and it too
clearly contains a theology of death with references to the
aconscious. There are two references which might contribute to a
better grasp of the contents of the narratives before us, the
last three Days of the creation cycle, and the three
transcendent messianic miracles, and the first of these is given
in the first sign:
On the third day (th? h(me/ra? th? tri/th?)
there was a marriage at Cana in Galilee, and the mother of
Jesus was there; (John 2.1)
The Jews then said to him, "What sign have you to show us
for doing this?" Jesus answered them, "Destroy this temple,
and in three days ( e)n
trisi\n h(me/raiv) I will raise it up." (John 2.18,
19)
The only other reference to 'three days' is contained in the
introduction The Feeding Of The Four Thousand, the
messianic counterpart to the Day 6 story:
In those days when again a
great crowd had gathered, and they had nothing to eat, he
called his disciples to him, and said to them, "I have
compassion on the crowd, because they have been with me now
three days (h!dh h(me/rai
trei~v), and have nothing to eat;" (Mark 8.1, 2)
There is in Luke's story of The Boy Jesus In The Temple
(Luke 2.41-51) also, a reference to the same time interval,
which though not immediately relevant here, can be listed:
After three days (meta\ h(me/rav trei~v)
they found him in the temple ... (Luke 2.46)
Our goal is not to enter into any of the explanations or
apologetics given for the method of reckoning the amount of
actual time between the death and resurrection of Jesus. It is
rather to understand the three transcendent messianic
miracles, and by dint of the relation of the entire series to
the theology of creation, that half of that story as well,
relatively to the tradition of the 'sign of Jonah'. The saying
is immediately salient. Having already interpreted two halves of
the two narrative cycles, the first three Days of the creation,
and the three Eucharistic messianic miracles, both of
which are normative for the remainders of their respective
texts, the remaining body of texts describing mind a
propos of the phenomenon of death now remains. What is already
apparent is that neither the entire six messianic miracles nor
the entire series of six Days of creation, fits the temporal
construct of these various sayings about 'three days and three
nights, 'in three days', 'after three days', and 'on the third
day'. Neither do the six normative categories, the three Days
signifying normative transcendence and the three Eucharistic
miracles signifying normative immanence. In neither group of six
is there any intrinsic connection between these as wholes and an
eschatological agenda touching upon the phenomenon of death.
But just such an eschatological link between the categories of
the aconscious and death does exist. There is a very clear and
intelligible connection between the three transcendent messianic
miracles and the three forms of unity as depicted both in
Genesis and the gospels. In other words, the 'three days and
three nights' of the 'sign of Jonah', as of the passion
predictions and other texts, these all refer in the first place
to the binary and triadic structures of the aconscious. Their
organization maintains the differential of conceptual and
perceptual radicals. In conscious mind these were represented as
diurnal and nocturnal respectively. The imagery of the first
three Days, which begins with the separation of light from
darkness, sets the tone for the conceptual polarity, just as
does the story of the miracle at the wedding, which begins the
messianic series. There is no contradiction of this principle
with the admission of the aconscious categories to
consideration, even though they appear to counter the first
level division between transcendence and immanence. Thus the
'three days' of the sign of Jonah saying is a figure for the
three forms of unity, and the 'three nights' a figure for
the three forms of imagination.
An immediate rapport in both cases is evident. As we saw in the
second half of the creation narrative: the sub-human realm plays
a vital role; and in the transcendent miracle narratives, we
found images of sleep; the fantasma
appearing to the disciples as walking on the sea; the appearance
of two figures, Moses with Elijah, who have both already died,
and the latter of whom is connected to a tradition akin to the
event of resurrection in some way. The 'sign of Jonah' as put
previously, is a set of signs, and these amplify the temporal
construct which accompanies the saying, 'three days and three
nights'. But if at first we thought that the six messianic
miracles, the six signs of the series answering to the six Days,
are the referents of this construct, we were mistaken. It is
true that the sixfold messianic series is morphologically
co-incident with the binary and triadic shape of the expression.
But clearly only three of the six messianic miracles are
remarkably linked with death; namely the three transcendent
episodes denoting sense-percipient imagination. Just as clearly,
the other half of the radicals constituting the aconscious
belong to this realm, this domain, this order of mind, and they
too are not only connected with death, but with what we mean by
the term 'aconscious'. So then, I am contending that the sign(s)
of Jonah are those components in the theologies of creation and
salvation respectively, which reckon the mind in terms of its
aconscious structures.
This has the obvious benefit of once more integrating the two
canons, not just the two isomorphic narratives of beginning and
end. For its fuller argumentation will demand consideration of
three books belonging to the Tanakh, which we have already
mentioned: Daniel, Job and Jonah. I am also contending as part
of the theology of the Word, that is, as part of Christian
epistemology and psychology, that these three books encapsulate
the three forms of unity categorised in the second half of the
creation narrative. I am arguing that Daniel best
encapsulates the significance to theological reflection of the
conceptual form of unity space : time; similarly, I am proposing
that Job is the best and single exemplification of what we mean
by the symbolic feminine; and that Jonah for its part, is a
theology of soma, the
mind : body. It would be surprising if any interpretation of the
'sign of Jonah' had no recourse to that book at all. But here we
are emphasising just such a method; that and more still. For we
are taking Jonah in connection with the other two books of the
same kind; books which theologically have to do with what we
refer to as the aconscious and the theology of death. Just like
the second half of the creation narrative, sub-human creatures
play a very significant role in all three books, and in Daniel
and Job, 'super-human' beings are also present. In due
course, we shall comment further on this aspect of the theology
of the Word, and the theology of semiotic forms. But it is
important to expand the emergent picture we have of the 'sign of
Jonah' in its relation to the aconscious categories.
What is pertinent to better understanding the aconscious is its
vectoral nature. In the mandala immediately above which pictures
the co-ordination of the four gospels in terms of a theology of
logos, the Word, we see
that the process from an initiating and conative mode of
intentionality to a final mode, has not been altered. This can
be later understood as the depiction of convergence to the
present from ultimate or distal pasts and futures. Thus the link
between these processes as the outcomes of their generative
categoreal radicals of mind, the logos, has not been altered. The structures
whereby the conative modes are instrumental to the cognitive
modes is one and the same for the aconscious as for the
conscious. But what does change notably, is the flux from the
category identified by the same sign in each case. Put simply,
during that half of the annual cycle representative of the
conscious, the processive transference moves from darkness to
light; but during the other half depicting the aconscious, there
is a processive transference towards darkness.
Where we might expect the conceptual forms and their resultant
intentional modes to be inverted by the forms of unity and their
sovereign forms of intentionality, this is not the case.
Equally, we might have thought of the relationship between the
forms of memory and the forms of imagination, as also that
between their respectively corresponding forms of
intentionality, representatively given in the above mandala as
the rapport between both equinoctial qaurters of the annual
cycle, to be likewise oppositional or inverted in
some way. But neither is this so. It is here that the second
order division intervenes, that of the reduplication within the
two basic categories already taxonomised as transcendent and
immanent, of this same binary paradigm, transcendence :
immanence. As a result, the forms of unity invert the integrated
arrangement of the normative immanent radicals; and the forms of
imagination invert the integrated arrangement of the normative
conceptual radicals. In either case, the pivotal point is that
of the two solsitial moments, and these come to signify two
defining factors of the conscious and aconscious alike. We shall
comment further on these details in the treatments of the four
individual gospels, beginning with Luke, in which the soma, the conceptual form
of unity, acts as the defining component in aconscious mind. But
it is important to point out here the specific relation between
the perceptual memory and its 'equivalent' aconscious province,
consisting of the forms of unity. There is a reciprocity here by
means of which the aconscious appears to invert the temporality
of the normative, that is, conscious. So too, there same
relation occurs between the imaginal realm and the conscious
conceptual order. Imagination is reciprocally related to the
normative pure conceptual forms in virtue of its apparent
inversion of their integrated temporal organization. This
feature is descriptive of the aconscious in its relation to the
conscious.
Of all the elements of the aconscious then, that of the body is
finally the most salient, the most powerful, the most
significant. We can represent these aconscious components of
consciousness in terms of a spectrum which begins with the
radical haptic imagination. This is as far removed from the
former as any component of the aconscious. But the same
disparity recurs when we take the cyclical aspect of time as a
guiding construct. It is not simply that within the aconscious, haptic
imagination and the concept of the body stand relatively to one
another with utmost variation, though indeed they do. The very
same pattern is repeated in the analogous relations. These can
be easily reckoned, and they contribute to what exactly we mean
by the disparity. For we can speak in broad terms of similarity
and disparity. We have already noted Mark's taxonomy of the
three conceptual forms, mind : body (or soma), male : female, and
space: time, according to their contiguity, their similarity. We
can add to this same presentation by realising its opposite,
whereby just two of these constituents of the aconscious throw
each other into greatest contrast. If then haptic imagination
and the body offer to one another the greatest degree of
incompatibility of the elements of aconscious mind, the greatest
discrepancy, the greatest relief, the same is true of the
following: optic imagination and male : female; acoustic
imagination and space : time. These extreme antipathies, as
noted, within the aconscious, between
what are the formative elements of the modes of intentionality,
can also be understood as disposing of the latter themselves in
the same way. Desire-to-know and belief-in-desire;
will-to-believe and knowledge-of-will, these are intentional
modes juxtaposed to the greatest degree of any within the aconscious, as are the
two hybrid Pneumatological modes which combine on the one hand
desire-to-know and knowledge-of-will, and on the other,
will-to-believe and belief-in-desire.
But finally of course, it is between the conscious and the
aconscious radicals of mind, as between the modes of
intentionality for which they are in turn accountable, that the
uttermost differences obtain. So belief-in-desire and belief,
even though they are both identifiably Christological forms of
intentionality, stand at greatest variance from one another, as
do the remaining two Christological modes, desire and
desire-to-know. This same pattern is reproduced in the
structures of the Transcendental modes, will and
will-to-believe; and knowing and knowledge-of-will; just as it
is for the Pneumatological modes. These observations will assist
us in developing the theology of the two orders of mind,
conscious and aconscious. The construal appears to associate the
aconscious with death. I know of no secular psychological or
metapsychological theories which follow suit. In fact the notion
of the 'unconscious' or 'subconscious' itself is obscure in all
but its barest outlines, and a major reason for this deficiency
is the lack of any coherent and systematic references to the
essential links between the aconscious and death.
