God said, “Let there be lights in the expanse  of the sky to separate the day from the night, and let them be signs  to indicate seasons and days and years, and let them serve as lights in the expanse of the sky to give light on the earth.” It was so. God made two great lights   – the greater light to rule over the day and the lesser light to rule over the night. He made the stars also. God placed the lights in the expanse of the sky to shine on the earth,  to preside over the day and the night, and to separate the light from the darkness.  God saw that it was good. There was evening, and there was morning, a fourth day. (Genesis 1.14-19 NET Bible)

The heavens declare the glory of God:
and the firmament proclaims his handiwork;
One day tells it to another:
and night to night communicates knowledge;
There is no speech or language:
nor are their voices heard;
Yet their sound has gone out through all the world:
and their words to the ends of the earth.
There he has pitched a tent for the sun:
which comes out as a bridegroom from his chamber and rejoices like a strong man to run his course.
Its rising is at one end of the heavens and its circuit to their farthest bound:
and nothing is hidden from its heat.

(Psalm 19.1-6, A New Translation for Worship, Collins, London, 1977, p 46)

John's story of The Transformation Of Water Into Wine is one of just two Christological texts belonging to the corpus, the messianic series, the entirety of which stands in logical relation of analogy to the creation story. This particular narrative, and the rubric of creation, Day 4, remain indispensable to any understanding of Lukan theology. But any perceived dependence of Luke upon John is reciprocal. For whereas the governing principle of Johannine theology is belief, the 'coefficient' of Lukan aconscious belief-in-desire, which we have yet to explicate, any account of the desire-to-know, the guiding aconscious intentional form of Johannine theology, will depend in the first place on a proper understanding of desire simpliciter, the business of Luke.
Thus these gospels are mutually inclusive insofar as the proper aconscious intentional mode of the one requires the proper conscious intentional mode of the other. In categoreal terms, this amounts to the non-normative nature of the form of unity, soma, which underpins Luke, and that of the non-normative form of imagination which underpins John, haptic imagination. It is appropriate then, that the single recension we have of the Christological miracle which denotes the conscious Christological intentional mode desire, if it is to be present at all, should be present in the gospel of John. We have already examined numerous texts in Luke in relation to his presentation of the phenomenon of desire, but it is his record of The Lord's Supper (Luke 21.14-23), which finally and fully centres these. It twice explicitly refers to desire, and twice mentions the element of wine (vv 17-18, 20). The Johannine miracle story for its part, does not fail to indicate the passion and death of Christ, commemorated in the Eucharist:
And Jesus said to her, "O woman, what have you to do with me? My hour has not yet come (ou)/pw h(/kei h( w(/ra mou)." (John 2.4)
Mark mentions 'evening' (Mark 14.17, par. Matthew 26.20), but Luke's own introduction to The institution Of The Eucharist immediately resonates with the Johannine messianic miracle story:
And when the hour came (Kai o(/te e)ge/neto h( w/(ra), he sat at table, and the apostles with him (Luke 21.14)
It is of course the enumeration of the six stone jars filled with water to become wine (John 2.6-9), which itemises not only the six messianic miracles themselves, whose subjects are the perceptual radicals of consciousness, as the occasions of the various generic forms of desire, but itemises equally the six conceptual forms detailed in the creation story. The miracle story is therefore doubly indispensable to the messianic narratives as well as to the creation cycle. These same six conceptual forms establish the aconscious counterparts to each of the varieties of desire. For they determine the various instances of belief-in-desire. Thus soma, the conceptual form of the body, stands as the counterpart to haptic memory; the conceptual form symbolic feminine as the counterpart to optic memory; the conceptual form space : time as the counterpart to acoustic memory and so on. The process of 'transformation' from the conceptual to the perceptual, is to be complemented by the process of 'transfiguration' of the perceptual to the conceptual, the premier subject of The Transfiguration. We must not forget that. It is already adumbrated in the element of 'water' as the stuff which becomes, the element which is transformed, just as it is in the motifs in both narratives, the miracle story and that of The Institution Of The Eucharist, which allude to death as the other significant hermeneutical ingredient in The Transfiguration narrative, as well as in the entire cycle of 'six days' of 'beginning' itself, culminating as it does in the Sabbath 'rest' of God, a theology which The Letter To The Hebrews will elaborate in some detail.

We have the remaining two feeding miracles, and one of these, The Feeding Of The Five Thousand, is extant in as many as four versions, to complete the theology of desire in its normative instances. In each case of an immanent messianic event, is the same factor of pressing need, first depicted in the remark by the mother of Jesus, which inspired the riposte cited above. We may rightly say desire rather than need, clearly in the case of the first messianic miracle. It should be possible as well as necessary to distinguish between desire and need. Indeed this must be one of the tasks of any moral psychology. In the context of the Lord's Prayer we most clearly come across something of the kind upon reading that most perplexing, because rarest, of epithets, epiousion:
Give us each day our daily bread (to\n a)/rton h(mw~n to\n e)piou/sion di/dou h(mi~n Luke 11.3)

Give us this day our daily bread (to\n a)/rton h(mw~n to\n e)piou/sion do\v h(mi~n sh/meron Matthew 6.11)
The phenomenology of the messianic miracles as a serial whole, culminating in The Eucharist, entails that we view it keeping with the theology of perceptual consciousness. This means of course that it is intelligible vis-a-vis the three actual miracle which denominate the three phenomenal modes of sense-percipience, the haptic, the optic and the acoustic modes, all of which in one way or another are engaged in human communication, and so corroborate the Johannine theology of the word made flesh. The intelligibility of the Eucharist in such a context confronts us very squarely with what is involved in the day to day perpetuation of our very existence, namely eating and drinking. Thus the Eucharist signals those very modes, smell and taste, which establish the metaphor foundational to the understanding of the three phenomenal modes of sense-percipience. The fact of eating and drinking, is the fact of need as distinct from, even if concomitant with, desire, and is the fact of the sacrifice of other living entities. With the concept of time, it sits at the heart of religious consciousness. This has a certain bearing on philosophy, given the compact between the same and theology, a fact which still goes all too largely unaccounted for. We shall have to address this want, but is is important here to acknowledge any conceptual and moral psychological severance of need from desire, must take its cue from the theology of sense-percipience as formally portrayed in the stories of The Eucharist. These of course stand in tandem with the Sabbath rubric in the P creation narrative, and by extension, with the second creation story, in which eating, if not drinking, is mythologically instrumental to the apparent incursion of the complex conjunction of Eros-Thanatos into the world.