One immediate and great merit of biblical metaphysics is the
clear distinction it draws between the personal or individual
and the collective. This also concerns eschatological doctrine,
and hence the theology of death. As for the theology of mind,
the same differentiation marks not only the perceptual
aconscious, consisting of the three forms of imagination, but
also correspondingly the conceptual aconscious. Just as it is
true of all conscious categories, perceptual and conceptual, and
their corresponding forms of intentionality. We have used the
biological expressions 'ontogeny' and 'phylogeny' to clarify
this basic tenet. It is recorded in the above mandala. These
remarks are necessary here in the context of any association we
make between the aconscious and death, because they must
influence any Christian doctrine of what Berdyaev has called
'being after death'. That is, they will bear on eschatological
doctrines such as those of 'personal immortality' so-called.
Concerning this in particular, we find therefore not
surprisingly, at the very introduction of The
Transfiguration:
And he said to them, "Truly,
I say to you, there are some standing here (tinev w(~de tw~n e)sthko/twn)
who will not taste death before they see that the kingdom of
God has come with power." (Mark 9.1)
Effectively the last Johannine miracle, The Raising Of
Lazarus (John 11.1-44), tends towards the same purpose, a
theology of the ontogenetic self beyond death. But neither
narrative proposes that the same physical body, the same soma, as which we presently
exist, is identical in all respects, to the body raised from
death. The personal relationship between Lazarus and Jesus is
congruent with the depiction of Jesus as 'my beloved Son' (or
'my Son, my Beloved', or 'my Son, the Beloved'), whom the 'voice
[which] came out of the cloud' identifies at The
Transfiguration (Mark 9.7). Thus the 'certain ones', or
'some standing' in the presence of the transfigured Jesus, and
Lazarus, both personify the haptic imaginal mind. It
should be clear to common sense or to intuition, that if my
personal perceptual conscious is given by haptic memory, and
that this subtends a certain relation of differentiation from
the acoustic, a distinctively phylogenetic order of being, then
the same must apply in that sphere of the perceptual polarity of
mind indicated by the words 'imagination', 'imaginal' and so on.
Haptic imagination constitutes a sense of the self and a mode of
intentionality altogether other than acoustic imagination, and
the intentionality for which this is responsible. If we think of
the uniqueness to the self of occasions which involve haptic
memory, then to accept that haptic imagination equally and also
generates a wholly personal or ontogenetic self must follow. If
touch itself in the form of the erotic, haptic memory, is one of
the factors of consciousness which individuates me as me, we
must understand that this is only half of the picture. The same
sentient mode persists in an aconscious form; that is, there is
a centre of consciousness arising from haptic imagination
complementary to that of haptic memory, which nonetheless
incorporates it. This imaginal form of haptic
sense-percipience defines the aconscious in the same way as its
perceptual counterpart determines the perceptual conscious; that
is to say, ontogenetically.
All of the Christological categories, those of soma and mind as well as
the two perceptual categories just named, dispose of
consciousness in this manner. In spite of the existence of other
bodies, my body is mine alone. The
problem of 'other minds' has been well noted, and it pertains to
what we are affirming here. Mind, or logos, is the Christological conceptual
radical. Thus the 'uniqueness' of 'the' Son, to whom John refers
as 'the only (monogenh\v)
Son' (John 1.18), embodies this same quality, this same
attribute of mind. At the same time, one of two tenets
distinctively essential to Christian doctrine, its insistence on
this single event of 'incarnation', for the same reason, best
serves the division of the entire temporal
evolutionary-historical trajectory into its two complementary
halves. Those epochs themselves fit aptly the division of two
fundamentally juxtaposed metaphysical understandings of time, as
far as we have described them in terms of the eschatological
categories. These categories, the masculine and feminine of the
conceptual polarity, and the two optic radicals of the
perceptual polarity, are deployed in Genesis and The Apocalypse
respectively. They remain our best guide in any effort towards
a theological understanding of death. Thus of the three
imaginal forms of consciousness, optic imagination is the
predominant member, and of the three forms of unity, the
symbolic feminine is the predominant member, where the
eschatological is concerned. The former, as envisioned in The
Stilling Of The Storm, appears to invoke the book of
Jonah.
The first step in approaching this book, and in any attempt to
integrate it into the comprehensive grasp of the form of the
gospel, our primary business here, and furthermore, in the
effort towards a theology of death, must first appreciate its
formal contours. These are remarkably fourfold, as is the
gospel, and the four sevenfold series belong certainly to any
hermeneutic of The Feeding Of The Four Thousand,
as we have urged. This form is already part and parcel of the
hexadic pattern of aconscious categories, and we need to advert
to it. The aconscious radicals are six in number: the three
forms of imagination, to which optic imagination is central, and
the three forms of unity, to which the symbolic feminine is
likewise central. These central and Pneumatological categories
play a very large role in apocalyptic literature, and this
ensures their affinity with eschatological doctrine. The
reduction of the six ingredients of the aconscious to a tetrad
is a simple matter, and vouched for by the last Johannine
miracle, whose relation to The Transfiguration has
already been outlined. A link between The Transfiguration
and The Apocalypse is is subtended by the story of Lazarus, and
it is one which confirms the relevance to the eschatological
doctrines of the gospels and The Apocalypse of the sign of Jonah
sayings and other sayings of the same kind. This narrative
certainly applies to any doctrine of the aconscious in virtue of
the same relation. It contains several references not just to
'days' but also to 'hours', and these are as follows:
But when Jesus heard it,he
said, "This illness is not unto death; it is for the glory of
God, so that the Son of God may be glorified by means of it."
Now Jesus loved Martha and her sister and Lazarus. So when he
heard that he was ill, he stayed two days longer (du/o h(me/rav) in the
place where he was. Then after this he said to the disciples,
"Let us go into Judea again." The disciples said to him,
"Rabbi, the Jews were but now seeking to stone you, and you
are going there again?" Jesus answered, "Are there not twelve
hours in the day (dw/deka
w~(rai/ ei)sin th~v h(me/rav)? If any one walks in
the day, he does not stumble, because he sees the light of
this world (fw~v tou~
ko/smou tou/tou). But if any one walks in the night (
e)n th~? nukti/),
he stumbles, because the light is not in him." Thus he spoke,
and then he said to them, "Our friend Lazarus has fallen
asleep, but I go to awake him out of sleep." The disciples
said to him, "Lord, if he has fallen asleep, he will recover."
Now Jesus had spoken of his death, but they thought that he
means taking rest in sleep. Then Jesus told them plainly,
"Lazarus is dead; and for your sake I am glad that I was not
there, so that you may believe. (pisteu/shte). But let us go to him."(John
11.4-15)
These references to light and day resonant of the theology of
creation, recur to the opening of the gospel itself, John's
theology of the Word and the incarnation, as well as to the
prior miracle, when, in response to the question posed by the
disciples regarding the cause of the blind man's illness:
Jesus answered, "It was not
that this man sinned, or his parents, but that the works of
God might be made manifest in him. We must work the works of
him who sent me, while it is day ( e(/wv h(me/ra); night comes, when no one
can work. As long as I am in the world, I am the light of the
world (o(/tan e)n tw~?
ko/smw? w~ fw~v ei)mi tou~ ko/smou)." (John 9.3-5)
This miracle story is John's account of optic imagination as a
formative element of mind, hence its association with the logos. The eschatological
and Pneumatological motifs of the pericope, as the effort of the disciples to
grasp the reason for the illness and the redoubled references to
the verb 'send' (9.4, 7. 11), are paramount. But the narrative
paves the way for what is the final, and as such, most
significant of all Johannine signs, involving Lazarus. In which
story the other references to days are as follows:
Now when Jesus came, he found
that Lazarus had already been in the tomb four days. (te/ssarav h!dh h(merav
(John 11.17))
Then Jesus deeply moved
again, came to the tomb; it was a cave, and a stone lay upon
it. Jesus said, "Take away the stone." Martha, the sister of
the dead man, said to him, "Lord, by this time there will be
an odour, for he has been dead four days. (tetartai~ov (John
11.38, 39))
According to the reckoning employed here, there are twelve hours
in a day. Hence two of the 'days' during which the body of
Lazarus lay in the tomb, must have been nights, making for a
total of two actual days and two nights; in other words, a
period of forty eight hours. The application of this way of
reckoning the temporal figure squares perfectly with the
fourfold pattern determining the structure of the aconscious in
terms of its four tipping points. That is, excluding the two
Pneumatological radicals which intervene between the initial and
the final members of both taxa,
the three forms of imagination and the three forms of unity,
leaves the four radicals which with their normative parallels,
comprise those distinctive four points of the annual and
seasonal cycle. Those four elements omitted in this procedure,
do not add anything novel to the sum total of elemental
intentional forms. The four Pneumatological modes of
intentionality all combine modes already extant; all four
Pneumatological intentional modes of intentionality are hybrids.
They utilise already extant modes of intentionality; so any
further abstraction from the hexadic to the tetradic contours of
the cycle, can dispense with them. We saw the same feature in
the Pneumatological narratives which have the appearance of
being if not otiose, then repetitive of already existing
narratives; The The Stilling Of The Storm being an
ostensible duplicate of The Walking On The Water and so
on.The pattern here, as also arguably of The Apocalypse, reverts
to the basic tetradic format consisting of just those four
moments in the yearly cycle at which the ratio of day to night
is distinctive: the two solstitial moments, and the two
equinoctial moments. These as noted, are the subjects of the
narratives which sit at the centre and the peripheries of the
Johannine signs: the two Christological miracles, the first, The
Transformation Of Water Into Wine and the last, The
Death Of Lazarus, and both Transcendental miracles, The
Feeding Of The Five Thousand and The Walking On The
Water respectively. It is as likely as not, that if the
Johannine signs predate the Markan redaction of the six
messianic events, these four episodes were those which were
first consigned to written form.
The inclusion of the last Johannine miracle story a propos of an
eschatological doctrine concerning the aconscious, death, and
the post-mortem state, thus follows the same meaning in The
Transfiguration. That narrative speaks of 'six days', and
we have correctly read such a reference as securing the homology
between the six Days of 'beginning' and the six messianic
events. But in itself, the episode marks the ontogeny of haptic
imagination, the most highly individuated, that is,
'personalist' element of perceptual aconscious mind. The last of
the messianic events like the last of the Johannine signs,
therefore has an indubitably eschatological cast. We may treat
of the one as of the other. The six radical components of the
aconscious can so be accounted for in terms which signal the
fourfold anatomy of consciousness itself. The two forms of
imaginal consciousness, the haptic and acoustic therefore stand
in apposition to the two forms of unity, soma and space : time.
These in their respective fields, which we can distinguish in
several ways, circumscribe the limits of the aconscious as both
ontogenetic and phylogenetic respectively. That there may well
be a link between them and the fundamental organizing principle
of The Apocalypse, each of whose quarters begins with a
sevenfold series, is a proposition worth pursuing, but not so,
immediately here and now.
The hexadic structure of the aconscious can be thus reduced so
as to yield an even more abstract tetradic form. This results in
the emphasis of the two conceptual components, space : time and
the soma, the
peripheral members of their taxon,
its initial and final elements, as well as their necessary
conative and cognitive forms of intentionality, which extend
from a remote past or future, to converge at a present. The two diurnal
intervals of the Johannine pericope,
the two days in the tomb of Lazarus, as of the disciple of
Jesus, figure these two conceptual components of the aconscious.
The same applies to understanding the two peripheral perceptual
aconscious components. The haptic imagination and acoustic
imagination, along with their respective intentional modes, thus
are figured by the two nocturnal twelve hour intervals, the two
nights. Rather than 'three days and three nights' then, the
Lazarus story speaks of 'four days', by which we understand the
two sets of equal intervals, two days and two nights, or two
whole twenty-four hour cycles. The introduction to the story
which mentioned Jesus staying 'two days longer in the place
where he was' supports this reading. Such reckoning of the
temporal references in the Johannine narrative accord perfectly
with the synoptic traditions regarding the same phenomenon,
namely the aconscious. The Christological narratives, The
Transfiguration, and The Death Of Lazarus, as
well as the overall configuration of the messianic events and
the Days of creation, sing in unison regarding these tenets of
Christian epistemology and psychology.
A possible link between The Death Of Lazarus and The
Apocalypse seems every bit as intelligible as that these 'signs
of Jonah', whether we reckon them according to the fourfold or
the sixfold structure, provide the basis of a theology of death
and more particularly, of the interim state between the same and
the final consummation as given in The Apocalypse. It does not
finally matter that we enumerate the ingredients of the
aconscious in any hard and fast way. What is clear is its
relevance for any beliefs we have concerning death. We have
already seen that the Pneumatological ingredients of the
aconscious, optic imagination and the male : female conceptual
form of unity, frequently best serve the notion of passage. This
does not mean 'transmutation' as it applies to the
Christological categories, which are clearly associated with
love and death, Eros
and Thanatos. It means
the economy of living entities in virtue of which the governing
function of immanence and of the Pneumatological realises its
end; and that is, unity. Any eschatological conception of the
immediate destiny of human consciousness after death must
therefore deal with the reality of life in all its connectivity.
To explore further the relationship between death and the
doctrine of the aconscious takes us to the centre of Markan
eschatology, where once again, the notion of an animal
consciousness, which is also by definition collective, comes
into play; hence the recurrence of the familial motifs, and the
occurrence in the two outlying narratives of terms such as
'Legion' and 'Syrophoenician', indexes of phylogeny. There is a
distinct and important link forged between the aconscious and
death. We see it in almost every one of the stories of healings
Mark has placed between 5.1 and 7.31, the stories which address
animal consciousness and the aconscious conceptual polarity
together. That such concerns might belong to the doctrine of the
aconscious has been neglected very remarkably by Western
psychology ever since the time of Brentano who first put the
case for it in the modern era. Philosophical psychology, and
more particularly, evolutionary psychology, have thus far failed
one of their most sacrosanct obligations. What has already
become quite clear is the significance of that Christological
half of the equation entitled to fullest consideration in
any discussion of the aconscious, namely Thanatos. This
is a topic rarely if ever addressed in contemporary psychology.
Its weight, and the metaphysical freight which it bears, are
much too burdensome for secularist agendas. Yet if anything,
this is the very first characteristic we must contend with in
the fuller doctrine of the aconscious.
It is certainly evoked in the several miracle
narratives and in the stories of messianic transcendent miracles
as it is not in just those rubrics and pericopae which have to do with the conscious.
Consideration of the aconscious is necessarily consideration of
the meaning of death for consciousness generally, just as it is
necessarily the due discussion of the various issues surrounding
time, the raison d'etre of the present work. We are not seeking
to confine the doctrine of consciousness in its relation
to time and death, to just those narratives which outline the
aconscious. But these must demand our attention if not first,
then equally to any attention we give to the canonical texts
dealing with the normative components of mind. The
first point to assess, though we will not do so in any detail
here, would be the eschatological one. An account of the
biblical doctrine of the aconscious wherever we meet it, enjoins
theological consideration of death.
One final point deserves observation, and it is yet another
indication of the logical consistency of the narratives. The sex
of the individuals involved in the healing miracles which
present the perceptual aconscious radicals of mind
are of a piece. This sorts with the utmost rigorous logic in
keeping with those narrative already examined, the healing
narratives in Mark and the synoptics which portray the
conceptual aconscious. These of course involve women, even
though they do in one sense begin with the story of a man, The
Gerasene Demoniac (Mark 5.1-20). This text isolates for
treatment the category of the symbolic masculine. It must
therefore in one way be ostensibly disconnected for this
conceptual form of unity stands apart as taxonomically
transcendent. The Gerasene Demoniac himself too stands
cut off from his other, the feminine, with which Mark must
nevertheless tie his story, and so he does, by the means which
we have already detailed above. The Syrophoenician Woman
and The Gerasene Demoniac establish the outermost
members of the catena or chain of events whereby Mark more
thoroughly presents his theology of the conceptual aconscious.
We must not forget the paradoxes native to the symbolic
masculine whish stem largely from the fact that of the three
pure conceptual forms, as representative of the Holy Spirit and
of immanence generally, it is weighted in favour of the
immanent. This is the least 'transcendent' member of its class
for the conceptual polarity of consciousness. So the theology of
the conceptual aconscious is consistently portrayed with female
rather than male protagonists: Jairus' Daughter (Mark
5.21-24a, 35-43), the theology of the conceptual form soma; The Haemorrhagic
Woman (5.24b-34), the theology of the conceptual form
space : time; The Syrophoenician Woman's Daughter
(7.24-31), the theology of the conceptual form symbolic
feminine. The editing of these narratives complies with their
taxonomic status. They select from the twelve categories just
those three which elaborate the radical disposition of the
conceptual aconscious, and of these the symbolic feminine is
treated last, as it was in the creation narrative. Mark has
faithfully followed that same, even if, for reasons already
discerned, he interrupts the story of Jairus' Daughter,
his counterpart to the Day 4 rubric.
So the apparent inclusion of that single pericope about the symbolic
masculine, The Gerasene Demoniac, given the inclusive
nature of the complementary category, the symbolic feminine, in
this chain of healing miracles, is at once perfectly
intelligible. It is moreover a tour de force, for which we were
prepared by the arrangement by the previous concatenation of
miracles, The Demoniac In The Synagogue (Mark
1.21-28), signifying the conceptual category space; Simon
Peter's Mother-In-Law (1.29-31), an alternative, albeit
very summary portrait of the symbolic feminine; and The
Paralytic (2.1-12), signifying the conceptual category
mind, and whose link to The Leper (1.40-45), the
story of haptic imagination, we have already determined. We
shall say more about this arrangement later. But it is certain
that the evangelist thinks of the categories of the aconscious
in terms of the Pneumatological category itself, male and
female. This is inevitable, since bodies are in the very first
place, sexually determined. We can then appreciate that
each of the persons implicated in each half of the Markan
theology of the aconscious, submits logically to this
distinction; so, whereas the three conceptual radicals of the aconscious are
given as the stories of women, as we saw; the three perceptual radicals of the
same order are manifestly all about males: The Leper, The
Blind Man At Bethsaida, and The Deaf Mute Boy. The
second half of John's series of signs is similarly consistent,
even if it begins with a messianic miracle, The Walking On
The Water (John 6.16-21), rather than a healing event.
Thus The Man Born Blind (9.1-12), and Lazarus (11.1-44),
both fit also the Johannine theology of imaginal consciousness,
the theology of the perceptual aconscious. The contiguity
maintained by these narratives in both gospels is therefore
another point of contact between John and Mark, or Mark and John
as the case may be.
The exorcistic healing of the deaf and dumb boy, whose
conclusion we noticed, referred to 'prayer and fasting' (Mark
9.29), may be said to conform to the Johannine metaphor
regarding imagination in so far as it points to the negation of
the mode taste. Thus the expression 'fasting' agrees with what
we have observed a propos of the metaphor basic to the messianic
events, that of assimilation, which it reiterates negatively,
since what is at stake is not perceptual memory qua taste, but perceptual
imagination qua smell.
The location of this story immediately subsequently to The
Transfiguration pericope should also be taken into account
as supporting the theology of perceptual imagination. We need to
further consider this idea before leaving the discussion of the
aconscious. The Eucharistic modes, those of smell-taste, are
enmeshed already in the Christological functions, those of
touch. John and Mark both agree on this point also. Thus both
evangelists include references to the olfactory modes of
sense-percipience in the last of the miracles:
And he said to them, "Truly,
I say to you, there are some standing here who will not taste
(geu/swntai) death
before they see that the kingdom of God has come with power."
(Mark 9.1)
Jesus said, "Take away the
stone." Martha, the sister of the dead man, said to him,
"Lord, by this time there will be an odour (o!zei), for he has been
dead four days. " (John 11.39)
John no less than the synoptic evangelists, identifies Jesus
as the embodiment of that centre of consciousness we are calling
'haptic imagination'. He has arranged this last miracle story in
tandem with the first, where the same Jesus was seen as the
embodiment of 'haptic memory'. This means of course, that the
inclusion of the first Johannine sign in the messianic series as
the logical complement to the last, The Transfiguration,
is necessary. In this way, John's gospel becomes as necessary to
the synoptics as do theirs to his. To read the introduction of
the miracle in Mark in tandem with the Johannine construct
involving the sentient mode, taste-smell, in John is not only
valid, but required. Both miracle narratives portray the
perceptual aconscious. Both recur to the J narrative of the
'fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil' in which
eating is the central metaphor connecting death and sexual love,
Eros and Thanatos. In this way the propagation of
animal and vegetable species at the level of husbandry and the
assimilation of such living things mutually justify each other.