As far removed as might appear to be the first half of The Lord's Prayer from the pressing and mundane concerns of humanity, this first earthly petition alludes to the same constraint which pervades the three immanent messianic miracle narratives
. It would seem to stem in large measure, from a theodicy, expressing the contingent nature of our existence and that of our world. If a transcendent being creates the world and creates humankind in their image, then that creator must be accountable for its continuation. The perpetuation of humankind in time of course depends on itself as well as on the same 'God'. But there is in the first place, a responsibility of God to the world for its continued being. The very same responsibility encompasses more than the daily provision of 'bread'; it entails what we glimpse in the Eucharist in response to the second creation story, the relation of the world to God. Only this time, it is a historically real individual rather than a mythological 'first' human couple, who embodies that relation. Moreover, this same person, already made known to us in the three prior miraculous occasions pre-emptive of the Eucharist, which remains the eschatological feeding event, represents both the 'tree of the knowledge of good and evil', and the couple who consume its fruit. This dual or complete adoption by the person of Christ, of the drama portrayed in the second creation story, the fact the he in himself, is the final and full meaning of that event, which we have come to know as 'the fall', is clearly borne out by the subtlest yet most succinct references in both passion narratives. (John invoked the 'tree', albeit ironically, in the preface to the story of the first messianic miracle, mentioning that Jesus saw Nathanael 'under the fig tree' (John 1.48). This is the first of many references conjoining the themes of death and desire, in that gospel:
Since it was the day of Preparation, in order to prevent the bodies from remaining on the cross on the sabbath (for that sabbath was a high day), the Jews asked Pilate that their legs might be broken, and that they might be taken away. So the soldiers came and broke the legs of the first, and of the others who had been crucified with him; but when they came to Jesus and saw that he was already dead, they did not break his legs. But one of the soldiers pierced his side with a spear, and at once there came out blood and water. (John 19.31-35)
John's conclusion to the passion narrative thus reverts explicitly to the first messianic miracle story. Mark's technique is slightly more oblique, although we must remember that neither he nor any other synoptist contains The Transformation Of Water Into Wine. But he has certainly grasped the import of the Day 4 rubric, which lists the soma taxonomically by means of solar, lunar, and sidereal imagery, so portraying its psychological and epistemological value in terms that closely define its links to both the male : female form of unity, and that of space : time. Nor should we miss the significance of the numerical reference:
And when the sixth hour ( w(/rav e(/kthv) had come, there was darkness over the whole land until the ninth hour. (Mark 15.33, par. Matthew 27.45, Luke 23.44)
All three cases of an immanent messianic, that is, feeding, miracle, and again the Eucharist itself, consistently emphasize necessity or constraint. This is not logical or nomic necessity, nor metaphysical necessity. It is necessity as the manifest and defining attribute of desire itself. But in the Eucharist the emphasis shifts from necessity qua desire, to needfulness, just as it shifts from sexual desire, to the desire for God, or the needfulness of being as God. I mean more than simply being 'like' God in the sense of 'knowing what is good and evil' (Genesis 3.5), according to the J creation narrative, or yet again, having been created 'according to the image of God' (Genesis 1.27), as the P creation story states. I mean precisely one's desire to be like God in not being subject to death, the suppressed premise of that second creation myth:
And Yahweh God said: Now man indeed has become like one of us, in knowing what is good and evil. However: that he may not  now stretch out his hand, take from the tree of life, eat and live for ever!

So Yahweh God sent him out of the garden to till the ground from which he was taken.

And God expelled the man and at the east of the garden of Eden he stationed cherubim and the flickering flaming sword, to guard the way to the tree of life. (Genesis 3.22-24)
The tree of life, mentioned only once previously, now occupies a strategic role in the myth:
And Yahweh God made all kinds of trees grow out of the ground, pleasant to look at and good to eat, and the tree of life in the middle of the garden, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. (Genesis 2.9)
Thus the tree of life is mentioned prior to the disobedience of the couple; yet the latter is on some readings, responsible for the incursion of death into the created order. Similarly, there is an obvious reference to the necessity of human sexual coition prior to the description of the couple eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil:
And so a husband leaves his father and mother and stays fast by his wife, and they become one flesh. (Genesis 2.24)
Such threads in the story undermine its wholesale interpretation as an aetiology of sex-death. They insist that it be read as myth and not history. But they also, like the stories of The Transformation Of Water Into Wine and The Lord's Supper, seek to interweave death and desire. We see the same in the narratives of The Transfiguration, which, inasmuch as it deals with haptic imagination, ties the aconscious desire-to-know with both death and desire simpliciter. But to return to the distinction between desire and need, we must ask whether Luke, like Thomas Traherne, the first stanza of whose poem was cited at the beginning of this essay, is explaining actual desire in terms of need as a first, albeit ultimate and so, eschatological principle?  To do so is more or less in keeping with the petition for 'daily bread' in the Lord's prayer. Just prior to Luke's version of the latter, the conclusion of the story, Mary And Martha also touches upon the close ties between needfulness if not desire, and death:
But the Lord answered her, "Martha, Martha, you are anxious and troubled about many things; one thing is needful ( e(no\v de/ e)stin xrei/a). Mary has chosen the good portion (a0gaqh\n meri/da), which shall not be taken away from her." (Luke 10.41, 42)
These verses are somewhat ambivalent. The real source of our anxiety is the singular one of our death(s). Additionally, it may well be that there are indeed more things than one, which are 'needful'. Bread alone will not suffice the self-perpetuation of life where it is a question of need rather than desire. We need water; we need shelter; we need clothing, and those things conducive to physical and mental well-being, and so on. Luke's text is somewhat ambiguous even on this point also, since variant readings provide for the translation 'few things are needful, or only one'.

How then should a Christian theology of desire give an account of itself? Clearly it is of import not just to Christian theology. Desire has been the pivotal point of Buddhist psychologies for centuries. The same might be said of many Hindu schools of religious thought, except that they seem to be more readily pre-occupied with the phenomenon of knowing, and indeed with psychological knowing, or knowing the knower 'itself', as a primary manifestation of the same. Buddhist reticence regarding epistemologies as well as psychologies, and indeed metaphysics, if not its outright proscription of these endeavours, leaves open the field for its precursor to claim the title of a religious tradition centred on the intentionality of knowing.

Proscriptive tendencies towards desire do not emerge explicitly in the poem by Traherne,  neither in the gospel of Luke. Neither is prepared to inveigh against the characteristic capacity of desire to rule, indeed to compel our actions.
I will argue moreover, that just as the final section of The Apocalypse engages the phenomenon of desire as immediately pertinent to the eschatological context, Luke enlists its defining quality, constraint, in the service of his soteriology. Thus Luke's Jesus himself expresses the earnest desire to eat the passover with his disciples before he suffers (Luke 21.15). Desire is absolutely central to Luke's version of the institution of the Eucharist. Traherne, although he does not impugn the phenomenon of desire, looks beyond it, viewing it as evidence for the existence of greater goods, and better satisfactions than those realisable in the actual world. He is effectively stating the argument from desire. Is Luke doing the same thing? Does the explicit double reference to desire invoke the second creation story for this reason? The argument from desire, which flies in the face of Freudian skepticism regarding the religious impulse, the want of 'life with God forever', has been succinctly put as follows:
1. Every natural, innate desire in us corresponds to some real object that can satisfy
that desire. 
2. But there exists in us a desire which nothing in time, nothing on earth, no
creature can satisfy. 
3. Therefore there must exist something more than time, earth and creatures, which
can satisfy this desire. 
4. This something is what people call "God" and "life with God forever." (See  the full article by Peter Kreeft)