As with Mark's introduction to The Transfiguration,
John's story of The Anointing At Bethany, following that
of The Death Of Lazarus, again sustains the connection
between the phenomenology of the olfactory, if not the
gustatory, and death:
Mary took a pound of costly
ointment of pure nard and anointed the feet of Jesus and wiped
his feet with her hair; and th house was filled with the
fragrance (o0smh~v)
of the ointment. (12.3)
Jesus said, "Let here alone, let her keep it for the day of
my burial. The poor you always have with you, but you do not
always have me." (John 12.7)
The Markan and Matthean recensions of this story contain the
same link, although only John carefully does not fail to mention
the 'fragrance':
"She has done what she could;
she has anointed my body beforehand for burying." (Mark 14.8)
"In pouring this ointment on my body she has done it to
prepare me for burial." (Matthew 26.12)
The relationships between Lazarus, Martha and Mary each, and
Jesus are qualified by everything we seek to convey by the term
'haptic imagination', they are examples of the way in which this
counters the type of relationships put by the first miracle
story, the erotic type, which is effected by haptic
memory, although both generate the reality of the self as
individuated or 'ontogentic' rather than 'phylogenetic'. The
manner in which the gospel of John uses the theology of
perception deserves attention here. For the 'Eucharistic' mode
of sentience, the combined osmic-gustic mode also evidently
infers the distinction between memory and imagination. That is,
the sense of smell as distinct from the sense of taste, which
the latter almost always necessarily comprises, can and does
function in itself and for itself alone. This is one of the most
illuminating images we have of the perceptual imagination. Smell
and not taste then, signifies in this context, the imagination
as opposed to the memory. Of course John is careful to secure
the connection of the last with the first sign, both being
Christologies, just as Mark also links The
Transfiguration with the phenomenon of the crypto-erotic,
having used the epithet 'The Beloved' (also translated 'My
Beloved'), of Jesus in his last messianic miracle
narrative:
When the steward of the feast
tasted ( e)geu/sato)
the water now become wine, and did not know where it came from
(though the servants who had drawn the water knew), the
steward of the feast called the bridegroom and said to him,
"Every man serves the good wine first; and when men have drunk
freely, then the poor wine; but you have kept the good wine
until now." (John 2.9, 10)
We know surely enough that to taste is to touch. This
Eucharistic mode is therefore at its heart Christological, even
if, in another sense it invokes all three forms of phenomenal
sense-percipience in virtue of its generic nature. Consequently,
the absence of actual (mnemic) touch, is synonymous with the
absence of taste. Their synonymy is a substantial part of the
subtext of the two last miracle narratives, both of which
represent the transcendent Son. So we cannot ignore the role of
the olfactory and gustatory sentient modes. Their primacy for
consciousness we know also from the second creation narrative,
and we see the very broad sweep of their operation in the
conative and cognitive experience of animals, facts brought to
light in the healing narratives we examined in Mark, which
surely allude to the complicit relation between smell-taste and
sexual congress. But the configuration of these two modes, or
one mode, depending on just how we account them, is germane to
any discussion of the aconscious. The phenomenon of the
combination and division of the two, smell and taste, offers us
a profound insight into the taxonomic division of
sense-percipience into its mnemic and imaginal vectors. We say
'vectors' advisedly, because the real thrust of any significant
distinction between smell and taste as analogously related to
the imaginal and mnemic, logically resorts to the radical
differentiation of future and past, for which also, the
two relata symbolic
masculine and symbolic feminine also function paradigmatically.
Just as the symbolic feminine is the essential combination of
both relata,
analogously, the sense of taste is indivisibly bound with the
sense of smell. But we have put also that one of the relata stands alone, signal
of transcendence, to however limited a degree: the symbolic
masculine in the case of the anthropic and conceptual category,
and the sense of smell in the case of the Eucharistic and
perceptual category. Now this tenet comes into play here since
it readily illuminates the doctrine of the perceptual
aconscious.
The prevailing construal for the perceptual polarity of mind is
given in the Eucharist itself, and in the three Eucharistic
miracles prior to it. These all involve actual events of
eating/drinking. Where the perceptual imagination is concerned
in relation to these, we can invoke the binary form of the
Eucharistic mode itself. Taste involves smell; but the obverse
does not occur. That is, taste always engages the sense of
smell, in the same way that memory always engages imagination.
We have argued that the latter are indissolubly conjunct.
However, imagination for its part, does exist in its own right;
it enjoys a transcendence of sorts. The image or metaphor for
which is just that form of sentience, the olfactory sense alone,
which John and Mark refer to in the transcendent
Christologies and John alone refers to in the story of The
Anointing At Bethany. This imagery of the sense of smell is
ideally fitted to convey the perceptual imagination, and its
corresponding modes of intentionality. The imagination stands in
a sense as divided from its memory; or at least, as
appropriating to itself the trappings of such disjunction
maintained by the pure conceptual forms. We should never lose
sight of the fact that perceptual imagination is in no uncertain
sense abstractive, or reductive in that seeks to overcome the
normativity of the perceptual memory of consciousness. For
this same polarity is the basis or norm of the
imagination, just as the pure conceptual forms are
normative of the forms of unity. Perceptual memory defines what
we mean by perception, sentience and so on. The texts
consistently represent by means of the metaphor of assimilation,
and so more specifically, the sense-percipient mode taste.
But the figures of whom Mark's Transfiguration narrative
speaks as 'standing here who will not taste death' square with
the Johannine phenomenological vocabulary, and with the
metaphorical use of sleep for death in the miracle narrative.
Initially this depicts the eschatological dimension of the
aconscious in terms of sleep, again consistently with several
other texts as we have seen. The two metaphors both say the same
thing: sleep is less than waking consciousness, and to perceive
an odour is less than to taste its source. The point is that
sleep is not the same thing as death, and alternatively,
adopting the second metaphor, if to 'taste death' is equivalent
to dying, the figure reverting back to the second creation
narrative, then neither is this the same thing as what may
conceivably be meant by the 'imaginal' ingredient in taste
itself, sense-percipience of an odour. Both sleep and the
sense-percipient mode of smell rather than taste, are extremely
useful metaphors for the imaginal consciousness, as for any
doctrine of the ontogenetic mind 'subsequent' to the death of
the body. Indeed the metaphors and images of both miracle
stories are redolent of the ontogenetic self. Even so, we should
not forget that both are metaphors
for the perceptual aconscious in its relation to death, sleep
and the olfactory sense-percipient mode; both are figures of
speech. The two paradigms for the normative and conscious
radicals of mind, that is the use of the phenomenon of light to
signify the pure conceptual forms, and the use of the phenomenon
of assimilation of food and drink to represent the modes of
perceptual memory, may be more than just figures of speech. More
needs to be said in this respect, for concerning the first
alone, the clear link between mind and time, of which light in
the creation story is the measure, just as it is in contemporary
cosmology, entitles such language to further detailed
consideration.
THE
TETRAD : TEMPORAL HIERARCHIES
It is here, in preparation for the more detailed study of
each of the four gospels, that we must further justify, or
better still, explain the reduction of the twelvefold and
sixfold structures, to the more concentrated one in which the
four canonical ('evangelical') dyads are paramount. This is
central to the relation between mind and time as given in the
story of Transfiguration, which is necessarily to say, the Day 1
rubric. It pertains to the integrity of the inclusive twelvefold
(sixfold) categoreal schema
if we acknowledge that mind 'includes' itself; that the whole,
of which it is a part, is nevertheless the whole: the logos always involves this
resolution of the dilemma between part and whole. The
explanation of abstracting from the six to the four dyads
acknowledges the fact of sovereignty. There are eight forms of
intentionality standing so to speak, at the four quarters of the
temporal cycle. These are arranged in pairs, coherent or
parallel intentional modes which reflect the ismorphism of the
two narrative cycles, the analogous relation between the six
Days and the six messianic miracles. We might with equal
justification speak of the Pneumatological dyads in terms of
sovereignty, that is, canonicity, where intentionality is
concerned. But there are several important differences to be
accounted for. For one thing, as noted, the intentional modes
generated by all four Pneumatological categories of
consciousness do not introduce to it anything not previously
there. They are in one sense derivative from, even parasitic
upon, or at least consequent upon the eight more elemental
forms. One way of understanding this is to use the phenomenon of
language:
The first point to notice is
that we now employ two distinct types of language, namely, the
language of sound and the language of sight. There is speech,
and there is writing. The language of writing is very modern.
Its history extends for less than ten thousand years, even if
we allow for the faint anticipations of writing in primitive
pictures. But writing as an effective instrument of thought,
with widespread influence, may be given about five of six
thousand years at the most.
Writing as a factor in human experience is comparable to
the steam engine. It is important, modern, and artificial.
Speech is as old as human nature itself. It is one of the
primary factors constituting human nature. We must not
exaggerate. It is now possible to elicit the full stretch of
human experience by other devices when speech in exceptional
instances is denied. But speech, developing as a general
social requirement, was one leading creative factor in the
uprise of humanity. Speech is human nature itself, with none
of the artificiality of written language.
Finally, we now so habitually intermingle writing and
speech in our daily experience that, when we discuss language,
we hardly know whether we refer to speech or to writing, or to
the mixture of both. But this final mixture is very modern.
About five hundred years ago, only a small minority could read
- at least among the European races. ... The effect of writing
on the psychology of language is a neglected chapter in the
history of civilization. (Alfred North Whitehead, Modes Of Thought, The
Free Press, Macmillan, New York, 1938, pp 36-37)
To conceive of optic memory as the means of the written mode of
communication, is to concede this argument, and furthermore, to
grant the predominant status of the acoustic, or at least, the
chronological reliance of optic memory on acoustic memory where
language is concerned. The very same truth applies to the
individual as well as to the races; that is, the pattern of
ontogenetic linguistic development, replicates the evolution of
language at the level of phylogeny. No child learns its written
language before learning its spoken language. It is perhaps even
justifiable to describe the widespread emergence of literacy,
and numeracy both, since the latter is virtually entirely optic
in its essential character, as teleological, indeed if not
eschatological. Such an idea is delivered in The Apocalypse. There
are many such references in this book, references to the
accoutrements of both forms of language, the written and the
spoken:
It works great signs (shmei~a), even making
fire come from heaven to earth in the sight of men; and by the
signs (shmei~a)
which it is allowed to work in the presence of the
beast, it deceives those who dwell on earth, bidding them make
an image of the beast (ei)ko/na
tw~? qhri/w?) which was wounded by the sword and yet
lived; and it was allowed to give breath to the image of the
beast (ei)ko/ni tou~
qhri/ou) so that the image of the beast (ei)kwn tou~ whri/ou)
should even speak, and cause those who would not worship the
image of the beast (ei)ko/ni
tou~ qhri/ou) to be slain. Also it causes all, both
small and great, both rich and poor, both free and slave, to
be marked on the right hand or the forehead, so that no one
can buy or sell unless he has the mark (xa/ragma), that is, the
name of the beast, or the number of its name. This calls for
wisdom: let him who has understanding reckon the number of the
beast, for it is a human number, its number is six hundred and
sixty-six. (Apocalypse 13.13-18)
The final compression of the structures of consciousness to
their fourfold aspect can be more than adequately defended on
the grounds of the inherent reference to time within the
mandala. There are four and only four marked points in both
cycles, solar and lunar, which define the four seasons and
phases in each case, although it is the first that most concerns
us here. The occurrence of the analogues to Pneumatological
radicals in the same figures, do not present themselves with the
same clarity of identity, the same haecceity as those
constituting the ends and beginnings of the quarters, of which
there are in all just eight. These eight 'points' arrange
themselves as four, since they require the ratio of day to
night, if not light to darkness, for their definition. They are
transitive just as are the Pneumatological 'moments' of the
year; they are preceded by and succeed to certain other
durations in the same scheme. But very notably they are unlike
the four Pneumatological radicals, for they constitute the
course of the annual cycle in a rudimentary and significant way.
(Thus in the history of archeoastronomy the 'cross quarters'
never assumed a significance equal to that of the two solstices
and two equinoxes.) The transitional quality of just these four
points however, is pivotal, momentous, and structurally
semiological to an exceptional degree.
The tetradic form of the categories analogically to the seasonal
cycle, must surely juggle with certain basic characteristics of
temporality as these impinge upon consciousness. These are very
readily intelligible. It is indeed the intentional forms, which
are the product of each of the peripheral or terminal categories
of the four taxa,
which render intelligible the features. In each case their
pattern follows an initiating conatus,
a conative mode of intentionality and terminates in a cognitive
mode. It is necessary to remember here that we are dealing with
the sovereign occasions of the forms of intentionality; that is,
with the modes of intentionality in their canonical forms. So
haptic memory as responsible for desire, begins the taxon, perceptual memory,
which is ended by acoustic memory, responsible for knowing. The
transition here is from the conative to the cognitive. It is the
same in each case, that is, all four taxa reproduce this same graded transition,
with the Pneumatological and hybrid form of intentionality being
the intervening mode. The hybridity of the Pneumatological forms
of intentionality, in the previous example, desiring-and-knowing, confirms their
own innate lack of identity, so that they are other than just
those four dyads which are the governing intentional forms of
the four gospels. Thus the Pneumatological modes, like their
corresponding intervals if not moments, in time, are devoid of
singular identity. They all consist of combined conative and cognitive forms of
intentionality. Theirs is the business of unity, of immanence,
contrastively to transcendence, for which a synonym might well
be 'identity'.
But the four dyadic intentional modes which are analogous to the
four 'moments' ('point-instants') of the annual cycle are
indeed susceptible of sortation. They are
radically identifiable, as being either conative (affective) or
cognitive (intellective). The unity of the intervening
Pneumatological forms of intentionality should not blind us to
the fact of their dependence upon these same radical
identifiable elemental modes, whether these be simple
(conscious) or compound (aconscious). We see this in The
Apocalypse, which in a given sense is derivative, or
'plagiaristic', and entirely beholden to the gospel. It is the
same with the modes themselves. They introduce ambiguity into
what requires clarity; and we begin with them on pain of grossly
misunderstanding what is actually primary and original. But
these very same hybrid intentional forms play an enormous role
in consciousness; consider alone the fact of vision, and how it
influences us. The blandishments of beauty are part and parcel
of this influence, the strategic value that 'things seen', and
just as surely, 'unseen', have; their sheer power over our
lives. Whether or not we should consider the Pneumatological
radicals and their subsequent forms of intentionality from the
point of view of the instant, that is the 'point-instant', or
whether it would be better to view their nature and function as
exclusively transitional, or durational, can remain a moot
point. At any rate, we have to distinguish between the hybrid
modes of intentionality and those forms which are
decisively, that is purely, either conative or cognitive. This
includes of course all four compound and aconscious modes:
desire-to-know, and will-to-believe, both of which are purely
conative; and also knowledge-of-will and faith-in-desire which
are purely cognitive. We must
not confuse these compound intentional forms with the hybrid
modes. All four compound modes act in the same way as
their conscious counterparts where it is a question of
distinguishing the basic, elemental, primary structures of
consciousness; these remain tetradic in form.
Concerning the intelligibility of the hierarchical transition
from an incipient and conative to a final and cognitive mode, we
must here distinguish between degrees of both pastness and
futurity. In each case the same fundamental directedness is
operative. There is always a convergence towards the present.
All purely cognitive
forms of intentionality circumscribe either pasts or futures
that are tangential to the immediate present. If we say
'tangential' this does not rule out actual contiguity, and so we
shall use the word 'proximal' to denote this boundedness between
both an immediate past or an immediate future, with the actual
present. Here I shall speak in anatomical terms
which refer to the phalanges of the fingers. It is possible that
the Markan schema was
reckoned using the hand. It provides us with so many of the
configurations attributable to the categories which lie at the
heart of Christian metaphysics. Indeed one learns to count by
means of the fingers. The fingers, excluding the thumb, consist
of twelve jointed members or phalanges. These are organically
related one to another in a triadic pattern to which we refer as
distal, medial and proximal. The distal
phalanx is remarkable not only for being the terminal joint of
the finger, it also contains a nail. The other reason for
enjoining this metaphor here in the discussion of memory and the
graded hierarchies of both categories, conceptual and
perceptual, and both conative and cognitive modes of
intentionality, and both orders of consciousness, the conscious
and the aconscious, resides in the utility to meditation
practice of the hand. Both Hindu and Buddhist schools of yoga
employ mudra or hand
gestures, as indeed do Christian and Islamic praxes, though to a
lesser extent. (We shall say more about this later, since the
hand is also the haptikon,
the sign according to the mode of touch, for the perceptual
radical seminal to Lukan theology, haptic memory, and of course
its necessary mode of intentionality, desire.) We
shall use the word 'distal' to denote the maximal extent of
those pasts and futures from the immediate present. It is at
once obvious that these distal pasts and futures are all of one
kind, conative. Whether we speak of the forms of will or those
of desire, (noting that the aconscious inverts their normative
temporal domains), we must note that they circumscribe what
belongs to the remotest ('distal') recesses of both the past and
the future. The peculiar nature of conation as well as being
the initiatory or instrumental to cognition, locates
either remotest pasts
or remotest futures.
To these conative forms of intentionality, cognitive
modes are antithetically disposed in that they circumscribe
those pasts and future which are not only closest to present
immediacy, but which actually border it. On account of this, we
refer to them as 'proximal'. So we may say that every form of
knowing and every form of belief, in all of which there are
four, locate what is immediately
past or immediately
future, and as such bordering on the immediate present.
These purely cognitive modes thus diverge from the prior
intervening Pneumatological ones, which elide the conative and
cognitive modes, and which locate either pasts or futures less
remote from purely conative pasts and futures, but still more
remote from purely cognitive pasts and futures.
In speaking of a hierarchy we are instantly made aware of the
presence of the same in acoustic memory. Here the theology of
semiotic forms has to do with the dodecaphonic scale. A scale is
intrinsically a systematically graded hierarchy. But rather than
enter here into the acoustic semiotic forms, we have taken the
correlate with which the acoustic memory as perceptual category
coheres, namely the conceptual category space : time. We have
already mentioned the vectoral perspective of immanence as the
present-to-past in keeping with the notion of memory, and that
of transcendence as the present-to-future. Thus this primordial
category is already implicated in our discussion. What serves to
interpret the scaled gradations innate to the three phenomenal
modes of perceptual sentience is their differentiation between
pasts. The above icon indicates the canonical forms of
intentionality without reference to the varieties within these
same twelve modes. But here we must extend their meaning so as
to account for the fact that each intentional form ranges over
the entirety spectrum of the conceptual or perceptual
polarities. So in the case of desire, there are in all six
generic species of the same, for there are three radical forms
of memory and three radical forms of imagination, constituting
the perceptual polarity. This means that the hierarchy implicit
within the consistency of the categories themselves determines
the hierarchy of occasions of each mode of intentionality. In
other words, the species of desire are structured relatively to
one another according to the hierarchic principle delineating
the modes of intentionality relatively to one another. The
canonicity of specific occasions of any given mode, and the
further hierarchic arrangement of the remaining instances of
that mode are explicable on this basis.
The temporal difference between those two radicals of
consciousness lying at opposite ends of the taxon, haptic memory and
acoustic memory, is the essential difference between the two
intentional modes of which they are the sufficient and necessary
conditions. That is, it further explains the shift from conation
to cognition, from desiring to knowing. In whichever order of
consciousness, perceptual or conceptual, conscious or
aconscious, the cognitive form of intentionality remains on the
threshold of the present. All four cognitive or epistemic modes
of consciousness, knowing, believing, knowing-will and
believing-desire, inhabit the boundary of the present with
either its past or its future. Thus knowing sits at the
threshold of the past-present, belief at that of the
present-future; thus also knowledge-of-will sits on the
present-future cusp, whereas belief-in-desire borders that of
present-past.
Hence in the case of conative intentional modes, there is a
distinct and remarkable disparity. All four of these same
circumscribe the remote pasts or the remote futures, the reason
for describing them in terms of the mnemonic aid of the fingers
with their four 'distal'
phalanges. Desire is as removed from the present of knowing as
it is possible for any two modes of intentionality so
taxonomically ordered, to be. So too with belief and will.
Nonetheless, we should not fail to grasp that this same
taxonomic ordering means that any two fully juxtaposed
modes of intentionality always belong to the same spatial or
spatiotemporal domain. Will and belief are both definable in
terms of the purely spatial future. (We say 'spatial' here and
not spatiotemporal for the simple reason that this future space
transcends the immanent space-time of four dimensions, and is
accountable in terms of its triadic disposition.) That said
however, it is belief and not will, which transmits this future
to the very verge of the present as linked to its future. Will
determines the remotest outposts of the future - hence we spoke
of it in connection with space, or what is the same thing
'heavens'. To will is to engage the 'distal' future. Conversely
desire in its pure canonical form, that given by haptic memory,
determines the furthest reaches of the conscious past, a past
which is transmitted to the present by means of the compound
mode desiring-and-knowing, and which achieves its final phase as
knowing. This intentionality is as near as any perceptual
intentional mode may come to the present.
The obverse applies to those radicals and their canonical modes
of intentionality which are the aconscious. That is, the
will-to-believe, as already has been put, reverses the vectoral
disposition of actual or true will, and recreates it according
to the 'distal' past, and does so paradoxically. The
will-to-believe acts compossibly with desire, the other distal
conative intentionality, to establish the extents of the
furthest pasts. So the will-to-believe and desire are kindred
spirits in respect of the fact that they equally establish the
remotest or 'distal' past. The following intentional modes can
be grouped together on the same basis: will and desire-to-know -
the distal future; belief-in-desire and knowing - proximal
past-present; belief and knowledge-of-will - proximal
future-present. These affinities are important and will be
immediately recognisable also in the acoustic semiosis which is
fundamentally linked to the concept of a graded hierarchy. There
is no counter-intuitive strain in the association between will
itself and the future. To will something is in essence a
beginning, and a beginning always with the future in mind. It is
even conceivable that such willing can involve more or less
perpetual deferral, so grafted to futurity is it. On the other
hand, we normally, or rather, normatively, associate desire with
the recursive iteration of things, events, occasions, which are
past, actual, settled, determined. Both factors, repetition, and
pastness are characteristic of what the term 'desire' denotes.