It is first and foremost the quality of compulsion, which we associate with desire more immediately than any relation the same, constraint or compulsion, may have to knowing. This sounds like a derogation. But to qualify desire as precisely not free, meaning that its chief property is altogether other than that which we experience in 'will', is to define it negatively. Free will for its part, is no less concerned with outcomes than desire, even though these may not be aptly described as 'satisfactions' in the sense of being substantively material, and being responsive to incipient constraint. We can and do ignore our 'free' will. Yet will no less than desire, is a conation, it is affective, an emotive rather than an intellective form of intentionality. We tend to forget such facts. The point is that in light of the obvious juxtaposition of desire to will, desire has almost always received a bad press not just in the Buddhist and Christian traditions, but in secular philosophical schools of thought prior to the emergence of  Christianity. Greek and Roman Epicureans, Skeptics and Stoics, are the prime examples. Certain provisos concerning the traditional early Christian failure to esteem sexual satisfaction as a 'good' historically, must be stipulated here, although they originated initially and somewhat pragmatically, yet counter to all pragmatic common sense, from the expectation of the parousia in the immediate near future. As if  accepting its cue from the clear-cut strains of the miracle story in John, the overall tendency in Luke revises such attitudes:

When the steward of the feast tasted the water now become wine, and did not know where it came from(though the servants who had drawn the water knew ( h)/?deisan)), and said to him, "Every man serves the good (to\n kalo\n oi)~non) first; and when men have drunk freely, then the poor wine (to\n e)la/ssw); but you have kept the good wine (to\n kalo\n oi)~non) until now." (John 2.10, emphasis added.)
The miracle narrative and its complementary Christology, The Transfiguration, leave no doubt whatsoever as to the axiological identity of both haptic memory and haptic imagination. This will be inseparable from its characterization in terms of compulsion, obligation, constraint, or howsoever we define what is set against the oppositional and transcendental elements of consciousness, the conative conscious one being of course (free) will. (The same must also apply to the aconscious form of desire, the desire-to-know, which will also function as a driving force of human consciousness, to which resistance may seem futile.) Our desires constrain us; there is no gainsaying that. But neither is there any repudiation of the frankly pragmatic admission that sexual satisfaction is a good, which is not disingenuous. It is counterintuitive to argue against desire on the grounds of its constraining capacity alone, and the onus of proof for such arguments rests upon those who pose it. If there were no desire in the first instance, there could never be satisfaction. It is in this way that it is reckoned a good. Goodness here stems essentially from assuagement; and arguably, the more intense the desire, the greater the constraint in other words, then the greater the good, the greater the satisfaction. Xorta/zw, 'to feed on', usually rendered 'to be satisfied', means the end of such constraint, obligation, compulsion; in effect, the end, even if only temporarily of desire. The term occurs in both stories of the miraculous feeding with loaves and fish (Mark 6.42, 8.8 par. Matthew 14.20, 15.37; Luke 9.17). (Luke uses it in conjunction with the verb 'to desire', in the parable of The Rich Man And Lazarus, Luke 16.21.) Notably perhaps, John instead has a)naplhrow/:
Jesus then took the loaves, and when he had given thanks, he distributed them to those who were seated; so also the fish, as much as they wanted ( h)/qelon). And when they had eaten their fill ( e)neplh/sqhsan), he told his disciples, "Gather up the fragments left over, that nothing may be lost." (John 6.11, 12)
The very same expression is used for example, in Ecclesiastes, in more or less the very same context, that of appetition and satisfaction arising from acoustic and optic sense-percipience. But its worldweary tone could barely contrast more with that of the miracle narratives:
All this monotony is tiresome; no one can bear to describe it: the eye is never satisfied (LXX emplhsqh/setai) with seeing, nor is the ear ever content (LXX plhrwqhse/tai) with hearing. (Ecclesiastes 1.8 NET Bible)
Even if the first of the two miracles of loaves and fish refers in the first place to the event of knowing, that is a satisfaction linked with the satisfaction of desire, given our understanding of the instrumentality of the latter to the former. Furthermore, certainly the second miracle of loaves concerns the hybrid intentional mode of desiring-and-knowing, and so secures the concept of transitional relation between the conative and the cognitive forms of normative perceptual consciousness, desire and knowing. The mention of 'satisfaction' in this latter context agrees with what is implicit in the first miracle story of the series, which, if it does not speak of 'satisfaction' as such, does not fail to mention the same. It is the experience of desire as constraint, which we shall consider in Luke's use of dei~, again in conjunction with death, which gives rise to the consequent experience of satisfaction:
and [the steward of the feast] said to him, "Every man serves the good wine first; and when men have drunk freely ( o(/tan mequsqw~sin), then the poor wine; but you have kept the good wine until now." (John 2.10)
mequ/w means 'to be drunken', (Acts 2.15, Matthew 24.49, 1 Corinthians 11.21). It sorts well with John's use of a)naplhro/w, 'to fill up', 'to complete', used in the subsequent immanent messianic miracle, as just noted. Luke uses the cognate mequ/skw ('to become intoxicated') in the explanation  of the parable, The Watchful Servants (Luke 12.35-40), the ones 'who are waiting for their master to come home from the marriage feast, so that they may open to him at once when he comes and knocks.' These he contrasts with 'that servant [who] says to himself, 'My master is delayed in coming,' and begins to beat the menservants and maidservants, and to eat and drink and get drunk,' (v 45). John's miracle narrative imputes to haptic memory, the basis of erotic desire, the property of conative perceptual intentionality in general; its putative ability to govern our actions. We must say putative, for we have yet to consider belief-in-desire, and its aconscious ordering of autonomy, or self-governance. Desire does not exist in a vacuum; it is underpinned by belief-in-desire. There is no haptic memory without the concept of a body, a soma, which in certain respects is tantamount to the self. But awareness of the bodily self is by definition cconceptual; concept of soma standing in analogous rapport with sense-percipient haptic memory. Their relation is depicted  as the event of 'transformation', the changing of the water into wine, the transitional relation between the conceptual aconscious and the perceptual conscious in the intentional mode, desire. These components of consciousness are mutually inclusive. Nor is the relation simply of that kind, the transformative one resulting in the experience of desire.

An example of the conative power of will rather than desire, along lines comparable to these images of desire, is given in the story of The Gerasene Man. Here, in its full panoply, is the symbolic masculine, a conceptual form, not a perceptual radical. It is an idea, and as such, occasions four conceptual modes of intentionality, will, faith, will-to-believe and faith-in-desire. Most significantly, it is responsible for the canonical form of the hybrid mode, will-and-faith. These are all conceptual modes of intentionality. So that the symbolic masculine is something we associate with willing and believing, and neither of these do we normally associate with constraint. Yet the figure portrayed in that healing miracle narrative is hardly any less self-governing than the 'men who have drunk freely'.