This, the commonsensical understanding of desire is roundly
endorsed by the gospel, only it is supplemented with the
conviction that there is a form of desire which is neither
conscious, nor recursive, (mnemic), that is, not reiterative. We
mean of course mental desire, or intellectual desire, so to
speak; the desire-to-know. This is necessarily insusceptible of
repetition, as its object lies not in the past, but in the
future. The latter must be purely novel, such that it admits of
only one final and full satisfaction, in which respect it
conforms to the sacramental practice of baptism, envisaged in
both The Transfiguration and its precursor, The
Baptism Of Jesus. Thus the paradoxical nature
of the aconscious is clearly demonstrated by the fact that it
'reverses' the temporal perspectivity of the conscious. In
order to use any of the above common language terms with as much
technical and philosophical precision as possible, and to
acknowledge the primacy of the primordial creative fiat, we
define their categoreal application vis-à-vis time.
Process Cosmologies
There is a measure of accord between Markan metaphysics and
process philosophy, only its emphasis on process itself should
be considered as extreme, because it occurs at the expense of
identity, or as we say, 'Transcendence'. 'Presentational
immediacy' is one of two modes of 'perception' foundational to
Whiteheadian philosophical psychology, or cosmology. But the
term 'perception' is indeed troubling because even if it doesn't
leave out of court the ideational or conceptual polarity of
mind, otherwise mentioned in the metaphysics, it removes this
from the centre of attention. The conceptual receives short
shrift in this school of thought, so much the worse for its
account of the subject-object distinction, of which it
nevertheless makes ample use. Any lasting differentiation
between the two, subject and object, will constitute a glaring
problem for process philosophy. But granting the aptness, or
not, of this term to cover the radical alterity between concepts
and percepts and the various modes of intentionality proper to
them, process thought believes in an equally radical alterity
between two ways of assimilating, that is of relating to the
environing world. These are 'causal efficacy' and
'presentational immediacy'.
As posited above, the graded hierarchy of categories acts in
accordance with the fourfold annual and seasonal shift of time,
both to and from its two hemispherical intervals, those of
increasing and decreasing light. Any and every initial and
distal phase of any and every one of these four processes
analogous to the four distinct seasons of the year is a conatus. Thus its
generational phase consists of either will (conceptual) or
desire (perceptual), in either form, conscious or aconscious.
This answers to the Whiteheadian notion of 'causal efficacy'.
The remaining four forms of 'proximal' cognitive intentionality,
those of knowing and belief, are part and parcel of the modes of
'perception' classified by process philosophy as 'presentational
immediacy'. Regarding causal efficacy, Christian metaphysics
posits final causation, that is future causation, to the same
degree that it posits efficient causation from the past. Final
causality is constituted by occasions of willing and
desiring-to-know. Causality in either mode, willing or
desiring-to-know, is identifiable on the basis of distal
futurity. These two causal, or conative, forms of
intentionality instantiate the first relatum of the categoreal paradigm,
transcendence : immanence, which relatum is synonymous with the term 'God'.
In sum then, the conative and distal modes, those of will or
desire, correspond to 'causal efficacy' in Whiteheadian
metaphysics. The cognitive (epistemic) and proximal forms of
intentionality, those of believing or knowing, answer to
'presentational immediacy'. However, in process
metaphysics, such a mode of 'perception' is deemed to be
without temporal bias. 'Perception' in the mode of
'presentational immediacy' is supposed to function always within
the here and now, the eternal present. The real distinction
between the two, causal efficacy and presentational immediacy,
is founded on this.
Markan metaphysics accepts that causality has a twofold
structure. Thus the word 'then' can be construed in terms of
either a past or a future. But this gives the lie to the
rudimentary structures of time relative to consciousness if we
lump together these two very different 'thens' and
furthermore contrast them with a presentationally immediate
'now'. The real alterity consists not between 'then' and 'now',
but between the two 'thens', for indeed there exists no distinct
'now' that is not in some manner related to these. No present is
identifiable on the basis of causality, since what occurs within
it is neither prior nor subsequent, and such simultaneously
occurring occasions must consist in independence of one another.
The conative (causal) modes, the four distal modes, conscious
and aconscious, consisting of willing or desiring, adopt this
very paradigm. The past, inheritable by the present to which it
relates continuously, is analogous to the immanent; and the
future, which is discretely related to the present, is the
transcendent analogue. Non-simultaneous causality reiterates the
categoreal paradigm in respect of the polarisation of the
continuum. The latter affords two perspectives, a
present-to-past, the perspective of immanence, and a
present-to-future, that of transcendence. Here is the
fundamental disparity between the gospel and process cosmology,
and the principle of parsimony demands that we not employ three
terms, past, present, and future, where just two suffice. We
must add always the proviso that the immanent appropriates the
transcendent polarity; which means of course that the future is
immanent within the past, even if this is not identical with the
transcendent future in itself as represented by the expression
'heaven'. Thus biblical and Christian metaphysics repudiates the
presupposition common to Whitehead and others, including Spinoza
and Heidegger, that there are three temporal entities - past,
present, and future - which are of the same ontological order.
The hic et nunc of the
'eternal present' stands for Mark as for other biblical authors,
distinctly apart from the past and the future which both
converge upon it. This is a fundamental feature of consciousness
as of time, without recognition of which we will be led astray
in any effort to frame a coherent metaphysics. For Whitehead,
who abjured the notion of 'nature at an instant' to have
posited such, seems glaringly in defiance of his own agenda.
There is no third entity called a present, a 'now'
distinguishable apart from what is already supplied. Markan
metaphysics understands the primordial or spatiotemporal aspect
of consciousness from the point of view of the categoreal
paradigm, transcendence : immanence. The 'eternal present' as a
third term, is the specious present. This means that in the
categoreal formula, transcendence : immanence, 'presentational
immediacy' is represented by the sign for logos, the sign for
relation, the sign which means both 'and' and 'or', conjunction
and disjunction. Thus the very same pattern, that of
transcendence : immanence, is sustained by presentational
immediacy. The present is radically informed by transcendence :
immanence; how otherwise could any present inherit past
occasions, or act as the nexus for future ones? Immediate events
even if they consist independently of each other, must be
inflected relatively to both pasts and futures. Christian
metaphysics in understanding 'presentational immediacy'
according to the categoreal paradigm, posits all cognitive, that
is, epistemic, modes of intentionality which are operative in
immediacy, as therefore polarised accordingly.
Hence those modes of intentionality which would otherwise be
definable in process philosophical terms under the banner
'presentational immediacy', are also influenced by the same
polarity that determines the causal (conative), distal modes.
Thus all four modes of believing and knowing: believing,
knowing, believing-in-desire, and knowing-will, these four modes
of intentionality are likewise informed by the fundamental
distinction between past and future. There is no intentional
mode in the purely permanent, or 'eternal' present; no knowing
or believing that is, wholly instantaneous, wholly
presentational. The four cognitive or epistemic modes, while
they are not causal, and not confined to the distal past and
distal future as are the conative (causal) forms of
intentionality, nonetheless occur according to the same
polarisation of the continuum. This is given by their various semeia.
The Biblical doctrine of consciousness construes intentional
processes whether conscious or aconscious, and whether
conceptual or perceptual, and whether cognitive or conative, in
terms of one and the same paradigm, transcendence : immanence,
the pervasive, ultimate generality which operates at the most
basic morphological level. There is no present consciousness
which is not in some way related to either the future or the
past, as these are represented respectively by the two terms of
that categoreal relation. This is one important respect in which
the process philosophical account is deficient. Much of the
difficulty lies with its view of the future. For Whitehead, and
no less for Santayana, the asymmetry of temporality all but
leaves the future out of account. Both appear to understand the
temporality of process as a perpetual flow from past to present
and so on to future. But where there is such continuity of
passage of the past to the present, there is no continuous
passage of present to future. If immanent causality is
continuous in kind, then transcendent causality is not so. The
'relation' between the present and the future is discrete; and
the only way in which there can be passage of the kind which
links the present and the future is by means of the immanence of
the future within the past itself, as is given by the forms of
memory - since these always include the transcendent, that is,
imaginal, polarity - and which is given equally by the inherence
of a transcendent polarity in each of the three forms of
unity, the most significant of which is the symbolic masculine
within the form of unity male : female; notwithstanding the
independences of the same. Thus perceptual imagination must
nevertheless be said to transcend its relation of conjunction
with memory, and likewise the symbolic masculine its relation of
conjunction with the feminine.
Let us repeat: cognitive or epistemic processes no less than
conative ones, are at least inflected with respect to the
primordial category, space : time. Even though we shall link the
cognitive-epistemic with that which Whitehead has called
'presentational immediacy', all four cognitive-epistemic
processes must bear some proclivity vis-à-vis the categoreal
structure of the present itself. There is no present without
either past recursiveness, or precursiveness to the future.
Additionally, the vector past to present, as immanent by
definition, contains a transcendent component. Hence where the
future is ingredient in the present, it is so by virtue of the
immanence of the future within the past. Teleological
causality achieves its aim by means of this future within the
past. The point is that there is no eternal present, shorn of
vectoral or perspectival quality. That is a specious present.
Hence if the future and the past ingress within the immediate
present, they do so in diametrically opposed ways. This means
that those modes of intentionality which we are here equating
with 'presentationally immediate perception', the four modes of
knowing and believing, both conscious and aconscious, must be
disposed in the same two radically juxtaposed ways. Thus the
cognitive or epistemic forms of intentionality which are given
above as the final or completed phases of processes initiated by
conative modes, no less than the latter forms, are inflected
according to either temporal vector; past-to-present in the
cases of knowing, and believing-desire, and present-to-future in
the cases of believing and knowing-will.
THE
EVANGELICAL COMPASS
This is why we emphasise the radical morphology of the
gospel, its nakedly tetramorphism shape which is that of
Christian eschatology as well. It is what we mean by 'the
competing claims of consciousness' and the arrant heterogeneity
of the gospels which faithfully reflect the same. In this much
we once again follow the principle of parsimony.