The other image of the constraining power of desire proper in the Johannine narrative is presented quite early in the text, and is linked with the symbolic feminine, in the guise of the mother of Jesus:

When the wine gave out, the mother of Jesus said to him, "They have no wine." (John 2.3)
More can be said about her role, and its import for the conceptual form soma, the body. The relation of the parenting bodies to the child was clearly drawn in Mark's story of Jairus' Daughter, his rubrical text about the conceptual form soma, which underpins haptic memory, and which we shall address directly. The exchange between Jesus and his mother, parallels that between Jesus and Philip in the later feeding miracle (John 6.5-7). Only there, Jesus himself initiates the conversation, pointing to the lack of provisions. If the tone is not quite so pressing in that second episode, we may justifiably explain this according to the hierarchy of desire. The desire in question there, desire in its social or hierarchic denomination, which is indissolubly linked to knowing, the canonical form of intentionality arising from acoustic memory, stands at some considerable remove from the canonical instance of desire, which is the erotic, the product of haptic memory. All three, or rather, four forms of memory, are depicted in terms of consumption, all are equally 'Eucharistic'. But the story of the miracle at the wedding at Cana is in its own way, more proximate to the actual Eucharist, as we see from the use of the verb geu/w, 'to taste' (John 2.9). Matthew uses the very same verb in his account of the crucifixion:
they offered him wine to drink, mingled with gall; but when he tasted (geusa/menov) it, he would not drink it. (Matthew 27.34)
This verb is used in the New Testament of food as well as it is here, of wine or drink (Acts 10.10, 20.11), and of course, as we have seen, it is used in conjunction with the event of death (Mark 9.1), and not just the death of Jesus alone, congruently with the subject of the text here, sexual appetition and satisfaction. Wine unlike water, is neither colourless nor tasteless. Hence it is important to note as well as the superabundant quantity of the substance provided, the qualitative difference between the two. The metaphorical use of wine to denote sexual love turns upon its capacity to intoxicate, to make the drinkers want still more, since it induces states of euphoria. Such states often exaggerate the value of the thing itself, the wine, and equally the sense of rapture, especially when it is consumed in the company of others. Any exaggeration of this kind is proportionate to the increased consumption of the wine and the levels of intoxication. The message here is quite simple; not infrequently, the more one 'drinks wine' the more one may want to do so. It is likely that John's hyperbolical reference to the quantity involved in the miracle alludes to this fact. That is, it is likely that he is shrewdly making a statement about sexual gratification, and the way in which it in turn feeds sexual appetition. The metrhta\v  is a measure for liquids, rather less than nine gallons, (John 2.6).

The detail is by no means incidental. The specification of the capacity of the stone jars serves the argument that the wine in some sense comprises the water without which it would not exist at all. It is not made ex nihilo, a fact which sits perfectly with the overall inflection of John's gospel, beginning as it does with beginning itself; that is, writing large the theology of transcendence. The quantity of water is equal to the quantity of wine, a clear and certain statement about the evident parity between the two conscious and normative forms of intentionality, will and desire. John's hyperbole then is doubly ironical. Not only does he picture the self-perpetuating aspect of desire, that is part of his refusal to shy away from noting the reality of satisfied sexual desire as a good. But he also shows how inextricably desire is pitted against its antithetical form of intentionality, that of will. Here we see the evangelist's own character to be one of not so much sobriety and gravity, as lucidity and perspicuity. It was immediately detectable in the earlier record of Jesus' reference to his eventual death.

The closeness of the haptic modes of intentionality, desire and desire-to-know, and that of the conceptual Christological modes, belief and belief-in-desire, to the single Eucharistic episode, is borne out by the same affinity between the sense of touch, and the mind : body, and those most mundane of activities, eating and drinking. The pericope concludes by noting the Christological conceptual mode(s) of intentionality for this reason. In other words, it underlines the essential link between desire and belief, the two conscious Christological forms of intentionality:
This, the first of his signs Jesus did at Cana in Galilee, and manifested his glory; and his disciples believed ( e)pi/steusan) in him. (John 2.11)
The paramount desire for Luke then, the desire to be as God is, to enjoy being beyond death, which his account of the Eucharist articulates, is pivotal to the theological understanding of both forms of the intentionality of desire: conscious desire simpliciter itself, and the desire-to-know. It is similarly indispensable to the theology of belief, by which we mean, both actual belief simpliciter, and the belief-in-desire. This understanding knits together Luke's moral psychological vision of the relation between true desire as compelling or constraining, and authentic needfulness, which latter is more nearly appropriate to the use of the word 'desire' in the context of the Eucharist. The discussion of that however must lie ahead of us for now.

What we require immediately, is an account of the specificity of desire, that is to say, an account of the attribution to it of necessity or constraint as its defining criterion. In every case of an intentional mode, whether conscious or aconscious, the same must apply. That is, we must answer the juxtaposition of desire and will, and also reckon with the juxtaposition of belief and knowing. We have already observed a similar relation between the two Christological forms of intentionality, conscious desire and conscious belief, and consequently, that between aconscious desire-to-know and aconscious belief-in-desire, in terms of the analogy between the two solstitial moments of the annual cycle, midwinter, representative of desire and belief-in-desire, and midsummer, representative of belief, and the desire to know. But we need to supplement this temporal analogy, as fitting as it is, and to give some sort of explanation for the defining attributes of each of the four radical forms of intentionality, and their compound counterparts. For the Transcendental modes of intentionality also formulate relationships along the same lines. Knowing and will-to-believe mark the vernal equinox, and antithetically, will simpliciter and the knowledge-of-will, mark the autumnal equinox.

All eight forms of intentionality when reckoned in terms of defining attributes should manifest more cogently the varieties of antithesis with which we have to deal. Thus in the case of desire simpliciter, it is not so much a question of its contrastive relation to will, or indeed, to the will-to-believe. It more thoroughly contrasts with the desire-to-know. For this relation is analogous to the contrast between the nocturnal interval at the winter solstice, the temporal analogue for desire simpliciter, and the nocturnal interval at the summer solstice, the analogue for desire-to-know. In order to say more about why both should be defined criteriologically in terms of constraint, and yet maintain what in some sense must be called their antithesis, the reality of an oppositional structure, we must here broach the issues surrounding the properties of intentional modes.

In what follows therefore, we are providing a philosophical basis for the attribution of a criteriological property to each intentional mode. Each form of intentionality has a defining attribute, a governing quality, a ruling characteristic. We shall explain not just what it means to say that desire is 'constraining'; but also the logical basis of describing will as 'liberating', or 'emancipating'. We shall define knowing as 'heteronomous'; and belief as 'autonomous'. In each case, the reason is the same. These attributions of constraint to desire, and of freedom to will, like that of heteronomy to knowing, and of autonomy to belief, all accord with one and the same structure inherent in the categories themselves. The following discussion therefore relates to a more comprehensive epistemology and psychology; that is to say, to an overarching Christology, whose premise is John's identification of the transcendent Son, the logos or Word.


I term ‘commensurately universal’ an attribute which belongs to every instance of its subject, and to every instance essentially and as such; from which it clearly follows that all commensurate universals inhere necessarily in their subjects. The essential attribute, and the attribute that belongs to its subject as such, are identical. E.g. point and straight belong to line essentially, for they belong to line as such; and triangle as such has two right angles, for it is essentially equal to two right angles. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Book I, section 4, translated by G.R.E. Mure: Adelaide University eBooks.) 

In adopting the Aristotelian concept of commensurate universals, it should be made clear that we are not endorsing Aristotelian doctrine concerning universals in its entirety, whatever that might be. But the language which Aristotle uses in his treatment of universals, and the way in which it coheres with his treatment of syllogistic reasoning will provide a fuller account of the relation of an intentional mode, here desire, to a category, here haptic memory, and the further depiction of the former by means of a defining attribute, here constraint. The doctrine of universals, a well-worn and still current chapter in philosophy, emerges in both books, Hebrews and the gospel of John, redolent as they are of middle Platonism. Aristotle himself inherits the classical discussion of the theory of universals ('ideas', 'forms'), from Plato. Thus we shall be indebted to both philosophers, just as those books themselves are, and certainly, the framework of the theory of universals will re-appear in this essay, even if Hebrews and the gospel of John are to complement Plato and Aristotle.

The commensurate universals in the case of desire, are (i)
hapticity and (ii) constraint. Our task then, according to Aristotle, must be the demonstration (apodeixis) of the link, the middle term, between these two terms. The first premise contains the subject of the conclusion: hapticity. This is the minor premise. The second premise contains the attribute of the  conclusion, constraining, and is the major premise. The middle term, desiring, must explain why every instance of hapticity is forcefully compelling, why its chief property is constraint. It must provide the explanatory reason for haptic consciousness being universally constraining. The basic logical  principle operative is thus that where two things agree with or belong to  a third, they must agree with or belong to one another: if (i)=x and  (ii)=x, then (i) and (ii) are commensurately universal. The middle term in this case is the intentional mode, desiring. It is the link between attribute and subject: constraint and desire. As such, it appears twice, in each of the two premises, the major premise containing the attribute or predicate, constraining, and the minor premise containing the subject, hapticity.
The middle term, 'b', is the cause or explanation of the necessary and universal pairing of subject 'a' with predicate 'c'. In other words, one explains why every 'a' is 'c' by finding a middle term, 'b', such that necessarily, Aab and necessarily, Abc. Aristotle writes, "Demonstrative knowledge must be knowledge of a necessary nexus, and therefore must clearly be obtained through a necessary middle term; otherwise its possessor will know neither the cause nor the fact that his conclusion is a necessary connection" (Anal. Post. 1.6).
The middle term must be taken universally at least once. That is, it cannot both times be taken particularly. It must at least once be used in conjunction with the word 'all' or 'every', rather than 'some' or a particular instance. Here it will be taken universally once, occurring in the major premise. This is the third of the rules of syllogistic reasoning, just as the rule that you must have three and only three terms, three and only three propositions, is the first. The second rule concerns the sense in which any term may be taken in the conclusion. In the conclusion no term may be taken more widely than how it was taken in the premises. If taken universally in the premises, it may be taken universally or particularly in the conclusion. But if taken only particularly in the premises, it may not be taken universally in the conclusion. It must in that case, be taken particularly in the conclusion.

In the following syllogism, there are three terms; the middle term, 'desiderative'/'desderation' occurs in both premises, and does not appear in the conclusion. The term 'haptic sentience' does not differentiate between haptic memory and haptic imagination. The expression 'haptic sentience' applies to haptic consciousness generally; that is, to both the imaginal, aconscious radical, and the mnemic, conscious radical: to both haptic imagination and haptic memory.
It refers equally to these two categoreal entities. We have not stipulated either one, the mnemic or the imaginal. The term 'haptic sentience' denotes haptic consciousness generally, and hence both haptic memory and haptic imagination. 'Desiderative/desideration' occurs in both premises, and so it is able to link the attribute 'constraining', and subject 'haptic sentience' in the conclusion. 'Desiderative/desideration' is taken particularly in the minor premise, and universally in the major premise. Thus it is taken universally at least once. 'Haptic sentience', which will appear as the subject in the conclusion, and is referred to as the minor term, is taken universally in both the minor premise and in the conclusion. Both times, it has the word 'all' before it. 'Constraining', which will appear as the attribute in the conclusion, and is referred to as the major term, is taken particularly in the major premise. This means that the way 'constraining' is used in that premise is not universal. The major premise does not cover all instances of constraining entities. Desires are not the only things which constrain us; as noted, death is another. (The attribute of an affirmative proposition, whether universal or particular, is always taken particularly: it always has the word 'some' understood before it.) So too in the conclusion, no universal claims are made a propos of 'constraining'. That is, it is not used more widely than it was used in the premise, since it is not used universally but particularly, in the conclusion. 'Constraining' is taken particularly in both the major premise and in the conclusion. We have therefore been observant of the rules applying to syllogistic reasoning. The universal claim of the conclusion concerns haptic consciousness.
All haptic sentience is desiderative;
All desideration is constraining;
All haptic sentience is constraining.
We shall propose here the commensurate universals applying in the case of belief also. Belief is the conceptual Christological form of intentionality, and occurs in a close relationship with desire, the perceptual Christological form of intentionality. Thus it will apply to the aconscious perceptual mode, belief-in-desire, without which, desire itself is as nothing.
All minds are believing;
All believing is autonomous;
All minds are autonomous.
This syllogism contains three terms. The connecting link or middle term, is the attribute 'believing'; once again referring to a mode of intentionality. The minor premise proposes that minds are universally of this kind. Hence the subject, 'minds', is taken universally, whereas the attribute 'believing' is taken particularly. (The attribute of an affirmative proposition, whether universal or particular, is always taken particularly: it always has the word 'some' understood before it.) The major premise proposes the attribute, 'autonomous', taken particularly, of 'believing'. That is, it applies to 'all believing'. Hence 'believing' is taken universally. The middle term must be taken universally at least once, and so it is.

Luke himself is not stranger to syllogistic reasoning. (See Vernon K. Robbins, From Enthymeme To Theology In Luke 11.1-13.)
The above syllogistic reasoning will serve the description of the constituents of two of the cardinal, radical, forms of intentionality, namely the Christological modes, belief and desire. Both intentional modes of desire, desire simpliciter and desire-to-know, are described as deterministic; both forms of belief, conscious belief proper, and faith-in-desire, are described as autonomous. The two forms of will, conscious, actual will simpliciter, and the aconscious will-to-believe are described complementarily to the defining attribute of desire. They are described in terms of freedom from constraint or determined impulses. Additionally, both knowing, the conscious perceptual cognitive intentional mode, and knowledge-of-will, its aconscious counterpart, are described as heteronomous. (We should note in passing, that the use of 'autonomy' and 'heteronomy' to define belief and knowing respectively in juxtaposition to one another, must not be confused with the terms 'ontogenetic' and phylogenetic'). In every case the intentional mode functions as the middle term. Thus it is the logical link between the radical and its defining attribute.

We might have taken 'goodness' as the definitive property of desire. It is mentioned clearly in the two narratives concerning haptic memory, and hence concerning desire: The Man With a Withered Hand and The Transformation Of Water Into Wine. But it also is just as certainly implicated in those narratives which deal with belief, the story of the creation of light and its separation from darkness. The story of The Paralytic does not contain the word 'good' itself, neither does that of the Leper. But the word is present in the story of The Transfiguration. The point is that the axiological elements of these texts is a bond. The axiology of desire and that of belief are one and the same. The concept of the 'good' serves to unite, not to define as distinct from one another, both desire and belief, the two Christological forms of intentionality. Hence it cannot be used in this way. On the contrary, another step towards the resolution of the problematic surrounding moral responsibility as suggested by words like 'autonomy' and 'constraint', will rely on this fact. It will exploit rather than neglect the obvious fact of the axiological identity of the Christological modes of intentionality, belief and desire, in pursuit of Christian moral psychology.

It goes without saying that the characterisation of the modes of intentionality in terms of their various governing properties are not necessarily positive as to value. That is, desire, or desideration, need not always enjoy a positive valence. Desire thus includes negative evalutions; it includes not desiring as such. It is important to keep this in mind as a caveat in the discussions which follow. To say therefore that all haptic consciousness, whether that of haptic memory or that of haptic imagination, and therefore, all desiring and all desiring-to-know are qualified by the experience of constraint, is to say that specific instances of these may be either positive or negative. But the chief property in either case is one of constraint: thus we are constrained either to desire or not desire, and to desire-to-know or to not desire-to-know.