Hence we have urged the immediate precedence of the fourfold
over the sixfold paradigm. We ought now to further explain this
preference as following its structural disposition. That is,
those four ingredients in mind we may describe as 'pivotal',
'turning points', 'tipping points', and so on. In that they
correspond with the rudimentary form of the annual cycle, they
are clearly other than the transitive and Pneumatological
categories. These latter occur within the same four marginal
points which determine the utlimate contours of the temporal
compass. Each of the four evangelical dyadic arrangements of
intentional forms - for example, in the case of Luke, the dyad
consisting of desire, springing from haptic memory, and
belief-in-desire, springing from the concept of the body - one
of only four radical point-instants in the year is marked. In
this example, it is that of the winter solstice. There is a
clear and analogous relation between the aconscious and
conceptual category, soma
or the body, as concept, along with its intentionality,
belief-in-desire, and the diurnal interval at just that
point-instant, midwinter; and an equally clear and complementary
analogy of the conscious and perceptual category, haptic memory,
with its own intentional form, desire, and the midwinter
nocturnal interval. One is at its minimum: the aconscious
and conceptual form, the body believing as it does in desire;
while the other, the conscious and perceptual form, haptic
memory, responsible for desire simpliciter, is at its maximum. There can be
only four such occasions in the year if we duly acknowledge the
successiveness of night to day and so on. This rules out of
consideration the transitive points, the so-called 'cross
quarters', two of which, lammas and imbolc,
nevertheless mark festivals in the Christian calendar.
By 'isomorphic' we refer to the same relation as is described by
the word 'parallel' of the radicals or categories which underlie
as the sufficient and necessary conditions, the various forms of
intentionality. Thus we find The Transfiguration acting
as the analogue of, or isomorph to, the Day 1 rubric; The
Walking On The Water as also parallel to the Day 2 rubric
and so on. There are four such analogous, isomorphic or parallel
sets which we must investigate a propos of the four
gospels. Further to which we can survey also the remaining two
incidences of isomorphism between the two narrative cycles,
those which concern the Holy Spirit. In all of this, what most
occupy us are not the actual radicals, that is categories, of
consciousness themselves, which the two narrative cycles
categorise, but their proper modes of intentionality, which as
noted, act across the entire range of the two basic taxa,
transcendent and immanent, conceptual and perceptual.
Although The Transfiguration topically itemises haptic
imagination, it nevertheless defers to the Day 1 story, the
first portrait ever in biblical metaphysics that we possess of
mind, the normative category of the two, transcendent
Christological categories, mind and haptic imagination, the
intrinsic manifestation of transcendent good. This deference,
the normativity of the Genesis rubric, ensures that mind be
essential to the meaning of The Transfiguration. This
too follows from the meaning of the opening phrase of the
miracle story, as clear an index of creation metaphysics for the
synoptists as is the opening to the fourth gospel for its
evangelist: 'In the beginning ... ' (John 1.1). The
Transformation Of Water Into Wine also involves the figure
'six'. But whereas The Transfiguration places
perceptual categories in relation to conceptual categories with
the result that the latter, the conceptual, are the outcome, the
things into which sense-percipient temporality is
'transfigured', the first miracle story posits a different
relation between the two categories: conceptual forms and
perceptual forms. There, the event issues in the perceptual, or
sense-percipient polarity of consciousness. Thus The
Transfiguration as depicting time and death highlights the
outcome as involving the entire spectrum of conceptual forms;
but the obverse applies to the first miracle, where the outcome
involves the entire range of perceptual categories. In other
words, the relation of God to the world - 'transformation'
- and so too, that of the conceptual-to-perceptual poles of
consciousness, and the relation of the world to God -'transfiguration'
- and so too that of the perceptual-to-conceptual poles of
consciousness, are not to be understood as transitive. But we
must nevertheless comprehend them as part of a whole,
since their central event is one and the same: change, passage,
or transmutation. The two same reciprocal processes are
envisaged in the remark of Jesus qua Son of man to
Nathanael at the outset of the sixfold messianic miracle series:
And he said to him,"Very truly, I tell you, you
will see heaven opened and the angels of God ascending and
descending upon the Son of man." (John 1.51)
We therefore have in these two Christological events the
answer to that very apparent paradox logically outlined in
Genesis 1.1.s, which we referred to as a 'polarity of
polarities', the antithesis of forms of antitheses, succinctly
denoted by the central figure of the categoreal paradigm, the
sign for ratio, the sign for logos.
So in the case of the Day 1 rubric and its apparently immanent
counterpart, Day 4, we asked "What is the relation between
the 'dyad' light/darkness, and the dyad day-night?" The answer
can only be found in the gospels, since it is there that we find
the effective summation of the immanent categories, which the
Day 4 rubric in this instance portends. So the adjunction of two
modes of antithesis, one transcendent or disjunctive, and the
other immanent or conjunctive, will be explicated only by the
messianic series, where the final exposition of the immanent is
given. The polarity of polarities in this case is between mind,
the topos of the incipient rubric, Day 1, and the subject of The
Transformation Of Water Into Wine, haptic memory; and so
too, between their canonical forms of intentionality belief and
desire. We shall say more about this later. We have already
drawn attention to their antithetical natures as maximally
contrastive.
Hence we need to emphasise the New Testament Christological
narratives and the doctrine of intentionality as this functions
at the level of the inscribed texts. That is we need to make
clearer and more certain still, just what the two episodes of
change or process - transmutation - reveal about the intentional
modes themselves as shaping the theologies of salvation, and
furthermore, the eschatologies of The Apocalypse. Because
although the radicals differ in each of the four instances, the
two relational patterns obtaining between them, patterns which
reveal the reciprocity of their proper intentional modes, are
the same. These are described in the two Christological miracles
as processes of change, transition, or becoming. We have
previously referred to various obvious points of contact between
the first and last of the messianic miracles. The essential
correlation is however the crucial one, and it is that of change
or becoming. In avowing that the two correlates are intelligible
as the relation of Transcendence to the world in the first event
- and the relation of the world to Transcendence, depicted in The
Transfiguration, by the last term, Transcendence, is meant
not only the Transcendent ("the Father"), but of course all
three identities in 'God', the Transcendent, the Son and the
Holy Spirit. Thus the numeral 'six' in both miracles recurs to
that of the creation; and as already observed, the formal
radical features of both series, creation and salvation, are the
triadic and dyadic. Both miracle narratives, The
Transformation Of Water Into Wine, and The
Transfiguration, posit the connexity between the
conceptual and perceptual radicals of consciousness by means of
the idea of process, change, transition, or transmutation,
referentially to the doctrine of intentionality, and do so in a
manner which proscribes any final reification of the twelve
modes of intentionality.
We may say of these that there are indeed twelve distinguishable
pervasive modes of intentionality, as listed above. That is the
meaning of the numerical figure 'twelve' in The Feeding Of
The Five Thousand, and it is equally the delivered in
theology of semiotic forms, as it incorporates the acoustic
memory, the subject of that narrative. But we should resist any
tendency to entify the forms of intentionality in a way which
denies or undermines the fact of change. Between each of the
four sets of isomorphic modes of intentionality there is an
equal and opposite reaction, given in the two Christological
miracle narratives. Between each of the four sets of
isomorphic modes of intentionality there is an equal and
opposite reaction, given in the two Christological miracle
narratives. This is why we have construed them as the
countervailing processes whereby God enters the world and the
world itself is conveyed back into God, and also why we have
simultaneously read them as theologies of birth and death.
We have used a variety of expressions to describe the one-to-one
correspondences that obtain between the story of Days and the
messianic series; analogous, isomorphic, parallel, counterpart,
dyadic, and so on. But the expression coherence may do justice
for all of these and at the same time bring before us the
essentially Christological character of the relationships. We
mean by Christological, meaning itself, as suggested by
'coherence', and as explicitly denoted by the Johannine term 'logos'.
'Coherence' is used here synonymously with 'analogous',
'parallel', isomorphic' and so on, in reference to the dyadic
structure of the modes of intentionality governing each of the
four gospels. In every case, the two, one conscious the other
aconscious, are mutually necessary to one another, but neither
are they reducible, one to the other. And just as we noted
previously, their relationship is neither one of derivation.
This requisiteness, whose reciprocity is the central subject of
the two Christological miracle stories, is one of many relations
subtended by members of the two orders to one another - the six
conceptual forms and their six perceptual 'equivalents' or
cohering radicals. The relations between such radicals of
consciousness as given in these stories, do indeed affect the
entities in question. But the basis of their relationality, the
rationale of their cohering is axiological. That is, it defers
to one of the three forms of value into which the triadic
rationale of the cycles is finally resolvable. Thus the body,
both as ontological event and the conceptual radical soma,
are, in the words of Genesis, 'good', as is equally the
phenomenon of sexual satisfaction, equally forthrightly avowed
by the miracle narrative. Their difference is that of
normativity, and this is more or less synonymous with the
differential subserving the distinction of aconscious and
conscious. For the former, the conceptual form soma, is
non-normatively and extrinsically expressive of immanent
goodness, whereas the latter, the perceptual radical haptic
memory, is intrinsically and normatively expressive of the same
value, immanent goodness. This distinction fits every one of the
four cases involved in determining the specificity of the
gospels, and moreover, the remaining two instances of cohering
conceptual forms and perceptual forms. So in the case of the
Pneumatological forms, optic memory is normatively or
intrinsically expressive of the value beauty, whereas the
symbolic feminine - noting as always that this comprises
masculine and feminine - is the extrinsic expression of the same
value, immanent beauty; and conversely the symbolic masculine
intrinsically expresses transcendent beauty, and optic
imagination equally and coherently so, but this time
extrinsically. So then, the relations between the two things in
question do not determine the entities themselves, even though
they may affect them.
We began this essay with an epigraph from the opening of one of
the Johannine epistles, taking it in reference to the doctrine
of the word. We can resume that theme here in further developing
the relationship of coherence between the conceptual and
perceptual forms, in advance of a more detailed consideration of
the four specific instances of these which pervade each of the
gospels inseparably from its soteriological and eschatological
perspectives.
'Coherence' as here
employed, means that the fundamental ideas, in terms of which
the scheme is developed, presuppose each other, so that in
isolation they are meaningless. This requirement does not mean
that they are definable in terms of each other; it means that
what is indefinable in one such notion cannot be abstracted
from its relevance to the other notions. (A. N. Whitehead, Process And Reality,
Corrected Edition, Edited by David Ray Griffin and
Donald W. Sherburne, Macmillan, London, 1978 (1929), p. 3)
In The
Function Of Reason (p 67), within the context of a
useful distinction often made in the interests of epistemology,
that between theoretical and practical reason, A. N. Whitehead
discusses coherence as follows:
The Greeks invented logic in the broadest sense of that
term - the logic of discovery. The Greek logic as finally
perfected by the experience of centuries provides a set of
criteria to which the content of a belief should be subjected.
These are...
(v) Status of a Logical scheme with,
(a) widespread conformity
to experience,
(b) no discordance with experience,
(c) coherence among its categoreal notions,
(d) methodological consequences.
The misconception which has haunted the ages of thought down
to the present time is that these criteria are easy to apply.
... The view which I am maintaining is that none of these
operations are easy. In fact they are extremely
difficult.
(For a critical discussion of these criteria for rational
coherence, see Dorothy M. Emmet, Whitehead's
Philosophy Of Organism, Macmillan & Co., London,
1932, pp. 15-23.) In the first two gospels which will occupy us,
those of Luke and Mark, there is an obvious logic to the
parallelism. This has been noted by other philosophers, for
example Susanne Langer has commented on the affinity between
hearing, what we are terming acoustic memory, and the concept of
time. So in the case of Mark, we are met with the clear-cut
parallelism between acoustic memory and the conceptual form of
unity space : time. But in the case of Luke however, we have an
even more insistent and readily available incidence of what the
isomorphic coherence between the two stories of beginning and
end are seeking to convey. For there we have to deal with the
clearly correlated entities haptic memory and the body. We have
briefly put the case above why the soma is not identical with what we mean by
touch, and here of course we are referring to mnemic touch, as
signaled by the immanent messianic miracle story. Even if as a
form of unity, rather than a purely conceptual form, the
body (soma), is
ambiguous, paradoxical, ambivalent, especially as regards its
determination in the face of the categoreal paradigm
transcendence : immanence, even if, in certain respects and some
measure, it looks undeniably all but identical to just what we
mean by the haptic (memory), it is not so. For it remains
nevertheless a concept, an idea. It can be presented to us in
thought at any point, and does not require the tangible
experience denoted by haptic memory. We can think the body of an
object, an animal, a person living or deceased, without needing
recourse to touch these things, and without the experience of
ever having done so which would have resulted in a memory of the
kind we describe as haptic. The epistemological-psychological
status of the entity in question can therefore be settled; it is
to all intents and purposes an idea, and functions in tandem in
consciousness with the other five such entities of its kind or
class, although it sits at one end of a spectrum which, when
juxtaposed with that containing the pure transcendent forms of
space and mind, we might refer to as ostensibly concrete rather
than abstract. Here it keeps company with the symbolic feminine.
The dyadic, coherent relations between haptic memory and the
body, determine the psychological/epistemological entities which
characterize, imbue, permeate, pervade the gospel of Luke in a
way that is fundamental and illustrative of his own theological
concerns, and although to a lesser degree, those of his
co-evangelists. For the very same two processes outlined in the
two Christological miracle narratives refer to the isomorphic
equivalence between the two Lukan radicals, haptic memory and soma. So it is that
isomorphism is tantamount to coherence. The conceptual form of
the body requires the perceptual form haptic memory and vice
versa. The same applies in each of the six cases which correlate
the conceptual and perceptual categories. The use of the term
'inherence' and its cognates to describe the common axiological
ground of these same coherent radicals of consciousness, to
which we have referred all too briefly thus far, is intended as
party to this same feature of Christian epistemology. That is,
in the case of Luke for example, we have proposed that the
conceptual form soma
or the body, is the inherent expression of the value goodness,
just as are the occasions of haptic memory. This value of course
also entails the corresponding disvalue. Fundamentally then,
though the former is non-normative and the latter normative, or
as we have said, the body qua
conceptual form manifests the value/disvalue good/bad
extrinsically, whereas the coherent radical, haptic memory is
inherently expressive of the same, but normatively, or
intrinsically. Coherence then, or what is the same thing, the
fact that the formal contours of these two narrative cycles are
isomorphic, analogous, homologous, rests upon the theory of
value; the fact that one and the same value along with its
disvalue, is inherent within now a conceptual form and now a
perceptual form.
ORDER OF CONSCIOUSNESS
|
LUKE - winter solstice
|
MARK - spring equinox
|
MATTHEW - autumn equinox
|
JOHN - summer solstice
|
conscious
|
desire
(nocturnal)
|
knowing
(nocturnal)
|
will
(diurnal)
|
faith
(diurnal)
|
aconscious
|
belief-in-desire
(diurnal)
|
will-to-believe
(diurnal)
|
knowledge-of-will
(nocturnal)
|
desire-to-know
(nocturnal)
|
This pattern of analogy between the four cardinal, dyadic
intentional modes, already inferred for us in the Day
4 narrative, and the paradigm of the four seasons,
was set out above. It honours the ontological and transactional
connection between time and mind, a key tenet of The
Transfiguration, which stands as a premise to evolutionary
theory, and evolutionary psychology. As set out above, the form
of intentionality believing, has as its aconscious counterpart
the desire-to-know, and similarly, that the counterpart to the
form knowing is will-to-believe. The other two instances seem to
vary this pattern, for they consist of the form desiring and its aconscious
parallel faith-in-desire;
and willing with its
aconscious parallel knowledge-of-will. In the latter two cases, we see the
repetition of the term for the simple mode within the aconscious
compound mode. (These have been written in italics to make the
point clear.) At first glance this may seem inconsistent. But
these modes are already unlike the former two. For the former
two consist totally of the same polarity. Will and believing are
both functions of ideas or conceptual forms, hence the compound
or aconscious mode, will-to-believe, can be described as pure.
An alternative description would be 'theoretical'. So also,
desiring and knowing are functions of the perceptual polarity of
consciousness. Hence the form of intentionality desire-to-know
is also pure. Once again, we might just as well describe this as
a 'theoretical' mode of intentionality.
The parallel relatedness of the will-to-believe with a mode of
intentionality, knowing, that is neither willing nor
believing, is consistent with the previous two cases, just as is
the order which binds together the two parallel forms belief,
faith, and desire-to-know, even though at first sight, their
parallelism is not evident. For the latter is purely perceptual.
The reason why the overall arrangement is fully coherent, and
only appears to be less than so, is that the function of the
aconscious is in each of the four cases to act as a bridge. This
must follow after all from the fact that the non-normative and
aconscious forms of intentionality appear to alloy the paradigm
transcendence : immanence. Every time we met them, we had to
deal with their equivocation if not evident mitigation of the
fundamental distinction between pure conceptual and pure
perceptual polarities. Thus even though we decided finally in
favour of the categoreal definition given for the forms of
unity, that these are essentially conceptual, and that for the
forms of imagination that they are definitionally immanent, that
is, perceptual, we nevertheless cannot avoid the fact that both
possess ambivalent characteristics in the face of the first
order categoreal differential. This very ambivalence now becomes
highly intelligible. For without it, not only could there never
be a full appreciation of the ambivalent quality of the
aconscious, but there could never be any interlocution between
conscious and aconscious processes.
Such ambivalence enables interchange, transaction between the
two realms, conscious and aconscious. For the task of those four
forms of intentionality inherent in the equivocal, conceptual
and perceptual radicals is one of connectivity. This is why in
every set of parallels there is an affiliation of
conceptual-perceptual or perceptual-conceptual. Let us take
first the two impure compound modes, and their conscious
parallels: faith-in-desire and its axiological parallel, desire,
and secondly knowledge-of-will and its axiological parallel,
will. Faith-in-desire is a conceptual prehension of a perceptual
prehension: it is a mental feeling of a physical feeling, to use
process philosophical terms. As such, it can lay no claim to
being other than pure where this distinction between polarities,
conceptual and perceptual, is writ. It is in a given sense
'practical'. But it performs a vital function. For it acts as
the substrate in the aconscious to any process of desire simpliciter, promoting the
essential connexity between the same polarisation. This cuts to
the very core of the shared morphology of the two narrative
cycles, creation and salvation.
The same is true of the parallels knowledge-of-will and will
proper. For the former consists of a perceptual premise,
knowledge, and a conceptual datum,
will. Since it is the perceptual assimilation of a conceptual
form it is impure, since it is equivocal as to the true (pure)
differentiation of conceptual and perceptual which we find in
the conscious modes of intentionality. This impurity relegates
it to the aconscious, casting it as practical rather than
theoretical. Even if the final adjudication of values does
belong to the conscious, with its normative or intrinsic
realisations of the three forms of transcendent value and three
forms of immanent value, the fullest force of paradox belonging
to the aconscious will be necessary to any understanding of
desire proper. Just as will cannot function without the nurture
it obtains from physical, perceptual, experience, desire
is necessarily connected to mentation, that is, to the
conceptual polarity of consciousness. The roots of desire are to
be found elsewhere than in sheer physical, perceptual,
experience. They lie in the conceptual form, the body. It is
finally the body, an idea or conceptual form, which provides
desire itself with its antecedent. For desire to operate as it
does in consciousness, must require a connection of this kind, a
connection between the otherwise disparate zones, perceptual and
conceptual.
Now let us address the remaining two instances: desire-to-know
vis-à-vis belief, and will-to-believe vis-à-vis knowing. There
is no disturbance of an emerging pattern here, but rather its
completion. For we now see that in every case, the conscious
modes are linked with aconscious modes in the antithetical
polarity. Noting the categoreal premise in the cases of compound
modes, the full pattern is either conceptual-perceptual, as it
was for belief
vis-à-vis desire-to-know
and will vis-à-vis knowledge-of-will, or it is
perceptual-conceptual, which is so for knowing vis-à-vis will-to-believe and for desire vis-à-vis belief-in-desire.
This emphasis on the role of the first element, the
premise, or as we have also termed it, the co-efficient of the
compound intentional forms, underscores their triadic
('Trinitarian') rationale. Hence desire-to-know is emphasised as
Christological, equally with the Christological mode desire, and
so on.
The next stage of enquiry will be to examine the first of the
four gospels, Luke, in relation to the overarching content of
the doctrine of intentionality. That is, we shall pursue the
thesis that its governing intentional modes are those of desire
and faith-in-desire, the latter of which will require some
elaboration. We shall also invoke certain sections of The
Apocalypse in this effort. It is obvious from the patterns
presented by the semeioptika how closely integrated are
the sets of Pneumatological categories with the sets of
Transcendental and Christological categories determining the
gospels. That is to say any Christian understanding of desire
and faith-in-desire necessitates reference to
desiring-and-knowing and the hybrid intentional mode which fuses
the will-to-believe and faith-in-desire. For these
eschatological forms of intentionality complete the
soteriological ones which lie at the heart of the gospel of
Luke.
Updated 25.10.2022.
Copyright MM Publications.
© All rights reserved, including international rights.