We must emphasize that the aconscious, including of course the form of unity mind : body or soma, so central to Lukan theology, is not relegated to permanent inferiority. On the contrary, the contribution and role to consciousness as a whole, of the aconscious is equal to that of the conscious. This must be acknowledged. Therefore it is necessary now to explain the rationale for this proposition in the case of the intentional dyad proper to the theology of the gospel of Luke, and what follows from it. It is in light of this that Christian metapsychology departs for instance, from Freudian metapsychological dogmas. The following argument also demonstrates  how the Christian psychology of desire acquits itself of the obligation to account for the 'subconscious' or 'unconscious' of such secular schools of psychological thought. A clear and certain disparity obtains between what is on the one hand a perceptual category, haptic memory, and a conceptual form of unity, the soma, the conceptual form of mind : body. This disparity is sustained notwithstanding that we describe the conceptual form as one of virtual immanence, synonymously with its description as non-normative, or heterodox, or aconscious. Another way of putting the same tenet will be to refer to the intentional mode of belief-in-desire  as pseudo perceptual.

The four categoreal classes or taxa, each consist of three members: from the creation taxonomy pure conceptual forms, the subjects of Days 1, 2, and 3, and the (conceptual) forms of unity, the subjects of Days 4, 5 and 6; and from the messianic series, the three forms of memory, and the three forms of imagination. These three members of the four classes are hierarchically bound to one another in two different ways: one expressing the hierarchical gradations of the cognitive mode of intentionality proper to each of the four taxa; and antithetically, that is, obversely in order, reflecting the hierarchical gradations of the conative mode of intentionality to each taxa. But it is the former which corresponds to the processive order analogous to the temporal paradigm. So for example, haptic memory is the initial member of its taxon, the class forms of memory, whereas acoustic memory is the final member of that same class. Haptic memory is the sovereign or canonical occasion of desire, the conative mode of intentionality proper to its taxon; but acoustic memory is the canonical occasion of knowing, the cognitive intentionality proper to the same taxon. It is the latter to which the order tends, signifying the innately temporal analogous relation  of this class of categories to the spring quarter of the annual cycle. In other words, the cognitive and not the conative syntactical gradation corresponds to the inherent temporality of each class of radicals. Thus in the mandala of the hierarchies of desire, we included an arrow which marked the transition from acoustic to haptic memory. Acoustic memory is the raison d'etre for hierarchic desire, a third grade, and as such degraded, form of desire. This direction marking the flow towards the sovereign or canonical form of desire goes against the grain, so to speak, when it comes to the actual temporal structure of the taxon. For this is directed from haptic, through optic, and finally to acoustic memory, in the service of cognition.

Two factors can explain this postulate: normative and non-normative status of the categories themselves, and their own innate temporality. The latter means of course that in the case of the class, forms of memory, haptic memory occupies the distal past, optic memory the medial past, and acoustic memory the proximal past. So the actual passage is inevitably towards the presentational domain, always put finally by the Eucharist. In this case, particularly so, since it denotes a perceptual entity, the composite modes of the gustic and osmic, (taste and smell). And acoustic memory circumscribes the temporal realm nearest to this Eucharistic present. That is, acoustic memory provides the perceptual intentional mode knowing, as opposed to the conceptual cognitive mode, believing, with its canonical definition. By reason of which, The Feeding Of The Five Thousand functions so very much like the virtually absent Eucharist in the gospel of John.

If we look at the organization of the aconscious forms of unity, we see that the distal past corresponds to the conceptual form of unity space : time; the medial past to the conceptual form of unity male : female; and the proximal past to the conceptual form of unity soma (mind : body). Here the passage is directly oppositional to that of the forms of memory, since the soma circumscribes the proximal past. Thus we might accept this taxon as determining the direction of time which the syntax of this class of radicals necessarily posits. But these are not normative entities as to the immanent. They are actually conceptual entities, belonging to the perceptual polarity. We have referred to the non-normative status of the aconscious radicals repeatedly, and stressed their ambiguity. These three categories, even though they are conceptual in terms of the first level distinction between the two groups of twelve components which we are addressing, possess characteristics which render them comparable to the forms of memory. The soma is not a form of memory to be sure; nevertheless it functions in many ways sympathetically or compatibly with the operations of haptic memory in consciousness. For this very reason we refer to all three forms of unity as entities of 'virtual immanence'. Both factors, the innate temporal disposition of every category along with the inevitable impetus towards the Eucharistic, immediate present of each class as a syntactically ordered whole, and the normative status of just two taxa, namely, the pure conceptual forms and the forms of memory, therefore account for the postulate concerning the temporal passage inherent in each of the four taxa.

The entirety of the twelve categoreal forms is split between two orders: conscious and aconscious, the normative and non-normative, the axiologically orthodox and axiologically heterodox. The former order is logically analogous to the half of the year which begins immediately with, that is, after, the winter solstitial night, culminating in the summer solstitial day. That half of the annual cycle analogous to the aconscious begins immediately with summer solstitial night, and is consummated with the midwinter solstitial day. Emergent religious consciousness connected this half of the year with death, and so too does biblical theology, though we might just as well say, 'natural theology'. We have already seen that the miracle stories, whether healing or messianic, which posit the aconscious order of mind, consistently and explicitly mention death: The Transfiguration, The Stilling Of The Storm, The Walking On The Water all do so; and so too does the story of The Deaf Mute Boy, the equivalent to the  last of these from the healing miracle cycle,
since both narratives deal with acoustic imagination. And certainly the story of Jairus' Daughter, the rubric within the corpus of healing miracles which depicts the conceptual form of unity, soma, does the same. What we now to reason as well as part of the theology of death, is the fact that the aconscious is not relegated to permanent inferiority because of the normative status of the conscious.

Every conscious, normative radical is paralleled by an aconscious, non-normative radical. This dyadic structure of the categoreal forms and their corresponding canonical intentional modes determines the basic and specific theological character of each of the four gospels. We must take each of the members of each dyad in tandem. For as we shall see, for Luke, there can be no desire without the belief-in-desire; and one of these is more important than the other. It is necessary to affirm here at the beginning of the discussion of the relation between members of the intentional dyads, that not every conscious radical subjugates its aconscious parallel. It is not the case that the entire workings of consciousness are predominantly those of the conscious, as might be suggested by its description as 'normative'. It is not the case that the aconscious is permanently subordinate or inferior to the conscious, in terms of their relative roles. In each of the two Christological intentional modal dyads, signifying the solstitial points of the annual cycle, one member of the binary structure predominates. In the case of belief simpliciter and the desire-to-know, this is the conscious intentional mode, belief. But in the case of belief-in-desire and desire simpliciter, it is the aconscious category, belief-in-desire. Thus to urge the predominance of aconscious belief-in-desire over conscious desire, to insist on the primary value or forcefulness of belief-in-desire over actual desire itself, is also to emphasise the significance of the theology of death in the context of desire. This is implicit in Luke's account of the institution of the Eucharist, just as it is in the story of Jairus' Daughter.

The fact that desire and belief-in-desire differ in the extents of their influence is not reflective of the disparity between nocturnal and diurnal intervals at precisely that point of the year, the winter solstice, to which they are analogous. The same applies to the dyadic structure of intentional consciousness which conforms to the simultaneous yet antithetical point in time, the summer solstice, namely belief an the desire-to-know. The oppositionality of these two Christological dyads, is guaranteed by their simultaneity. The Transcendental dyads consist of will and the knowledge-of-will, on the one hand, and knowing and the will-to-believe, on the other. These conform analogously to the equinoxes; and likewise, they occur simultaneously. As such, they too should be seen as equilibrating forces in consciousness. Again, one member of each of these intentional modal dyads is predominant. Yet again, it is not the extent of the analogous duration which determines the extent of influence of any particular category as belonging to its dyad. The solstitial moments of the annual cycle are the longest day and shortest night at the summer solstice, and the longest night and shortest day at the winter solstice. The two intervals in any case, diurnal and nocturnal, and disparate in the extreme, belong not just to different taxa, but to different orders which grade them hierarchically. The equinoctial moments of the annual cycle are marked by total parity between the intervals, diurnal and nocturnal. Yet one predominates. This serves to distinguish the Christological forms of intentionality. Even so, the Transcendental dyadic forms of intentionality are likewise structured: one mode of intentionality is pre-eminent or primary. Hence we cannot logically adduce the duration of the analogous interval as determining the status of each member of a dyad. Rather it is determined by the necessary vectoral impetus towards the presentational realm. In each case, the final member of the class or taxon is the single one which achieves the significance of its innate tendency, whether this be towards light or darkness; whether that is, it is the final member of a class belonging to either half of the annual cycle. Both the categoreal entities and the modes of intentionality of which they are sovereign circumscribing distal or medial temporal domains, subserve this impetus. It is the final member of the taxa which actualises its inherent inclination. There is in every case, always a constant impulse towards cognitive or epistemic accomplishment, since the proximal pasts and proximal futures are the provinces of the conative, and the medial pasts and medial futures stand midway between the conative and cognitive, in terms of the intentional modes of which they are sovereign.

Concerning the soma, and death, we see that the P creation rubrics which nominate the aconscious categories, do not overtly appear to deal with the theology of death. That having been said however, the presence of the sub-human creatures, and the depiction of their continuous relation with humanity, as well as the theme of consumption, in fact do necessarily incorporate a theology of death. The intimations of mortality in the rubrics of Days 4, 5, 6 and 7, of which the motifs of animals, and of eating are the most significant, are elaborated in the second creation story. That story of the first human couple, we have linked with the Sabbath, since the Day 7 rubric and the Eucharist are certainly party to the analogical relation between the narratives of 'beginning and end', and since the Eucharist pertains immediately to the second creation story as a whole. They share the common theme of consumption, if not appetition and satisfaction, already adumbrated in the second, 'earthly' half of the P creation narrative to which the Sabbath belongs. The corresponding healing miracle stories which posit the forms of unity are: Jairus' Daughter (soma), The Haemorrhagic Woman (space : time), and The Syrophoenician Woman (male : female). Of these, clearly the story of Jairus' Daughter, whose subject is the soma, explicitly announces the theology of death. But these factors demand
their hermeneutical integration with the theology of death: that all three figures are women; that their expository functions mirror the 'earth' section of the P narrative; their internal contiguous organization; the location of the pericope announcing the symbolic masculine, The Gerasene Demoniac at the beginning of the chain, yet in distinction from the three episodes involving the females.

Thus the stories of the first two females are virtually inseparable. That of The Syrophoenician Woman for its part, looks back to the narrative of The Gerasene Demoniac, which Mark has adroitly placed at the beginning of the whole catena, forging,  the indissoluble link between symbolic masculine and symbolic feminine. In addition to this obvious intertextual rapport, the presence of eating animals in both of these episodes, which begin and end the miracle catena, a chiasmos, connecting it with the chiastic organization of the messianic miracle series, once more deliberatively reverts to the creation taxonomy. It is there, in the second half of the P creation narrative, and as noted, in the ensuing J creation narrative, that we uncover the link between animal and human consciousness, and its necessary association with death.

In defense of this point, we again advert to the processive nature in which the taxa organize themselves. In every case, there is a gradation either from a distal past, through a medial past, to a proximal past; or one from a distal future, through a medial future, to a proximal future. In each of the dyads, whether Christological or Transcendental, the superordinate or primary radical is responsible for a cognitive mode of intentionality rather than a conative mode, in its hierarchically graded canonical (sovereign) occasion. Let us deal with the Christological dyads, since the gospel of Luke concerns one of this pair. We see that belief and not the desire-to-know, and belief-in-desire and not desire itself, are operative disproportionately to the influence  of the subordinate modes of intentionality constituting their dyads. Each of the two superordinate modes, one conscious, belief, and the other aconscious, belief-in-desire, stand as final points in their taxonomically graded cognitive (epistemic) hierarchies. Thus soma, or mind : body, remains quite literally the last of the three members of its class, the three forms of unity. Its native form of intentionality, belief-in-desire, realizes the inherent (cognitive) possibility of the category. In the same way, the impetus within the class of pure conceptual forms proceeds from a distal future, the business of the pure conceptual form, space, to a proximal future; and the latter is the canonical occasion of the intentional mode, belief, rather than will. Belief is an epistemic (cognitive) form of intentionality, bordering the present 'Eucharistic' domain.
Only here the expressions 'Sabbatical' is more apt. I shall expand this point in what follows later, the discussion between the Christological miracle narratives and the sacramental theology which is germane to the Sabbath : Eucharist complex. It is relevant to the conclusive distinction between past and future as correlative to the distinction posed by the creation series and the messianic series. In other words, it relates to the epistemological and psychological polarisation of the categoreal entities into conceptual and perceptual forms. In just this way, sacramental theology contributes to biblical metaphysics.

We have indicated that the four cardinal points of the annual temporal compass afford just four canonical templates, each different from the others. Their structural singularity hinges upon the variant relations of diurnal to nocturnal intervals within the single span of twenty-four hours, a day, a complete revolution of the earth upon its axis, around the sun. That said however, we must repeat that it is not the greater duration of an interval which determines the primary mode of a dyadic intentional system answering to each of these four cardinal point-instants. If that were the case, we should have to aver that desire is the primary intentional form, and belief-in-desire, the secondary member of the dyad. The perceptual polarity, whether we mean perceptual memory or perceptual imagination, is always designated by a nocturnal and not a diurnal interval, and a
t the winter solstice, the nocturnal interval reaches its peak. By comparison, the midwinter day plays a minor part. But though it is  conscious, and what is the same thing, normative, desire simpliciter is not the primary or superordinate member of these dyadic intentional modes, either in Luke's world-view or in human consciousness itself. Aconscious belief-in-desire and not desire itself operates with greater formal efficacy than actual desire itself. This is thus one of two occasions which are of paramount importance in the delivery of the doctrine of the aconscious.

In discussing the category soma, we must not lose sight of the fact that as a member of the class, forms of unity, it belongs no less than the pure conceptual forms, to the conceptual polarity of mind. The first level distinction between conceptual and perceptual polarities, is put very simply by the difference of the Days series from the messianic series respectively. This is perfectly clear. That everything is encapsulated as a rubric within the frame of a Day, is intelligible in its Christological meaning. All the radicals, of both sorts, pure conceptual forms, namely mind, space, and the symbolic masculine and equally, the (conceptual) forms of unity, namely mind : body, space : time and male : female, comprise the conceptual polarity. The nocturnal intervals as a whole, designate the normative, conscious perceptual radicals, the forms of memory; and the non-normative, aconscious perceptual radicals, the forms of imagination. The former taxon, contains just one member which realizes the inherent cognitive potential of its class or taxon as an entirety, and this is signified by the nocturnal interval at the spring equinox. Haptic memory, and with it, the intentional mode desire, belongs to this taxon. Desire is thus instrumental to knowing.

The class or taxon to which soma belongs, is that of forms of unity, designated by diurnal intervals. These are marked paradigmatically by the quarter of the year beginning immediately following the autumn equinoctial interval. Since the elements here are conceptual forms, we have to consider the diurnal component. Thus it is not a question of the increased nocturnal interval, but of the diminished diurnal interval. Effectively, rather than say that the  nocturnal duration is increasing, we should say that the diurnal interval is decreasing. This is what marks the transition 'from dark to dark', to revert to the Buddhist terminology of Nagarjuna's Friendly Letter. (Only here, a Christian point of view will ensure that belief is radically bound to desire, and that desire tout court, as an ontologically independent mode of intentionality, does not exist. That is the case in Luke, the most Buddhist of gospels. We shall have more to say concerning Luke as the 'Buddhistic' evangelist later. The role of desire in his gospel ensures its relevance to the interweaving of Buddhist and Christian eschatologies as well as their soteriologies. But already it should be clear that just as the Christian doctrine of intentionality links desire indissolubly with belief-in-desire, which marks it as a genuine advance on secular epistemology-psychology both in terms of nuance and content, its understanding of desire enjoys very real advantages over the indistinct presentation of the same in Buddhisms. For these all in all, are liable to demonise desire from the outset, the direct result of making salvation completely dependent on one's own efforts and achievement in ascetic practice, and necessarily entailing the renunciation of sexual desire. We have seen already that the gospel of Luke tells very plainly for another understanding of desire. In terms of the history of Christian doctrine, this did not come to the fore until the German Reformation of the 16th Century, and then its realization was defined more implicitly than explicitly. For just which reason, the same trend within the history of the church remains unfinished.)

So, the salient fact is not the maximal extent of the nocturnal winter solstitial duration, but the minimal extent of the diurnal interval at that twenty-four hour unit in the annual cycle. In other words, it is not that the night is increasing, but that the day is tending towards its minimum. The day at the winter solstice, when the diurnal interval is at its minimum, designates the conceptual form of unity, soma.
The form of intentionality which the concept of the mind : body, or soma, imparts to consciousness, aconscious belief-in-desire, remains superordinate over actual desire itself. Both forms are the governing intentions of the specifically Lukan soteriological and eschatological perspectives; but it is essential to grasp the difference in their status. Not to recognise this is to fail to understand Luke. Belief-in-desire may be characterized as the most concealed, covert, clandestine, arcane, enigmatic, veiled, obscure, and rudimentary of the foremost components of mind. Metaphorically speaking, soma, the concept of the body (always the mind : body), is the 'darkest' of any such predominant element of consciousness.

If we seem to have laboured this tenet regarding the temporal analogues of the non-normative, that is, aconscious categories, whose proper forms of intentionality are superordinate over the conscious modes of intentionality, the reason is the
future application to each of the canonical dyads of the very same principle. There will be no further need to rehearse the argumentation, which has been emphatically supplied here. The same postulate will necessarily apply to the other three gospels.  In two of the total of four cases, the aconscious member of the dyadically constituted modes of intentionality is primary, and the conscious member secondary. This is the case in the gospels of Luke and Matthew. And in the other two cases, the primary member of the coupled modes of intentionality is the conscious form, the secondary member being the aconscious form. This is true of the gospels Mark and John. The net result of which is that equilibrium is maintained between the intentional modes constituting the four dyads. Conscious belief simpliciter is therefore balanced by aconscious belief-in-desire; aconscious desire-to-know by conscious desire simpliciter; conscious knowing by aconscious knowledge-of-will; and conscious will simpliciter by aconscious will-to-believe.

Of equal significance, this point duly concerns t
he theologies of death contained in all four gospels, for all of them maintain a direct link between the aconscious and death. These theologies of death are directed towards the eschatological visions fully outlined in The Apocalypse. We touched on the same matter in the prior discussion of the fourfold structure of the gospel itself, when addressing the passion predictions, the 'sign of Jonah' sayings, et al. The phrase 'three days and three nights'  of these logia which specify the entombment of Jesus, clearly vindicates the basis for distinctions concerning the two orders, conscious and aconscious, and the postulate of their equivalence. The references to three days of entombment denote the three forms of unity which are analogically marked by the annual quarter culminating in the winter solstitial day, and the references to three nights of entombment denote the three forms of imagination, analogous to the annual quarter culminating in the autumnal equinoctial night. Together, these  comprise the darkest half of the annual cycle. The formula, like the paradigm, outlines the nexus between the aconscious and the phenomenon of death. In the interests of just such a theological vision, it is vital to grasp their pertinence to the aconscious order of mind, and to clarify their significance for the doctrine of the logos. The exposition of both a theology of death and a credible eschatology remain tasks incumbent on  Christian theology, more so than ever, now in the third millennium.

We can thus be sure that the form of intentionality which the concept of the mind : body, or soma, imparts to consciousness, namely aconscious belief-in-desire, is superordinate to actual desire itself. Both the psychology of desire itself and the epistemology of belief-in-desire determine Luke's particular soteriology and eschatology; but it is essential to grasp their disparate status. More remains to be said concerning the instrumentality of each specific conative form of intentionality to the final cognitive form of the taxon or class to which the two belong. We glimpsed this fact of instrumentality as early as the J creation narrative, which inextricably links desire and knowing. But all four taxa are internally disposed in the same manner. Each of the four classes of components possesses the same innate temporal momentum which realizes its epistemic potential, directing it towards the present. The fourfold taxonomic sorting of the categories in turn gives rise to consideration of the nature of temporal flux. Such temporal flux is not from past to present and thence to future, as is so often put in metaphysics. It is always directed towards the hic et nunc, the 'Sabbatical : Eucharistic present', from both non-presents: the medial and distal past; and the medial and distal future. It is this drive from the distal, through medial pasts, into the proximal pasts, and from the distal, through medial futures into the proximal futures both, confluent in the present domain, to which the structures of consciousness conform. The thrust of 'thens' into the now, their confluence in the presentational domain, which we have uncovered in the discussion of the relative status of coupled conscious and aconscious modes of intentionality, best puts the essential rapport between time and mind. We need to explore the issue further, particularly in relation to Luke's account of the Eucharist.

But having
arrived at the outset of the travel narrative, (Luke 9.51-56), it is time to resume the systematic examination of his gospel in light of the thesis that both particular two modes of intentionality, desire and the belief-in-desire, pervade his gospel to an extent that is nothing less than foundational to its meaning. Since we shall discuss this a propos of the thematic depiction of constraint or necessity as the defining characteristic of desire itself, we should first note three of the most obvious presentations of this property in the gospel, before examining the story of the journey to Jerusalem.

This page was updated 28th January 2017.

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